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MATHEMATICAL SEMANTICS OF INTUITIONISTIC LOGIC
SERGEY A. MELIKHOV
Abstract. This work is a mathematician’s attempt to understand intuitionistic logic.
It can be read in two ways: as a research paper interspersed with lengthy digressions
into rethinking of standard material; or as an elementary (but highly unconventional)
introduction to first-order intuitionistic logic. For the latter purpose, no training in
formal logic is required, but a modest literacy in mathematics, such as topological
spaces and posets, is assumed.
The main theme of this work is the search for a formal semantics adequate to Kol-
mogorov’s informal interpretation of intuitionistic logic (whose simplest part is more or
less the same as the so-called BHK interpretation). This search goes beyond the usual
model theory, based on Tarski’s notion of semantic consequence, and beyond the usual
formalism of first-order logic, based on schemata. Thus we study formal semantics of
a simplified version of Paulson’s meta-logic, used in the Isabelle prover.
By interpreting the meta-logical connectives and quantifiers constructively, we get a
generalized model theory, which covers, in particular, realizability-type interpretations
of intuitionistic logic. On the other hand, by analyzing Kolmogorov’s notion of semantic
consequence (which is an alternative to Tarski’s standard notion), we get an alternative
model theory. By using an extension of the meta-logic, we further get a generalized
alternative model theory, which suffices to formalize Kolmogorov’s semantics.
On the other hand, we also formulate a modification of Kolmogorov’s interpreta-
tion, which is compatible with the usual, Tarski-style model theory. Namely, it can
be formalized by means of sheaf-valued models, which turn out to be a special case
of Palmgren’s categorical models; intuitionistic logic is complete with respect to this
semantics.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Formal semantics
Much of this long treatise is devoted to understanding in rigorous mathematical terms
A. Kolmogorov’s 1932 short note “On the interpretation of intuitionistic logic” [108].
What the logical community has grasped of this text is contained in the so-called BHK
interpretation, often considered to be “the intended interpretation” of intuitionistic logic
and very extensively analyzed in the literature (see §§3.7–3.8 below). However, as ob-
served in the classic textbook by Troelstra and van Dalen [202], “the BHK-interpretation
in itself has no ‘explanatory power’ ” since “on a very ‘classical’ interpretation of [the
informal notions of] construction and mapping,” its six clauses “justify the principles of
two-valued (classical) logic.” But as discussed in §§3.9–3.13 below, this arguably does
not apply to Kolmogorov’s original interpretation.
The problem with Kolmogorov’s original interpretation is that it is incompatible with
the usual model theory, based on Tarski’s notion of semantic consequence; worse yet, it
is an interpretation of something that does not exist in the usual formalism of first-order
logic, based on schemata.
Instead of this usual formalism we use a simplified (and, eventually, slightly extended)
version of L. Paulson’s 1989 meta-logic [157], which is the basis of the Isabelle prover
(see §§4.1–4.6). (In fact, it builds not on the standard modern formalism but rather
on the early tradition of first-order logic, as in the textbooks by Hilbert–Bernays [90]
and Hilbert–Ackermann [89].) The meta-logical connectives and quantifiers can be used
to express, for instance, the horizontal bar and comma in inference rules (in fact, the
entire deductive system of a first-order logic is a single meta-formula); derivability of a
formula or a rule; implication between principles (in the usual sense, which has nothing
to do with ordinary implication between formulas or schemata); variables fixed in a
derivation (in the sense of Kleene), etc. In this approach, principles and rules, and even
implications between them become finite entities within the formal language (without
any meta-variables — even in situations where the standard formalism would have side
conditions such as “where x is not free in F ” or “where t is free for x in F (x)”) and so
one can speak of their interpretation by mathematical objects.
Formal semantics of the meta-logic of first-order logics seems to have never been
developed, however; thus we have to undertake this task (see §§4.7–4.8 and §7). In
usual model theory, regarded as a particular semantics of the meta-logic, the meta-logical
connectives and quantifiers are interpreted classically (and moreover in the two-valued
way) — even though they are constructive. By interpreting them constructively, we get
a generalized model theory (see §7.1). It suffices to formalize, in particular, realizability-
type interpretations of intuitionistic logic, which do not fit in the usual model theory
(see §7.1.4). However, to formalize Kolmogorov’s interpretation of inference rules (which
is a substantial part of his interpretation of intuitionistic logic, and seems to be uniquely
possible in his approach), we need an alternative generalized model theory (see §7.3).
It is nothing new for formulas and principles, but an entirely different interpretation of
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rules (and more complex meta-logical constructs) already in the case where the meta-
logical connectives and quantifiers have a classical, two-valued interpretation (see §7.2
concerning this case).
We also formulate an alternative interpretation of intuitionistic logic, called “modified
BHK-interpretation”, which is compatible with the usual, Tarski-style model theory. A
specific class of usual models of intuitionistic logic that fully meets the expectations of
the modified BHK-interpretation is described. These are sheaf-valued, or “proof-relevant
topological” models (§6) of intuitionistic logic — not to be confused with the usual open
set-valued “sheaf models” (see [13] and references there). As one could expect, sheaf-
valued models turned out to be a special case of something well-known: the “categorical
semantics” (cf. [121]), and more specifically Palmgren’s models of intuitionistic logic in
locally cartesian closed categories with finite sums [156]. But unexpectedly, this very
simple and natural special case with obvious relevance for the informal semantics of intu-
itionistic logic does not seem to have been considered per se (apart from what amounts
to the ∧,→ fragment [11]). We prove completeness of intuitionistic logic with respect
to sheaf-valued models by showing that in a certain rather special case (sheaves over
zero-dimensional separable metrizable spaces) they interpret the usual topological mod-
els over the same space. Normally (e.g. for sheaves over Euclidean spaces or Alexandroff
spaces) this is far from being so. On the other hand, our sheaf-valued models also
interpret Medvedev–Skvortsov models (§3.13).
1.2. Informal semantics
We adopt and develop Kolmogorov’s understanding of intuitionistic logic as the logic of
schemes of solutions of mathematical problems (understood as tasks). In this approach,
intuitionistic logic is viewed as an extension package that upgrades classical logic without
removing it — in contrast to the standard conception of Brouwer and Heyting, which
regards intuitionistic logic as an alternative to classical logic that criminalizes some of
its principles. The main purpose of the upgrade comes, for us, from Hilbert’s idea of
equivalence between proofs of a given theorem, and from the intuition of this equivalence
relation as capable of being nontrivial. This idea of “proof relevance” amounts to a
categorification; thus, in particular, our sheaf-valued semantics of intuitionistic logic
can be viewed as a categorification of the familiar Leibniz–Euler–Venn subset-valued
semantics of classical logic.
Traditional ways to understand intuitionistic logic (semantically) have been rooted
either in philosophy — with emphasis on the development of knowledge (Brouwer, Heyt-
ing, Kripke) or in computer science — with emphasis on effective operations (Kleene,
Markov, Curry–Howard). Kolmogorov’s approach emphasizes the right order of quan-
tifiers, and is rooted in the mathematical tradition, dating back to the Antiquity, of
solving of problems (such as geometric construction problems) and in the mathematical
idea of a method (of solution or proof). The approach of Kolmogorov has enjoyed some
limited appreciation in Europe in the 1930s, and had a deeper and more lasting impact
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on the Moscow school of logic1 — but nowadays is widely seen as a mere historical cu-
riosity. One important reason for that2 could have been the lack of a sufficiently clear
formulation and of any comprehensive exposition of intuitionistic logic based on this
approach. The present treatise attempts to remedy this deficiency.
Our introduction to some basic themes of intuitionistic logic (§5) is in the language of
its usual topological models, which were discovered independently by Stone, Tang and
Tarski in the 1930s but largely went out of fashion since the 60s. (However, in the zero-
order case these models include, in disguise, Kripke models, which have had far better
luck with fashion.) We present a motivation of topological models through a model of a
classical first-order theory extracted from the clauses of the BHK interpretation (§5.1).
Disclaimers
(i) This unconventional introduction to intuitionistic logic should suffice for the purposes
of the author’s papers [1], [2], [3], but as such it does not pretend to be complete or even
finished. It is hoped that a future version will cover certain additional topics and will
be accompanied by an unconventional introduction to homotopy type theory.
(ii) Most translations quoted in this paper have been edited by the present author in
order to improve syntactic and semantic fidelity. When emphasis is present in quoted
text, it is always original.
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2. Motivation: homotopies between proofs
2.1. Hilbert’s 24th Problem
In 1900, Hilbert published (and partly presented in his lecture at the International
Congress of Mathematicians in Paris) a list of 23 open problems in mathematics [85].
Shortly before the 100th anniversary of the list, the historian Ru¨diger Thiele discovered a
would-be 24th problem in Hilbert’s notebooks [195] (for a photocopy see [106] and [196]).
We don’t know why Hilbert refrained from publicizing it, but one obvious possibility is
that he simply did not see how to state it precisely enough.
“The 24th problem in my Paris lecture was to be: Criteria of simplicity, or proof of
the greatest simplicity of certain proofs. Develop a theory of the method of proof in
mathematics in general. Under a given set of conditions there can be but one simplest
proof. Quite generally, if there are two proofs for a theorem, you must keep going until
you have derived each from the other, or until it becomes quite evident what variant
conditions (and aids) have been used in the two proofs. Given two routes, it is not
right to take either of these two or to look for a third; it is necessary to investigate the
area lying between the two routes. Attempts at judging the simplicity of a proof are in
my examination of syzygies and syzygies between syzygies (see [[84]], Lectures XXXII–
XXXIX). The use or the knowledge of a syzygy simplifies in an essential way a proof
that a certain identity is true. Because any process of addition [is] an application of the
commutative law of addition etc. [and because] this always corresponds to geometric
theorems or logical conclusions, one can count these [processes], and, for instance, in
proving certain theorems of elementary geometry (the Pythagoras theorem, [theorems]
on remarkable points of triangles), one can very well decide which of the proofs is the
simplest.”3
A rather narrow understanding of the problem, as merely asking for “a criterion of
simplicity in mathematical proofs and the development of a proof theory with the power
to prove that a given proof is the simplest possible”4 has became widespread in the
literature (see e.g. [20; p. 38], [77], [195]). However, Hilbert’s original text above is
unambiguously posing a totally different problem as well (in the two sentences starting
with “Quite generally”): to develop a proof theory that can tell whether two given proofs
of a theorem are “essentially same”, or homotopic, in the sense that one can derive each
from the other (whatever that means). It is this aspect of the 24th problem that we
shall be concerned with.
3Translation by Thiele, who also comments that “a part of the last sentence is not only barely legible
in Hilbert’s notebook but also grammatically incorrect”, and points out that “corrections and insertions
that Hilbert made in this entry show that he wrote down the problem in haste”.
4Quoted from Wikipedia’s “Hilbert’s 24th problem” (English) as of 11/11/11
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Moreover, Hilbert’s reference to syzygies between syzygies is obviously5 6 provoking
one to think of a hypothetical space of proofs of a given theorem and of whether it
should be acyclic or contractible (so that proofs can be simplified in a canonical way)
under a given set of conditions.
Certainly, Hilbert was not alone in being concerned with (informal) questions of this
kind. For instance, a sample of attempts by mathematicians other than proof theorists at
judging “essential sameness” of certain proofs (of the irrationality of
√
2 and of Gauss’
quadratic reciprocity law) can be found in T. Gowers’ blog [72]. A more systematic
study of the question of identity of proofs has taken place in intuitionistic proof theory,
starting in the 70s (Prawitz [165], Kreisel [112], Martin-Lo¨f [125]; see a brief survey in
[42; §2]) and continued in the context of higher categories and higher λ-calculus [121],
[178], [78], [91]. The more recent approach of homotopy type theory [92] is to a large
extent a development of this proof-theoretic tradition. We should also point out some
very different approaches to somewhat similar questions, which cannot be discussed here
in detail: [120] (and references there), [174], [35], [20], [145; §8.2], [23].
So how to judge if two proofs of a theorem are “essentially same”? Hilbert’s idea that
there might be the simplest proof of a theorem Θ and his mention of the use of variant
conditions (and aids) in proving Θ establish a context where it seems natural to identify
a proof p of Θ with every its simplification, that is, a proof of Θ obtained from p by
crossing out some redundant steps. Of course, the notion of a “redundant step” (or a
step that is not “essentially used” in the proof) needs an accurate definition; we will
return to this issue later.
On the other hand, Hilbert’s words (“keep going until you have derived each from the
other”) may seem to hint at a formal theory of proofs containing a number of specified
elementary transformations between proofs of the same assertion. In this case the rela-
tion of homotopy between proofs of the same assertion can be defined as the equivalence
relation generated by elementary transformations.
Such formal theories endowed with elementary transformations between proofs are
best known in the case of constructive proofs (in particular, the natural deduction sys-
tem of Gentzen–Prawitz and the corresponding λ-calculus, see [64]). Before turning to
constructive proofs, let us review the situation with usual, non-constructive ones.
5Let us also note the connection between (higher) syzygies and (higher) Martin-Lo¨f identity types. In
Voevodsky’s model of Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory, types are interpreted as Kan complexes (see [92]), so
one kind of a type is an abelian simplicial group, which by the Dold–Kan correspondence (see [67]) can
be identified with a pointed chain complex C of abelian groups: b ∈ C−1 ∂0←− C0 ∂1←− C1 ∂2←− C2 ∂3←− . . . .
Write t : C to mean t ∈ ∂−1
0
(b), and t = u : C to mean that t : C and u : C are homologous relative
to ∂0(t) = ∂0(u), that is, t− u ∈ ∂1(C1). Then the identity type IdC(t, u) will be the following pointed
chain complex: t− u ∈ C0 ∂1←− C1 ∂2←− C2 ∂3←− . . . .
6Perhaps we should also note the connection between (higher) identity types and (higher) “homotopical
syzygies” (see [123]), which goes back to J. H. C. Whitehead’s classical work on identities among
relations (see [4]). The role of the Dold–Kan correspondence is played here by the not so well understood
connection (see [146]) between extended group presentations of [30], where higher relators correspond
to higher cells of a CW complex, and free simplicial groups, such as the Kan loop group (see [67]) of a
simplicial set.
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2.2. The collapse of non-constructive proofs
A standard theory of derivations based on classical logic is Gentzen’s sequent calculus
[65] (see [64]). In particular, the elementary inferences
(Cut) from A ∨ C and C → B infer A ∨B;
(CR) from A ∨ A infer A;
(WR1) from A infer A ∨ B;
(WR2) from A infer B ∨ A;
(WL) from B infer C → B
can be interpreted as instances of the inference rules of sequent calculus.7 A number
of elementary transformations between derivations of the same proposition in sequent
calculus can be found in the proof of Gentzen’s Hauptsatz on cut elimination (see [64],
[65]). These Γ-transformations include, in particular, the following (ΓL) and (ΓR).
(ΓL) Suppose that q is a proof of C → B. Then the following fragment of a proof:
• A implies A ∨ C by (WR1);
• C → B by q;
• hence A ∨B by (Cut)
transforms into
• A implies A ∨B by (WR1).
We note that (ΓL) can be seen as a simplifying transformation: it eliminates the proof
q of the redundant lemma C → B at the cost of replacing one weakening (A implies
A ∨ C) by another (A implies A ∨ B).
(ΓR) Suppose that p is a proof of A ∨ C. Then the following fragment of a proof:
• B implies C → B by (WL);
• A ∨ C holds by p;
• hence A ∨B by (Cut)
transforms into
• B implies A ∨B by (WR2).
The symmetry between (ΓL) and (ΓR) is highlighted in Gentzen’s original notation
[65; III.3.113.1-2]. We can see it explicitly by rewriting C → B and A ∨ C respectively
as B ∨ ¬C and ¬C → A, using tautologies of classical logic.
Let us also consider two additional Λ-transformations:
(Λ1), (Λ2): The following fragment of a proof can be eliminated:
• A implies A ∨A by (WR1) or by (WR2);
• A ∨A implies A by (CR).
7Namely, (Cut) can be interpreted as an instance of the cut rule, (CR) as an instance of the right
contraction rule, (WR1) and (WL) as instances of the right and left weakening rules, and (WR2) as
(WR1) followed by an instance of the exchange rule.
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Theorem 2.1 (Lafont [64; Appendix B.1]; see also [42; §7]). All proofs of any given
theorem are equivalent modulo Γ- and Λ-transformations.
Lafont’s own summary of his result is that “classical logic is inconsistent, not from the
logical viewpoint ([falsity] is not provable) but from an algorithmic one.”
Proof. Let p and q be proofs of a theorem Θ. They can be augmented to yield a proof
p+WR1 of Θ∨Φ, where Φ is some fixed assertion, and a proof q+WL of the implication
Φ→ Θ. Combining the latter two proofs, we obtain a proof (p+WR1)+ (q+WL)+Cut
of the assertion Θ ∨Θ. Hence we get a third proof, (p+WR1) + (q +WL) + Cut+ CR,
of Θ, which we will denote p⊕ q for brevity.8
It remains to show that p ⊕ q can be reduced to p, as well as to q by Γ- and Λ-
transformations. Indeed, ΓL reduces p ⊕ q to the proof p + WR1 + CR of Θ (which
augments p by saying that Θ implies Θ ∨Θ, which in turn implies Θ). The latter proof
is reduced to p by Λ1. Similarly, ΓR reduces p⊕ q to the proof q+WR2+CR of Θ, which
in turn is reduced to q by Λ2. 
It should be noted that, despite Lafont’s theorem, some authors have been able to
find inequivalent proofs in the framework of classical logic. See, in particular, Dosˇen
[42] (see details in [43]; see also [44] and references there), Kuznets [117] and references
there; and Guglielmi [73], [74] (see also [75] and references there)
Remark 2.2. One issue with Γ-transformations is that (ΓL) does not merely eliminate q,
but only does so at the expense of changing a weakening. So it is not immediately clear
that the lemma C → B is redundant in the initial proof of (ΓL), in the strict sense of
not being used at all in that proof.
To address this concern, let us revisit Lafont’s construction.9 Recall that we were free
to choose any assertion as Φ. We can set Φ, for instance, to be the negation ¬Θ (any
weaker assertion, such as Θ ∨ ¬Θ, would also do). Then Θ ∨ Φ holds in classical logic
regardless of validity of Θ. Therefore the step WR1 of the proof p⊕q replaces the proved
theorem Θ with the tautology Θ ∨ Φ. The effect of this step is that we forget all that
we have learned from the proof p. Thus p ⊕ q does not essentially use p, so p must be
redundant even in the stricter sense.
On the other hand, we could take Φ to be Θ itself (any stronger assertion, for instance
Θ ∧ ¬Θ, would also do). Then the step WL replaces the proved theorem Θ by the
tautology Φ→ Θ. The effect of this step is that we forget all that we have learned from
q, and we similarly conclude that q must be redundant. However, it appears that the
meaning of the proof p⊕ q should not vary depending on the strength of Φ, since for the
purposes of this proof we did not need to know anything at all about Φ.
Our conclusion, that neither p nor q is “essentially used” in p⊕q, shows that the notion
of a proof “essentially using” its part cannot be sensibly formalized in the framework of
8A version of this ⊕ is also found in Artemov’s Logic of Proofs (see [101]).
9What follows is only an informal discussion, perhaps raising more issues than it attempts to settle.
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classical logic. It turns out, however, that this notion can be consistently defined once
we abandon classical logic in favor of intuitionistic.
2.3. About constructive proofs
In contrast to classical logic, where one can sometimes prove that a certain object exists
without giving its explicit construction, proofs in intuitionistic logic can be interpreted,
at least very roughly, as algorithms (the Curry–Howard correspondence, see [64], [188]).
For example, if S is a set, an intuitionistic proof of the assertion “S is nonempty” can
be roughly thought of as a program (executed on a Turing machine, say) that returns a
specific element of S. (These issues will be discussed in more detail in §3.12 and §7.1.4.)
In writing a computer program, it is not enough to know that some subsidiary com-
putation is possible in principle; for the program to run, every step must be actually
implemented. In fact, the value of every particular variable can be chased through all
dependent subroutines using a debugger. This is in sharp contrast with classical math-
ematics, where the particular way that a lemma is proved has absolutely no effect on
the proof of the theorem modulo that lemma. In intuitionistic logic, there can be no
dependence between statements other than a dependence between their specific proofs.
With the above in mind, although Θ ∨ Φ is intuitionistically a tautology as long Φ
is (for instance, Φ can be taken to be Θ → Θ), the intuitionistic step WR1, replacing
the proved theorem Θ with the tautology Θ ∨ Φ does not have the effect of forgetting
how Θ was proved. On the contrary, it has the effect of specifying that Θ ∨ Φ is to be
proved “via Θ” and not “via Φ”, and extending a given proof of Θ to a specific proof of
Θ ∨Φ. Since the latter proof does not depend on any proof of Φ, the intuitionistic step
Cut promotes it to a proof of Θ ∨Θ that does not depend on any proof assuming Φ as
a premise.
It follows that if p and q are constructive, then p ⊕ q, understood constructively,
essentially uses p and does not essentially use q. In agreement with this, the intuitionistic
version of the sequent calculus (see [64]) admits only asymmetric interpretations of p⊕q,
which can be reduced by the intuitionistic analogues of Γ- and Λ-transformations to p,
but not to q.
3. What is intuitionistic logic?
3.1. Semantics of classical logic
In classical logic, the meaning of propositions is determined by answering the question:
When is a given proposition true? A standard answer to this question is given by Tarski’s
definition of truth. The definition is by induction on the number of logical connectives
and quantifiers:
• which primitive propositions are true is assumed to be known from context.
For instance, in the context of arithmetic, a proposition of the form t = s (with t and s
being arithmetical expressions) is true whenever t and s rewrite to the same numeral.
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• P ∨Q is true if P is true or Q is true;
• ¬P is true if P is not true;
• ∃xR(x) is true if R(x0) is true for some x0 ∈ 풟.
Here P , Q are propositions and R is a unary predicate, i.e., a proposition with one
parameter. In first-order logic, all parameters are understood to run over a fixed set 풟,
which is called the domain of discourse. Thus R(x0) is a proposition for any x0 ∈ 풟
The other classical connectives and quantifiers ⊤, ⊥ ∧, →, ∀ do not need to be
mentioned since they are expressible in terms of ∨, ¬ and ∃. For the record, we get for
them, as a consequence of the above:
• ⊤ is true;
• ⊥ is false;
• P ∧Q is true if P is true and Q is true;
• P → Q is true if Q is true or P is not true;
• ∀xR(x) is true if R(x0) is true for all x0 ∈ 풟.
We can also understand the latter six clauses the other way round, as an “explanation”
of classical connectives and quantifiers in terms of truth of propositions.
Remark 3.1. In this chapter we always assume our meta-logic to be classical; that is,
when discussing intuitionistic or any other logic, we always mean this discussion to take
place in classical logic. It the next chapter, some of that discussion will be formalized
(in fact, more of it than in any standard text on first-order logic), so we will speak of a
formal meta-logic, which in fact will turn out to be not exactly classical (but for many
purposes it can assumed to be classical); but then the meta-meta-logic, in which all
discussions of that formal meta-logic take place, will still be classical.
Intuitionistic logic can be approached in several ways, of which we will discuss the
two earliest ones: the Brouwer–Heyting approach (briefly), and Kolmogorov’s approach
(in more detail).
3.2. Platonism vs. Verificationism
The tradition initiated by Brouwer in 1907 and continued by his school in Amsterdam
(Heyting, Troelstra, et al.) and elsewhere till the present day — perhaps more success-
fully in computer science than in mathematics — presupposes a deep rethink (along the
lines of Logical Positivism and prior development of verificationist thinking; see Martin-
Lo¨f [131], [127; pp. 414–416]), of the conventional understanding of what mathematics
is and what it is not. In the words of Troelstra and van Dalen [202; p. 4]:
“It does not make sense to think of truth or falsity of a mathematical statement inde-
pendently of our knowledge concerning the statement. A statement is true if we have [a
constructive] proof of it, and false if we can show that the assumption that there is a [con-
structive] proof for the statement leads to a contradiction. For an arbitrary statement
we can therefore not assert that it is either true or false.”
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Thus, in the tradition of Brouwer and Heyting, propositions are considered to have
a different — intuitionistic — meaning, which is determined by answering the question:
When do we know a constructive proof of a given proposition? We will return to this
question in §3.7, once it will have been restated in §3.4 so as to avoid the terminological
clash with the classical meaning of propositions.
Whether the classical meaning of propositions “makes sense” or not is a philosophical
question which we will try to avoid — so as to focus on answering mathematical questions.
But at the very least, the author is determined to keep good relations with the 99% of
mathematicians who are convinced that the classical meaning of propositions does make
sense; and so considers the terminology of Brouwer and Heyting, which is in direct
conflict with the convictions of the 99% of mathematicians, to be unfortunate. Indeed,
a useful terminology would provoke mathematical, and not philosophical questions.
The depth of the rethink of mathematics promoted by the battlefield terminology of
Brouwer and Heyting should not be underestimated. In the above quote, we are asked
to abstain not only from using the principle of excluded middle (in the form asserting
that every statement is either true or false), but also from understanding mathematical
objects with the customary mental aid of Platonism (i.e. Plato’s vision of mathematical
objects as ideal entities existing independently of our knowledge about them). To be
sure, Heyting has stated it boldly enough [80]:
“Faith in transcendental existence, unsupported by concepts, must be rejected as a means
of mathematical proof, [... which] is the reason for doubting the law of excluded middle.”
The present author is no proponent of Platonism, but, on the contrary, feels that
properly understood mathematics should not depend on any particular philosophy (for
reasons related to Occam’s Razor). Heyting certainly has a point in that when we
mathematicians speak of “existence” of mathematical objects and “truth” of mathemati-
cal theorems, it is not at all clear what we mean by this; the implicit hypothesis that this
talk “makes sense” at all can certainly be considered as a religious dogma. On the other
hand, basic concepts of Intuitionism such as “construction”, “proof” and “contradiction”
are just as obscure as “existence” and “truth”; and the intuitionists’ conviction that these
concepts (as well as their “explanation” by clauses of the BHK interpretation, cf. §3.7
below) “make sense” is certainly no less of a religious dogma.
Thus the claims of greater meaningfulness and lesser dogmatism that Intuitionism
pretends to have over classical mathematics appear to be highly controversial. Can we,
nevertheless, understand what is intuionistic mathematics?
3.3. The issue of understanding
From the viewpoint of Intuitionism, it is trivial to understand classical mathematics:
one just needs to explicitly mention the principle of excluded middle in the hypothesis
of every classical theorem, thus transforming it into a conditional assertion.
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Moreover, as shown and emphasized by Kolmogorov [107], the use of this principle
alone cannot be the source of a contradiction (see §5.6); nor it can lead to a contradic-
tion when combined with the axioms of first-order arithmetic (Go¨del–Gentzen, cf. [129]).
The same is true of the second-order arithmetic (Kreisel, cf. [34]) and, with some addi-
tional effort, also of the set theory ZF (without the axiom of choice) [58], [163] — albeit
this requires impredicative intuitionism, which is something that not all constructivists
accept [129], [34]. However, in the presence of the countable axiom of choice (which
suffices for classical analysis) in its standard form, interpreted intuitionistically accord-
ing to Kolmogorov, the addition of the principle of excluded middle generally increases
consistency strength even with respect to impredicative intuitionism [21] (see also [153]).
In fact, the issue of precise formulation of the axiom of choice is important here; see
[34; 2.2.4] and [130].
This is entirely parallel to the situation within classical mathematics. Some principles
of classical set theory, including the continuum hypothesis and the axiom of choice, are
internally provable to be consistent with ZF; in particular, their addition to ZF does not
increase its consistency strength — or in other words, their use alone cannot be the source
of a contradiction. Other principles, like large cardinal axioms or the Axiom of Deter-
minacy, are known or conjectured to increase consistency strength when added to ZF;
yet there are various good reasons to believe that resulting systems are still consistent,
perhaps not significantly different from the reasons for one’s belief in the consistency
of ZF. Thus classical mathematics with or without the axiom of choice should be, from
the viewpoint of an intuitionist, on a par with areas of classical mathematics that de-
pend on the said principles as seen by a classical mathematician who does not find these
principles to be intuitively justified. Conversely, it would be beneficial to understand
intuitionistic logic and its relations with classical logic in a way that is compatible with
the plain Platonic intuition arguably shared by most “working mathematicians”.
First attempts at meaning explanations of intuitionistic logic in terms of ordinary
practices of classical mathematics can be found in a 1928 paper by Orlov [154; §§6,7]
(see also [40]) and in the 1930 and 1931 papers by Heyting [79], [80]. Both Orlov and
Heyting gave explanations (see [1; §6.2.1] for a detailed review) — in terms of provability
of propositions (“propositions” and “provability” being understood in a sense compatible
with classical logic) which directly anticipate Go¨del’s 1933 provability translation — to
be reviewed in §5.7.3. Go¨del’s translation certainly yields an accurate explanation in
arguably classical terms (albeit not exactly in terms of classical logic) of the standard
formalization of intuitionistic logic. But nevertheless it arguably misses the essence of
intuitionistic logic, in that it does not explain how one proposition can have essentially
different proofs (cf. §2).
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3.4. Solutions of problems
The second approach to intuitionistic logic, initiated by Kolmogorov in 1932 and con-
tinued to some extent by his school in Moscow aimed at being less demanding of one’s
philosophical convictions. In the words of Kolmogorov [108]:
“On a par with theoretical logic, which systematizes schemes of proofs of theoretical
truths, one can systematize schemes of solutions of problems — for example, of geometric
construction problems. For instance, similarly to the principle of syllogism we have the
following principle here: If we can reduce the task of solving b to that of a, and the task
of solving c to that of b, then we can also reduce the task of solving of c to that of a.
Upon introducing appropriate notation, one can specify the rules of a formal calculus
that yield a symbolic construction of a system of such problem solving schemes. Thus,
in addition to theoretical logic, a certain new calculus of problems arises. In this setting
there is no need for any special, e.g. intuitionistic, epistemological presuppositions.
The following striking fact holds: The calculus of problems coincides in form with
Brouwer’s intuitionistic logic, as recently formalized by Mr. Heyting.
In the second section we undertake a critical analysis of intuitionistic logic, accepting gen-
eral intuitionistic presuppositions; and observe that intuitionistic logic should be replaced
with the calculus of problems, since its objects are in reality not theoretical propositions
but rather problems.”
In this paper, we use the word problem solely in the sense of a request (or desire)
to find a construction meeting specified criteria on output and permitted means (as
in “chess problem”, “geometric construction problem”, “initial value problem”). With
problem understood in this sense, Kolmogorov’s interpretation is, in the words of Martin-
Lo¨f [126; p. 6],
“very close to programming. ‘a is a method [of solving the problem (doing the task) A]
can be read as ‘a is a program ...’. Since programming languages have a formal notation
for the program a, but not for A, we complete the sentence with ‘... which meets the
specification A’. In Kolmogorov’s interpretation, the word problem refers to something
to be done and the word program10 to how to do it.”
A key difference between problems and propositions is the lack of a direct analogue of
the Platonic concept of truth in the case of problems. In the words of Kolmogorov [108]:
“It is, however, essential that every proved proposition is correct; for problems one has
no concept corresponding to this correctness.”
As a matter of convention, we will always understand a solution of a problem positively,
in that a proof that a problem Γ has no solutions is not considered to be a solution of
Γ. Instead, we consider it to be a solution of a different problem, denoted ¬Γ; and the
problem of either finding a solution of Γ or proving that one does not exist is denoted
Γ ∨ ¬Γ. We say that Γ is solvable if Γ has a solution, and decidable if Γ ∨ ¬Γ has a
solution.
10Kolmogorov’s original interpretation does not mention any “programs”, so this is likely a misprint,
and the phrase is to be read as “the word solution”.
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3.5. The Hilbert–Brouwer controversy
A problem of the form Γ∨¬Γ may in general be very hard. There is nothing surprising
here, of course, since the principle of excluded middle applies to propositions, whereas Γ
is a problem. Nevertheless, the principle of decidability of every mathematical problem
has been stressed forcefully by Hilbert in the preface to his famous list of problems [85]:
“Occasionally it happens that we seek the solution [of a mathematical problem] under
insufficient hypotheses or in an incorrect sense, and for this reason do not succeed. The
problem then arises: to show the impossibility of the solution under the given hypotheses,
or in the sense contemplated. Such proofs of impossibility were effected by the ancients,
for instance when they showed that the ratio of the hypotenuse to the side of an isosceles
right triangle is irrational. In later mathematics, the question as to the impossibility
of certain solutions plays a preeminent part, and we perceive in this way that old and
difficult problems, such as the proof of the axiom of parallels, the squaring of the circle, or
the solution of equations of the fifth degree by radicals have finally found fully satisfactory
and rigorous solutions, although in another sense than that originally intended. It is
probably this important fact along with other philosophical reasons that gives rise to the
conviction (which every mathematician shares, but which no one has as yet supported
by a proof) that every definite mathematical problem must necessarily be susceptible of
an exact settlement, either in the form of an actual answer to the question asked, or by
the proof of the impossibility of its solution and therewith the necessary failure of all
attempts. Take any definite unsolved problem, such as the question of the irrationality
of the Euler–Mascheroni constant C, or of the existence of an infinite number of prime
numbers of the form 2n + 1. However unapproachable these problems may seem to us
and however helpless we stand before them, we have, nevertheless, the firm conviction
that their solution must follow by a finite number of purely logical processes.”
A counterexample to Hilbert’s ascription of his conviction to all mathematicians was
soon provided by Brouwer, who himself fiercely opposed it [26; Statement XXI], [27],
[28]. Yet one can hardly deny that the task of settlement, in the sense of Hilbert,
of mathematical problems (including, indeed, those in Hilbert’s list), i.e., the task of
solving problems of the form Γ∨¬Γ, is something that we mathematicians all constantly
undertake, with great efforts — including those 99% of us who consider the principle of
excluded middle to be a triviality, which can be used freely whenever the need arises.
We thus come to distinguish the principle of excluded middle (for propositions) and the
principle of decidability (for problems). Yet the two have been systematically conflated
by Heyting (see [80] and [201; p. 235]) and especially by Brouwer; in fact, their conflation
was at the very root of Brouwer’s opposition to the principle of excluded middle, whose
first published record [27] reads:
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Firstly, the syllogism infers from the embedding [inpassing]11 of a system [systeem] b into
a system c, along with the embedding of a system a into the system b, a direct embedding
of the system a into the system c. This is nothing more than a tautology.
Likewise the principle of non-contradiction is indisputable: The accomplishment of the
embedding of a system a into a system b in a prescribed manner, and the obstruction
showing the impossibility of such an embedding, exclude each other.
Now consider the principle of excluded middle: It claims that every hypothesis is either
true or false; in mathematics this means that for every hypothetical embedding of one
system in another, satisfying certain given conditions, we can either accomplish such an
embedding by a construction, or we can construct the obstruction showing its impossi-
bility. It follows that the question of the validity of the principle of excluded middle is
equivalent to the question whether undecidable mathematical problems can exist. There
is no indication of a justification for the occasionally pronounced (see [Hilbert’s problem
list [85] ...]) conviction that there exist no undecidable mathematical problems.
This all is remarkably similar to what one could say about the problem of “embedding
of one system in another” (whatever that means), except for the alleged connection with
the principle of excluded middle. Twenty years later, Brouwer has even complained
that after his repeated declarations that the principle of excluded middle is the same
as the principle of decidability, Hilbert still fails to recognize their alleged identity [28].
Unfortunately, neither this complaint nor the repeated declarations cited in it seem to
bring in any arguments as to why the two principles should be equated (apart from the
insistence that they obviously should). In fact, in the opinion of Kolmogorov [110],
“The principle of excluded middle is, according to Brouwer, inapplicable only to judge-
ments of a special kind, in which a theoretical proposition is inseparably linked with
construction of the object of the proposition. Therefore, one may suppose that Brouwer’s
ideas are actually not at all in contradiction with the traditional logic, which has in fact
never dealt with judgements of this kind.”
3.6. Problems vs. conjectures
Obviously, Brouwer committed what most mathematicians still do today: he conflated
a problem (understood as a request for finding, for instance, a proof of a certain asser-
tion, according to a certain specification of what counts as a proof) with a conjecture
(understood as a judgement that a certain assertion is true). Indeed, most of Hilbert’s
11This is the first occurrence of this term in the text, but it was explained in Brouwer’s dissertation
[26; p. 77], where he apparently rejects the notion of a subset defined by a property of its elements in
favor of an explicitly constructed subset: “Often it is quite easy to construct inside such a structure,
independently of how it originated, new structures, whose elements are taken from the elements of
the original structure or systems of these, arranged in a new way, but bearing in mind their original
arrangement. The so-called ‘properties’ of a system express the possibility of constructing such new
systems having a certain connection with the given system. And it is exactly this embedding of new
systems in a given system that plays an important part in building up mathematics, often in the form
of an inquiry into the possibility or impossibility of an embedding satisfying certain conditions, and in
the case of possibility into the ways in which it is possible.”
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problems consist in proving a conjecture. Let us take, for instance, his first problem,
which asks to prove the Continuum Hypothesis (CH): Every infinite subset of R is of
the same cardinality as R or N.
Is it the case that CH is either true or false? Yes: this is a theorem of ZFC — a direct
consequence of the principle of excluded middle.
So, is CH true? Not really: CH cannot be proved in ZFC, as shown by P. Cohen.
So, is CH false? Not really: CH cannot be disproved in ZFC, as shown by Go¨del.
This is why in modern classical logic, truth is considered to be a semantic notion,
depending on the choice of a two-valued model of the theory (cf. §3.1; two-valued means
that every formula without parameters is either true or false). For instance, CH is true
in Go¨del’s constructible universe, and false in Cohen’s models of ZFC.
In contrast, the following problem (!CH): Prove CH in ZFC — has no solutions (by
Cohen); and the problem (!¬CH): Disprove CH in ZFC — also has no solutions (by
Go¨del). And we do not need to fix a model of ZFC for this to make sense. Thus we
should not equate the problem !CH with any question pertaining to truth. Then, if
we want to be precise, Hilbert’s first problem should indeed be seen as a problem —
arguably, best formalized as !CH — and not a yes/no question.12 But had Hilbert used
a whether question in his first problem, it could as well be formalized as the problem
!CH ∨ !¬CH, i.e., Prove or disprove CH in ZFC. Note, incidentally, that insolubility of
the latter problem (which follows from Go¨del and Cohen) does not yield a counterexam-
ple to Hilbert’s principle of decidability of all mathematical problems. Indeed, !CH is
decidable (by Cohen), !¬CH is decidable (by Go¨del), and even !CH∨ !¬CH is decidable
(by Go¨del and Cohen). But the decidability of these problems is not, of course, merely
a consequence of the principle of excluded middle.
In general, a problem — as understood in the present paper — should not be conflated
with any yes/no question. In particular, the problem Prove P , where P is a proposition,
is closely related to two distinct questions: Is P true? and Does there exist a proof of P?
Truth should not be conflated with provability, since by Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem
most theories are not complete with respect to any model. On the other hand, if G
and H are groups, the question Is G isomorphic to H? is closely related to two distinct
problems: Prove that G is isomorphic to H and Find an isomorphism between G and
H . Proofs should not be conflated with constructions of isomorphisms: one proof might
correspond to several isomorphisms or not correspond to any specific isomorphism.
12This is even reasonably consistent with Hilbert’s original wording [85]: “The investigations of Cantor
on such assemblages of points suggest a very plausible theorem, which nevertheless, in spite of the most
strenuous efforts, no one has succeeded in proving. This is the theorem: Every system of infinitely
many real numbers, i.e., every assemblage of numbers (or points), is either equivalent to the assemblage
of natural integers, 1, 2, 3, . . . or to the assemblage of all real numbers”. Alongside the Continuum
Hypothesis, Hilbert also poses the problem of well-ordering of the continuum: “It appears to me most
desirable to obtain a direct proof of this remarkable statement of Cantor’s, perhaps by actually giving
an arrangement of numbers such that in every partial system a first number can be pointed out.”
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3.7. The BHK interpretation
The mathematical meaning of problems is determined by answering the question: What
does it mean to find a solution to a given problem? A standard but informal answer
to this question was given essentially in Kolmogorov’s 1932 paper [108] and can also
be seen as an interpretation of the intuitionistic connectives, and to some extent also
quantifiers13 in terms of solutions of problems. Independently14 of Kolmogorov, Heyting
gave rather similar interpretations for some intuitionistic connectives in terms of proofs
of propositions (¬ and ∨ in [80] and → in a 1930 letter to Freudenthal [208], [205]
and in print in a 1934 book [81]). Kolmogorov went somewhat further than this in
that he described a systematic interpretation of zero-order formulas of intuitionistic
logic. But much more importantly, Kolmogorov’s paper also offers what in essence is
an interpretation of the meta-logical connectives and quantifiers (as discussed in §3.11
and §7.2.1 below); to the best of the author’s knowledge, this aspect of Kolmogorov’s
interpretation has been completely ignored in all of the previous literature dealing with
the “BHK-interpretation”.
A formal answer to the question What does it mean to find a solution to a given
problem? (orWhat does it mean to give a constructive proof to a given proposition?) was
given, in particular, by Gentzen’s 1935 natural deduction calculus [65]. (An independent
but essentially equivalent answer is given by the λ-calculus, see [64], [93], [119], [34],
[188; §4], [202; §10.8].) This answer can of course be read syntactically, on a par with,
say, the sequent calculus for classical logic. Yet the introduction rules of the natural
deduction calculus can be also read as a semantic interpretation of the intuitionistic
connectives and quantifiers, which turns out to be closely related to Kolmogorov’s and
Heyting’s interpretations (see [54], [127; pp. 410–412]).
Initially, Heyting has switched to Kolmogorov’s language; in particular, the intro-
duction into intuitionistic logic found in his 1934 book [81] is based on Kolmogorov’s
understanding of the connectives and quantifiers (but not the meta-quantifiers, which
Heyting ignores in [81]). More influential, however, was his later return to the ideolog-
ically loaded language of Brouwer, most notably in his 1956 book [82]. This in turn
inspired the modern tradition of the so-called “BHK interpretation”, named so by Troel-
stra after Brouwer, Heyting and Kreisel [197], with “K” later reassigned to Kolmogorov
by Troelstra and van Dalen [202]. It is also known as the “standard interpretation”, and
even the “intended interpretation” of intuitionistic logic (see [199], [188], [190], [64], [206],
[171], [211]). Compared to Kolmogorov’s original interpretation, the BHK interpretation
(i) omits Kolmogorov’s interpretation of the meta-connectives and meta-quantifiers; (ii)
13An interpretation of ∃ is discussed in a slightly different language in §2 of Kolmogorov’s paper.
14A note inserted at proof-reading in Kolmogorov’s paper [108] acknowledged the connection with
Heyting’s [80]. A remark found in the body of [108]: “This explanation of the meaning of the sign ⊢
is very different from that by Heyting, although it leads to the same formal calculus” must refer to
Heyting’s syntactic definition of ⊢ and indicates that at the time of writing, Kolmogorov was unaware
of Heyting’s semantic interpretation of ⊢ in [80], which is rather similar to Kolmogorov’s.
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treats the quantifiers in a more systematic way; (iii) gives a more detailed interpretation
of → due to Heyting (which is similar to Kolmogorov’s interpretation of ∀).
Most presentations of the BHK interpretation in the literature are in Brouwer’s lan-
guage, but here is one in the language of Kolmogorov.
• What are solutions of primitive problems is assumed to be known from context.
For instance, Euclid’s first three postulates are the following primitive problems:15
(1) draw a straight line segment from a given point to a given point;
(2) extend any given straight line segment continuously to a longer one;
(3) draw a circle with a given center and a given radius.
We may thus stipulate that each of the primitive problems (1) and (3) has a unique
solution, and give some description of the possible solutions of (2).
• A solution of Γ ∧∆ consists of a solution of Γ and a solution of ∆.
• A solution of Γ ∨∆ consists of an explicit choice between Γ and ∆ along with a
solution of the chosen problem.
• A solution of Γ→ ∆ is a reduction of ∆ to Γ; that is, a general method of solving
∆ on the basis of any given solution of Γ.
• The absurdity × has no solutions; ¬Γ is an abbreviation for Γ → ×, and the
triviality X is an abbreviation for ¬×.16
• A solution of ∃xΘ(x) is a solution of Θ(x0) for some explicitly chosen x0 ∈ 풟.
• A solution of ∀xΘ(x) is a general method of solving Θ(x0) for all x0 ∈ 풟.
Kolmogorov’s notion of a “general method” roughly corresponds to the notion of a
“construction” advocated by Brouwer and Heyting, but is perhaps less rhetorical in
that it puts a central emphasis on the tangible issue of the right order of quantifiers.
According to Kolmogorov, if Γ(풳) is a problem depending on the parameter 풳 “of any
sort”, then “to present a general method of solving Γ(풳) for every particular value of 풳”
should be understood as “to be able to solve Γ(풳0) for every given specific value of 풳0 of
the variable 풳 by a finite sequence of steps, known in advance (i.e. before the choice of
풳0)”. This does not pretend to be a fully unambiguous definition, but “hopefully cannot
lead to confusion in specific areas of mathematics”.
An important clarification to the BHK interpretation, emphasized by Kreisel (in some-
what different terms; see details and further discussion in [39] and [17; §5.1]), is that
a solution of a problem must not only consist of a construction of a prescribed type,
but also include a proof that the proposed construction does solve the problem. In fact,
this stipulation is clearly expressed already in Proclus’ ancient commentary on Euclid’s
15See [3; §??, §??] for a thorough discussion of postulates vs. axioms.
16The notation ×, X is non-standard; the usual one is ⊥, ⊤ — same as in classical logic. We will
eventually need to differentiate notationally between classical and intuitionistic logics, and to this end
we use ⊤, ⊥ and Roman letters in classical contexts; and X, × and Greek letters in intuitionistic
contexts. This suffices to differentiate classical formulas from intuitionistic ones, and so we can afford
to keep the other connectives, and both quantifiers, identical in appearance in classical and intuitionistic
contexts.
MATHEMATICAL SEMANTICS OF INTUITIONISTIC LOGIC 20
Elements (see [3]), and so may be called the Proclus–Kreisel principle. If we parse the
clauses of the BHK interpretation, assuming that solutions of primitive problems come
with correctness proofs, we see that these easily yield correctness proofs for solutions
of problems in the ∧, ∨, and ∃ clauses; thus in the context of the BHK interpretation,
the Proclus–Kreisel principle essentially amounts to the convention that every general
method (such as those in the → and ∀ clauses) is supplied with a proof that it actually
does what it is meant to do.17
Finally, two more precautions on interpreting the BHK interpretation:
• The domain풟 must be a “simple domain” such as the set N of natural numbers; a
subset of N defined with aid of quantifiers would require a more elaborate version
of the BHK interpretation (see [39]). In fact, Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory [126] is
based on extending the BHK interpretation to more general domains.
• The status of all primitive problems (i.e. if they are considered to have a solution)
is supposed to be fixed before the logical connectives can be explained, and cannot
be updated as we determine the meaning of the connectives (Prawitz; see [173]).
3.8. Understanding the connectives
3.8.1. ∨ and ∃. The seemingly innocuous interpretations of ∨ and ∃ are already in sharp
contrast with classical logic. Let us consider the following classical proof that xy can be
rational for irrational x and y: if
√
2
√
2
is rational, then x = y =
√
2 will do; else let
x =
√
2
√
2
and y =
√
2. Although we have proved that the proposition P (x, y) =“xy is
rational” holds either for (x, y) = (
√
2,
√
2) or for (x, y) = (
√
2
√
2
,
√
2), this method is
not going to prove it for any specific pair. Thus if !Q denotes the problem Prove the
proposition Q, then we have solved the problem !
(
P (
√
2,
√
2)∨P (√2
√
2
,
√
2)
)
, and hence
also the problem !∃x∃y P (x, y) (with x and y ranging over all irrational numbers), but
we have no clue about solving either ∃x∃y !P (x, y) or !P (√2,√2) ∨ !P (√2
√
2
,
√
2).
On the other hand, with classical meta-logic we may wonder if for a given particular
problem Γ there exists a solution of Γ. According to the BHK interpretation (as presented
above), the set of solutions of a problem Γ ∨ ∆ is the disjoint union of those of Γ and
∆. The disjoint union of two sets is nonempty if and only if at least one of them is
nonempty. Thus we conclude that Γ ∨ ∆ is soluble if and only if either Γ is soluble
or ∆ is soluble. In symbols, if ?Γ denotes the proposition “The problem Γ is soluble”,
then ?(Γ ∨∆) is equivalent to ?Γ ∨ ?∆; for similar reasons, the proposition ?∃xΓ(x) is
equivalent to ∃x ?Γ(x).
Let us note that the explicit choice between Γ and ∆ that is present in any solution
of Γ ∨ ∆ is forgotten (and cannot be recovered in general) when only the existence of
17A well-known alternative to the Proclus–Kreisel principle is to deal with bare constructions, and defer
their correctness verifications until the solubility of the entire problem (built out of primitive problems
with the logical connectives) is asserted. This approach necessitates a clear distinction of “propositions”
(or problems) vs. “judgements” and is used in Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory (see [17; §5.1.2]). In fact,
according to [71; p. 36], this alternative approach is implicit already in Frege’s work.
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such a solution is asserted. For instance, the proposition ?
(
!P (
√
2,
√
2)∨ !P (√2
√
2
,
√
2)
)
might follow from a proof-theoretic result asserting that rationality of real numbers of
a certain form can always be either proved or disproved (in ZFC, say); this would still
give us no clue which of the two numbers is rational (unless the proof-theoretic result is
proved in a constructive way).18
3.8.2. ∀ and ∧. The significance of the Proclus–Kreisel principle is clear from the fol-
lowing Schwichtenberg’s paradox. Let us consider the problem !P (x, y, z, n) of proving
the following proposition P (x, y, z, n):
xn + yn = zn → n ≤ 2.
Of course, it is trivial to devise a general method m to verify the inequality xn+yn 6= zn
and thus to solve the problem !P (x, y, z, n) for every particular choice of positive integers
x, y, z and n > 2 for which it can be solved. What is hard is to prove that m actually
succeeds on all inputs. Thus it is only due to Kreisel’s clarification that the problem
∀x, y, z, n !P (x, y, z, n) (with x, y, z, n ranging over all positive integers) is nontrivial.
Yet this problem is easily seen to be equivalent to the problem !∀x, y, z, n P (x, y, z, n) of
proving Fermat’s last theorem. Indeed, any solution of the problem ∀x !Q(x) is clearly
a proof of the proposition ∀xQ(x); conversely, any proof of the latter proposition yields
by specialization a proof of every its instance Q(x), and this specialization procedure
is a general method with respect to the input x, whose success is guaranteed by the
original proof of ∀xQ(x). Let us note that, due to the existence of the general method
m, the problem of proving Fermat’s last theorem is also equivalent to the problem
!¬?!¬∀x , y, z, n P (x, y, z, n) of proving that Fermat’s last theorem cannot be disproved.19
If there exists a general method of solving a problem Γ(x) for every x, then, trivially,
Γ(x) is soluble for each x; in symbols, ?∀xΓ(x) → ∀x ?Γ(x). This implication cannot
be reversed in general. For example, if Γ(f) asks to find a complex root of an algebraic
equation f(x) = 0 of degree > 0, then a solution of Γ(f) exists by the fundamental
theorem of algebra; yet a general method of solving all such problems Γ(f) could be
interpreted, for instance, as a formula providing a solution in radicals. Similarly, if Γ(f)
is an initial value problem of the form y′ = f(x, y), y(x0) = y0, f ∈ C1, then a solution
of Γ(f) exists in some neighborhood of x0 by the well-known theorem; yet a general
method of solving all such problems could be interpreted, for instance, as a formula
providing a solution in terms of elementary functions.
The intuitionistic conjunction per se does not behave very differently compared to
the classical conjunction. In particular, one can see that the proposition ?(Γ ∧ ∆) is
18In fact, irrationality of
√
2
√
2
follows from the Gelfond–Schneider theorem (which answered a part of
Hilbert’s 7th problem): ab is transcendental if a and b are algebraic, a 6= 0, 1, and b is not rational.
19A similar remark about Goldbach’s conjecture is found in Kolmogorov’s letter to Heyting (see [1;
§6.2.2]), which indicates that he did implicitly assume general methods to include verification of their
own correctness and seems to have been aware of the significance of this provision. In his paper [108],
he also emphasized universal acceptability of the validity of solutions as an inherent property of logical
and mathematical problems.
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equivalent to ?Γ ∧ ?∆ (similarly to the above discussion of ∨) and that the problem
!(P ∧Q) is equivalent to !P ∧ !Q (similarly to the above discussion of ∀).
3.8.3. →. By the modus ponens rule
P, P → Q
Q
any proof of the proposition P → Q yields a general method of converting proofs of P
into proofs of Q, along with a proof that this method indeed effects such conversion. In
other words, any solution of the problem !(P → Q) yields a solution of !P → !Q. But not
conversely. For instance, a general method of converting ZFC-proofs of the Continuum
Hypothesis CH into ZFC-proofs of 0 = 1 (where 0 = ∅ and 1 = {∅}, as usual) is
given by simply keeping the given ZFC-proof; and a verification of the correctness of
this method is given by Cohen’s proof that ZFC-proofs of CH do not exist. Yet we
cannot possibly obtain from this a ZFC-proof that CH implies 0 = 1, since no such
ZFC-proofs exist, as proved by Go¨del. Of course, what this argument really shows is
that the problems !¬P and ¬!P are inequivalent for any independent statement P .20
By the→ clause of the BHK interpretation, or by the intuitionistic modus ponens rule
Γ, Γ→ ∆
∆
if there exists a reduction of the problem ∆ to the problem Γ, then the solubility of
Γ implies the solubility of ∆; in symbols, ?(Γ → ∆) → (?Γ → ?∆). The converse
implication does not hold in general. For example, let Γ be the problem !?∆ of proving
the solubility of ∆. Clearly, if Γ is soluble, i.e., there exists a proof of the solubility of ∆,
then ∆ is soluble. On the other hand, a proof of the solubility of ∆ does not necessarily
yield an actual solution of ∆.21
20 Some issues need to be clarified here. For the sake of definiteness, we may demand that the verifica-
tions of correctness of general methods take place in some theory T . If all atomic problems request to
prove something in a certain theory, a natural choice for T would be that theory. It might seem that
identifying × with !0 = 1 would then get us in trouble with the second incompleteness theorem, which
says that T itself does not prove Bew(#0 = 1) → 0 = 1, where Bew is a formula expressing Go¨del’s
provability predicate for T (see [185]). However, we are dealing here with solutions rather solubility, but
the incompleteness theorems arise only because of the existential quantifier. Namely, let us recall that
Bew(#P ) is defined as ∃nProv(n,#P ), where Prov(n,m) is a formula expressing the predicate that n
is the Go¨del number of a proof of the formula with Go¨del number m. T proves Prov(n,#P ) for some
numeral n if and only if T proves P ; and T proves ¬Prov(n,#P ) for every numeral n if and only if T
does not prove P (see [185; 3.2.4]). In particular, T proves that Prov(n,#0 = 1)→ 0 = 1. Thus from
a proof of 0 = 1 in T we can certainly get a contradiction. Also, returning to our example (where T =
ZFC), since ZFC does not prove either CH or ¬CH by Go¨del and Cohen, ZFC proves ¬Prov(n,CH)
and ¬Prov(n,¬CH).
21According to a certain formal logic QHC of ?’s and !’s [1], for this to be possible, ?∆ must be indepen-
dent from the formal theory being considered [2; Remark 3.10]. QHC also places further limitations on
potential examples of the above type. Although the implication ¬?Γ → ?¬Γ does not hold in general,
the rule ¬?Γ / ?¬Γ is valid; thus one cannot prove ¬?Γ without also proving ?¬Γ [1; 3.12]. Also, there
are the rule ?!P → ?!Q/ ?(!P → !Q) and the implication (!?Γ→ !?∆)→ !(?Γ→ ?∆) [1; 3.16].
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3.8.4. Absurdity. Let us now discuss the meaning of the negation, ¬Γ. Using ! and ? as
before, and writing ¬ also for the classical negation of propositions, we get the problem
!¬?Γ, which reads: Prove that Γ has no solutions. (As before, this refers to classical
proofs, not constructive ones.) We will now argue that this problem is equivalent to ¬Γ
on the BHK interpretation (with our classical meta-logic), by describing solutions of the
problems ¬Γ → !¬?Γ and !¬?Γ → ¬Γ.
Indeed, suppose that we have a solution of ¬Γ, that is, a general methodm of obtaining
a solution of × based on any given solution of Γ, including a proof that this method
works. But since × has no solutions, we get the following proof pm that Γ has no
solutions: “If s is a solution of Γ, then m applied to s yields a non-existent object, which
is a contradiction; thus Γ has no solutions.” Moreover, it is clear that the procedure
associating pm to m is a general method, which works regardless of the nature of m.
Conversely, let p be a proof that Γ has no solutions. If s is a solution of Γ, then p
yields a proof that s is itself also a solution of ×; indeed, p proves that s does not exist,
but everything is true of a non-existent object. Thus, given a p, we get a general method
mp of obtaining a solution of × on the basis of any given solution s of Γ; namely, mp
returns s itself and includes a verification that s is a solution of × (which is given by
p). Thus mp is a solution of ¬Γ. Moreover, it is clear that the procedure associating mp
to p is a general method, which works regardless of the nature of p.
Curiously, this analysis is at odds with Kolmogorov’s remark [108]:
“Let us note that ¬a should not be understood as the problem ‘prove the unsolvability
of a’. In general, if one considers ‘unsolvability of a’ as a well-defined notion, then one
only obtains the theorem that ¬a implies the unsolvability of a, but not vice versa.
If, for example, it were proved that the well-ordering of the continuum surpasses our
capabilities, one could still not claim that the existence of such a well-ordering leads to
a contradiction.”
Could one make any sense out of the last sentence, mathematically? It could be referring,
for instance, to the fact that the existence of a well-ordering of the continuum might be
(i) not provable in some formal theory, say ZF, and yet (ii) consistent with this theory.
(For example, this is how Kolmogorov’s words are interpreted by Coquand [34].)
To interpret (i) as the unsolvability of some problem Γ1, this Γ1 could be the problem
of deriving the existence of the well-ordering of the continuum (i.e., a special case of the
axiom of choice) from the axioms of ZF; a solution of Γ1 would be such a derivation,
and the proof of the non-existence of such derivation would presumably be either in ZF
or in some stronger theory. But in this case, ¬Γ1 was solved by Cohen: given such a
derivation, he does get a contradiction (by a method whose correctness is verified in ZF;
cf. footnote 20 above).
And to interpret (ii) as the unsolvability of ¬Γ2 for some problem Γ2, we could un-
derstand it syntactically or semantically. On the syntactic reading of (ii), ¬Γ2 could be
the problem of deriving a contradiction from the axioms of ZF and the hypothesis of the
well-orderability of the continuum; but this does not seem to be of the form ¬Γ2 for any
problem Γ2. On the semantic reading of (ii), Γ2 could be the problem of constructing
MATHEMATICAL SEMANTICS OF INTUITIONISTIC LOGIC 24
a model of ZF and a well-ordering of the continuum in this model; indeed, the unsolv-
ability of this ¬Γ2 amounts to the (non-constructive) existence of a model of ZF where
the continuum can be well-ordered (compare [1; §5.4]). But in this case, Γ2 was solved
by Go¨del, who constructed a certain model of ZF (Go¨del’s constructible universe), and
a well-ordering of the continuum in that model.
Thus it is possible that Kolmogorov might have simply conflated Γ1 and Γ2, thinking
of a single informal problem, “Find a well-ordering of the continuum”.
On the other hand, Kolmogorov’s wording (“¬a implies the unsolvability of a”; “the
existence of such a well-ordering leads to a contradiction”) certainly conflates implications
between problems with implications between propositions; this makes us suspect that in
writing of what must have been the former, he might have actually been thinking of the
latter (in this particular remark about the well-ordering of the continuum). Indeed, if P
is the proposition The continuum is well-orderable, then the unsolvability of the problem
of proving it, or ¬?!P in the above notation, certainly does not imply ¬P , the proposition
that the existence of a well-ordering of the continuum leads to a contradiction. In this
connection, let us also not forget Kolmogorov’s initial rejection of the explosion principle
×→ α [107], [208].
It should be noted that Heyting, while using Kolmogorov’s terminology (and so being
aware of Kolmogorov’s remark quoted above) has explicitly identified ¬Γ with !¬?Γ [81]:
“It is appropriate to interpret the notion of ‘reduction’ in such a way that the proof
of the impossibility of solving a at the same time reduces the solution of any problem
whatsoever to that of a.”
3.9. Something is missing here
Troelstra and van Dalen note of the BHK interpretation [202; p. 9 and p. 33]:
“This explanation is quite informal and rests itself on our understanding of the notion
of construction and, implicitly, the notion of mapping; it is not hard to show that, on a
very ‘classical’ interpretation of construction and mapping, H1–6 [the six clauses of the
BHK interpretation] justify the principles of two-valued (classical) logic.”
“This exercise [[202; Exercise 1.3.4]] shows that the BHK-interpretation in itself has no
‘explanatory power’: the possibility of recognizing a classically valid logical schema as be-
ing constructively unacceptable depends entirely on our interpretation of ‘construction’,
‘function’, ‘operation’.”
Indeed (see also [175]), let Γ denote the set of solutions of the problem Γ. Then the
BHK interpretation guarantees that:
• Γ ∧∆ is the product Γ × ∆ ;
• Γ ∨∆ is the disjoint union Γ ⊔ ∆ ;
• there is a map ℱ : Γ→ ∆ → Hom( Γ , ∆ ) into the set of all maps;
• × = ∅;
• ∃xΓ(x) is the disjoint union ⊔d∈풟 Γ(d) ;
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• there is a map 풢 : ∀xΓ(x) →∏d∈풟 Γ(d) into the product.
If we force ℱ to be the identity map, we obtain what might be called the “classical
BHK”. Indeed, Γ∨¬Γ = Γ ⊔Hom( Γ ,∅) is never empty; thus Γ∨¬Γ has a solution
for each problem Γ. Note that we get the same result as long as ℱ is surjective.
Thus the six clauses of the BHK interpretation, as presented either above or in
Troelstra–van Dalen [202], fail to capture the essence of intuitionistic logic. The way to
deal with this issue in the intuitionistic tradition has been, unfortunately, just to sweep
it under the carpet.22 Thus, elsewhere in the same book by Troelstra and van Dalen
[202; p. 10], we find the assertion
“Even if the explanations H1-6 [the six clauses of the BHK interpretation] leave a lot of
questions open, they suffice to show that certain logical principles should be generally
acceptable from a constructive point of view, while some other principles from classical
logic are not acceptable.”
This is followed by an analysis of “the principle of excluded middle” (i.e. the principle of
decidability in our terminology), which ends with a striking conclusion [202; p. 11]:
“Thus we cannot accept PEM [the Principle of Excluded Middle] as a universally valid
principle on the BHK-interpretation.”
Don’t the latter two quotations directly contradict the previous two quotations from the
same book, in which the same BHK interpretation was found to “justify the principles
of two-valued (classical) logic”?
The only sign of hope for understanding what is going on here is the clause “as
a universally valid principle”, whose meaning is not really explained in Troelstra–van
Dalen [202]. We are told, however, that
“Constructively, accepting PEM [the Principle of Excluded Middle] as a general principle
means that we have a universal method for obtaining, for any proposition A, [a proof of
A ∨ ¬A, that is,] either a proof of A or a proof of ¬A”
This is parallel to Heyting’s original assertion [80; p. 59]:
“a proof that the law of excluded middle is a general law must consist in giving a method
by which, when given an arbitrary proposition, one could always prove either the propo-
sition itself or it negation.”
Yet these demands for a “method” appear out of the blue both in Heyting [80] and in
Troelstra–van Dalen [202], without any explanations. Of course, what they could have
said to settle the issue is that (i) it is precisely their demands for a “method” that
are lacking to give “explanatory power” to the six clauses of the BHK-interpretation;
(ii) thus these demands should really be included in an additional clause of the BHK-
interpretation, in order to guarantee that it does explain intuitionistic rather than clas-
sical logic.
22And it is arguably this particular sweeping under the carpet that is largely responsible for the fact
that most mathematicians are aware of intuitionistic logic, yet fail to understand it.
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In fact, Kolmogorov did explicitly incorporate a similar demand (for a “method”) in his
original version of the BHK interpretation [108]. But before we are ready to formulate
and discuss it in a clear language, we will need to understand what could have prevented
Troelstra and van Dalen, as well as all other writers in the intuitionistic tradition (to the
best of the author’s knowledge) to add such a stipulation to the BHK interpretation.
One factor, which could be deciding in the case of Heyting’s early work, was the
attitude that, in view of Heyting’s derivation system, intuitionistic logic needs to be
explained philosophically, rather than mathematically. It is obviously due to this attitude
that Heyting did not attempt a systematic contentual interpretation of intuitionistic logic
prior to Kolmogorov’s paper, even though he had clearly gathered the necessary bits and
pieces. But this attitude also meant that one does not even aim at delineating exactly
what is included in the interpretation.
Another, much more serious factor was the widespread acceptance of first-order logic
with its usual model theory and a particular tradition of trying to express notions that are
not expressible in it (including the “principle of excluded middle”) as the default language
in foundations of mathematics. Like any language (natural or artificial), it comes with
a plethora of implicit assumptions that on the one hand facilitate communication and
thought, but on the other hand subjugate them to invisible limitations. We will now
proceed to review and overcome some of these limitations.
3.10. Classical logic revisited
A detailed treatment of first-order formal logic will be given in the next chapter (§4).
Here we include a quick glimpse of it, just enough to proceed with clarification of the
BHK interpretation in the next section (§3.11).
3.10.1. Syntax. Formal classical logic deals with formulas, such as
p ∨ ¬q
and
q ∨ ¬p.
Here p and q are propositional variables and ∨, ¬ are (formal) connectives; all of these
are some of the ingredients of the formal language of classical logic. In classical logic,
one cannot (formally) derive any of these two formulas from the other one (as we will
discuss shortly). Similarly, none of the formulas
p ∨ ¬p
and
q ∨ ¬q
is derivable from each other without using the law of excluded middle.
In modern treatments of first order classical logic, the law of excluded middle is usually
expressed by the schema
f ∨ ¬f
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in which ∨ and ¬ have the same meaning as before, but f is a metavariable or schematic
variable (not to be confused with the propositional variable f), which is absent from the
formal language of classical logic, but is understood to denote a formula. Formulas like
p ∨ ¬p, q ∨ ¬q and (p ∨ q) ∨ ¬(p ∨ q), obtained by replacing each meta-variable with
some formula are instances of this schema, just like e.g. 32 − 22 = (3 + 2)(3 − 2) is an
instance of the identity x2 − y2 = (x+ y)(x− y).
The schema itself is sometimes identified with the set of its instances. But in any
case it does not belong to the formal language — because infinite sets of formulas, like
metavariables, exist only in meta-language and not within the formal language. (A finite
set of formulas can often be identified with their conjunction, which is a single formula,
but infinite conjunctions do not exist in traditional classical logic.) In particular, when
the ingredients of the formal language are interpreted in some way, we get interpretations
of formulas, but no interpretations of schemata.
Thus, even though the law of excluded middle is constantly used in classical logic, it is
absent as an entity from both syntax and semantics in the standard modern formalism
(like all other laws and inference rules that define classical logic). One could argue that
“only specific instances of the law of excluded middle are really used”, but this is only a
part of the story, since to recognize some formula as an instance of the schema one does
refer to the actual schema.
This recognition step can actually be bypassed. There is a one-to-one correspondence
between formulas and schemata given by replacing predicate variables by metavariables
and conversely (at least if they are drawn from the same alphabet, meaning either a finite
human alphabet, for practical purposes, or a countably infinite mathematical alphabet,
for theoretical ones). Then instead of instances of a schema one can speak of substitution
instances of the corresponding formula (which are the same set of formulas).
Moreover, classical logic (and all other logics that we will consider) satisfies the sub-
stitution theorem: if some formula is derivable in classical logic, then also all its sub-
stitution instances are derivable. Because of this, it suffices for practical purposes to
speak only of derivability of formulas, and so often there is no practical need for a
separate notion of “derivability of schemata”; for example, all instances of the schema((
(f → g) → f) → f) are derivable if and only if the formula (((f→ g)→ f)→ f)
is derivable. (They are indeed derivable in classical logic, but this does not concern
us here.) But as one goes deeper into the modern formalism of first-order logic there
appear more and more of such surrogates, i.e. writing one thing while actually thinking
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about another one.23 So it can be argued that to sacrifice the notion of “derivability of
schemata” is to step on a slippery slope from a conceptual viewpoint.
Remark 3.2. Let us pause here to note that the substitution theorem does not say that
each substitution instance F ′ of a formula F is derivable from F in classical logic (and
it is generally not derivable!). It only says that the judgement of derivability of F in
classical logic, denoted ⊢ F , implies the judgement ⊢ F ′. The difference is that both
these judgements belong to the meta-theory, and so the implication between them is
“contentual” rather than formal (in other words, one is derived from the other not in
formal classical logic, but in textbooks on formal classical logic).
It not hard to formally include a device that amounts to the use schemata into the
formal language. Let us add a new symbol “· ” to the formal language, and write it
in front of a formula whenever we want to “read it as a schema”; such expressions of
the extended formal language, consisting of a formula prefixed by “· ”, will be called
principles. (Thus the notion of a formula is in effect extended to include principles;
however, to avoid confusion, we will keep the old meaning for the word “formula”, using
it to refer to formulas of the original language, without “· ”.) That is, instead of the
schema
f ∨ ¬f
(which does not belong to the formal language) or rather the infinite conjunction of its
instances, which could be written symbolically as
∀f f ∨ ¬f
(but anyway does not belong to the formal language) we will write the principle
·f ∨ ¬f
(which now belongs to the formal language). Of course, the principle
·p ∨ ¬p
23Suffice it to say that in intuitionistic logic, the formula ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ is not a consequence of the formula
¬¬ϕ→ ϕ; but nevertheless people say and write, and for a good reason, that “the principle of excluded
middle”, which they express by the schema ϕ∨¬ϕ, is a consequence of “the principle of double negation”,
which express by the schema ¬¬ϕ→ ϕ (see Example 4.36 and Remark 4.37 below for the details). And
people obviously do think in these terms of “principles”, which are made illegitimate by the standard
formalism. Worse yet, the modern tradition of dealing with schemata, according to which “principles”
are expressed by schemata, is in itself a source of confusion. The relation between the meta-language
and the language is akin to the relation between syntax and semantics. Just like the arithmetical
formula x + y = y + x denotes any of its interpretations 0 + 1 = 1 + 0, 2 + 3 = 3 + 2, etc. (see also
§4.1.4 concerning the semantics of non-closed formulas), the schema f ∨¬f denotes any of its instances
p ∨ ¬p, (p ∨ q) ∨ ¬(p ∨ q), etc. But just like the formula ∀x∀y x + y = y + x denotes effectively the
infinite conjunction 0+1 = 1+1∧2+3 = 3+2∧. . . , it would be more accurate to say that the “principle
of excluded middle” is expressed not by the schema ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ, but rather by the infinite conjunction of
all its instances, which might be written symbolically as ∀ϕ ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ (and similarly for the “principle of
double negation”).
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will then serve the same purpose — but this is not a big deal, as the formula
∀x r(x)
already serves the same purpose as24
∀y r(y).
Here we encounter some further ingredients of the formal language of classical logic: the
quantifier ∀, the unary predicate variable r and the individual variables x, y. It should
be noted in this connection that instances of the schema p ∨ ¬p also include formulas
like ∀x r(x)∨¬∀x r(x) and r(x)∨¬r(x); and instantiation and substitution become a bit
more complicated to define precisely in the presence of individual variables (this will be
discussed in §4).
But there are more substantial questions to worry about:
(1) Can one derive arbitrary instances of a schema from the corresponding principle,
without resorting to meta-language?
(2) Can one reasonably formalize derivability of principles?
(3) Does “· ” have any natural semantics?
The answers are affirmative, and will be briefly discussed here and in more detail in §4.
Our way to answer the first two questions is along the lines of the well-known proof
assistant Isabelle, whose approach is in many ways closer to the early tradition of first-
order logic, as e.g. in the textbooks by Hilbert–Ackermann [89] and Hilbert–Bernays [90]
than to the modern formalism.
For our present purposes, we can identify the judgement of derivability of a principle
·F , denoted ⊢ ·F , with the judgement ⊢ F . A more reasonable definition is in §4.
Now let us turn to the third question.
3.10.2. Formal semantics. As discussed in §?? above, the elements of the formal lan-
guage of classical logic (or any other formal language) are themselves devoid of any
meaning but can be given meaning in an interpretation. For example, one can interpret
• each propositional variable by a subset of the set R of real numbers (for example,
|p| could consist of all integers, and |q| of all positive reals);
• each individual variable by an element of the set N of natural numbers (for
example, |x| = 3, |y| = 5);
• each k-ary predicate variable by an Nk-indexed family of subsets of R (for exam-
ple, |r|(n) = (−∞, n]); and
• each connective or quantifier by an appropriate set-theoretic operation; in par-
ticular, ∨ by taking the union of the two given sets, ¬ by taking the complement
of the given set in R, and ∀ by taking the intersection of all members of the given
N-indexed family of sets.
24We will see in §4 that in both cases this is a matter of replacing an expression of λ-calculus with
an α-equivalent expression, because “· ” is really just an abbreviation for the “meta-quantifier closure”
(whatever it means).
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Then each formula also gets an interpretation, defined by a straightforward recursion
on its subformulas. In our example, |p ∨ ¬q| consists of all integers and all nonnegative
reals, whereas |q ∨ ¬p| consists of all positive reals and all non-integer reals; inciden-
tally, these two sets would have to be equal if the formulas p ∨ ¬q and q ∨ ¬p were
interderivable.
The interpretation of individual variables, which is called an individual assignment,
is needed to interpret formulas with free occurrences of individual variables, such as
r(x) ∨ ∀x (r(x) ∨ r(y)). Here the first occurrence of x and the only occurrence of y are
free, but the second occurrence of x is not free, because it is “bound” by the quantifier.
But we obviously do not need an individual assignment to interpret closed formulas,
that is, those in which no individual variable occurs freely. For example, |∀x r(x)| =⋂
n∈N(−∞, n] = (−∞, 0].
It is also not hard to see that all instances of the law of excluded middle, includ-
ing p ∨ ¬p, q ∨ ¬q, ∀x r(x) ∨ ¬∀x r(x) and r(x) ∨ ¬r(x) have the same interpretation,
R. Moreover, this remains true regardless of exactly how propositional, predicate and
individual variables are interpreted.
The latter fact suggests that the principle ·p ∨ ¬p could also be assigned a definite
interpretation: “(semantic) truth”, denoted
‚
. In general,
• every principle ·F is assigned an interpretation |·F | ∈ {‚,‚}, which is set to be
‚
if for every interpretation of propositional and predicate variables that occur
in F and individual variables that occur freely in F , the interpretation of F is
the entire set R; and otherwise, ‚.
Thus |·p ∨ ¬q| = ‚ (which is called “(semantic) falsity”) since e.g. |q ∨ ¬p| 6= R.
The interpretation of propositional and predicate variables, called a predicate valua-
tion, is needed to interpret formulas, but is not needed to interpret principles. By an
interpretation of the language of classical logic we will mean only an interpretation of
connectives and quantifiers (which includes the choices of N and R). This suffices to
interpret principles.
If |·F | = ‚, we also say that the principle ·F is valid in our interpretation of the
language of classical logic. The judgement that ·F is valid in the interpretation being
considered is denoted by  ·F . It is well-known that  ·F is equivalent to ⊢ ·F in the
present example (see §4.8.2, where this example is discussed in more detail). Validity of
formulas with respect to a fixed predicate valuation and/or a fixed individual assignment
will be discussed in §4, but it is not needed for our present purposes.
Remark 3.3. An interpretation of the language of a theory T over classical logic (such
as Peano Arithmetic, Tarski’s elementary geometry or Zermalo–Fraenkel set theory)
extends an interpretation of the language of classical logic by interpreting additional in-
gredients in the language of T : function symbols (such as those for the binary operations
of addition and multiplication and for numeric constants) and predicate constants (such
as those for the binary predicates of equality and membership and the ternary predicate
of betweenness for points on a line).
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Connectives, quantifiers, function symbols and predicate constants are constants;
whereas individual variables and predicate variables are variables (in the sense of λ-
calculus, see §4.2 below). This distinction is mathematically significant, as predicate
constants and predicate variables do behave differently even in classical logic (see ex-
amples in §4.8.1 and §4.8.2), and was clear in classic texts such as those of Hilbert–
Ackermann [89], Hilbert–Bernays [90], Church [32] and Novikov [149], [151].
Nevertheless the modern tradition of first-order logic effectively conflates predicate
variables and predicate constants under the guise of “predicate symbols” (or “predicate
letters”).25 Consequently, the distinction between the language of a logic and the lan-
guage of a theory is also blurred, and hence an interpretation of such language is assumed
to include an interpretation of “predicate symbols” in modern treatments of first-order
logic — even though modern treatments of propositional (=zero-order) logic usually
clearly separate valuation of propositional variables from interpretation of connectives.
3.10.3. Informal semantics. Let us now look at another way of interpreting the ingre-
dients of the language of classical logic:
• each propositional variable is interpreted by a contentful (e.g. mathematical)
proposition;
• each individual variable by an element of a set 풟, called the domain of discourse;
• each k-ary predicate variable by a k-ary contentful predicate on 풟;
• each formal connective or quantifier is interpreted according to the usual truth
tables (see §3.1), or in other words by the corresponding contentual26 connective
or quantifier (∨ by “or”, ¬ by “not”, ∀ by “for all”, etc.);
• a principle ·F is interpreted by the meta-proposition (that is, a judgement about
propositions, itself treated as a higher-level proposition) asserting that for every
interpretation of propositional and predicate variables that occur in F and indi-
vidual variables that occur freely in F , the contentful proposition that interprets
F is true;27
25They are usually introduced on a par with function symbols, and are indeed treated as constants in
the context of theories — in which case the substitution theorem does not apply (unless all axioms are
given by schemata). But when dealing with a bare logic and its models, “predicate symbols” can often
be substituted with formulas, which one would not normally do to constants; and one often assumes a
countable list of “predicate symbols” of each arity, none of them standing for anything specific (as e.g.
in the texts of Kleene [103] and Troelstra–van Dalen [202]), which is also a strange way of dealing with
constants. But it should be noted that in the case of propositional logic, “propositional symbols” are
clearly distinguished from the (syntactic) propositional constants ⊤ and ⊥; and in logic with equality,
the equality is clearly distinguished from “predicate symbols”. The difference is that ⊤, ⊥ and = are
not supposed to be substitutable by formulas.
26“Contentual” (or rather its more widely used German equivalent inhaltlich) is Hilbert’s term, the
opposite of “formal”, which he used to explain the Formalist program.
27In more detail, let ~x = (x1, . . . , xn) be the tuple of all individual variables that occur freely in
F , let ~p = (p1, . . . , pm) be the tuple of all propositional and predicate variables that occur in F ,
and let ~r = (r1, . . . , rm) be the tuple of their arities. Then ·F is interpreted by the meta-proposition
∀~P ∀ ~X (~p, ~x 7→ Φ)(~P , ~X) asserting the truth of all the contentful propositions (~p, ~x 7→ F )(~P , ~X) obtained
from F by substituting ~x by an n-tuple ~X of elements of풟 and ~p by anm-tuple ~P of contentful predicates
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•  ·F asserts that the meta-proposition that interprets ·F is true.
This is not really a definite interpretation but rather an informal sketch of what could
possibly be made into a definite interpretation. To be sure, this can be done; for instance:
• each propositional variable is interpreted by a closed formula in the language of
Peano Arithmetic (PA);
• each individual variable by a closed term of PA (such as (1 + 1) ∗ (1 + 1) + 1);
• each k-ary predicate variable by a formula F (x1, . . . , xk) in the language of PA
such that ∀x1 . . .∀xk F (x1, . . . , xk) is a closed formula;
• each formal connective or quantifier by the namesake connective or quantifier in
the language of PA, or rather of its underlying (classical) logic;
• a principle ·F is interpreted by the formula of the language of PA which ex-
presses, using the Go¨del numbering, the assertion that for every interpretation
of propositional and predicate variables that occur in F and individual variables
that occur freely in F , the formula that interprets F is derivable in PA;
•  ·F asserts that the formula that interprets ·F is true in the standard model
N of PA.
In this example, if |p| is a formula expressing that there exist infinitely many twin
primes and |q| is Go¨del’s formula, “asserting its own non-derivability”, then |p ∨ ¬p|
and |q ∨ ¬q| are different formulas (in contrast to the previous example), though both
are derivable in PA. Incidentally, that neither |q| nor |¬q| is derivable in PA is nothing
special, because already in the previous example neither |q| nor |¬q| was the entire
R. Also, |·p ∨ ¬p| and |·¬¬p→ p| are different formulas (in contrast to the previous
example), though both are true in N (and derivable in PA, though this is less obvious
and does not matter for the purposes of our interpretation).
Admittedly, this example is silly enough in that it can be said to interpret formal
classical logic by means of formal classical logic — except that the new ingredient “· ”
is interpreted in a more meaningful way. Indeed, derivability of formulas in PA is no
longer the business of PA and its underlying logic, but rather of the meta-theory of
PA and its underlying (meta-)logic — which has been formalized by Go¨del within PA
and its underlying logic. Thus the interpretation of · takes us from “propositions” to
“meta-propositions” (which are realized here as formalized judgements about formalized
propositions). But this is not all. Validity of arithmetical formulas in the standard
model of PA is also no longer the business of PA. Thus the the definition of validity
takes us further from meta-propositions to judgements about meta-propositions (which
are this time left at an informal level).
Returning to the informal sketch above, let us emphasize that an informal interpre-
tation like above is in general not necessarily formalizable in a reasonable way; but if it
happens to be formalizable, there ought to some flexibility in how it can be formalized.
(In our example, we could look at a non-standard model of PA, or at Tarski’s plane
of arities r1, . . . , rm on 풟, and then applying the usual truth tables to interpret the connectives and
quantifiers.
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geometry along with its various models, or at the set theory ZFC along with its vari-
ous models.) Also, the informal sketch above seems to be adding nonzero value to its
particular formalization above, just like reading an informal sketch/idea of proof often
turns out to be more helpful than going through the details of a carefully written, but
unmotivated formal proof. Because of this, in what follows we will occasionally still
resort to informal “contentual” interpretations on a par with the sketch above; but it
should always be clear what is supposed to be rigorous and what is not.
Let us note that according to the informal sketch above, the principle of excluded
middle,
·p ∨ ¬p,
is interpreted by the meta-proposition asserting that for each contentful proposition p,
the proposition p ∨ ¬p is true. The judgement
 ·p ∨ ¬p
asserts that this meta-proposition is true. If we ignore the subtleties of different levels of
reflection, which are anyway far from clear in such vague formulations, we can roughly
express both the informal interpretation of the principle of excluded middle and the
judgement of its validity as
∀P P ∨ ¬P,
where P is understood to run over contentful (e.g. mathematical) propositions.
3.11. Clarified BHK interpretation
Let us now try to do the same with intuitionistic logic and with the principle of decid-
ability,
·γ ∨ ¬γ.
Here γ is a propositional variable in the formal language of intuitionistic logic, which we
denote by a Greek letter in order to avoid confusion with the language of classical logic.
In fact, in view of our previous discussions, it makes sense to call γ a problem variable,
because intuitionistic logic is supposed to be about problems rather than propositions
(at least, certainly not about propositions in the usual sense of classical mathematics).
At this point, we are completely ignorant about the laws and inference rules of in-
tuitionistic logic, and know little about its semantics. But at least we could hope that
an informal interpretation of the principle of decidability parallel to the above informal
interpretation of the principle of excluded middle can be roughly expressed as
∀Γ Γ ∨ ¬Γ,
where Γ is understood to run over contentful (e.g. mathematical) problems. But what
does this expression mean? If we read it by analogy with the ∀ clause in the BHK
interpretation, then it expresses the (meta-)problem of finding a general method of solving
the problem Γ ∨ ¬Γ for every contentful problem Γ. And this is precisely Kolmogorov’s
original interpretation of the principle of decidability [108], except that his use of the
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symbol “⊢” where we use the symbol “· ” raises some issues (which we will discuss in a
moment).
If we now turn to the judgement
 ·γ ∨ ¬γ
that the principle of decidability is valid in our informal interpretation, the natural way
to express it is that there exists a solution of the said meta-problem; that is, there exists
a general method of solving the problem Γ ∨ ¬Γ for every contentful problem Γ. Using
the notation of §3.8, this can be roughly written as
?∀Γ Γ ∨ ¬Γ.
And this is reminiscent of Brouwer’s “Third insight. The identification of the principle
of excluded middle with the principle of decidability of every mathematical problem.”28
[28; §1].
Remark 3.4. Let us now discuss Kolmogorov’s original approach [108]. It is conceivable
that he did not really mean his semantic definition of ⊢ (which coincides with our
semantic interpretation of · ) to serve as an interpretation of Heyting’s syntactic definition
of ⊢ (“To indicate that a formula is included in the list of ‘correct formulas’ the sign ⊢ will
be put in front of it” [83]). This reading is supported by the fact Kolmogorov separately
lists “rules of our calculus of problems”, which are themselves not problems. In this case
our interpretation above can be seen simply as a slight extension of Kolmogorov’s.
However, Kolmogorov’s words “This explanation of the meaning of the sign ⊢ is quite
different from that of Heyting, even though it leads to the same rules of the calculus”
[108] suggest that he could have actually meant one to interpret the other. In this case
our interpretation above is rather a “correction” of Kolmogorov’s, since in our approach
the judgement ⊢ ·γ ∨ ¬γ is naturally interpreted by the judgement  ·γ ∨ ¬γ, and not
by the meta-problem that interprets ·γ ∨ ¬γ. It should be noted here that Heyting,
in his review of Kolmogorov’s problem interpretation [81], already chose to interpret a
formula prefixed by the ⊢ symbol as a judgement and not a problem (though without
any mention of a general method).
The “correction”, if it indeed occurs, may have some philosophical implications. Kol-
mogorov has claimed that in his calculus of problems, “there is no need for any special,
e.g. intuitionistic, epistemological presuppositions” (cf. his quote in §3.4). But he ar-
guably did not quite achieve this stated goal, because he appears to implicitly refer to the
28Brouwer’s four “insights” intended to summarize his work in intuitionism; the third is the shortest, and
essentially reiterates after 20 years the identification discussed in §3.6 — except that this “Third insight”
taken alone can be seen as a definition of the principle of excluded middle. The “principle of decidability
of every mathematical problem”, originally formulated by Hilbert (see §3.4), hardly intended to assert
a general method for settlement of all mathematical problems. However, it is likely that Brouwer, with
his philosophy that all mathematical statements should be read constructively, did actually mean this
principle to assert a general method — at least in the later paper [28]. See, for instance, footnote 6 in
[28], which guarantees this sort of reading for another principle.
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same epistemological presuppositions as Heyting.29 It is also arguable that our choice of
the judgement of existence instead of Kolmogorov’s implicit or Heyting’s explicit judge-
ments of knowledge does provide independence from “epistemological presuppositions”,
even if gained by the price of what Heyting called “faith in transcendental existence”.
On a more practical level, the switch from knowledge to existence corresponds to the
use of classical, rather constructive meta-logic (or meta-meta-logic in the setting of §4).
Let us now extend the above to the following informal interpretation of the ingredients
of the language of intuitionistic logic:
• each individual variable is interpreted by an element of a set 풟;
• each k-ary problem variable is interpreted by a contentful (e.g. mathematical)
problem with k parameters, each running over 풟;
• each formal connective or quantifier is interpreted according to the usual BHK
interpretation (see §3.7);
• a principle ·Φ is interpreted by the meta-problem of finding a general method of
solving all the contentful problems that result from all possible interpretations
of all problem variables that occur in Φ and all individual variables that occur
freely in Φ;30
•  ·Φ asserts that the meta-problem that interprets ·Φ has a solution.
To fix a name, we will call this the clarified BHK (or briefly cBHK) interpretation of
intuitionistic logic.
29According to Kolmogorov [108], “the formula [⊢ a∨¬a] reads as follows: to give a general method that
for every problem a either finds a solution of a or deduces a contradiction on the basis of such a solution!
In particular, when the problem a consists in proving a proposition, one must possess a general method
to either prove or reduce to a contradiction any proposition. If the reader does not consider himself
to be omniscient, he will probably determine that [⊢ a ∨ ¬a] cannot be on the list of problems solved
by him.” Let us note that this effectively appeals to an assumption regarding the reader’s knowledge.
Elsewhere in [108] Kolmogorov introduces a list of axioms of intuitinistic logic by stating that “we must
assume that the solutions of some elementary problems are already known. We take as postulates that
we already have solutions to the following groups A and B of problems. The subsequent presentation is
directed only to the reader who has solved all these problems”. Here Kolmogorov again clearly assumes
something regarding the reader’s knowledge. In fact, his assumption that solutions of certain problems
beginning with ⊢ are already known is not so different from Heyting’s epistemological definition of ⊢ [79]:
“To satisfy the intuitionistic demands, the assertion must be the observation of an empirical fact, that
is, of the realization of the expectation expressed by the proposition p. Here, then, is the Brouwerian
assertion of p: It is known how to prove p. We will denote this by ⊢ p. The words ‘to prove’ must be
taken in the sense of ‘to prove by construction’.”
30In more detail, let ~x = (x1, . . . , xn) be the tuple of all individual variables that occur freely in Φ, let
~γ = (γ1, . . . , γm) be the tuple of all problem variables that occur in Φ, and let ~r = (r1, . . . , rm) be the
tuple of their arities. Then ·Φ is interpreted by the meta-problem ∀~Γ ∀ ~X (~γ, ~x 7→ Φ)(~Γ, ~X) of finding a
general method of solving all the contentful problems (~γ, ~x 7→ Φ)(~Γ, ~X) obtained from Φ by substituting
~x by an n-tuple ~X of elements of 풟 and ~γ by an m-tuple ~Γ = (Γ1, . . . ,Γm) of contentful problems,
where each Γi has ri parameters running over 풟, and then applying the usual BHK interpretation to
interpret the connectives and quantifiers.
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3.12. The principle of decidability and its relatives
So is the principle of decidability valid on the clarified BHK interpretation? That is,
does there exist a general method31 of solving the problem Γ ∨ ¬Γ for every contentful
problem Γ?
If Gp is a group given by a finite presentation p (i.e. a finite list of generators and
relations), let Γp be the problem, Find an isomorphism between Gp and the trivial group
1. Then from any solution of Γp we can extract a proof that Gp ≃ 1 (by Kreisel’s
clarification), whereas from any solution of ¬Γp we can extract a proof that Gp 6≃ 1
(by our solution of ¬Γp → !¬?Γp). Hence any solution of Γp ∨ ¬Γp would tell us, in
particular, whether Gp is isomorphic to 1 or not (since any solution of Γ ∨ ∆ involves,
in the first place, an explicit choice between Γ and ∆).
Now if we have a general method of solving all problems of the form Γ ∨ ¬Γ, then in
particular we have a general method of solving the problem Γp∨¬Γp for all values of p. If
the latter general method is interpreted as an algorithm (in the sense of Turing machines)
with input p (which is perfectly consistent with Kolmogorov’s explanation of a general
method), then such a general method would yield an algorithm deciding whether Gp is
isomorphic to 1. But it is well-known that there exists no such algorithm.32 This shows
that the principle of decidability is not valid under the clarified BHK interpretation:
6 ·γ ∨ ¬γ.
In the next section (§3.13) we will review a much more elementary example, which shows
incidentally that it is not really necessary to interpret general methods constructively,
as algorithms.
Let us pause to note that we have not established validity, on the clarified BHK
interpretation, of the negated principle of decidability, ·¬γ ∨ ¬γ. For that we would
need a solution of ∀Γ !¬?(Γ∨¬Γ), that is, a general proof (=a general method to prove)
that each contentful problem of the form Γ ∨ ¬Γ has no solutions. But there exists no
such general proof, since, in fact, any problem of the form (∆→ ∆) ∨ ¬(∆ → ∆) does
have a solution. Thus we see, quite trivially, that
6 ·¬(γ ∨ ¬γ)
31One can also wonder about Hilbert’s conviction, that Γ ∨ ¬Γ admits a (possibly ad hoc) solution for
every contentful problem Γ. This judgement, which can be expressed as ∀Γ ?(Γ ∨ ¬Γ) in the above
notation, falls outside of the scope of intuitionistic logic on the clarified BHK interpretation,. A certain
extension QHC of both intuitionistic and classical logics, which includes additional connectives ? and
! (and no further connectives) is studied in the author’s papers [1], [2], [3]. Hilbert’s conviction is
naturally seen as an interpretation of the principle · ?(γ∨¬γ) in the language of QHC, which turns out
to be an independent principle with respect to QHC.
32The geometrically-minded reader might prefer the modification of this example based of S. P. Novikov’s
theorem (improving on an earlier result of A. A. Markov, Jr.), that for a certain sequence of finite
simplicial complexes K1,K2, . . . there exists no algorithm to decide, for any positive integer input n,
whether Kn is piecewise-linearly homeomorphic to the 5-dimensional sphere (see [31]).
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on the clarified BHK interpretation. In fact, a stronger assertion turns out to hold:
 ·¬¬(γ ∨ ¬γ);
thus on the clarified BHK interpretation, there exists a general proof (we will describe
it explicitly in §3.14, (32)) that for each problem Γ there exists no proof that Γ ∨ ¬Γ
has no solutions. Yet on the other hand, we have just seen a proof that the problem
∀p (Γp∨¬Γp) has no solutions. In particular, our former argument works also to establish
6 ·¬¬∀x (γ(x) ∨ ¬γ(x))
on the clarified BHK interpretation; this was originally observed by Brouwer, who pre-
sented “counterexamples to the freedom from contradiction of the Multiple Principle of
Excluded Middle of the second kind” [28; §2], and now is better known as independence
of the Double Negation Shift principle (see §5.6.1).
3.13. Medvedev–Skvortsov problems
Let us fix a set X, and consider the class of problems Γf of the form: Solve the equation
f(x) = 0, where f : X → {0, 1} is an arbitrary (set-theoretic) function. Thus a solution
of Γf is any x ∈ X such that f(x) = 0. Such problems will be called Medvedev–Skvortsov
problems with domain X. Of course, f is determined by the pair of sets
(
X, f−1(0)
)
.
Thus we may write a pair of sets, (X, Y ), to encode the problem Γf , where f : X → {0, 1}
is such that f−1(0) = Y . It is this language of pairs that was used by Medvedev [136],
[137], Skvortsov [183] and La¨uchli [119] (see also [179]). If풟 is a fixed set (the domain of
discourse) and k ∈ N, we may also consider k-parameter families of Medvedev–Skvortsov
problems with a fixed domain X. Every such family is encoded by a k-parameter family
of pairs of sets
(
X, Y (x1, . . . , xk)
)
, where x1, . . . , xk run over 풟. Here Y is a function
from 풟k to the set 2X of all subsets of X.
Let us consider the following interpretation of the ingredients of the language of intu-
itionistic logic.
• each nullary problem variable is interpreted by a pair of sets (X, Y );
• each individual variable is interpreted by an element of 풟;
• each k-ary problem variable is interpreted by a k-parameter family of pairs sets
of the form
(
X, Y (t1, . . . , tk)
)
, where each ti runs over 풟;
• each formal connective or quantifier is interpreted as follows:
– (X, Y ) |∧| (X ′, Y ′) = (X ×X ′, Y × Y ′);
– (X, Y ) |∨| (X ′, Y ′) = (X ⊔X ′, Y ⊔ Y ′);
– (X, Y ) |→| (X ′, Y ′) = (Hom(X,X ′), {f : X → X ′ | f(Y ) ⊂ Y ′});
– |×| = ({∅},∅);
– |∃|t (X, Y (t)) = (풟 ×X, {(d, x) ∈ 풟 ×X | x ∈ Y (d)});
– |∀|t (X, Y (t)) = (Hom(풟, X), {f : 풟 → X | ∀d ∈ 풟 f(d) ∈ Y (d)}).
• a principle ·Φ that contains occurrences of precisely m problem variables is in-
terpreted by a function |·Φ| that assigns to every m-tuple of sets X1, . . . , Xm
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a pair of sets (S, S ′), defined as follows. Let x1, . . . , xn be all individual vari-
ables that occur freely in Φ, let γ1, . . . , γm be all problem variables that oc-
cur in Φ, and let r1, . . . , rm be their arities. Upon substituting each xi by
some di ∈ 풟, and each γi by an ri-parameter family of pairs sets of the form(
Xi, Yi(t1, . . . , tri)
)
, and applying the above interpretation of the connectives and
quantifiers, we obtain an interpretation of Φ by a pair or sets (S, T ). Here S
depends only on ~X = (X1, . . . , Xm) and T = T (~d, ~Y ) is a subset of S that
depends additionally on ~d = (d1, . . . , dn) and ~Y = (Y1, . . . , Ym). The desired
pair |·Φ|( ~X) is (S, S ′), where S ′ is the intersection of the sets T (~d, ~Y ) over all
(~d, ~Y ) ∈ 풟n ×Hom(풟r1 , 2X1)× . . .× Hom(풟rm , 2Xm).
•  ·Φ asserts that the function |·Φ| assigns to every tuple of sets a pair (S, S ′)
with nonempty S ′.
This is very much in the spirit of the clarified BHK interpretation. Indeed, let us
recall that a pair of sets (X, Y ) is actually supposed to encode a problem whose set of
solutions is Y . Thus let us write (X, Y ) = Y . If we denote pairs of sets by Greek
letters, then we obtain, just like in §3.9:
• Γ |∧|∆ = Γ × ∆ ;
• Γ |∨|∆ = Γ ⊔ ∆ ;
• there is a map ℱ : Γ |→|∆ → Hom( Γ , ∆ ) (actually, a surjection);
• |×| = ∅;
• |∃|tΓ(t) = ⊔d∈풟 Γ(d) ;
• there is a map 풢 : |∀|tΓ(t) →∏d∈풟 Γ(d) (actually, a bijection).
Moreover, a “general method” of solving the problems encoded by
(
S, T (~d, ~Y )
)
for all
(~d, ~Y ) is naturally interpreted as a common solution to all these problems, i.e., an element
in the intersection of all the sets T (~d, ~Y ). And then of course such a general method exists
if and only if the intersection is nonempty. Thus the Medvedev–Skvortsov interpretation
of intuitionistic logic is arguably a formalization of the clarified BHK interpretation.
Let us now consider the interpretation of the principle of decidability, |·γ ∨ ¬γ|. It is
a function assigning to a set X the pair of sets (S,
⋂
Y⊂X T (Y )), where(
S, T (Y )
)
= (X, Y ) |∨| |¬|(X, Y ).
We have S = X ⊔Hom(X, {∅}) and T (Y ) = Y ⊔ {f : X → {∅} | f(Y ) ⊂ ∅}, that is,
T (Y ) =
{
Y ⊔∅, if Y 6= ∅;
∅ ⊔ Hom(X, {∅}), if Y = ∅.
Thus
⋂
Y⊂X T (Y ) = ∅. So the principle of decidability is not valid under the Medvedev–
Skvortsov interpretation.
3.14. Some intuitionistic validities
The point of the clarified BHK interpretation is that it provides a reasonable explanation
of intuitionistic validities, without relying on any formal system of axioms and inference
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rules. Although this explanation is highly informal, it works — and is often more helpful
than any formal calculus if one needs to quickly verify whether a given formula is an
intuitionistic validity.33
The order of precedence of connectives, quantifiers and the symbol · is (in groups of
equal priority, starting with higher precedence/stronger binding): 1) ¬, ∃ and ∀; 2) ∧
and ∨; 3) → and ↔; 4) · .
Another convention (perhaps obvious): we do not omit parameters of problem vari-
ables, e.g. in the formula ∀x (α ∨ β(y) ∨ γ(x, y)), α is a nullary problem variable, β is a
unary one and γ is a binary one. (This agrees with the notation of §4.)
3.14.1. Basic validities.
(1)  ·γ→ ¬¬γ
Given a problem Γ and a solution s of Γ, we need to produce a solution of ¬¬Γ by a
general method. Indeed, given a solution of ¬Γ, that is, a method turning solutions of
Γ into solutions of ×, we simply apply this method to s and get a contradiction.
(2) (contrapositive)  · (γ→ δ) −→ (¬δ→ ¬γ)
Indeed, from Γ→ ∆ and ∆→× we infer Γ→×.
(3)  ·¬γ ←→ ¬¬¬γ
This follows from (1): the “→” implication by substitution, and the “←” implication via
(2).
(4)  ·¬¬× ←→ ×
Here the “←” implication is a special case of (1), and the “→” implication can be
rewritten as  ·¬¬¬×, which by (3) is equivalent to  ·¬×. The latter is a special case
of  ·γ→ γ (where the problem Γ→ Γ has an obvious solution).
(5) (explosion)  ·×→ γ
If s is a solution of ×, then s does not exist; in particular, s is itself also a solution of
any given problem Γ.
(6)  ·¬δ ∨ γ −→ (δ→ γ)
Given a solution of ¬∆ ∨ Γ and a solution of ∆, we get a solution of × ∨ Γ, hence a
solution of Γ ∨ Γ. This yields a solution of Γ by considering two cases.
(7)  ·β ∨ γ −→ (¬β→ γ)
This follows from (6) with δ substituted by ¬β, using (1).
(8) (decidability implies stability)  ·γ ∨ ¬γ −→ (¬¬γ→ γ)
33Why do these informal BHK-arguments work? One possible answer is that they do just because they
are in fact sketches of proofs that the principles in question are satisfied in the sheaf-valued models of §6.
Intuitionistic logic is shown to be complete with respect to this class of models in §6, so by formalizing
these sketches one would indeed establish that the principles in question are intuitionistic validities.
Alternatively, one can interpret the informal BHK-arguments as textual representations of λ-terms (see
[93], [188; §4], [202; §10.8]) or, equivalently, as sketches of proofs that the principles in question are
satisfied in La¨uchli’s models [119]. In fact, there seems to be no significant difference between the two
alternatives (see [11]).
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This follows from (6) with δ substituted by ¬¬γ, using (3).
3.14.2. Quantifiers.
(9)  ·∃x ∀y γ(x, y) −→ ∀y ∃xγ(x, y)
Indeed, if we found an x0 and a method to turn every y into a solution of Γ(x0, y), then
we have a method to produce for every y an x and a solution of Γ(x, y).
Here is a good place to note that, like in classical logic, ∃ and ∀ can be thought of as
generalizations of ∨ and ∧. Thus similarly to (9) we get
(10)  ·∃x (γ(x) ∧ δ(x)) −→ ∃xγ(x) ∧ ∃x δ(x)
(11)  ·∀y γ(y) ∨ ∀y δ(y) −→ ∀y (γ(y) ∨ δ(y))
Intuitionistic logic features an additional connection: ∃ and ∀ behave as if they were
generalizations of ∧, and →, respectively.34 Thus similarly to (9) we also get
(12)  ·∃x (θ→ γ(x)) −→ (θ→ ∃xγ(x))35
Moreover, similarly to the obvious validities:  ·∀x ∀yγ(x, y) ←→ ∀y ∀xγ(x, y) and
 ·∃y ∃xγ(x, y) ←→ ∃x ∃y γ(x, y) we get something otherwise not so obvious:
(13)  ·∀x (θ→ γ(x)) ←→ (θ→ ∀xγ(x))
(14)  ·θ ∧ ∃xγ(x) ←→ ∃x (θ ∧ γ(x))
In addition, by specializing (11) we get
(15)  ·θ ∨ ∀xγ(x) −→ ∀x (θ ∨ γ(x))36
There are two more validities of the above sort. Firstly,
(16)  ·∀x (γ(x)→ θ) ←→ (∃xγ(x)→ θ)
Indeed, a solution of ∀x (Γ(x) → Θ) turns each x into a solution of Γ(x) → Θ. A
solution of ∃xΓ(x) → Θ turns any given x0 and solution of Γ(x0) into a solution of Θ.
These are obviously reducible to each other.
Secondly,
(17)  ·∃x (γ(x)→ θ) −→ (∀xγ(x)→ θ)37
Indeed, given an x0 and a solution of Γ(x0)→ Θ, and assuming a method of solving Γ(x)
for every x, we apply this method to x = x0 to get a solution of Γ(x0) and consequently
a solution of Θ.
(18)  ·¬∃xγ(x) ←→ ∀x¬γ(x)
(19)  ·∃x¬γ(x) −→ ¬∀xγ(x)38
These are special cases of (16) and (17).
34This connection is made precise in dependent type theory, where no distinction is made between the
domain of a variable, like 풟 in the BHK clauses for ∃ and ∀, and the set of solutions of a problem, like
that of Γ in the BHK clauses for ∧ and →.
35The converse implication is known as the Principle of Independence of Premise; see §5.2.2.
36The converse implication is known as the Constant Domain Principle; see §5.2.1 below.
37The converse implication is an independent principle; see §5.2.2.
38The converse implication is known as the Generalized Markov Principle; see §5.5.
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3.14.3. Distributivity.
(20)  ·θ ∧ (γ ∨ δ) ←→ (θ ∧ γ) ∨ (θ ∧ δ)
(21)  ·θ ∨ (γ ∧ δ) ←→ (θ ∨ γ) ∧ (θ ∨ δ)
Here (20) and the “→” implication in (21) follow similarly to (14) and (15).
The remaining implication says that if we have (i) either a solution of Θ, or a solution
of Γ, and (ii) either a solution of Θ, or a solution of ∆, then we can produce, by a general
method, (iii) either a solution of Θ, or solutions of Γ and ∆. Clearly, there is such a
general method which proceeds by a finite analysis of cases; in fact, there are two such
distinct methods mi, i = 1, 2, which in the case that we have two solutions of Θ select
the ith one.
(22)  · (θ→ γ) ∧ (θ→ δ) ←→ (θ→ (γ ∧ δ))
(23)  · (θ→ γ) ∨ (θ→ δ) −→ (θ→ (γ ∨ δ))39
These follow similarly to (13) and (12).
(24)  · (γ→ θ) ∧ (δ→ θ) ←→ ((γ ∨ δ)→ θ)
(25)  · (γ→ θ) ∨ (δ→ θ) −→ ((γ ∧ δ)→ θ)40
These follow similarly to (16) and (17).
(26) (exponential law)  · (α ∧ β→ γ) ←→ (α→ (β→ γ))
(27)  ·α ∧ (β→ γ) −→ ((α→ β)→ γ)
These are again similar to (16) and (17).
(28) (de Morgan law)  ·¬γ ∧ ¬δ ←→ ¬(γ ∨ δ)
(29) (de Morgan law)  ·¬γ ∨ ¬δ −→ ¬(γ ∧ δ)41
These are special cases of (24) and (25).
(30)  ·¬(γ ∧ δ) ←→ (γ→ ¬δ)
(31)  ·γ ∧ ¬δ −→ ¬(γ→ δ)
These follow from (26) and (27).
3.14.4. Consequences and refinements.
(32)  ·¬¬(γ ∨ ¬γ)
Indeed, a solution of ¬(Γ∨¬Γ) yields by (28) a solution of ¬Γ∧¬¬Γ, that is, a solution
of ¬Γ together with a method to turn such a solution into a contradiction.
(33)  · (γ→ ¬δ) ←→ (δ→ ¬γ)
This follows from (30).
(34)  · (¬¬γ→ ¬¬δ) ←→ (¬δ→ ¬γ)
This “idempotence of contrapositive” follows from (3) and (33).
(35)  · (¬¬γ→ ¬δ) ←→ (γ→ ¬δ)
39The converse implication is equivalent to the Go¨del–Dummett principle · (γ→ δ) ∨ (δ→ γ); see
§5.2.2.
40The converse implication, Skolem’s principle, is equivalent to the Go¨del–Dummett principle; see
§5.2.2.
41The converse implication is equivalent to Jankov’s principle ¬α ∨ ¬¬α, see Proposition 5.9 below.
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This follows from (33) and (3), or alternatively from (1), (2) and (3).
(36)  ·¬(γ ∧ ¬¬δ) ←→ ¬(γ ∧ δ)
(37)  ·¬(γ ∨ ¬¬δ) ←→ ¬(γ ∨ δ)
These follow from (30) and (28) respectively, using (3).
Surprisingly, (31) is a consequence of a reversible implication:
(38)  ·¬¬γ ∧ ¬δ ←→ ¬(γ→ δ)
Here the “←” implication follows from (28) and the contrapositive of (6).
Conversely, suppose we are given a solution of ¬¬Γ ∧ ¬∆ and a solution of Γ → ∆.
Then we have solutions of ¬∆, of ¬Γ → ×, and of ¬∆ → ¬Γ (the contrapositive).
Applying the latter to the solution of ¬∆, we get a solution of ¬Γ, and hence a contra-
diction.
(39)  ·¬(¬δ ∨ γ) ←→ ¬(δ→ γ)
This improvement on the contrapositive of (6) follows from (38) and (28).
(40)  ·¬(β ∨ γ) ←→ ¬(¬β→ γ)
This improvement on the contrapositive of (7) follows from (39) and (37).
(41)  ·¬(¬γ ∨ ¬δ) ←→ ¬¬(γ ∧ δ)
This improvement on the contrapositive of (29) follows from (39) and (30).
(42)  ·¬(γ ∧ ¬δ) ←→ ¬¬(γ→ δ)
This improvement on the contrapositive of (31) follows from (38) and (36).
(43)  ·¬¬γ ∧ ¬¬δ ←→ ¬¬(γ ∧ δ)
This follows from (41) and (28), or alternatively from (38) and (30).
(44)  · (¬¬γ→ ¬¬δ) ←→ ¬¬(γ→ δ)
This also follows from (38) and (30).
(45)  ·¬¬γ ∨ ¬¬δ −→ ¬¬(γ ∨ δ)42
This follows from (29) using (28).
(46)  ·¬¬∀xγ(x) −→ ∀x¬¬γ(x)43
(47)  ·∃x¬¬γ(x) −→ ¬¬∃xγ(x)44
Each of these follows from (19) using (18).
4. What is a logic, formally?
This chapter provides a rather unconventional introduction to basic first-order logic.
On the one hand, it aims at being relatively readable by including just enough detail
to make it possible for the interested reader to reconstruct the rest. (For instance, we
use parentheses without discussing their official treatment in the formal language.)
42The converse implication is equivalent to Jankov’s principle ¬α ∨ ¬¬α, see Proposition 5.9 below.
43The converse implication is known as the principle of Double Negation Shift; see §5.6.1.
44The converse implication is known as the Strong Markov Principle; see §5.5.
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On the other hand, we are much more careful about meta-level reasoning than is
usually done. Some reasons for doing this are discussed in the following Introduction.
4.1. Introduction
This Introduction is not formally used in the sequel; it is addressed to the reader who
has some acquaintance with logic textbooks and is wondering what is the point of yet
another treatment of basic first-order logic.
4.1.1. Two conceptions of a logic. We identify a logic with the collection of its derivable
rules (including derivable principles, i.e. derivable rules with no premisses). This is
equivalent to identifying a logic with its consequence relation. In the terminology of
Wo´jcicki [212; §1.6] and Blok–Pigozzi [24] this is the “inferential” conception of logic, as
opposed to the “formulaic” one, in which a logic is identified with the collection of its
derivable principles (or, equivalently, derivable formulas); these authors as well as Avron
[8] argue in favor of the inferential conception.
In particular, as noted by Wo´jcicki [212; §1.6.0], if the purpose of a logic is to elucidate
schemes of reasoning, then logical schemes of inferences found in a mathematical practice
that is considered to be in agreement with a logic L are captured by the derivable rules
of L; in general, these cannot be reconstructed from the derivable principles of L alone,
which capture only direct use of logical validities in the said mathematical practice.
The two conceptions of a logic ascribe somewhat different meanings to the notion of an
inference rule, which is related to the difference between derivable and admissible rules.
(A rule is called admissible if adding it as a new inference rule to the derivation system
does not affect the collection of derivable principles. Thus, the notion of admissibility
is “formulaic” in that it only depends on the collection of derivable principles.) In
classical logic, the difference between derivable and admissible rules exists but is rather
insignificant (see Examples 4.68 and 4.69, Remark 4.70 and Proposition 4.73 below).
So the entire issue of two different conceptions of a logic only really manifests itself in
intuitionistic and other non-classical logics.
4.1.2. What is a rule? Another variety of phenomena that one cannot fully appreciate by
only looking at classical logic is independent principles, as well as consequences between
them — and more generally, consequences between rules (see, however, Examples 4.75
and 4.82 and Proposition 4.74 concerning the situation with these in classical logic).
Analyzing such consequences is going to be quite helpful in the next chapter to get some
feel of how intuitionistic logic works.
Now, even to give a definition of derivable rules or consequences between principles,
some precise definition of a rule — and, in particular, of a principle — is needed. Indeed,
it is not so clear exactly what they are, since the formal language provides no syntax for
their usual side conditions such as “provided that x is not free in α” or “provided that t
is free for x in α(x)”, and a fortiori no formal rules for dealing with these side conditions.
Often principles and rules are treated as arbitrary infinitary collections of formulas (or
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of tuples of formulas). But this is clearly at odds with the fact that in essence they
are finite objects (written with finitely many symbols in logic textbooks). The well-
known workaround [162] (see also [47]): a rule is called structural if it is preserved by
all substitutions without anonymous variables (in the sense of Kleene [103]) — is clearly
still far from being a satisfactory solution.
The usual way to understand (and represent in writing) principles and rules as finite
objects is by means of schemata, which belong to the meta-language. While it is not
difficult to make this meta-language just as formal as the language itself (for example,
by regarding the set of terms and the sets of α-equivalence classes of n-formulas of the
language as semantic objects, and creating an obvious syntax to describe them), this
approach does not seem to be technically advantageous (see, however, [176], [152], [61]
concerning formal calculi of meta-variables, and [172; §3.7], [99] concerning schematic
rules). And, as it turns out, there is a good reason for not taking this path: the extra
level of linguistic abstraction (where syntax is regarded as an abstraction of semantics)
is actually an overkill, because the desired effect can already be achieved by means of the
usual λ-abstraction (where a function is regarded as an abstraction of the dependence
of a prescribed expression on prescribed variables).
4.1.3. Meta-logic. To get rid of side conditions of the form “provided that x is not free
in α”, we will use a meta-quantifier. In the author’s initial approach, the desired effect
was achieved by means of a device that is like a usual quantifier in that it binds an
(otherwise free) metavariable in a schema, but is invisible on the level of formulas, since
the binding is only used to specify which formulas are considered to be instances of the
schema. Thus it was natural to call this device a “meta-quantifier”.
However, by googling for the word meta-quantifier, the author discovered that a sim-
ilar, but much more convenient device has been used for the same purpose (of getting
rid of the side conditions) in the Isabelle theorem prover [148; §5.9], [157]. It has
also been called the “meta-quantifier” (e.g. in the index of the old manual [158]) but
for a somewhat different reason [157; §2.1]: it is the (universal) quantifier of Isabelle’s
meta-logic, which serves the purpose of a common ground for a number of different logics
supported by Isabelle.
This view of Isabelle and its creator Paulson that the meta-quantifier is really a
quantifier of the meta-logic turns out to be very beneficial. The side conditions do not
disappear, they are only relegated from rules to meta-rules, where they can be seen
to belong naturally. No schemata are needed whatsoever, because the meta-quantifier
operates on formulas. In this respect Paulson’s approach builds on the early tradition
of first-order logic, found in the textbooks by Hilbert–Ackermann [89], Hilbert–Bernays
[90], Church [32] (alongside the modern schematic approach) and P. S. Novikov [149],
[151]. In this tradition, one does not speak of any schemata, but only of formulas; instead,
the derivation system includes a substitution rule (see also Church [32] and Feferman [53]
for a comparison and the history of the two approaches). However, inference rules were
anyway stated in schematic form; and the substitution rule may be seen as problematic
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because it is not structural. In Paulson’s approach, inference rules involve no meta-
variables, and the substitution rule effectively becomes a meta-rule.
Another principal ingredient of Isabelle’s metalogic is the meta-implication, which
is closely related, in particular, to the entailment (the horizontal bar in rules) and to
the consequence (⊢) — not to be conflated with the implication (→) — in object logics.
These relations will be clarified below; the former is described implicitly in Paulson’s
example [157; §4.4, subsection “Hypothetical rules”], whereas of the latter Paulson only
notes that ⊢ is not the same as the meta-implication [157; Remark at the end of §3].
To summarize, meta-logic enables one to “explain” many standard notions in logic that
one just gets used to rather than understands in the traditional approach, as well as to
avoid some traditional ambiguities, which can easily lead to errors through mechanical
application of the official definitions.
4.1.4. Two conceptions of consequence. In mathematics, there are two ways to interpret
formulas with parameters. The following example is given in Kleene’s textbook [103;
§32]: the arithmetical formula (x + y)2 = x2 + 2xy + y2 begs to be understood as an
identity (valid for all natural numbers x), whereas the arithmetical formula x2+2 = 3x
begs to be understood as an equation (i.e., as a condition on x). There is no difference
in syntax to reflect this obvious distinction in meaning. But the latter is not illusory:
it is reflected in use. For, as noted by Avron [10], when “dealing with identities [...] the
substitution rule is available, and one may infer sin x = 2 sin x
2
cos x
2
from the identity
sin 2x = 2 sin x cosx. In contrast, [...] substituting x
2
for x everywhere in an equation is
an error”.
In first-order logic, similar phenomena in the use of substitution are normally associ-
ated with the distinction between free and bound variables: it is only bound variables
that can be harmlessly renamed.45 However, in all of the above examples, x is intended
(by Kleene and Avron) to signify a free variable (in the sense of first-order logic). Logi-
cians often speak of “fresh free variables”, which can be seen to behave like variables in
identities rather than equations. While this idea suffices for practical applications (cf.
[157; §7]), it does not seem to be appropriate for theoretical/foundational purposes.
Instead, the way that traditional first-order logic accounts for the semantic distinction
between “identities” and “equations” is by distinguishing two notions of syntactic conse-
quence and two corresponding notions of semantic consequence. Thus Kleene [103; §22,
§32] speaks of variables being varied or held constant in a deduction (effectively distin-
guishing two variants of syntactic consequence); whereas Avron [8], [9], [10] speaks of
truth and validity semantic consequence relations (both are mentioned also e.g. in the
Kolmogorov–Dragalin textbook [111]). The same sort of distinction is also thought to
exist in propositional modal logic [8], [9] (see also [76] and references there).
45In the words of Paulson, “The purpose of the proviso ‘x not free in ...’ is to ensure that the premise
may not make assumptions about the value of x, and therefore holds for all x.” [158; §1.2.2].
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However, the view that first-order logic (classical or intuitionistic) must include two
distinct consequence relations at the same time has never gained wide acceptance, pre-
sumably due to its technical inconvenience and philosophical awkwardness. Most authors
appear to believe that there is a unique, “true” consequence relation (either syntactic
or semantic), but then they disagree with each other on which one it is. Thus, the
“truth”/“fixed variables” approach, corresponding to the equational interpretation of free
variables, is chosen e.g. by Church [32], Enderton [48], Troelstra [200] and van Dalen
[207]; whereas the “validity”/“varied variables” approach, corresponding to the identity
interpretation of free variables, is chosen e.g. by Shoenfield [181] and, in the syntactic
part, by Mendelson [141].
Each of the two approaches has its advantages. In particular, with the “validity”/“varied
variables” approach, the unrestricted Hilbert-style generalization rule holds (and so the
notion of a rule does not have to be very complicated). With the “truth”/“fixed variables”
approach, the unrestricted deduction theorem holds (and so proof-theoretic formalisms
such as sequent calculus and natural deduction apply in their usual form). The two
approaches are discussed and compared — with the opposite conclusions reached — by
Blok–Pigozzi [24] and Hakli–Negri [76].
The meta-quantifier offers a somewhat different outlook on these issues, which finally
clarifies the picture. There is only one consequence relation (coming from the meta-
logic), from which both traditional ones can be easily recovered. An appropriate form of
the generalization rule holds without restrictions (and so the notion of a rule does not
have to be complicated; in fact, as discussed above, it is simpler than in either of the
traditional approaches). The deduction theorem holds without restrictions — or rather
under the automatic restriction that the meta-quantifier cannot be used inside a formula
(because logical connectives and quantifiers cannot operate on expressions that involve
meta-logical ones).
4.2. Typed expressions
This section is mostly standard material (cf. [188], [64], [121]), apart from some devi-
ations in notation and terminology, which opt for a more mathematical (rather than
computer science) style, and some additional conventions in §4.2.4, §4.2.5.
4.2.1. Simply typed λ-calculus. One fixes a collection of base types (we will encounter
only three base types: of terms, of formulas, and of meta-formulas). Arbitrary types (or
in more detail types of λ-expressions)46 are defined as follows:
(1) base types are types;
(2) if Γ and ∆ are types, then so is Γ → ∆;
(3) if Γ and ∆ are types, then so is Γ×∆.
46These are also called “arities” following Martin-Lo¨f (see [147; §3.6]), but we will use the word “arity”
in its traditional sense.
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For each type ∆, one may fix a collection of constants of type ∆. For each type
∆, one always has a countable ordered collection of variables of type ∆, denoted x∆i ,
i = 1, 2, . . . . (Thus, by saying “x is a variable of type ∆” we mean that x = x∆i for some
i.) Arbitrary expressions47 of type ∆ are defined as follows, where T : ∆ denotes the
relation “T is an expression of type ∆”:
(1) a constant of type ∆ is an expression of type ∆;
(2) a variable of type ∆ is an expression of type ∆;
(3) (λ-abstraction) if T : ∆ on the assumption that x is a variable of type Γ, then
x 7→ T : Γ → ∆;48
(4) (function application) if F : ∆ → Γ, and T : ∆, then F (T ) : Γ;49
(5) (tuples) if S : Γ and T : ∆, then (S, T ) : Γ×∆.
(6) (projections) if Γ, ∆ are types, then p1 : Γ×∆ → Γ and p2 : Γ×∆ → ∆.
We will abbreviate F
(
(S, T )
)
by F (S, T ), and usually also
(
F (T )
)
(S) by F (T )(S) and
pi(T ) by piT .
Example 4.1. Let R be a type with one constant for each real number. Then addition
of real numbers (x, y) 7→ x+y is of type R×R → R; integration of functions (f, (a, b)) 7→∫ b
a
f(x) dx is of type (R → R) × (R × R) → R; and the differential f 7→ df is of type
(R → R) → (R → (R → R)). (This example ignores some complications such as non-
differentiable functions, etc.)
Example 4.2. Given F : Θ → Γ and G : Γ → ∆, we can define their composition
G ◦ F : Θ → ∆ by r 7→ G(F (r)). Thus ◦ : (Θ → Γ) × (Γ → ∆) → (Θ → ∆) is the
following expression: q 7→
(
r 7→ p1(q)
(
p2(q)(r)
))
.
Example 4.3. In first-order logic as treated e.g. in Isabelle, we have a type of terms,
which will be denoted below by 0, and a type of formulas, which will be denoted below
by 1. Then a quantifier is a constant of type (0 → 1) → 1. If q is a quantifier, the
expression q(x 7→ F ) is customarily denoted by qxF . (So e.g. for the universal quantifier
∀ : (0→ 1)→ 1 this takes the usual form ∀xF .)
Remark 4.4. Throughout this section we will continue to denote variables by lowercase
Roman letters, constants by lowercase Fraktur letters, unknown terms by uppercase
Roman letters, compound terms that are specific (at least up to α-equivalence, which
is defined below) by uppercase Fraktur letters; and unknown types by uppercase Greek
letters. These letters all represent metavariables in that they do not themselves belong
to λ-calculus, as opposed to the variables x∆i , the constants pi, specific base types and
their specific constants (these will introduced in the next section). It should also be
noted that the indices of the variables x∆i are plain numbers (i.e., sequences of bars, such
47In λ-calculus, these are usually called “terms”, but we reserve this word for expressions of one specific
type, in accordance with the terminology of first-order logic.
48In λ-calculus, x 7→ T is usually written as λx.T , but we will use the traditional mathematical notation.
49In λ-calculus, F (T ) is usually written as FT , but we will normally use the more customary mathe-
matical notation. In some cases we do resort to FT , regarding it as an abbreviation for F (T ).
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as |||||, abbreviated as usual by means of decimal notation) and not numeric expressions;
thus x∆
101010
is not an expression of type ∆, but only an informal meta-expression that
may be taken as a euphemism referring to an actual expression of type ∆ (which is
unprintable).
Abstraction binds variables; variables that are not bound by an abstraction are called
free. More precisely, whether a variable x of some type occurs freely in an expression
T of some type is determined by the following recursive definition (recursion over the
number of symbols in T ). Let y be a variable distinct from x (i.e. x = xΓi and y = x
∆
j
where either Γ 6= ∆ or i 6= j), let c be a constant of some type and F , R and S be
expressions of some types. Then:
(1) x occurs freely in x;
(2) x does not occur freely in y;
(3) x does not occur freely in c;
(4) x occurs freely in (R, S) if it occurs freely in R or in S;
(5) x occurs freely in F (R) if it occurs freely in F or in R;
(6) x does not occur freely in x 7→ R;
(7) x occurs freely in y 7→ R if it occurs freely in R.
For example, x does not occur freely in x 7→ x; but y occurs freely in (x 7→ x)(y). Also,
f and g occur freely in (f 7→ f)
(
x 7→ f(g(x))).
An expression of some type is closed if no variable of any type occurs freely in it.
Example 4.5. A closed expression E :
(
Λ → (∆ → Γ)
)
→
(
(Λ → ∆) → (Λ → Γ)
)
can
be defined by f 7→
(
g 7→
(
l 7→ f(l)(g(l)))).
Example 4.6. A closed expression D :
(
(∆ → Γ) → Θ
)
→
((
∆ → (Λ → Γ)
)
→ (Λ →
Θ)
)
can be defined by f 7→
(
g 7→
(
l 7→ f(t 7→ g(t)(l)))).
4.2.2. Substitution. Let T : ∆, and let x be a variable of type ∆. The (capture-avoiding,
strict) substitution S|x:=T , where S : Γ, is, when defined, an expression of type Γ, which
is determined recursively as follows. Let y be a variable distinct from x, let c be a
constant of some type and F , R and S be expressions of some types. Then:
(1) x|x:=T = T ;
(2) y|x:=T = y;
(3) c|x:=T = c;
(4) (R, S)|x:=T = (R|x:=T , S|x:=T );
(5) F (R)|x:=T = (F |x:=T )(R|x:=T );
(6) x 7→ R|x:=T = x 7→ R;
(7) y 7→ R|x:=T =
{
undefined, if x occurs freely in R and y occurs freely in T ;
y 7→ (R|x:=T ) otherwise.
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Of course, the recursion halts once it reaches the “undefined” case, and in this event
S|x:=T is set to be undefined.
Example 4.7. In the notation of Example 4.3, suppose that > is a constant of type
0×0→ 1 and + is a constant of type 0×0→ 0, and let us write x > y to mean >(x, y)
and x+ y to mean +(x, y). Then
• ∀x x > y|y:=y+z = ∀x x > y + z;
• ∀x x > y|y:=x+z is undefined;
• ∀x x > y|x:=y+z = ∀x x > y.
The following auxiliary definition will be needed on several occasions. A relation ≻
on expressions is called compatible if it satisfies the following conditions, where x is a
variable of some type, and F,G,R, S, T are expressions of some types.
(1) if S ≻ T , then x 7→ S ≻ x 7→ T ;
(2) if S ≻ T , then F (S) ≻ F (T );
(3) if F ≻ G, then F (T ) ≻ G(T );
(4) if S ≻ T , then (R, S) ≻ (R, T ) and (S,R) ≻ (T,R);
(5) if S ≻ T , then p1S ≻ p1T and p2S ≻ p2T .
Two expressions are considered to be the same for all practical purposes if one can be
obtained from another by renaming of bound variables. In more detail, the α-equivalence
relation is the least compatible equivalence relation on expressions of arbitrary types such
that whenever x, y are variables of some type and T is an expression of some type,
• if y does not occur freely in T and T |x:=y is defined, then x 7→ T α= y 7→ (T |x:=y).
Clearly, α-equivalent expressions are always of the same type. Two α-equivalent expres-
sions are also said to be obtained from one another by α-conversion.
Example 4.8. x 7→ (y 7→ F (x, y)) is α-equivalent to a 7→ (b 7→ F (a, b)) and to
y 7→ (x 7→ F (y, x)). However, x 7→ (y 7→ x) is not α-equivalent to y 7→ (x 7→ y)
(because of the free variable).
Also, x 7→ (x 7→ x) is α-equivalent to x 7→ (y 7→ y) and to y 7→ (x 7→ x) but is
not α-equivalent to y 7→ (x 7→ y). Informally speaking, since bound variables can be
renamed, they are essentially only nameless placeholders. In particular, once a variable
gets bound (like in x 7→ x), it loses its name to an outside observer; this name may then
be recycled (like in x 7→ (x 7→ x)), should one need to do so.
The point of α-equivalence that if a substitution S|x:=T is undefined, then we can
replace S by an α-equivalent term S ′ so that S ′|x:=T is defined. (For example, x 7→
f(y)|y:=g(x) is undefined, but becomes defined upon renaming x in x 7→ f(y) into z.) Al-
though S ′ can be chosen in many ways, the result will be well-defined up to α-equivalence.
Let us note that the α-equivalence class S|αx:=T includes the results (when they are
defined) of all substitutions of the form S ′|x:=T ′, where S ′ is α-equivalent to S and T ′
is α-equivalent to T . This is useful, for instance, since one can always make a double
substitution of the form (S|x:=T )|y:=U defined by replacing S and T by α-equivalent terms
(see [188]).
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4.2.3. βη-equivalence. The relation of β-reduction is the least compatible relation such
that
(1) every expression of the form (x 7→ S)(T ) β-reduces to S|x:=T ;
(2) every expression of the form pi(T1, T2) β-reduces to Ti for i = 1, 2;
(3) α-equivalent expressions β-reduce to each other.
For example, (x 7→ x)(T ) β-reduces to T ; and (x 7→ T )(x) β-reduces to T .
Example 4.9. In Example 4.5, E(F )(G)(L) β-reduces F (L)
(
G(L)
)
in three steps. In
Example 4.6, D(F )(G)(L) β-reduces to F (t 7→ G(t)(L) in three steps.
Example 4.10. The expression
(
f 7→ f(z))(x 7→ (z 7→ x)) β-reduces to f(z)|f :=x 7→(z 7→x).
This substitution is defined, with the result
(
x 7→ (z 7→ x))(z). But the latter β-reduces
to z 7→ x|x:=z, which is not defined. Up to α-equivalence, this is the same as y 7→ x|x:=z,
which evaluates to y 7→ z.
The relation of η-reduction is the least compatible relation such that
(1) every expression of the form x 7→ F (x), where x does not occur freely in F ,
η-reduces to F ;
(2) every expression of the form
(
p1T,p2T
)
η-reduces to T ;
(3) α-equivalent expressions η-reduce to each other.
Let us note that η-reduction converts between functions that return the same output on
the same input (possibly by employing different algorithms).
The inverse of a β- or η-reduction is called a β- or η-expansion.
The βη-equivalence is the least compatible equivalence relation on expressions of arbi-
trary types generated by β-reduction and η-reduction. Clearly, βη-equivalent expressions
are always of the same type. We will denote βη-equivalence by the symbol =.
Example 4.11. Let us construct closed expressions F : (Θ×Γ→ ∆) → (Θ→ (Γ → ∆))
and G :
(
Θ → (Γ→ ∆)
)
→ (Θ× Γ → ∆) such that F(G(G)) = G and G(F(F )) = F .
We define F by f 7→
(
r 7→ (s 7→ f(r, s))) and G by g 7→ (q 7→ g(p1q)(p2q)).
F
(
G(G)
) β
= F
(
q 7→ G(p1q)(p2q)) β= r 7→ (s 7→ f(r, s))∣∣∣
f :=q 7→G(p1q)(p2q)
= r 7→
(
s 7→
(
q 7→ G(p1q)(p2q))(r, s)) β= r 7→ (s 7→ (G(p1q)(p2q)∣∣q:=(r,s)))
= r 7→
(
s 7→ G(p1(r, s))(p2(r, s))) β= r 7→ (s 7→ G(r)(s)) η= r 7→ G(r) η= G.
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Also,
G
(
F(F )
) β
= G
(
r 7→ (s 7→ F (r, s))) β= q 7→ g(p1q)(p2q)∣∣∣
g:=r 7→(s 7→F (r,s))
= q 7→
(
r 7→ (s 7→ F (r, s)))(p1q)(p2q) β= q 7→ (s 7→ F (r, s)∣∣r:=p1q)(p2q)
= q 7→
(
s 7→ F (p1q, s))(p2q) β= q 7→ (F (p1q, s)|s:=p2q) = q 7→ F (p1q,p2q)
η
= q 7→ F (q) η= F.
Remark 4.12. Here is an alternative argument, which uses (in addition to β- and η-
reductions) also η-expansions (but is perhaps conceptually clearer).
We have F(F )
β
= r 7→ (s 7→ F (r, s)), and consequently F(F )(R) β= s 7→ F (R, s), and
hence also F(F )(R)(S)
β
= F (R, S).
Also, G(G)
β
= q 7→ G(p1q)(p2q), and therefore G(G)(Q) β= G(p1Q)(p2Q), and hence
also G(G)(R, S)
β
= G(R)(S).
Thus F
(
G(G)
)
(R)(S) = G(G)(R, S) = G(R)(S).
Also, G
(
F(F )
)
(R, S) = F(F )(R)(S) = F (R, S).
Finally,
G
(
F(F )
) η
= q 7→ G(F(F ))(q) η= q 7→ G(F(F ))(p1q,p2q) = q 7→ F (p1q,p2q)
η
= q 7→ F (q) η= F.
Also,
F
(
G(G)
) η
= r 7→ F(G(G))(r) η= r 7→ (s 7→ F(G(G))(r)(s)) = r 7→ (s 7→ G(r)(s))
η
= r 7→ G(r) η= G.
Example 4.13. Let us construct closed expressions A : Γ × ∆ → Γ × (Γ → ∆) and
B : Γ× (Γ → ∆) → Γ×∆ such that B(A(Q)) = Q, but in general A(B(Q)) 6= Q.
We set A = q 7→ (p1q, s 7→ p2q) and B = q 7→ (p1q, p2(q)(p1q)).
Then A(S, T )
β
= (S, s 7→ T ) and B(S, F ) β= (S, F (S)).
Hence B
(
A(S, T )
)
= B(S, s 7→ T ) β= (S, T ). It follows that B(C(Q)) = Q.
However, A
(
B(S, F )
)
= A
(
S, F (S)
)
=
(
S, s 7→ F (S)) 6= (S, s 7→ F (s)) η= (S, F ).
4.2.4. Simultaneous substitution.
Convention 4.14. For n ≥ 2 let us write ∆1×. . .×∆n+1 to mean (∆1×. . .×∆n)×∆n+1
and (T1, . . . , Tn+1) to mean
(
(T1, . . . , Tn), Tn+1
)
. We also write pi : ∆1×. . .×∆n+1 → ∆i
to mean pi ◦ p1 for i ≤ n and to mean p2 for i = n + 1.
We abbreviate F
(
(T1, . . . , Tn)
)
by F (T1, . . . , Tn). We also write ∆
n for the n-tuple
product ∆× . . .×∆.
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We will further identify ∆1×∆2×∆3 with ∆1× (∆2×∆3) via the “function” of type
∆1 ×∆2 ×∆3 → ∆1 × (∆2 ×∆3), defined by q 7→
(
p1q,
(
p2q,p3q
))
, and the “function”
of type ∆1×(∆2×∆3) → ∆1×∆2×∆3, defined by q 7→
(
p1q,p1
(
p2q
)
,p2
(
p2q
))
, which
are easily seen to be mutually inverse.
By an iterated use of this identification we also identify ∆1×. . .×∆n with any iterated
product of ∆1, . . . ,∆n.
For each i = 1, . . . , n let Ti : ∆i, and let xi be a variable of type ∆i. Let us write
~x := (x1, . . . , xn) and ~T := (T1, . . . , Tn), and also ~x|kˆ and ~T |kˆ for the same tuples with xk
and Tk omitted. The (capture-avoiding, strict) simultaneous substitution S|~x:=~T , where
S : Γ, is, when defined, an expression of type Γ, which is determined recursively as
follows. Let y be a variable distinct from each xi, let c be a constant of some type and
F , R and S be expressions of some types. Then:
(1) xk|~x:=~T = Tk;
(2) y|~x:=~T = y;
(3) c|~x:=~T = c;
(4) (R, S)|~x:=~T = (R|~x:=~T , S|~x:=~T );
(5) F (R)|~x:=~T = (F |~x:=~T )(R|~x:=~T );
(6) xk 7→ R|~x:=~T = xk 7→ (R|~x|kˆ:=~T |kˆ);
(7) y 7→ R|~x:=~T =

undefined, if for some i,
xi occurs freely in R and y occurs freely in Ti
y 7→ (R|~x:=~T ) otherwise.
Example 4.15.
(
(x, y)|x:=y
)∣∣
y:=x
= (y, y) and
(
(x, y)|y:=x
)∣∣
x:=y
= (x, x). However,
(x, y)|x:=y, y:=x = (y, x).
Example 4.16. Somewhat unexpectedly, G
(
x 7→ (y 7→ T )) = G(y 7→ (x 7→ T )).
Indeed, G
(
x 7→ (y 7→ T ))(R)(S) = (y 7→ T |x:=R)(S), where the substitution |x:=R is
undefined if y occurs freely in R. If z is a variable that does not occur freely in R and
T , then up to α-equivalence we have
(y 7→ T |x:=R)(S) =
(
z 7→ (T |y:=z)|x:=R)(S) =
(
(T |y:=z)|x:=R
)∣∣
z:=S
= T |x:=R,y:=S.
Similarly, G
(
y 7→ (x 7→ T ))(R)(S) = T |x:=R, y:=S, and the assertion follows.
Convention 4.17. If x0, . . . , xn are variables of types ∆0, . . . ,∆n, and T : ∆, an ex-
pression
x0, . . . , xn 7→ T
of type ∆0 × . . . × ∆n → ∆ is defined recursively as G
(
x0 7→ (x1, . . . , xn 7→ T )
)
(see
Convention 4.14). Thus, for instance,
(
x, y 7→ (x, y))(y, x) = (y, x).
Up to α-equivalence, x1, . . . , xn 7→ T is the same as q 7→ T |x1:=p1q, ..., xn:=pnq, where q is
a variable of type ∆1 × . . .×∆n that does not occur freely in T . The new expression is
defined without recursion, but is well-defined only up to α-equivalence (because of the
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variable q). Let us note that the substitutions |xi:=piq commute, since no xj occurs in
the expression piq. So it does not matter if we make them simultaneously or in some
order.
Remark 4.18. If ~x denotes an n-tuple of variables of some types with n > 0, one may use
the notation ~x 7→ T as if it were an expression of the appropriate type — and not just an
abbreviation for such an expression. In particular, we have a version of the β-reduction:
(~x 7→ S)(~T ) = S|~x:=~T , and a version of the η-reduction: ~x 7→ F (~x) = F .
One may also use the notation ~T as if it were an expression of the appropriate type
— and not just an abbreviation for such an expression. We have a version of the β-
reduction: pi(T1, . . . , Tn) = Ti, and a version of the η-reduction: (p1T, . . . ,pnT ) = T .
However, one must be careful not to assume that this all works also for n = 0, since it
does not. Something much more involved does [36] (see also [38]).
Convention 4.19. We will regard ∆0 × Γ, Γ×∆0 and ∆0 → Γ as abbreviations for Γ
(without attempting to define ∆0).
4.2.5. Free substitution. It is well-known (see e.g. [188], [121]) that for every expression
T of any type ∆ there exists an expression T0 : ∆ such that T βη-reduces to T0, and if
T βη-reduces to T1, then T1 βη-reduces to T0; moreover, every T
′
0 satisfying the same
property is α-equivalent to T0. Such a T0 is called a normal form of T ; and if T is its
own normal form, it is said to be in normal form. (For our purposes the normal form
could be replaced in what follows by the β-normal form, which is defined similarly using
β-reduction.)
If T0 is a normal form of T , and some βη-reduction of T to T0 involves no α-conversions,
then T0 will be called a strict normal form of T , and T will be said to have a strict normal
form. It is not hard to see that when a strict normal form of a λ-expression T exists,
it is unique (as a λ-expression, and not just up to α-equivalence). Clearly, T is its own
strict normal form if and only if it is in normal form.
If S is in normal form, and the expression (~x 7→ S)(~T ) has a strict normal form,
where ~x = (x1, . . . , xn), ~T = (T1, . . . , Tn), each xi is a variable of some type ∆i, and
each Ti : ∆i, then this strict normal form of (~x 7→ S)(~T ) will be denoted by S[~x/~T ], or
in more detail by S[x1/T1, . . . , xn/Tn], and ~T will be called free for (substitution for) ~x
in S, or in more detail T1, . . . , Tn will be called free for (simultaneous substitution for)
x1, . . . , xn in S.
4.3. Languages and structures
4.3.1. Terms and n-terms. A first-order language ℒ provides, in particular, formal
means to speak about individuals, which are the elements of a certain nonempty set
풟, called the domain of discourse. For instance, if ℒ is the standard language of arith-
metic, a good choice for풟 would be the set of natural numbers. Now풟 and its elements
are regarded as “semantic” objects, whereas ℒ itself is about “syntax” only. This means,
in particular, thatℒ does not refer on its own to the elements of any specific set 풟, but
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is capable of doing it in multiple ways. One particular way is specified by anℒ-structure
풾, also known as an interpretation of ℒ, which includes a choice of a set 풟 along with a
number of other choices. The formal definitions of ℒ and 풾 will be summarized at the
end of §4.3.2, once we will have introduced all of their ingredients.
The “individual” fragment ofℒ is can be formulated in terms of a base type, which we
denote 0. The variables x01, x
0
2 , . . . of this type are the individual variables of the language
ℒ. For reasons of readability we will also use the alternative spelling a, b, c, . . . , x, y, z
for the first 26 ones, reserving an upright sans-serif font for this purpose. These are
abbreviations, and not metavariables, as they are determined by the specific identifica-
tions a = x01 , b = x
0
2, etc. Metavariables are used, for instance, in a phrase like “let a
and b be individual variables”, which amounts to saying “let a = x0i and b = x
0
j for some
unspecified i and j (possibly i = j)”.
ℒ may also contain function symbols (such as + and ∗), each standing for an operation
on 풟 (such as addition and multiplication of natural numbers) that inputs an n-tuple
of individuals (for some specified n ≥ 0) and outputs one individual. Thus an n-ary
function symbol ofℒ is a constant f of type 0n → 0, and its interpretation f풾 is an n-ary
operation 풟n → 풟. Nullary function symbols, which are constants of type 0 (such as 0
and 1), are called individual constants of ℒ and stand for specific individuals (such as
the natural numbers 0 and 1).
Terms ofℒ are defined inductively, as built out of individual variables using the func-
tion symbols. A sample term in the case of the language of arithmetic is (x+ 1) ∗ y + x.
Thus terms of ℒ are those expressions of type 0 that involve only variables of type 0,
tuples, function application, and a prescribed collection of constants of types 0n → 0.
(In particular, terms of ℒ do not involve λ-abstraction.)
If T is a closed term (i.e. a term that is a closed expression), its interpretation |T |풾
is a specific element of 풟. To interpret an arbitrary term T as an element of 풟, one
additionally needs a variable assignment 퓊, which assigns an individual 퓊(x) to each
individual variable x. Indeed, 퓊 extends in the obvious way to a function | · |퓊풾 : 풯 → 풟,
where 풯 =풯(ℒ) is the set of terms of ℒ. Thus for every term T we have |T |퓊풾 ∈ 풟.
It is often convenient to consider expressions of the form x1, . . . , xn 7→ T , where T
is a term and the xi are pairwise distinct individual variables (in other words, each
xi = x
0
in , where i1, . . . , in are pairwise distinct). We will call these n-terms; of course,
they are of type 0n → 0. Let us note that the arithmetical 1-terms x 7→ x+ y, y 7→ x+ y
and z 7→ x+ y should not be conflated, since application works differently for them:
(x 7→ x+ y)(t) = t+ y, (y 7→ x+ y)(t) = x+ t and (z 7→ x+ y)(t) = x+ y. One can de-
fine n-terms inductively, as built out of atomic k-terms, which are individual variables
and expressions of the form x 7→ x, where x is an individual variable, by using ap-
propriate lifts of the function symbols. For instance, using the lifted sum, from the
arithmetical 2-terms x, y 7→ x ∗ y and y, z 7→ 3 ∗ y one obtains the arithmetical 3-term
x, y, z 7→ x ∗ y + 3 ∗ y. (However, one does not obtain anything in this fashion from the
arithmetical 1-terms x 7→ x ∗ y and y 7→ y.)
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In more detail, every k-term can be lifted to a (k + l)-term by introducing l dummy
variables via Fl : (0
k
→ 0) → (0k × 0l → 0), defined by f 7→
(
q 7→ f(p1q)); and every
function symbol, f : 0n → 0, can be lifted to fm : (0
m
→ 0)n → (0m → 0) via Gm :
(0n → 0) →
(
(0m → 0)n → (0m → 0)
)
, c 7→
(
r 7→
(
q 7→ c(p1(r)(q), . . . ,pn(r)(q)))).
Thus fm(F1, . . . , Fn) = f ◦ (F1 × . . .× Fn), where F1 × . . .× Fn : 0m → 0n is defined by
q 7→ (F1(q), . . . , Fn(q)). Let us note that an interpretation of a function symbol induces,
via the analogue of Gm, an interpretation of its lifted version, which is by a function
Hom(풟m,풟)n → Hom(풟m,풟), where Hom(X, Y ) denotes the set of all maps X → Y .
Using the inductive construction of n-terms, every closed n-term F (i.e. an n-term
that is a closed expression) is interpreted by a specific function |F |풾 : 풟n → 풟. Also,
given a variable assignment 퓊, any n-term F is interpreted by a function |F |퓊풾 : 풟n → 풟.
Since λ-abstraction is traditionally not included in first-order languages, n-terms are,
strictly speaking, not included in the language for n > 0. This is not a serious issue,
since an n-term uniquely corresponds to a pair consisting of a term and an n-tuple of
pairwise distinct positive integers. However, there is no such simple connection between
terms and α-equivalence classes of n-terms.
4.3.2. Formulas. In fact, the languageℒ is not supposed to be a means to speak directly
of individuals, but rather of functions of individuals such as propositions or problems
about individuals or tuples of individuals. The case of 0-tuples amounts to proposi-
tions/problems without parameters, which are really the subject of zero-order logic —
but are also included in first-order logic.
Instead of dealing with actual human-language sentences expressing propositions or
problems, one fixes a set 풪 of mathematical objects, which can be thought of as Platonic
“ideas” (or rather Fregean “senses”) of propositions or problems (thus an element of 풪
is supposed to encode all propositions or problems without parameters that express the
same “idea” in different words). A function 풟m → 풪 can then be thought of as encoding
a proposition/problem with m parameters.
Of course, on assuming that a proposition has no “sense” beyond its “reference” (that
is, beyond its truth value), one must have 풪 = {0, 1}. However, even with classical
logic, there are more interesting options, discovered by Leibniz and Euler and reviewed
in §4.8.2 below.
Now these all are “semantic” objects, whereas ℒ itself is about “syntax” only. Thus,
a choice of 풪 is included not in the language ℒ, but in its interpretation 풾, which will
still include a number of further choices.
Now, just like elements of 풟 are represented by terms and other expressions of type
0, elements of 풪 will be represented by expressions of a new base type, 1. ℒ may
contain constants of type 0n → 1, which are called n-ary predicate constants. Thus
an n-ary predicate constant p is interpreted by a predicate |p|풾 : 풟n → 풪. Examples
include the arithmetical binary predicates = and < and the geometric ternary predicate
of betweenness (for points on a line).
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The variables x0
n
→1
1 , x
0n→1
2 , . . . of type 0
n
→ 1 for each n = 0, 1, 2 . . . are called the
predicate variables ofℒ. In dealing with classical logic (or modal logics based on classical
logic), we will also call nullary predicate variables propositional variables, and use the
nicknames a,b, c, . . . , x,y, z for the first 26 predicate variables of each arity, reserving
a fancy (Euler) upright serif font for this purpose. To indicate the arity of a predicate
variable f (here f is a metavaraible, in contrast to the abbreviations a,b, . . . , f, . . .), we
may write the appropriate η-expansion of f such as x 7→ f(x) or x, y 7→ f(x, y) instead
of f . (See Convention 4.17.) In dealing with intuitionistic logic (and its non-classical
extensions), the predicate variables can be called problem variables; in this case, we will
also write α,β,γ, . . . ,χ,ψ,ω for the first 24 ones of each arity, reserving also the Greek
part of the font.
The language ℒ may further contain constants of type 1n → 1, which stand for
logical operations, and are called n-ary connectives. Thus for every n-ary connective f,
its interpretation |f|풾 is a logical operation 풪n → 풪.
It should be noted that nullary connectives are the same kind of λ-expressions as
nullary predicate constants (all of them are constants of type 1). It is nevertheless
convenient to distinguish them, since connectives belong to the language of a logic,
whereas predicate constants only belong to the language of a theory over a logic.
ℒ may also contain constants of type (0 → 1) → 1, which are called quantifiers. A
quantifier q is interpreted by a function |q|풾 : Hom(풟,풪) → 풪. If q is a quantifier, F
is an expression of type 1, and x is an individual variable, then qxF abbreviates the
expression q(x 7→ F ). Here the individual variable x is bound by the λ-abstraction
7→; but traditionally it is also said to be bound by the quantifier. Also, F is called
the scope of (the occurrence of) the quantifier. Moreover, qx0, . . . , xn F abbreviates
qx0 (qx1, . . . , xn F ).
Example 4.20. The language of intuitionistic logic contains a nullary connective ×
(“absurdity”), which stands for a problem that has no solutions, binary connectives ∧
(“conjunction”), ∨ (“disjunction”) and → (“implication”; not to be confused with the
type constructor →), and quantifiers ∃ (“existential”) and ∀ (“universal”). There is no
redundancy between these ingredients of the language (see §5.8 below).
It is also convenient to add, as is often done, some “syntactic sugar” to the language
of intuitionistic logic: a logical constant X (“triviality”) is defined as × → ×; a unary
connective ¬ (“negation”) is defined as α 7→ α → × (thus X = ¬×), and a binary
connective ↔ (“equivalence”) is defined as α, β 7→ (α→ β) ∧ (β → α).
Example 4.21. The language of classical logic can be taken to be the same as that of
intuitionistic logic, except for the logical constants, which we will write as ⊤ (“truth”)
and ⊥ (“falsity”). (This complements our convention of denoting predicate variables by
Greek letters in the intuitionistic case and by Roman letters in the classical case). There
is additional redundancy here: the classical ∧ can be defined as p, q 7→ ¬(p → ¬q), the
classical ∨ as p, q 7→ ¬p→ q, and the classical ∃ as f 7→ ¬∀x¬f(x).
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Example 4.22. The language of a theory over classical or intuitionistic logic (for in-
stance, the “empty theory”, which has no axioms) may additionally contain finitely many
function symbols and/or predicate constants.
An atomic formula ofℒ is an expression of type 1 obtained by applying either an n-ary
predicate constant or an n-ary predicate variable to an n-tuple of terms. A formula ofℒ
is an expression built out of atomic formulas using the connectives and the quantifiers.
In other words, formulas are expressions of type 1 involving only variables of types 0 and
0n → 1, tuples, function application, a prescribed collection of constants of types 0n → 0,
0n → 1 and 1n → 1, and a prescribed collection of constants of type (0 → 1) → 1 used
in conjunction with certain specific λ-abstractions. (No other uses of λ-abstraction are
allowed.)
A formula is called closed (or “closed as a formula”) if individual variables do not occur
freely in it, and λ-closed (or “closed as a λ-expression”) if no variables occur freely in
it. The arithmetical formula ∀x, y (α(x, y) ∧ α(y, x)→ x = y) is closed, but not λ-closed.
The arithmetical formula ∀x, y, z (x+ z = y + z→ x = y) is λ-closed.
This completes our definition of a first-order language ℒ. Namely, it consists of the
following sets of typed λ-expressions (variables and constants only), where n ranges over
N = {0, 1, 2, . . .}:
(1n) of n-ary function symbols (of type 0
n
→ 0);
(2n) of n-ary predicate constants (of type 0
n
→ 1);
(3n) of n-ary connectives (of type 1
n
→ 1);
(4) of quantifiers (of type (0→ 1) → 1);
(5) of individual variables (of type 0);
(6n) of n-ary predicate variables (of type 0
n
→ 1);
Each of the sets (5), (6n) is countably infinite, and each of the remaining sets is required
to be finite. The sets (3n)–(6n) are called the purely logical part of the first-order language
ℒ. The set of terms 풯(ℒ) and the set of α-equivalence classes of formulas ℱ0(ℒ) can
be reconstructed from the sets (1)–(6), so they do not have to be included in ℒ.
The definition of an ℒ-structure 풾 is also complete: it consists of the sets 풟 and 풪
and of the following functions, where n ranges over N:
(1′n) from the set of n-ary function symbols to Hom(풟
n,풟);
(2′n) from the set of n-ary predicate constants to Hom(풟
n,풪);
(3′n) from the set of n-ary connectives to Hom(풪
n,풪);
(4′) from the set of quantifiers to Hom(Hom(풟,풪),풪).
We have not yet defined interpretation of formulas in an ℒ-structure; this will be
done next, with the aid of n-formulas.
4.3.3. n-Formulas and (n,~r)-formulas. By an n-formula we mean an expression of the
form x1, . . . , xn 7→ F , where the xi are pairwise distinct individual variables and F is
a formula. Thus n-formulas are of type 0n → 1; Kleene [103; §34] called them “name
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forms”. An n-formula is closed if individual variables do not occur freely in it, and λ-
closed if no variables occur freely in it. Let us note that quantifiers do not operate on
formulas, but rather transform a 1-formula into a formula; thus in some sense n-formulas
are inherent in first-order languages — even though traditionally these do not include
n-formulas.
It should be noted that an arbitrary formula can be viewed as a closed n-formula
applied to an n-tuple of individual variables; thus closed n-formulas can be viewed
as more fundamental than formulas. Moreover, an arbitrary k-formula can be viewed
as a closed (n + k)-formula pre-composed with an expression of the form x1, . . . , xn 7→
(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yk), where the xi and the yj are pairwise distinct individual variables.
Thus closed n-formulas can be viewed as more fundamental even than arbitrary k-
formulas.
Using k-formulas, one can give an alternative recursive description of formulas (and
n-formulas), which is particularly suitable for closed formulas (and closed n-formulas).
An atomic (closed) n-formula is an (n + k)-ary predicate variable or constant pre-
composed with a (closed) expression of the form x1, . . . , xn 7→ (T1, . . . , Tn+k), where
the xi are pairwise distinct individual variables and each Tj is a term. In particular,
each x1, . . . , xn 7→ Tj is a (closed) n-term. A (closed) n-formula is an expression built
out of atomic (closed) k-formulas using appropriate lifts of the connectives and the quan-
tifiers. For instance, using the lifted conjunction, from closed 2-formulas x, y 7→ ϕ(x, y)
and y, z 7→ ψ(y, z) one obtains the closed 3-formula x, y, z 7→ ϕ(x, y) ∧ ψ(y, z); and us-
ing the lifted existential quantifier, from the latter one obtains the closed 2-formula
x, z 7→ ∃yϕ(x, y) ∧ ψ(y, z).
In more detail, every k-formula can be made into a (k + l)-formula by introducing l
dummy variables via Fl : (0
k
→ 1)→ (0k×0l → 1), defined by f 7→
(
q 7→ f(p1q)); and
every connective on formulas, c : 1n → 1, can be made into a connective on m-formulas,
cm : (0
m
→ 1)n → (0m → 1), via Gm : (1
n
→ 1) →
(
(0m → 1)n → (0m → 1)
)
, defined by
c 7→
(
r 7→
(
q 7→ c(p1(r)(q), . . . ,pn(r)(q)))). Thus cm(F1, . . . , Fn) = c◦ (F1× . . .×Fn),
where F1 × . . . × Fn : 0m → 1n is defined by q 7→
(
F1(q), . . . , Fn(q)
)
. Also, every
predicate variable or predicate constant, ϕ : 0n → 1, can be lifted to an expression
ϕm : (0
m
→ 0)n → (0m → 1), so as to produce m-formulas out of m-terms, via Hm :
(0n → 1) →
(
(0m → 0)n → (0m → 1)
)
, which is defined similarly to Gm. Finally,
every formula quantifier, q : (0 → 1) → 1, can be made into an m-formula quantifier
qm : (0
m+1
→ 1) → (0m → 1) via Km :
(
(0 → 1) → 1
)
→
(
(0m × 0 → 1) →
(0m → 1)
)
, defined by q 7→
(
f 7→
(
r 7→ q(F(f)(r)))), where F is as in Example
4.11. Thus qm(y1, . . . , ym, ym+1 7→ F ) = y1, . . . , ym 7→ q(ym+1 7→ F ). Let us note that
interpretations of formula connectives and quantifiers induce, by using the analogues of
Gm, Hm and Km, interpretations ofm-formula connectives, predicate constants/variables
and quantifiers, which are, respectively, by functions Hom(풟m,풪)n → Hom(풟m,풪),
Hom(풟m,풟)n → Hom(풟m,풪) and Hom(풟m+1,풪)→ Hom(풟m,풪).
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A predicate valuation 퓋 assigns a function 퓋(ϕ) : 풟m → 풪 to each m-ary predicate
variable ϕ, for m = 0, 1, 2, . . . . (This will also be called simply “valuation”, especially
in the context of intuitionistic logic, where the “predicate variables” are really problem
variables.) Traditionally valuations are found only in zero-order logic, since modern
treatments of first-order logic do not include predicate variables in the language.
Given a predicate valuation 퓋, for every closed formula F we get a specific ele-
ment |F |퓋풾 ∈ 풪; and, more generally, for every closed n-formula F a specific function
|F |퓋풾 : 풟n → 풪. This function is defined straightforwardly using the previous recursive
description of closed n-formulas, and it is clear from this definition that it depends only
on the α-equivalence class of F . Let us note that if F is λ-closed, then |F |풾 := |F |퓋풾 does
not depend on 퓋.
Given a variable assignment 퓊, every predicate valuation 퓋 also yields, for each n =
0, 1, . . . , a function | · |퓊퓋풾 : ℱn → Hom(풟n,풪), where ℱn = ℱn(ℒ) is the set of α-
equivalence classes of arbitrary n-formulas of ℒ. Thus for every formula F we get a
specific element |F |퓊퓋풾 ∈ 풪, well-defined up to α-equivalence of F .
It is often convenient to consider expressions of the form ϕ1, . . . , ϕl 7→ F , where F
is an n-formula and the ϕi are pairwise distinct predicate variables of (not necessarily
distinct) arities r1, . . . , rm. We will call such an expression an (n; r1, . . . , rm)-formula, or
an (n,~r)-formula, where ~r = (r1, . . . , rm); it is of type
∏m
i=1(0
ri
→ 1) → (0n → 1). An
(n,~r)-formula is called closed if no individual variables occur freely in it, and λ-closed if
no variables occur freely in it. Similarly to the above, one can define lifted connectives,
predicate variables/constants and quantifiers for (n,~r)-formulas and use them to give an
inductive construction of (n,~r)-formulas. Given a predicate valuation 퓋 and a variable
assignment 퓊, an arbitrary (n; r1, . . . , rm)-formula G is interpreted, using this inductive
construction, by a function |G|퓊퓋풾 :
∏m
i=1Hom(풟
ri ,풪) → Hom(풟n,풪), which depends
only on the α-equivalence class of G. If G is closed, then |G|퓋풾 := |G|퓊퓋풾 does not depend
on 퓊; and if G is λ-closed, then |G|풾 := |G|퓋풾 does not depend on 퓋 either.
Remark 4.23. Let us note that λ-closed (n,~r)-formulas are similar to traditional schemata.
Indeed, term variables and ri-ary formula variables that occur in a schema can be con-
sidered as “blanks” that may be filled in by terms and by ri-formulas; to be precise, each
blank must be highlighted by a marker so that blanks of the same color are to be filled
in by the same term or ri-formula. Let us note, however, that these “blanks” themselves
do not correspond to any variables in the sense of λ-calculus, but rather to expressions
of the form v 7→ v, where v is an individual variable or a predicate variable.
4.3.4. Meta-formulas. We will now define the extension of the language ℒ by the lan-
guage of meta-logic — not to be confused with a meta-language of ℒ (which we do not
need to treat formally since what is usually expressed by meta-variables in schemata will
be achieved by means of the language of meta-logic). The additional ingredients of the
extension of ℒ are no longer specific to one’s choice of a logic (and for this reason we
need no separate notation for the extension); instead, they will be used to express meta-
problems (or rather their Platonic “ideas”/Fregean “senses”). Just like propositions and
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problems without parameters are interpreted by elements of the set 풪, meta-problems
without parameters will be interpreted by elements of another set 풬. We will further
assume that there is a “reflection” function ! : 풪 → 풬 converting a proposition into a
meta-problem asking one to prove it (or a problem into a meta-problem asking one to
solve this problem); and a “truth value” (or “meta-reflection”) function ? : 풬 → {‚,‚}
converting a meta-problem into a judgement (=meta-meta-proposition) asserting the
solubility of this meta-problem. The choice of 풬, ! and ? is included, along with a
choice of an ℒ-structure 풾 and some further data to be discussed in a moment, in a
meta-ℒ-structure 풿, also called a meta-interpretation of ℒ.
We will see in §4.7.1 that the usual, Tarski-style model theory corresponds to the
straightforward two-valued meta-interpretation 풿 = 풾+, which sets 풬 = {‚,‚} and
? = id no matter what 풪 is (i.e., meta-problems are postulated to have no observable
“sense” beyond their “reference”). However, we will also see in §7 that, in fact, a more
interesting option is contained in Kolmogorov’s implicit problem interpretation of the
meta-logic of intuitionistic logic [108]. Thus we leave 풬 unspecified at this point.
Now this all is semantics (or rather meta-semantics); to represent it syntactically, we
need yet another base type, to be denoted µ, along with a constant ! : 1 → µ. Thus
! is supposed to be an interpretation of !. Now any formula can be regarded, via !, as
an expression of type µ. In fact, this will be essentially our only source of “elementary”
expressions of type µ, since we are not going to use any variables of type µ. Thus, we
can already define an atomic meta-formula as an expression of the form !(F ), where F
is an arbitrary formula.
Arbitrary meta-formulas are built out of atomic meta-formulas using only the fol-
lowing constants: two meta-connectives and two varieties of a meta-quantifier (the
universal one). The meta-connectives are the meta-conjunction & : µ × µ → µ, and
the meta-implication ⇒ : µ × µ → µ.50 Their interpretations |&|풿 : 풬 × 풬 → 풬 and
|⇒|풿 : 풬 × 풬 → 풬 are supposed to express conjunction and implication between judge-
ments. Under the two-valued meta-interpretation these are given by the usual truth
tables, i.e., |&|풾+(q, r) =
‚
if and only if q = r =
‚
, and |⇒|풾+(q, r) = ‚ if and only if
q =
‚
and r = ‚. Then there is the first-order meta-quantifier q : (0→ µ)→ µ and the
n-ary second-order meta-quantifier qn : ((0
n
→ 1) → µ)→ µ for each n = 0, 1, 2, . . . . The
first-order meta-quantifier q is interpreted by a function |q|풿 : Hom(풟,풬)→ 풬; and the
n-ary second-order meta-quantifier qn by a function |qn|풿 : Hom(Hom(풟n,풪),풬
)→ 풬.
Under the two-valued meta-interpretation these behave like the classical universal quan-
tifier, i.e., |q|풾+(f) =
‚
if and only f(x) =
‚
for all x ∈ 풟, and |qn|풾+(f) =
‚
if and
only f(ϕ) =
‚
for all ϕ ∈ Hom(풟n,풪).
50The meta-absurdity, the meta-disjunction and the existential meta-quantifier are not really needed,
but will eventually be discussed as a side remark (see §4.6.3). All of these, as well as the meta-
conjunction, would be definable (see §4.6.3) in terms of quantification over variables of type µ (which
we do not include in our meta-logic, in contrast to Paulson).
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In practice, meta-quantifiers will be written like the old-style (early 20th century)
universal quantifiers,51 but with fancy parentheses ⟮·⟯ so as to avoid visual confusion
with the ordinary parentheses (·). Namely, if q : (∆ → µ) → µ is a meta-quantifier
(either of them), F is an expression of type µ, and x is a variable of type ∆, then
⟮x⟯ F abbreviates the expression q(x 7→ F). Here x is said to be bound by the meta-
quantifier, and F is called the scope of (the occurrence of) the meta-quantifier. Moreover,
⟮x0, . . . , xn⟯ F abbreviates ⟮x0⟯ (⟮x1, . . . , xn⟯ F), where the xi may be of different types.
This completes our definition of the meta-logical extension of ℒ: it consists of the
constants !, &, ⇒, q and q0, q1, . . . . Since these are fixed forever (in the present paper),
the set of meta-formulas can be reconstructed from ℒ alone.
The definition of a meta-ℒ-structure 풿 is also complete: it consists of anℒ-structure
풾, the set 풬, the maps ! and ?, and two elements |&|풿, |⇒|풿 of Hom(풬×풬,풬), an element
|q|풿 of Hom(Hom(풟,풬),풬) and an element |qn|풿 of Hom(Hom(Hom(풟n,풪),풬),풬) for
each n ∈ N.
When no confusion arises, we will omit the symbol ! in writing out expressions of type
µ. Accordingly, formulas will be regarded as special (namely, atomic) meta-formulas.
However, one should keep in mind that meta-connectives and meta-quantifiers cannot
be used inside of a formula.
As usual, F ⇔ G abbreviates (F ⇒ G) & (G ⇒ F); “⇔” is called meta-equivalence.
We will stick to the following order of precedence of logical and meta-logical symbols (in
groups of equal priority, starting with higher precedence/stronger binding):
(1) ¬, ∃ and ∀;
(2) ∧ and ∨;
(3) → and ↔;
(4) ⟮·⟯ ;
(5) &;
(6) ⇒ and ⇔.
By an n-meta-formulawe mean an expression of the form x1, . . . , xn 7→ F , where the xi
are pairwise distinct individual variables and F is a meta-formula. By an (n; r1, . . . , rm)-
meta-formula, or an (n,~r)-meta-formula, where ~r = (r1, . . . , rm), we mean an expression
of the form ϕ1, . . . , ϕm 7→ G, where the ϕi are pairwise distinct predicate variables of
(not necessarily distinct) arities n1, . . . , nm, and G is an n-meta-formula. Thus an (n,~0)-
meta-formula (where ~0 is the unique 0-tuple) is an n-meta-formula, and a 0-meta-formula
is a meta-formula. Let us call an (n,~r)-meta-formula closed if individual variables do
not occur freely in it, and λ-closed in no variables occur freely in it.
Like before, one can lift the meta-connectives and the varieties of the meta-quantifier
to the level of (n,~r)-meta-formulas, and use the lifts to give an inductive construction
of (n,~r)-meta-formulas. (Let us note that for a meta-formula F , such a recursive de-
scription will involve (n; r1, . . . , rm)-meta-formulas with n > 0 if F contains either a
51Peano’s notation for universal quantification, superseded by Gentzen’s analogue ∀ of Peano’s ∃.
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meta-level quantifier or a first-order meta-quantifier, and with m > 0 if F contains a
second-order meta-quantifier.)
Using this inductive construction, every (n; r1, . . . , rm)-meta-formula F along with a
variable assignment 퓊 and a predicate valuation 퓋 are easily seen to yield a function
|F|퓊퓋풿 :
∏m
i=1Hom(풟
ri ,풬) → Hom(풟n,풬). If F is closed, then this function, written
|F|퓋풿, does not depend on 퓊; and if F is λ-closed, then the function, written |F|풿, also
does not depend on 퓋.
In particular, a λ-closed meta-formula F is interpreted by a specific element |F|풿 ∈ 풬.
A closed meta-formula F along with a predicate valuation 퓋 yield an element |F|퓋풿 ∈ 풬.
Given a predicate valuation 퓋 and a variable assignment 퓊, an arbitrary meta-formula
F is interpreted by an element |F|퓊퓋풿 ∈ 풬.
Example 4.24. Let us parse the following λ-closed meta-formula:
⟮γ⟯ γ ∨ ¬γ.
We have omitted the reflection function, and here it is shown:
⟮γ⟯ !(γ ∨ ¬γ).
Let us also expand the meta-quantifier, so as to make the λ-abstraction explicit:
q0
(
γ 7→ !(γ ∨ ¬γ)).
Now let us assume that some meta-interpretation 풿 is given. Then the λ-closed
(0; 0)-formula γ 7→ γ ∨ ¬γ : 1→ 1 is interpreted by a function 풪 → 풪. Therefore γ 7→
!(γ ∨ ¬γ) : 1→ µ is interpreted by a function 풪 → 풬. Hence q0
(
γ 7→ !(γ ∨ ¬γ)) : µ is
interpreted by a specific element of 풬.
Example 4.25. Let us parse the following λ-closed meta-formula:
⟮γ⟯
(
⟮x⟯ γ(x)⇒ ∀xγ(x)).
We have omitted the reflection functions, and here they are shown:
⟮γ⟯
(
⟮x⟯ !
(
γ(x)
)⇒ !(∀xγ(x))).
Let us also expand the meta-quantifiers, so as to make the λ-abstractions explicit:
q1
(
γ 7→
(
q
(
x 7→ !(γ(x)))⇒ !(∀xγ(x)))).
Now let us assume that some meta-interpretation 풿 is given. Then the λ-closed
(0; 1)-formula γ 7→ ∀xγ(x) : (0→ 1) → 1 is interpreted by a function Hom(풟,풪)→ 풪
(namely, the interpretation of ∀), and the λ-closed (1; 1)-formula γ 7→ (x 7→ γ(x)) :
(0→ 1) → (0→ 1) is interpreted by a function Hom(풟,풪)→ Hom(풟,풪) (namely, the
identity function). Hence γ 7→ !(∀xγ(x)) : (0 → 1) → µ is interpreted by a function
Hom(풟,풪) → 풬, and γ 7→
(
x 7→ !(γ(x))) : (0 → 1) → (0 → µ) is interpreted by
a function Hom(풟,풪) → Hom(풟,풬). Next, γ 7→ q
(
x 7→ !(γ(x))) : (0 → 1) → µ is
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interpreted by a function Hom(풟,풪)→ 풬, and consequently
γ 7→
(
q
(
x 7→ !(γ(x)))⇒ !(∀xγ(x))) : (0→ 1) → µ
is also interpreted by a function Hom(풟,풪)→ 풬. Finally, the meta-formula in question
is interpreted by the interpretation of q1 applied to the latter function; this is a specific
element of 풬.
By a principle we mean a λ-closed meta-formula involving no meta-connectives. In
other words, a principle is a formula meta-quantified over all its free individual variables
and over all its predicate variables. A meta-formula will be called purely logical if it
involves no function symbols and no predicate constants.
Example 4.26. Fermat’s theorem is a formula, like most other mathematical theorems
that are expressible in a first-order language, whereas the principle of excluded middle
is a purely logical principle, like most other logical principles that are expressible in a
first-order language. There are important first-order theories (such as Peano arithmetic,
Tarski’s elementary geometry and Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory) where most axioms and
theorems are formulas, but some are principles, though none are purely logical (e.g. the
principle of mathematical induction, Tarski’s continuity principle and the set-theoretic
principles of separation and replacement).
A meta-formula F is said to be valid in a meta-ℒ-structure 풿 if ?(|F|퓊퓋풿 ) =
‚
for
arbitrary variable assignment 퓊 and predicate valuation 퓋. When F is closed, this is
equivalent to saying that ?(|F|퓋풿) =
‚
for an arbitrary predicate valuation 퓋; and when
F is λ-closed, this is equivalent to saying that ?(|F|풿) = ‚.
A meta-formula F is said to be valid in an ℒ-structure 풾 if it is valid in the two-
valued meta-interpretation 풾+. We also call F valid in the pair (풾,퓋) if ?(|F|퓊퓋풾+ ) =
‚
for
arbitrary variable assignment 퓊. Dually, F satisfiable in the pair (풾,퓋) if ?(|F|퓊퓋풾+ ) =
‚
for some variable assignment 퓊.
We denote by  F , or in more detail 풿 F , the judgement that the meta-formula F
is valid in 풿. The judgement 풿 (F1 & · · ·& Fm ⇒ G) is also abbreviated by
F1, . . . ,Fm 풿 G.
When this judgement is true, we also say that G is a semantic consequence of the Fi
in the meta-ℒ-structure 풿. When 풿 = 풾+, we abbreviate 풾+ by 풾, and speak of
semantic consequence in the ℒ-structure 풾.52
4.4. Meta-logic
Our meta-logic is in essence a second-order fragment of Isabelle’s meta-logic [157],
which is in turn essentially a fragment of higher-order intuitionistic logic.53
52When the Fi and G are formulas, this is Tarski’s standard definition of semantic consequence [193].
53Our meta-logic only deals with meta-formulas, whereas Isabelle’s with arbitrary expressions of types
generated from the base types 0, 1, µ using the type constructor→. Isabelle’s meta-logic additionally
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One need not panic about the fact that the meta-logic is intuitionistic and not classical
(just like with λ-calculus, which is closely related to a fragment of intuitionistic logic).
Firstly, when arguing about meta-logic, we have to do it in some meta-meta-logic (along
with some meta-meta-theory over it), and this one will be classical (and informal) in
our approach. Secondly, the semantics of our meta-logic according to the standard
(Tarski’s) setup of model theory turns out to be classical. On the other hand, it is
not unexpected that our meta-logic is intuitionistic: this simply reflects the fact that
derivation of formulas is a constructive activity; thus the primitive notion is that of the
problem (or task) of deriving a given formula, and the more familiar notion of derivability
of the formula is secondary: it merely asserts the existence of a solution of the said
problem. One can discuss semantics of the metalogic without degenerating into classical
logic (we will do it in §7), but one does not have to do it before discussing semantics of
an object logic, be it intuitionistic, classical or modal. Thus by defining a logic in terms
of meta-logic we will not complicate our task of understanding intuitionistic logic; on
the contrary, this will simplify matters, as it is always easier to understand something
that has a formal definition.
4.4.1. Meta-rules of inference. There are just two meta-rules of inference for each meta-
connective: the introduction rule and the elimination rule.54 In the meta-rules below,
F and G are meta-formulas, x is an individual variable, T is a term, γ is an n-ary
predicate variable, and Σ is an n-formula, for some n = 0, 1, 2, . . . .55 The meta-rules
are stated in the natural deduction style, which means that they operate on deductions
from assumptions. In particular, the ⇒-introduction meta-rule below is understood
thus: starting from a deduction of G from a list of assumptions that includes F , we
pass to a deduction of F ⇒ G from the same list of assumptions but with F removed.
(If some other entries of the list are identical with F , they are kept.) See [64], [164]
for further details on natural deduction (but it should be clear how it works from the
examples below).
includes quantification over variables of arbitrary types (of which only two are needed for dealing with
first-order logics, so we treat them separately), equality, λ-abstraction and function application (we
prefer to leave these at the informal meta-meta-level, since their explicit treatment does not seem to
add much conceptual clarity in our case). Due to our omission of Isabelle’s meta-rules for equality,
our meta-logic is not capable of dealing with first-order logics with equality — although some theories
with equality can be handled. (The author is unconvinced that this is a deficiency since modern type
theories provide an arguably more adequate framework for dealing with equality than first-order logic.)
Due to our omission of unrestricted quantification, Russell’s definitions of connectives (see §4.6.3) no
longer apply, and we find it convenient to add the meta-conjunction to our meta-logic (though it could
have been eliminated in principle by using the exponential law).
54These meta-rules themselves belong to meta-meta-logic, which we acknowledge by drawing bold hor-
izontal lines.
55It should be noted that this sentence sneaks in meta-meta-quantification over F , G, x, T , γ and Σ.
One does not need to worry about it too much, because all substantial issues appear to be already
addressed on the previous two levels. In particular, the meta-rules for ⟮·⟯ take care of the entire business
of capture-avoiding substitutions. This provides an opportunity to focus on more “substantial” issues at
the object level (in a traditional sense that is ignorant of the interpretation of substitution by pullback).
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(α-conversion)
...
F
G , if F is α-equivalent to G
(&-introduction)
...
F
...
G
F & G
(&-elimination)
...
F & G
F and
...
F & G
G
(⇒-elimination)
...
F
...
F ⇒ G
G
(⇒-introduction)
[F ]
...
G
F ⇒ G
(meta-generalization)
...
F
⟮x⟯F , provided that x does not occur freely in any of the assumptions;
...
F
⟮γ⟯F , provided that γ does not occur freely in any of the assumptions.
(meta-specialization)
...
⟮x⟯F
F [x/T ] , provided that T is free for x in F ;
...
⟮γ⟯F
F [γ/Σ] , provided that Σ is free for γ in F .
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Let us note that F [x/T ] has the same meaning as F|x:=T in the first-order meta-
specialization rule, and if n = 0, then also F [γ/Σ] has the the same meaning as F|γ:=Σ
in the second-order meta-specialization rule; but not so for n > 0, since in that case the
λ-expression F|γ:=Σ is not itself a meta-formula, and only β-reduces to the meta-formula
F [γ/Σ].
One could in fact drop the “free for” hypotheses and understand the meta-specialization
rules as enabling one to pass from a given deduction of ⟮x⟯F or ⟮γ⟯F to the deduction
of any meta-formula in the α-equivalence class to which (x 7→ F)(T ) or (γ 7→ F)(Σ)
β-reduces. This seems reasonable, since we anyway have the α-conversion meta-rule.
Nevertheless, the “free for” conditions are mentioned above in order to facilitate com-
parison with traditional treatments of first-order logics.
The “free for” conditions are defined in §4.2.5. Let us write them out explicitly in our
situation to see that they are similar to the usual ones used in first-order logic (cf. e.g.
Kleene [103; §18, §34], Church [32; §35]): only the clause (3) below is unusual, but it is
analogous to (0).
Namely, that T is free for x in F means that
(0) no free occurrence of x in F is in the scope of a quantifier or a meta-quantifier
over any individual variable y that occurs in T .
And that the n-formula Σ = x1, . . . , xn 7→ Θ 56 is free for γ in F means that
(1) every free occurrence of γ in F is in an atomic formula of the form γ(T1, . . . , Tn)
such that each Ti is free for xi in Θ;
(2) no free occurrence of γ in F is in the scope of a quantifier or a meta-quantifier
over any individual variable y that occurs freely in Σ;
(3) no free occurrence of γ in F is in the scope of a meta-quantifier over any predicate
variable δ that occurs in Σ.
From the viewpoint of λ-calculus, conditions (2) and (3) are checked upon the substi-
tution of Σ for γ; whereas (1) is checked upon the evaluation of the resulting expression,
which involves an auxiliary substitution.
The point of the α-conversion rule is that object-level inference rules and laws such
as ⟮α, t⟯ α(t)→ ∃xα(x) are now meta-formulas (and not just some schemata involving
meta-variables) and so do not automatically yield their copies with different names of
bound variables. Variables bound by meta-quantifiers can be easily renamed using the
specialization and generalization meta-rules; but no such procedure exists for variables
bound by usual quantifiers.
It is not hard to see that it suffices to assume the α-conversion rule only for atomic
meta-formulas (i.e. the !-images of formulas). Indeed, an arbitrary meta-formula is built
out of atomic ones using meta-connectives and meta-quantifiers; using the meta-rules of
inference one can get rid of the meta-connectives and the meta-quantifiers, at the cost of
56Let us note that we cannot just write Σ(x1, . . . , xn) instead of Θ, because that does not exclude the
unwanted situation that some xi occurs freely in Σ.
MATHEMATICAL SEMANTICS OF INTUITIONISTIC LOGIC 67
multiplying the number of deductions, adding new assumptions, and remembering that
some variables do not occur freely in the assumptions.
4.4.2. Examples of deductions. The only deductions that are provided from start are
the trivial deductions, in which a meta-formula is deduced from itself. A meta-formula
F is called deducible if using the meta-rules one can obtain (from the trivial deductions)
a deduction of F from no assumptions. We will also abbreviate the phrase “to obtain
(from the trivial deductions, using the meta-rules) a deduction of F from the assumption
G” by “to deduce F from G”.
Example 4.27. Starting from the trivial deduction of F from itself, we can apply the
⇒-introduction meta-rule to obtain a deduction of F ⇒ F from no assumptions. Thus
the meta-formula F ⇒ F is deducible.
Example 4.28. Starting from the trivial deduction of G from itself, we may view it
as a deduction of G from the assumptions F and G. Then the ⇒-introduction yields a
deduction of F ⇒ G from the assumption G. Applying the ⇒-elimination once again,
we get that G ⇒ (F ⇒ G) is deducible. Also, in the case where G is of the form H ⇒ H,
we can combine the deduction of F ⇒ G from the assumption G with Example 4.27 to
get that F ⇒ (H ⇒ H) is deducible.
Example 4.29. Let us show that (H ⇒ F)&(H ⇒ G) =⇒ (H ⇒ F&G) is deducible.
For this, it suffices to deduce H ⇒ F &G from (H ⇒ F)& (H ⇒ G). For this, it in turn
suffices to deduce F &G from the hypotheses H and (H ⇒ F)& (H ⇒ G). This is done
as follows: we first deduce H ⇒ F and (separately) H ⇒ G from (H ⇒ F) & (H ⇒ G);
and use the ⇒-elimination meta-rule to deduce F from H and H ⇒ F , and G from
H and H ⇒ G. This gives us deductions of F and G from the hypotheses H and
(H ⇒ F) & (H ⇒ G); thus we can use the &-introduction meta-rule to obtain the
desired deduction.
Example 4.30. Similarly to Example 4.29, ⟮x⟯
(H ⇒ F) =⇒ (H ⇒ ⟮x⟯F) is deducible,
where x is an individual or predicate variable that does not occur freely in H.
Example 4.31. Let us deduce (F & G ⇒ H) ⇐⇒ (F ⇒ (G ⇒ H)), the exponential
meta-law. By the &-elimination, it suffices to deduce both implications: “⇒” and “⇐”.
For this it suffices to deduce F ⇒ (G ⇒ H) from F & G ⇒ H and vice versa.
In one direction, it suffices, by the ⇒-introduction, to deduce G ⇒ H from the
hypotheses F and F & G ⇒ H. For this it suffices, by the ⇒-introduction, to deduce
H from G, G and F & G ⇒ H. Now from the hypotheses F and G we get, by the
&-introduction, F&G. From the latter and F&G ⇒ H we get H by the⇒-elimination.
Conversely, it suffices, by the ⇒-introduction, to deduce H from the assumptions
F & G and F ⇒ (G ⇒ H). Now F & G yields, by the &-elimination, F and G. From F
and F ⇒ (G ⇒ H) we get G ⇒ H by the ⇒-elimination. Similarly, from G and G ⇒ H
we get H, as desired.
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Example 4.32. It is also easy to check that ⟮x⟯F & ⟮x⟯G ⇐⇒ ⟮x⟯ (F & G) is deducible
and ⟮x⟯ (F ⇒ G) =⇒ (⟮x⟯F ⇒ ⟮x⟯G) is deducible, where x is either an individual
variable or a predicate variable.
Example 4.33. Given a deduction of H from G and a deduction of G from F , by
combining them we obtain a deduction of H from F . Using this observation, it is easy
to show that (F ⇒ G) & (G ⇒ H)⇒ (F ⇒ H) is deducible.
Remark 4.34. If one can deduce G from F , then by the ⇒-introduction, F ⇒ G is
deducible, and hence by the ⇒-elimination, the deducibility of F implies that of G.
However, the converse is not true: if the deducibility of F implies that of G, it does not
follow that G can be deduced from F . Indeed, it can be shown that the meta-absurdity
⟮γ⟯γ and the Peirce meta-principle ⟮α,β⟯
((
(α⇒ β)⇒ α)⇒ α) are both not deducible;
but still the former cannot be deduced from the latter.
4.4.3. Hilbert-style formulation. For purposes of models (see §4.7.1) it is convenient to
record a “Hilbert-style” formulation of the meta-logic, consisting mostly of meta-laws, i.e.
inference meta-rules with no hypotheses. To simplify notation, we omit the horizontal
bar in meta-laws and the vertical dots illustrating the deduction. Like before, F , G and
H stand for arbitrary meta-formulas, x is an individual variable, T is a term, γ is an
n-ary predicate variable, and Φ is an n-formula, for some n = 0, 1, 2, . . . .
(1) F ⇒ G, if F is α-equivalent to G;
(2) F ⇒ F ;
(3) (F ⇒ G) & (G ⇒ H) =⇒ (F ⇒ H);
(4)
(
(F & G)⇒H) ⇐⇒ (F ⇒ (G ⇒ H));
(5) F & G ⇒ F and F & G ⇒ G;
(6) (H ⇒ F) & (H ⇒ G) =⇒ (H ⇒ F & G);
(7) ⟮x⟯F ⇒ F [x/T ], provided that T is free for x in F ;
(8) ⟮γ⟯F ⇒ F [γ/Φ], provided that Φ is free for γ in F ;
(9) ⟮x⟯ (H ⇒ F) =⇒ (H ⇒ ⟮x⟯F), provided that x does not occur freely in H;
(10) ⟮γ⟯ (H ⇒ F) =⇒ (H ⇒ ⟮γ⟯F), provided that γ does not occur freely in H;
(11)
F
⟮x⟯F , provided that x does not occur freely in the assumptions;
(12)
F
⟮γ⟯F , provided that γ does not occur freely in the assumptions;
(13)
F , F ⇒ G
G .
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The three meta-rules with hypotheses are same as before, whereas the meta-laws have
already been shown to be deducible above, except for (1), (5), (7) and (8), which follow
immediately from the corresponding meta-rules using the ⇒-introduction.
Conversely, we immediately get the α-conversion, &-elimination and specialization
meta-rules from the corresponding meta-laws, using the ⇒-elimination meta-rule. Also,
from the meta-laws (2) and (4) we get F ⇒ (G ⇒ F&G), which yields the&-introduction
meta-rule by a double application of ⇒-elimination.
It remains to recover the⇒-introduction meta-rule. (This is similar to the usual proof
of the deduction theorem.) We induct on the length of the given deduction of G from
F . If this deduction is trivial, i.e. G = F , then the desired conclusion G ⇒ F is yielded
by the meta-law (2). Now given a deduction of G from F , there are two possibilities for
the last meta-rule used in this deduction.
Case 1. The last meta-rule is the ⇒-elimination with hypotheses of the form H and
H ⇒ F . We may assume that G ⇒ H and G ⇒ (H ⇒ F) are deducible. Then by
a double application of the meta-law (4), H ⇒ (G ⇒ F) is also deducible. Also, the
meta-laws (3) and (4) yield that (G ⇒ H) ⇒
((H ⇒ (G ⇒ F)) ⇒ (G ⇒ F)) is
deducible. Applying ⇒-elimination twice, we conclude that G ⇒ F is also deducible.
Case 2. The last meta-rule is the generalization with hypothesis of the form F ′, where
F = ⟮x⟯F ′ and x is either an individual or a predicate variable that does not occur freely
in G. We may assume that G ⇒ F ′ is deducible. Then by the generalization meta-rule,
⟮x⟯ (G ⇒ F ′) is deducible. Hence by (9) or (10), G ⇒ F is also deducible.
4.4.4. Enderton-style formulation. For purposes of models (see §4.7.1) we also need an
“Enderton-style” formulation of the meta-logic, whose only meta-rule is⇒-elimination.57
The notation is the same as in the Hilbert-style formulation, except that we now addi-
tionally need a tuple ~z of individual variables and a tuple ~β of predicate variables.
(1′) ⟮~z⟯ ⟮~β⟯
(F ⇒ G), if F is α-equivalent to G;
(2′) ⟮~z⟯ ⟮~β⟯
(F ⇒ F);
(3′) ⟮~z⟯ ⟮~β⟯
(
(F ⇒ G) & (G ⇒ H) =⇒ (F ⇒ H));
(4′) ⟮~z⟯ ⟮~β⟯
((
(F & G)⇒H) ⇐⇒ (F ⇒ (G ⇒ H)));
(5′) ⟮~z⟯ ⟮~β⟯
(F & G ⇒ F) and ⟮~z⟯ ⟮~β⟯ (F & G ⇒ G);
(6′) ⟮~z⟯ ⟮~β⟯
(
(H ⇒ F) & (H ⇒ G) =⇒ (H ⇒ F & G));
(7′) ⟮~z⟯ ⟮~β⟯
(
⟮x⟯F ⇒ F [x/T ]), provided that T is free for x in F ;
(8′) ⟮~z⟯ ⟮~β⟯
(
⟮γ⟯F ⇒ F [γ/Φ]), provided that Φ is free for γ in F ;
57Hilbert-style deductive systems for first-order logics usually include some form of the generalization
rule. In particular, so do the original systems of Hilbert–Bernays [90] and Hilbert–Ackermann [89].
Enderton’s deductive system [48] includes only one inference rule, the modus ponens. The generalization
rule has the status of a meta-theorem in his system, just like the Deduction Theorem.
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(9′) ⟮~z⟯ ⟮~β⟯
(
⟮x⟯ (F ⇒ G) =⇒ (⟮x⟯F ⇒ ⟮x⟯G));
(10′) ⟮~z⟯ ⟮~β⟯
(
⟮γ⟯ (F ⇒ G) =⇒ (⟮γ⟯F ⇒ ⟮γ⟯G));
(11′) ⟮~z⟯ ⟮~β⟯
(F ⇒ ⟮x⟯F), provided that x does not occur freely in F ;
(12′) ⟮~z⟯ ⟮~β⟯
(F ⇒ ⟮γ⟯F), provided that γ does not occur freely in F ;
(13′)
F , F ⇒ G
G .
All the meta-laws of the Enderton-style system are easily deducible in the Hilbert-
style system. Also, all the meta-laws of the Hilbert-style system are easily deducible
in the Enderton-style system (in fact, all of them except for (9) and (10) are already
present in the Enderton-style system, by considering empty ~z and ~β).
It remains to recover the generalization meta-rules in the Enderton-style system. Let
us first observe that if F and G are meta-formulas and v is either individual or predicate
variable, ⟮v⟯G is deducible from ⟮v⟯F and ⟮v⟯ (F ⇒ G) in the Enderton-style system.
Indeed, ⟮v⟯ (F ⇒ G) ⇒ (⟮v⟯F ⇒ ⟮v⟯G) is an instance of (9′) or (10′), and the assertion
follows by a double application of the ⇒-elimination. Also, if F is a meta-formula and
v is either individual or predicate variable that does not occur freely in F , then ⟮v⟯F is
easily deducible from F in the Enderton-style system.
Now suppose that we are given a deduction from assumptions in the system combining
the Enderton-style system and the two generalization meta-rules. Let us consider any
application of these meta-rules, i.e. the meta-generalization of a meta-formula F with
respect to an individual or predicate variable, call it v, that is not free in any of the
assumptions. The only way that v can first arise as a free variable in the deduction of F
from the assumptions is by occurring as a free variable in some instance G of some meta-
law used in this deduction. Arguing by induction, we may assume that generalization
meta-rules are not used within the deduction of F from the assumptions (regarded as a
subtree of the deduction tree under consideration). But then we amend this deduction
as follows: (i) G is replaced by another instance ⟮v⟯G of the same meta-law; (ii) every
application of the ⇒-elimination, inferring G ′ from F ′ and F ′ ⇒ G ′, is replaced as
follows: if v occurs freely neither in F ′ nor in G ′, nothing is changed; if v occurs freely in
F ′, the⇒-implication is replaced by the deduction (just mentioned above) of ⟮v⟯G ′ from
⟮v⟯F ′ and ⟮v⟯F ′ ⇒ G ′; and if v occurs freely in G ′ but not in F ′, then we first deduce
⟮v⟯F ′ from F ′ and then ⟮v⟯G ′ from ⟮v⟯F ′ and ⟮v⟯F ′ ⇒ G ′; (iii) the application of meta-
generalization to F is dropped. In the end of the inductive procedure, all applications
of the generalization meta-rules will have been eliminated.
4.4.5. Deducing from assumptions. The following examples deal with specific formulas
(regarded as atomic meta-formulas).
Example 4.35. Let us deduce β from the assumptions α, α → β and the following
modus ponens (object-level) rule:
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(i) ⟮ϕ,ψ⟯
(
ϕ→ ψ =⇒ (ϕ⇒ ψ)).
Using the second-order meta-specialization, from (i) we infer α → β =⇒ (α ⇒ β).
From this and our assumption α → β we infer, using the ⇒-elimination, α ⇒ β.
Applying it again, we infer β.
Example 4.36. Assuming (i) and the following principle (which holds in intuitionistic
logic, cf. §3.14, (32)):
(ii) ⟮γ⟯ ¬¬(γ ∨ ¬γ),
let us deduce the following implication between principles:
⟮γ⟯ ¬¬γ→ γ =⇒ ⟮γ⟯ γ ∨ ¬γ.
Taking into account the ⇒-introduction, it suffices to deduce ⟮γ⟯ γ ∨ ¬γ from (i),
(ii) and ⟮γ⟯ ¬¬γ → γ. Now from (ii) we get ¬¬(β ∨ ¬β) by the second-order meta-
specialization; and from ⟮γ⟯ ¬¬γ → γ we similarly get ¬¬(β ∨ ¬β) → (β ∨ ¬β).
Finally, similarly to Example 4.35, these yield β∨¬β; and then the second-order meta-
generalization yields ⟮β⟯ β ∨ ¬β. This is the same as ⟮γ⟯ γ ∨ ¬γ up to γ-equivalence.
Remark 4.37. By contrast, the rule
⟮γ⟯ (¬¬γ→ γ⇒ γ ∨ ¬γ)
cannot be deduced from (i) and (ii), because it meta-specializes (by setting γ = ¬β) to
¬¬¬β → ¬β ⇒ ¬β ∨ ¬¬β, where the premise holds in intuitionistic logic (see §3.14,
(3)), but the conclusion does not (see §5.4 below). (In other words, the said rule is not
even admissible for intuitionistic logic.)
Example 4.38. Let us deduce ∃x (γ(x)→ γ(y)) from (i) and the following assumptions
(which will be among the laws of intuitionistic logic):
(iii) ⟮γ⟯ γ→ γ;
(iv) ⟮β, t⟯ β(t)→ ∃xβ(x).
Using the first-order meta-specialization, from (iii) we infer γ(y)→ γ(y), and from (iv)
we infer ⟮β⟯ β(y) → ∃xβ(x). From the latter we infer, using the second-order meta-
specialization,
(
γ(y)→ γ(y))→ ∃x (γ(x)→ γ(y)). (Here we use that x 7→ γ(x)→ γ(y)
is free for β in β(y)→ ∃xβ(x). For this, it is essential that y is free in β(y)→ ∃xβ(x).
Thus we would not be able to make this step directly from (iv).) The remainder of the
argument is similar to that of Example 4.35.
Example 4.39. Let us deduce ∀x (γ(x)→ γ(y)) from (i), (iii) and the following rule
(v) ⟮β, t⟯
(
β(t)⇒ ∀xβ(x)).
Using the first-order meta-specialization, from (v) we can still infer ⟮β⟯
(
β(y)⇒ ∀xβ(x)).
From the latter we can still infer, using the second-order meta-specialization, the meta-
formula
(
γ(y)→ γ(y))⇒ ∀x (γ(x)→ γ(y)). Since we still have γ(y)→ γ(y) from (iii),
by the ⇒-elimination we conclude ∀x (γ(x)→ γ(y)).
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Remark 4.40. Since the formula deduced in Example 4.39 is contradictory (either classi-
cally or intuitionistically), we conclude that (v) is an incorrect interpretation of the gen-
eralization (object-level) rule. Moreover, the trouble is clearly in that x 7→ γ(x)→ γ(y)
is free for β in β(y)⇒ ∀xβ(x) — but it shouldn’t be, if this were to be the generalization
rule. There is no such trouble with the true generalization (object-level) rule:
(v′) ⟮β⟯
(
⟮t⟯ β(t)⇒ ∀xβ(x)).
This does not meta-specialize by substituting x 7→ γ(x) → γ(y) for β, because it is
not free for β in ⟮t⟯ β(t) ⇒ ∀xβ(x). The first-order meta-specialization does not apply
either, since the scope of the meta-quantifier is not the entire meta-formula in (v′).
Example 4.41. Assuming (i), let us deduce ⟮x⟯ ϕ(x)→ ψ(x)⇒ (⟮x⟯ ϕ(x)⇒ ⟮x⟯ ψ(x)).
By the ⇒-introduction, it suffices to deduce ⟮x⟯ ϕ(x) ⇒ ⟮x⟯ ψ(x), assuming (i) and
⟮x⟯ ϕ(x) → ψ(x). For this it suffices, by the same token, to deduce ⟮x⟯ ψ(x), assuming
(i), ⟮x⟯ ϕ(x) → ψ(x) and ⟮x⟯ ϕ(x). The latter two assumptions yield ϕ(x) → ψ(x) and
ϕ(x) by the meta-specialization. From these we get ψ(x) similarly to Example 4.35.
Finally, the meta-generalization yields ⟮x⟯ ψ(x).
Let us note that the last step is only possible since x is not free in our assumptions.
Example 4.42. The meta-formula in the conclusion of Example 4.38 can be restated
as ∀y ∃x (γ(x)→ γ(y)), if in addition to the original hypotheses (i), (iii), (iv) we assume
the generalization rule (v′).
Indeed, since y is not free in any of the assumptions, using meta-generalization we get
⟮y⟯ ∃x (γ(x) → γ(y)) from the conclusion of 4.38. Now the generalization rule (v′) can
be applied, using the second-order meta-specialization and the⇒-elimination, to obtain
the desired closed formula ∀y ∃x (γ(x)→ γ(y)).
Similarly, the conclusion of Example 4.39 follows in the form ∀y ∀x (γ(x) → γ(y))
from the assumptions (i), (iii), (v′) and the faulty assumption (v).
4.4.6. Specialization. A specialization of a meta-formula F is any meta-formula that is
a result of β-reduction (possibly involving α-conversions) of a λ-expression of the form(
~ϕ 7→ (~x 7→ F))(~Σ)(~T ), where ~x is an n-tuple of pairwise distinct individual variables,
~ϕ is an m-tuple of pairwise distinct predicate variables of arities ri, ~T is an n-tuple of
terms, and ~Σ is a tuple of ri-formulas.
In other words, a meta-formula F ′ is a specialization of a meta-formula F if and only
if F ′ = F [~x/~T , ~ϕ/~Σ], where ~T is free for ~x in F and ~Σ is free for ~ϕ in F .
Clearly, specialization can always be obtained by first using the generalization meta-
rule, then the specialization meta-rule, and finally the α-conversion meta-rule.
Thus, if a meta-formula F is deducible from assumptions that contain no free variables,
then any its specialization is deducible from the same assumptions.
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Example 4.43. Let us consider the formula F = ϕ(x) (regarded as an atomic meta-
formula), the term T = z and the 1-formula F = y 7→ ∃z ψ(y). Then(
ϕ 7→ (x 7→ F))(F )(T ) = (ϕ 7→ (x 7→ ϕ(x)))(y 7→ ∃z ψ(y))(z)
β
=
(
x 7→ (y 7→ ∃z ψ(y))(x))(z) β= (y 7→ ∃z ψ(y))(z) β= y 7→ ∃zψ(y)|y:=z α= ∃x ψ(z).
Of course, the final α-conversion can be avoided by the cost of replacing F with the
α-equivalent 1-formula F ′ = y 7→ ∃x ψ(y). The result depends on the choice of F ′, but
any other choice will yield a formula that differs only in the name of the bound variable.
Example 4.44. The formula α ∧ α→ α is a specialization of α ∧ β→ α.
Similarly, the meta-formula
(
α(x)→ α(x)) =⇒ (α(x)→ ∀xα(x)) is a specialization
of
(
β→ α(x)) =⇒ (β→ ∀xα(x)).
On the other hand, the meta-formula ⟮x⟯
(
α(x)→ α(x)) =⇒ (α(x)→ ∀xα(x)) is not
a specialization of ⟮x⟯
(
β→ α(x)) =⇒ (β→ ∀xα(x)).
Example 4.45. The formula
(
β(y)→ β(y)) −→ ∃x (β(x)→ β(y)) is a specialization
of α(y)→ ∃xα(x) (see Example 4.38).
Similarly, the meta-formula
(
β(y)→ β(y)) =⇒ ∀x (β(x)→ β(y)) is a specialization
of α(y)⇒ ∀xα(x) (see Example 4.39).
On the other hand, the meta-formula ⟮y⟯
(
β(y)→ β(y)) =⇒ ∀x (β(x)→ β(y)) is not
a specialization of ⟮y⟯ α(y)⇒ ∀xα(x) (see Remark 4.40).
4.5. Logics
The purpose of this section is to introduce and discuss some “syntactic meta-sugar”.
4.5.1. Rules. The first-order meta-closure ⟮⟯F of the meta-formula F is ⟮~x⟯F , where
~x is the tuple of all individual variables occurring freely in F . The second-order meta-
closure ⟮⟯F is ⟮~γ⟯F , where ~γ is the tuple of all predicate variables occurring freely in F .
Their combination ⟮⟯ ⟮⟯F will be called the full meta-closure of F . If ∆ is a formula
(and only in this case) we abbreviate ⟮⟯ ⟮⟯∆ by ·∆.
Thus every principle can be written in the form ·∆, and every meta-formula of the
form ·∆ is a principle, where by our convention ∆ must be a mere formula.
A (structural) rule, written Γ1, . . . ,Γm/∆, or, in more detail,
Γ1, . . . ,Γm
∆
,
where Γ1, . . . ,Γm and ∆ are formulas, is an abbreviation for the meta-formula
⟮⟯
(
⟮⟯Γ1 & · · ·& ⟮⟯Γm =⇒ ⟮⟯∆
)
.
The formulas Γ1, . . . ,Γm are called the premisses of the rule, and ∆ its conclusion.
What happens when m = 0, i.e. when the list of premisses is empty? If the empty
meta-conjunction is defined as an abbreviation of some specific deducible meta-formula
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T (for example, ⟮γ⟯ γ ⇒ ⟮γ⟯ γ), then a rule with no premisses, /∆, denotes the meta-
formula ⟮⟯
(T ⇒ ⟮⟯∆). But this is the same as the meta-formula ⟮⟯ ⟮⟯∆, since it is
easy to deduce
(T ⇒ F) ⇐⇒ F . Thus rules with no premisses can be identified with
principles.
Let us spell out some informal justification for the definition of a rule. The point of the
second-order meta-quantification (“ ⟮⟯”) is clear at once from Example 4.36 and Remark
4.37. The point of the first-order meta-quantification (“ ⟮⟯”) is that we want to use
principles and rules as basic assumptions in our deductions; but having free variables in
the assumptions would ruin many correct deductions, such as the ones in Examples 4.30,
4.41 and 4.42. Finally, the reason why the first-order meta-closure is applied separately
to each premiss of the rule (in contrast to the second meta-closure) is clear from Example
4.39 and Remark 4.40. Let us note that ⟮⟯Γ1 & · · ·& ⟮⟯Γm ⇐⇒ ⟮⟯ (Γ1 & · · ·& Γm) is
deducible (see Example 4.32).
A byproduct of the fact that principles and rules are λ-closed is that they have no non-
trivial specializations. Let us recall that a specialization of a meta-formula is obtained by
first applying meta-generalization, then meta-specialization, and finally α-equivalence.
By a special case of a rule we mean any rule that can be obtained from it by first applying
meta-specialization, then meta-generalization, and finally α-equivalence.
This turns out to work out differently for principles and for rules with premisses.
Clearly, a principle ·∆′ is a special case of a principle ·∆ if and only if the formula ∆′
is a specialization of the formula ∆. (That is, if and only if ∆′ = ∆[~x/~T , ~ϕ/~Σ], where ~T
is free for ~x in ∆ and ~Σ is free for ~ϕ in ∆.) This is not equivalent to saying that ⟮⟯∆′
is a specialization of ⟮⟯∆. For instance, ⟮⟯α(x) is not a specialization of ⟮⟯β, but α(x)
is a specialization of β.
But for rules with premisses, we cannot use first-order meta-specialization. Thus a
rule Γ′1, . . . ,Γ
′
m /∆
′ is a special case of a rule Γ1, . . . ,Γm /∆ if and only if the meta-
formula ⟮⟯Γ′1 & · · · & ⟮⟯Γ′m ⇒ ⟮⟯∆′ is a specialization of ⟮⟯Γ1 & · · · & ⟮⟯Γm ⇒ ⟮⟯∆.
(That is, if and only if for some tuple ~Σ of ri-formulas that is free for ~ϕ in each Γj and
in ∆, each Γ′j = Γj(~ϕ/~Σ) and ∆
′ = ∆(~ϕ/~Σ).)
Example 4.46. (Cf. Example 4.44.) The principle ·α ∧ α→ α is a special case of the
principle ·α ∧ β→ α.
Similarly, the principle ·
(
α(x) → α(x)) −→ (α(x) → ∀xα(x)) is a special case of
·
(
β→ α(x)) −→ (β→ ∀xα(x)).
However, the rule
α(x)→ α(x)
α(x)→ ∀xα(x) is not a special case of
β→ α(x)
β→ ∀xα(x) .
Example 4.47. (Cf. 4.45.) The principle ·
(
β(y) → β(y)) −→ ∃x (β(x) → β(y)) is a
special case of ·α(y)→ ∃xα(x).
Similarly, the principle ·
(
β(y) → β(y)) −→ ∀x (β(x) → β(y)) is a special case of
·α(y)→ ∀xα(x).
However, the rule
β(y)→ β(y)
∀x (β(x)→ β(y)) is not a special case of α(y)∀xα(x) .
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4.5.2. Logics and theories. A derivation system58 D in a first-order language ℒ is a
meta-formula of the form
H1 & · · ·&Hk,
where each Hi is a purely logical rule (possibly with no premisses) inℒ. In other words,
D is the meta-conjunction of finitely many purely logical principles and other purely
logical rules (with at least one premise), which are called, respectively, the laws59 and
the inference rules of D.
A logic is a meta-equivalence class of derivation systems in some first-order language
ℒ. In other words, derivation systems D and D′ are said to determine the same logic
if the meta-formula D ⇔ D′ is deducible. The purely logical part of ℒ is called the
language of the logic L and is denoted ℒ(L). A logic L+ is called an extension of a
logic L if there exist derivation systems D and D′ such that D determines L and D&D′
determines L+.
A meta-formula F is called derivable in the logic L determined by a derivation system
D if the meta-formula D ⇒ G is deducible (in the meta-logic) — or equivalently, if
F is deducible from the hypothesis D (in the meta-logic). Clearly, adding a derivable
principle or rule to a derivation system D does not affect derivability of principles and
rules in the logic determined by D.
A principle ·∆ is derivable in the logic if and only if either ·∆ is a special case of a
law, or there exist derivable principles ·Γ1, . . . , ·Γm such that the rule Γ1, . . . ,Γm /∆ is a
special case of an inference rule. More generally, a rule Γ1, . . . ,Γm /∆ is derivable in the
logic if and only if either the principle ·∆ is one of the ·Γi,
60 or it is a special case of a
law, or there exist finitely many formulas ∆1, . . . ,∆k such that each rule Γ1, . . . ,Γm /∆i
is derivable, i = 1, . . . , k, and ∆1, . . . ,∆k /∆ is a special case of an inference rule. (The
“if” assertion is trivial, and the converse is not hard.)
It is also not hard to see that every special case of a derivable rule is derivable, and
that every special case of a derivable principle is a derivable principle. In fact, every
specialization of a derivable meta-formula is a derivable meta-formula; in particular,
every specialization of a derivable formula is a derivable formula.
A first-order theory T over a logic L is a finite meta-conjunction of principles in a
first-order language ℒ whose purely logical part is the language of L.61 The language
ℒ is called the language of the theory T and is denoted ℒ(T ), and these principles are
58Also called a “deductive system” in the literature. For our purposes it is convenient to distinguish
deductions in meta-logic from derivations within a specific object logic.
59These correspond to what is usually called “axiom schemata”. Apart from the conflation of schemata
and principles, this standard terminology is objectionable in the case of intuitionistic logic, as it fits
well with the Brouwer–Heyting approach, but not with Kolmogorov’s approach. On Kolmogorov’s
approach, the laws of intuitionistic logic are not propositions accepted without proof, but rather a
toolkit of elementary constructions that can be used as black boxes.
60But not just a special case of one of the ·Γi. Thus the formulas Γi are not treated just as if the
principles ·Γi were laws.
61This corresponds to the traditional notion of a theory given by finitely many axioms and finitely many
axiom schemata.
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called the axioms62 of T . In contrast to the laws of a derivation system, the axioms of a
theory may involve function symbols and predicate constants. Because of this, a typical
theory (such as the theory of groups or the theory of an order relation) would involve
no predicate variables, and hence also no meta-quantifiers (as long as all its axioms
are closed formulas). Meta-quantifiers would be needed, however, to express principles
that are not purely logical (such as the principle of mathematical induction). An empty
theory over L has no axioms (but its language can be different from the language of L).
A formula G of ℒ is a theorem63 of a theory T over a logic L if the meta-formula
T ⇒ G is derivable in L, in other words, if G is deducible from D & T (in the meta-
logic), where D is a derivation system for L. This is equivalent to saying that either the
principle ·G is a special case of a law of D or of an axiom of T , or there exist theorems
F1, . . . ,Fm such that the rule F1, . . . ,Fm /G is a special case of an inference rule of D.
(Let us note that an axiom that involves no meta-quantifiers has no special cases other
than itself.) A theory T is called consistent if its theorems do not include all formulas of
ℒ. It is easy to see that T is inconsistent (i.e. not consistent) if and only if T ⇒ ⟮γ⟯γ
is derivable in L.
Of course, assertions called “theorems”, “lemmas” or “propositions” in the present
text are not supposed to be theorems of any first-order theory. They are meta-meta-
theorems. But some assertions of the present text (such as those starting with “the
following formula is derivable in such and such logic”) do signify theorems of the empty
theories over classical, intuitionistic or QS4 logics. Also, if logics are regarded as meta-
theories over the meta-logic, then for instance §4.4.2 is devoted to some meta-theorems
of the empty meta-theory over the meta-logic, and §4.4.5 to those of some non-empty
meta-theories.
4.5.3. Syntactic consequence. If L is the logic determined by a derivation system D,
we denote by ⊢ F , or in more detail ⊢L F , the judgement that the meta-formula F is
derivable in the logic. The judgement ⊢ (F1 & · · ·& Fm ⇒ G) is also abbreviated by
F1, . . . ,Fm ⊢ G.
When this judgement is true, we also say that G is a (syntactic) consequence of the Fi.64
Here the Fi and G can be arbitrary meta-formulas; but a few cases are of particular
interest. Namely, F1, . . . ,Fm ⊢ G might be of the following form:
(1) ⊢ ⟮⟯ ⟮⟯∆, where ∆ is a formula. This is saying that ·∆ is a derivable principle.
62 In the context of intuitionistic logic (and its non-classical extensions) these may be called postulates
following Euclid (and his ancient commentators Geminus and Proclus, who have actually made the
distinction between axioms and postulate quite clear, see [3]). It should be noted, however, that the
modern meaning of the word postulate is not very different from that of axiom, as opposed to the ancient
Greek word which meant request, demand (see [3]).
63Or a soluble problem in intuitionistic logic (and its non-classical extensions).
64Thus consequence belongs to meta-meta-logic, and not meta-logic. It is clear from Example 4.50 below
(see also Remark 4.34) that it would not be a good idea to explain the judgement ⊢ F by identifying
it with the meta-formula D ⇒ F itself.
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(1′) ⟮⟯ ⟮⟯Γ1, . . . , ⟮⟯ ⟮⟯Γm ⊢ ⟮⟯ ⟮⟯∆, where the Γi and ∆ are formulas. This is saying
that the principle ·∆ is a consequence of the principles ·Γi.
(1′′) ⟮⟯
(
⟮⟯Θ11& · · ·& ⟮⟯Θ1n1 ⇒ ⟮⟯Γ1
)
, . . . , ⟮⟯
(
⟮⟯Θm1& · · ·& ⟮⟯Θmnm ⇒ ⟮⟯Γm
)
⊢
⟮⟯
(
⟮⟯Ξ1&· · ·&⟮⟯Ξn ⇒ ⟮⟯∆
)
, where the Θij, Ξj, Γi and∆ are formulas. This is
saying that the rule Ξ1, . . . ,Ξn /∆ is a consequence of the rules Θi1, . . . ,Θini/Γi.
(2) ⊢ ⟮⟯∆, where ∆ is a formula. This is equivalent to ⊢ ⟮⟯ ⟮⟯∆ (since there are no
free predicate variables in D).
(2′) ⟮⟯Γ1, . . . , ⟮⟯Γm ⊢ ⟮⟯∆, where the Γi and ∆ are formulas. Similarly, this is the
case if and only if the rule Γ1, . . . ,Γm /∆ is derivable.
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(3) ⊢ ∆, where ∆ is a formula. This is saying that the formula ∆ is derivable, and is
the case if and only if ⊢ ⟮⟯∆ (since there are no free individual variables in D).
(3′) Γ1, . . . ,Γm ⊢ ∆, where the Γi and ∆ are formulas. This is saying that the formula
∆ is a syntactic consequence of the formulas Γi.
66 As long as the Γi contain no
free individual variables, we similarly have that Γ1, . . . ,Γm ⊢ ∆ if and only if
⟮⟯Γ1, . . . , ⟮⟯Γm ⊢ ⟮⟯∆. In general, for logics in which the deduction theorem
and the exponential law hold, Γ1, . . . ,Γm ⊢ ∆ if and only if ⊢ Γ1∧· · ·∧Γm → ∆.
What is this deduction theorem? In logics where implication is present, a usual rule
of inference is the modus ponens rule:
ϕ, ϕ→ ψ
ψ
.
Using this rule, we get that ⊢ Γ→ ∆ implies Γ ⊢ ∆ (see Examples 4.35 and 4.31); and
more generally, that Γ1, . . . ,Γn ⊢ Γ→ ∆ implies Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γ ⊢ ∆ (where Γ and ∆ are
formulas). In some logics the converse also holds, in which case it is called the deduction
theorem. In particular, the deduction theorem holds for classical and intuitionistic log-
ics, where it is proved similarly to the argument in §4.4.3 recovering the⇒-introduction
meta-rule from the Hilbert-style formulation of the meta-logic. By combining the deduc-
tion theorem with the exponential law ·
(
(α ∧ β)→ γ) ←→ (α→ (β→ γ)), we easily
get the last assertion in (3′) above.
The deduction theorem is not as banal as it might seem. Indeed, the modus ponens
rule yields, in fact, slightly more: the rule Γ /∆ is a consequence of the principle ·Γ→ ∆.
(If the principle is purely logical, this is equivalent to saying that if we add ·Γ → ∆
as a new law to the derivation system, then Γ /∆ becomes derivable.) However, the
deduction theorem, whenever it holds, does not imply that the principle ·Γ → ∆ is a
consequence of the rule Γ /∆. (Which in the purely logical case is equivalent to saying
that ·Γ→ ∆ becomes derivable once Γ /∆ is set as a new inference rule.) This is simply
not true in general — already in classical logic (see Examples 4.79 and 4.83). It follows,
65Thus ⟮⟯Γ1, . . . , ⟮⟯Γm ⊢ ⟮⟯∆ is the traditional “varied variables” version of syntactic consequence for
formulas, as in the textbooks by Schoenfield and Mendelson.
66Thus Γ1, . . . ,Γm ⊢ ∆ is the more usual “fixed variables” version of syntactic consequence for formulas,
as in the textbooks by Church, Enderton, Troelstra and van Dalen.
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incidentally, that for closed formulas Γ and ∆, the meta-formula (Γ⇒ ∆) =⇒ (Γ→ ∆)
need not be derivable, already in classical logic (see also Examples 4.78 and 4.81).
Consequence between principles and rules will often be referred to using the words
such as “implies” and “follows”, when this cannot lead to confusion; thus “·Γ implies ·∆”
signifies a meta-formula different form that signified by “the principle that Γ implies ∆”
(see Example 4.36 and Remark 4.37). A set of rulesR1, . . . ,Rk is said to be interderivable
(or simply equivalent, when this cannot lead to confusion) with a set of rules S1, . . . ,Sl
if each Ri is a consequence of S1, . . . ,Sl, and each Si is a consequence of R1, . . . ,Rk.
The notion of consequence between principles and rules is going to be indispensable for
our purposes; its explicit form seems to occur only rarely in the literature (see [203],
[33], [172; 1.4.8], [102]), but indirectly it is used more often (in particular, through the
equivalent notions of the order relation on extensions of a given logic and of the basis
for a set of rules, such as the set of all admissible rules).
Of the judgements listed above, (3′) implies (2′), which in turn implies (1′) (see Ex-
ample 4.32), and these implications are not reversible (see Example 4.39 and Remark
4.40 and, respectively, Example 4.36 and Remark 4.37). To these judgements we may
add also:
(0′) ⊢ Γ1, . . . ,⊢ Γm imply ⊢ ∆;
(0′′) ⊢ Θ11, . . . ,Θ1n1/Γ1, . . . ,⊢ Θm1, . . . ,Θmnm/Γm imply ⊢ H1, . . . ,Hn /∆.
Then (1′′) implies (0′′) by the ⇒-elimination meta-rule, and in particular (1′) implies
(0′). But not conversely, since non-derivable principles need not be consequences of each
other (even in classical logic, see Example 4.75 below; also, in zero-order intuitionistic
logic, ·¬¬γ ∨ ¬γ does not imply ·γ ∨ ¬γ, which in turn does not imply ·×, see §5.4
below). In fact, it is easy to see that principles ·Γ1, . . . , ·Γm imply ·∆ if and only if
the judgements G ⊢ Γ1, . . . ,G ⊢ Γm imply G ⊢ ∆ for each λ-closed meta-formula G (by
considering G = ·Γ1&· · ·&·Γm). The same argument also establishes the same assertion
with a different choice of G’s, namely: ·Γ1, . . . , ·Γm imply ·∆ over a logic L if and only
if ⊢L′ Γ1, . . . ,⊢L′ Γm imply ⊢L′ ∆ for any extension L′ of L by additional laws (or by
additional laws and inference rules). Similarly, (1′′) over a logic L is equivalent to (0′′)
over all extensions L′ of L by additional laws and inference rules.
Remark 4.48. Kleene’s sequent “Γ1, . . . ,Γm ⊢x1,...,xk ∆”, where ~x = (x1, . . . , xk) is the
tuple of individual variables that “may be varied” in the deduction, can be identified
with our judgement ⟮~x⟯Γ1, . . . , ⟮~x⟯Γm ⊢ ⟮~x⟯∆. In fact, according to Kleene [103; §24], his
sequent notation “is not fully explicit, as it does not show for which of the assumption
formulas a given superscript variable may be varied. [...] When there is occasion to
be more explicit, the facts may be stated verbally, e.g. as in Lemma 8a below.” Our
notation includes a formalization of such verbal comments, by simply meta-quantifying
the assumption formulas over distinct collections of individual variables. (The meta-
quantifiers in the conclusion are redundant, as long as they repeat those that are common
to all of the assumptions.)
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4.5.4. Admissible rules. A rule R is called admissible for the logic determined by a
derivation system D if every derivable principle of the logic determined by the extended
derivation system D & R is also derivable in the original logic. (That is, if ⊢ R ⇒ Φ
implies ⊢ Φ for each formula Φ.) Thus adding an admissible rule to a derivation system
does not change the set of derivable principles, but unless this rule is derivable, it changes
the logic (i.e. the syntactic consequence relation). This can happen even with classical
logic, as we will see in §4.7.1. Clearly, a purely logical rule Γ1, . . . ,Γm /∆ is admissible
if and only if for every its special case Γ1[~ϕ/~Φ], . . . ,Γm[~ϕ/~Φ] /∆[~ϕ/~Φ] (where ~Φ is free
for ~ϕ in each Γi and in ∆) such that each Γi[~ϕ/~Φ] is a derivable formula, ∆[~ϕ/~Φ] is also
a derivable formula.
Remark 4.49. For this reason, admissible rules of the form Γ1, . . . ,Γm /∆ are sometimes
stated in the literature in the form
⊢ Γ1, . . . ,⊢ Γm
⊢ ∆
or verbally, “if ⊢ Γ1, . . . ,⊢ Γm, then ⊢ ∆”, where the predicate variables ϕ1, . . . , ϕk oc-
curring in the Γi and in ∆ are tacitly understood to range over all rj-formulas Φ1, . . . ,Φk
that are free for ϕ1, . . . , ϕk in each Γi and in ∆ (that is, with an implicit meta-meta-
quantifier ∀~ϕ meant at the beginning of the sentence). The verbal version is particularly
confusing, since its two alternative readings: (i) without assuming any implicit meta-
meta-quantification as in the judgement (0′) above, (ii) assuming another implicit meta-
meta-quntification: “if ∀~ϕ ⊢ Γ1, . . . , ∀~ϕ ⊢ Γm, then ∀~ϕ ⊢ ∆” — are entirely different
judgements, which are equivalent to each other, but not to the admissibility of the rule.
In older literature, however, one often finds inference rules stated in this ambiguous
language (which is even more confusing, and certainly indicates the author’s acceptance
of the “formulaic” conception of logic).
Clearly, every derivable rule is admissible. Moreover, a purely logical rule Γ1, . . . ,Γm /∆
is derivable if and only if for every its special case Γ1[~ϕ/~Φ], . . . ,Γm[~ϕ/~Φ] /∆[~ϕ/~Φ] (where
~Φ is free for ~ϕ in each Γi and in ∆) and for every formulas Ψ1, . . . ,Ψl such that
⟮⟯Ψ1, . . . , ⟮⟯Ψl ⊢ Γi[~ϕ/~Φ] for each i, we also have ⟮⟯Ψ1, . . . , ⟮⟯Ψl ⊢ ∆[~ϕ/~Φ]. (This
follows by considering the case l = k, Ψi = Γi[~ϕ/~Φ].)
Let us note that if a new law or inference rule is added to a derivation system,
previously derivable rules do not cease to be derivable, but previously admissible rules
may cease to be admissible.
Example 4.50. One might be suspecting that a rule Γ /∆ is admissible if and only if
the meta-formula H := ⟮⟯
((D ⇒ ⟮⟯Γ) =⇒ (D ⇒ ⟮⟯∆)) is derivable. This is not so,
since the derivability of H is in fact equivalent to the derivability, and not admissibility
of the rule Γ /∆.
Indeed, the derivability of H amounts to the derivability of D ⇒ ⟮⟯∆ from the
assumption D ⇒ ⟮⟯Γ. This in turn amounts to the derivability of ⟮⟯∆ from the
assumptions D and D ⇒ ⟮⟯Γ. But derivability from these assumptions is equivalent to
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derivability from the assumptions D and ⟮⟯Γ. In turn, the derivability of ⟮⟯∆ from the
assumptions D and ⟮⟯Γ amounts to the derivability of ⟮⟯Γ⇒ ⟮⟯∆ from the assumption
D. This is the same as the derivability of the rule Γ /∆.
Clearly, derivability and admissibility of a rule are preserved when the rule is replaced
by one that is interderivable with it. In particular, an admissible rule that is inter-
derivable with a principle must be derivable. Jerˇa´bek [102] proved that in a number of
logics, including zero-order intuitionistic logic and S4, every rule is interderivable with
a principle plus a finite set of admissible rules.
Lorentzen’s book, where the term “admissible rule” was first used, also dealt with
the following notion: a rule R is admissible relative to a set of rules S1, . . . ,Sk if R
becomes an admissible rule upon adjoining S1, . . . ,Sk as new inference rules to the
logic [124; pp. 24, 40] (see also [177]). When R is a principle, this coincides with the
notion of consequence; and when k = 0, the two notions (i.e., consequence and relative
admissibility) reduce, respectively, to derivability of a rule and admissibility of a rule.
We will call a rule R stably admissible over a given logic if it is admissible over any
extension of this logic, obtained by adjoining any number of new laws and inference
rules. Thus derivable rules are stably admissible; and in contrast to admissible rules, if a
new law or inference rule is added to the derivation system, previously stably admissible
rules do not cease to be stably admissible. (However, a stably admissible rule can cease
to be stably admissible upon a mere extension of the language of the logic, see Examples
4.71 and 4.72.)
Clearly, a purely logical rule Γ1, . . . ,Γm /∆ is stably admissible if and only if for every
its special case Γ1[~ϕ/~Φ], . . . ,Γm[~ϕ/~Φ] /∆[~ϕ/~Φ] (where ~Φ is free for ~ϕ in each Γi and in
∆) the principle ·∆[~ϕ/~Φ] is a consequence of the principles ·Γ1[~ϕ/~Φ], . . . , ·Γm[~ϕ/~Φ].
This uses the characterization of consequence between principles given in §4.5.3. Since
that characterization involved some freedom, we obtain as a byproduct that a purely
logical rule R is stably admissible over a logic if and only if it is admissible over any
extension of this logic, obtained by adjoining any number of new laws (but not inference
rules). By using the same freedom, we also get that R is stably admissible if and only
if G ⊢ R ⇒ Φ implies G ⊢ Φ for every formula Φ and every λ-closed meta-formula G.
This is equivalent to saying that ⊢ (R ⇒ Φ) ⇒ Φ for every formula Φ (by considering
G = R ⇒ Φ).
On the other hand, it is easy to see that a rule R is derivable if and only if ⊢ R ⇒ F
implies ⊢ F for every rule F (by considering F = R). Similarly, a rule R is derivable
if and only if G ⊢ R ⇒ F implies G ⊢ F for every meta-formula F and every λ-
closed meta-formula G. Thus, similarly to the above, a rule R is derivable if and only if
⊢ (R ⇒ F)⇒ F for every rule F (or for every λ-closed meta-formula F).
Admissibility, stable admissibility and derivability are all distinct notions, already in
classical logic (see Examples 4.69, 4.71 and 4.72).
4.6. Intuitionistic logic (syntax)
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4.6.1. Derivation system. A formalization of intuitionistic logic QH in terms of a deriva-
tion system was found by Heyting [83] (1928 and 1931), extending partial formalizations
by Kolmogorov [107] (1925; the→,¬, ∃, ∀ fragment67 with the omission of the explosion
principle ·×→ α and with inadvertent omission of the universal specialization principle
·∀xα(x) → α(y); see [159]) and Glivenko (1928 and 1929; the zero-order fragment).68
Here is an equivalent formulation due to Spector (as in [200]; see also [199]), where the
usual side conditions are eliminated as explained below.
(I) (modus ponens rule)
α, α→ β
β
(II) ·α→ α
(III)
α→ β, β→ γ
α→ γ
(IV) (exponential law)
(α ∧ β)→ γ
α→ (β→ γ) and
α→ (β→ γ)
(α ∧ β)→ γ
(V) (explosion principle) ·×→ α
(VI) ·α ∧ β→ α and ·α ∧ β→ β
(VII) ·α→ α ∨ β and ·β→ α ∨ β
(VIII)
γ→ α, γ→ β
γ→ α ∧ β
(IX)
α→ γ, β→ γ
α ∨ β→ γ
(X) ·∀xα(x)→ α(t)
(XI) ·α(t)→ ∃xα(x)
(XII)
γ→ α(x)
γ→ ∀xα(x)
(XIII)
α(x)→ γ
∃xα(x)→ γ
Classical predicate logic QC is obtained by adding just one more law:
(XIV) (law of excluded middle) ·p ∨ ¬p
Let us note that the traditional schematic versions of (X) and (XI) with side conditions
follow immediately from (X) and (XI) respectively by applying the two specialization
meta-rules (see §4.4.1), in either order. We have a notational choice of specializing the
67Kolmogorov’s point of departure was Hilbert’s derivation system for classical logic, which did not use
other connectives. Presumably Kolmogorov was also aware of Russell’s definition of ∧, ∨ and ∃ in terms
of → and the second-order ∀, which is valid intuitionistically, see [5] and [164; p. 67].
68It should be mentioned that an algebraic formulation of the zero-order fragment is found already in
Skolem’s 1919 paper (see [210]).
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unary predicate variable α either to a 1-formula of the form x 7→ Θ, in which case we
get
⊢ ∀xΘ→ Θ[x/T ], provided that T is free for x in Θ;
⊢ Θ[x/T ]→ ∃xΘ, provided that T is free for x in Θ,
or to an arbitrary 1-formula Σ, in which case we get
⊢ ∀xΣ(x)→ Σ(T ), provided that T is free for x in Σ(x) and x does not occur freely in Σ;
⊢ Σ(T )→ ∃xΣ(x), provided that T is free for x in Σ(x) and x does not occur freely in Σ,
where the λ-expressions Σ(x), Σ(T ) stand for their normal forms (which are formulas).
Let us note that the second side condition, “provided that x does not occur freely in
Σ”, cannot be dropped. For instance, if Σ is the arithmetical 1-formula y 7→ x = y, and
T is the arithmetical term x+ 1, then ∀xΣ(x)→ Σ(T ) is not a valid formula.
Similarly, the traditional schematic versions of (XII) and (XIII) with side conditions
follow immediately from (XII) and (XIII) respectively by applying the second-order
meta-specialization and (for one of the traditions) the first-order meta-generalization
(see §4.4.1). Namely, by specializing γ to a formula Γ, and α to a 1-formula of the form
x 7→ Θ, we get
⟮x⟯Γ→ Θ ⊢ Γ→ ∀xΘ, provided that x does not occur freely in Γ;
⟮x⟯Θ→ Γ ⊢ ∃xΘ→ Γ, provided that x does not occur freely in Γ,
which corresponds to the tradition of “varied variables” (in Kleene’s terminology), found
in the textbooks by Schoenfield and Mendelson. Now by combining these with the
meta-generalization with respect to x, we get
Γ→ Θ ⊢ Γ→ ∀xΘ, provided that x does not occur freely in Γ and in the assumptions;
Θ→ Γ ⊢ ∃xΘ→ Γ, provided that x does not occur freely in Γ and in the assumptions,
which corresponds to the tradition of “fixed variables”, found in the textbooks by Church,
Troelstra and van Dalen. Like before, we can replace Θ with Σ(x), at the cost of the
additional side condition “provided that x does not occur freely in Σ”.
In particular, the special case of (XII) with γ = X, when rewritten as
(XIIX) (generalization rule)
α(x)
∀xα(x)
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(see Example 4.51 below), corresponds to the following traditional schematic forms of
the generalization rule:
⟮x⟯Σ(x) ⊢ ∀xΣ(x), provided that x does not occur freely in Σ;
Σ(x) ⊢ ∀xΣ(x), provided that x does not occur freely in Σ and in the assumptions,
where the λ-expression Σ(x) again stands for its normal form (which is a formula). The
side conditions cannot be dropped here as well (see Example 4.39 and Remark 4.40).
Example 4.51. Let us show that formulas Φ and X→ Φ are interderivable in intuition-
istic logic. Indeed, by (VI) ⊢ Φ∧X→ Φ, hence by the exponential law, ⊢ Φ→ (X→ Φ),
and thus by modus ponens, Φ ⊢ X → Φ. Conversely, since X = × → ×, by (II) ⊢ X,
and therefore by modus ponens, X→ Φ ⊢ Φ.
4.6.2. Modifications and dualizations. Since intuitionistic logic satisfies the deduction
theorem (see [200], where it is proved in Spector’s derivation system) and the exponential
law, Φ,Ψ ⊢ Ξ is equivalent to ⊢ Φ ∧Ψ→ Ξ (see §4.5.3).
Thus, should we wish to have fewer inference rules, we may well replace the inference
rules in (III), (IV), (VIII) and (IX) by the corresponding laws (in which the horizontal
bar is replaced by →, and the comma by ∧).
As for the inference rules (XII) and (XIII), for many purposes it is convenient to
replace them by the generalization rule (XIIX) along with the following ones:
(XII′)
∀x (γ→ α(x))
γ→ ∀xα(x)
(XIII′)
∀x (α(x)→ γ)
∃xα(x)→ γ
Indeed, using the generalization rule (XIIX) and its converse, which follows from (X),
we can clearly exchange (XII′) for (XII) and (XIII′) for (XII).
Now by the deduction theorem, the inference rules (XII′) and (XIII′) can be replaced
by the corresponding laws (in which the horizontal bar is replaced by →).
The generalization rule is, however, strictly weaker than the corresponding principle,
·α(x)→ ∀xα(x) (see §4.7.1). Informally, this can be explained as follows. If, for in-
stance, ¬ x = x+ 1 has been proved, we should be able to conclude ∀x ¬ x = x + 1; yet
from ∃x x = 1 we cannot conclude ∃x ∀x x = 1 (which is equivalent to ∃y ∀x x = 1); also,
from ¬∀x x = 1 we cannot conclude ¬ x = 1 (which, if proved, would imply ∀x ¬ x = 1).
Let us note dual forms of the rules (XII′) and (XIII′):
(XII′∗)
∃x (γ→ α(x))
γ→ ∃xα(x)
(XIII′∗)
∃x (α(x)→ γ)
∀xα(x)→ γ
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These, or rather their corresponding principles, follow from the laws (XI) and (X) re-
spectively, using the rule (XIII) and the generalization rule. Similarly, there are also
dual forms of the rules (VIII) and (IX).
The laws (X) and (XI) also imply the converses of the rules (XII) and (XIII), and
hence (using the generalization rule) also the converses of (XII′) and (XIII′). However,
the converses of the rules (XII′∗) and (XIII′∗) are not derivable in intuitionistic logic (see
5.2.2), and therefore not even admissible in it, since they are easily seen to be interderiv-
able with the principles ·∃t (∃xα(x)→ α(t)) and ·∃t (α(t)→ ∀xα(x)), respectively. In
classical logic, these principles are easily seen to be derivable.
Dual to the generalization rule is the following instantiation rule
(XII∗X)
∃xγ
γ
,
whose corresponding principle follows from (XIII) and (II). The more general rule
∃xα(x) /α(x), which is the “contrapositive” of the generalization rule, is not even admis-
sible in classical logic (by considering any of the two classically derivable formulas just
mentioned above, ∃x (∃yβ(y)→ β(x)) or ∃x (β(x)→ ∀yβ(y))).
The rule ∃xα(x) /α(x) is also not admissible in intuitionistic logic, by considering the
intuitionistically derivable formula ∃x (β(x)→ β(y)) (see Example 4.38). But the second
variable is essential here: as long as the language contains no function symbols, and Φ is
a closed 1-formula, ⊢ ∃xΦ(x) implies ⊢ Φ(x) by the “existence property” of intuitionistic
logic (Gentzen; see [104]). The related “disjunction property” will be discussed in §5.3
below.
4.6.3. Additional meta-connectives. In studying models, it seems worthwhile to be armed
with what was not needed previously: the meta-absurdity ⨳, the meta-disjunction F ‖ G
and the existential first-order meta-quantifier 〈x〉 F . These are assumed to satisfy the
following meta-rules, where F , G and H are meta-formulas, x is an individual variable
and T is a term.
(⨳-elimination)
...
⨳
F
(‖-introduction)
...
F
F ‖ G and
...
G
F ‖ G
(‖-elimination)
...
F ‖ G
[F ]
...
H
[G]
...
H
H
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(〈·〉-introduction)
...
F [x/T ]
〈x〉 F , provided that T is free for x in F
(〈·〉-elimination)
...
〈x〉F
[F ]
...
H
H , provided that x does not occur freely in H and
in the assumptions.
On the other hand, Russell’s well-known second-order definitions of ×, ∨, ∃ and ∧
(see [5] and [64; §11.3.2]) suggest the following versions of ⨳, ‖, 〈·〉 and &:
• ⨳˜ := ⟮α⟯α;
• F ‖˜ G := ⟮γ⟯ ((F ⇒ γ) & (G ⇒ γ)⇒ γ);69
• 〈˜x〉F := ⟮γ⟯ (⟮x⟯ (F ⇒ γ)⇒ γ);
• F &˜ G := ⟮γ⟯
((F ⇒ (G ⇒ γ))⇒ γ),
where γ is a nullary predicate variable that does not occur freely in the meta-formulas
F , G.
When F and G are formulas (regarded as atomic meta-formulas), we can identify
& with &˜ ; ‖ with ‖˜ ; and 〈·〉 with 〈˜·〉. We only include full details for the case of
meta-conjunction:
Proposition 4.52. (a) Φ &˜ Ψ ⇐⇒ Φ &Ψ is deducible for all formulas Φ, Ψ;
(b) each of Φ, Ψ can be deduced from Φ &˜ Ψ, and Φ &˜ Ψ can be deduced from Φ and
Ψ without using the &-introduction and the &-elimination meta-rules;
(c) Let H be a meta-formula where all occurrences of & are applied to formulas.
Then H is deducible if and only if the meta-formula obtained from H by replacing every
occurrence of & with a &˜ is deducible without using the &-introduction and the &-
elimination meta-rules.
Proof. (b). To deduce Φ from Φ &˜ Ψ we use the meta-specialization with γ = Φ along
with the fact that Φ ⇒ (Ψ ⇒ Φ) is deducible (see Example 4.28). To deduce Ψ from
Φ &˜ Ψ we use the meta-specialization with γ = Ψ along with the fact that Φ⇒ (Ψ⇒ Ψ)
is deducible (see Example 4.28).
To deduce Φ &˜ Ψ from Φ and Ψ, let us first note that γ can be deduced from Φ,
Ψ and Φ ⇒ (Ψ ⇒ γ) by a double application of the ⇒-elimination. Now by the ⇒-
introduction, we get a deduction of
(
Φ⇒ (Ψ⇒ γ))⇒ γ from Φ and Ψ, and it remains
to apply the meta-generalization. 
(a). The &-elimination meta-rule along with the &˜ -introducing deduction provided by
(b) yield a deduction of Φ &˜ Ψ from Φ & Ψ. Similarly one gets a deduction of Φ & Ψ
from Φ &˜ Ψ. The assertion now follows by the ⇒-introduction. 
69Let us note that & can be eliminated here by a mere application of the exponential meta-law.
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(c). The “if” assertion follows from (a), and the “only if” assertion from (b). 
Let us also discuss the special case of the 〈·〉-rules where x does not occur freely in Φ.
Example 4.53. Let us show that if Φ is a formula, Φ ⇐⇒ ⟮γ⟯ ((Φ ⇒ γ) ⇒ γ) is
deducible as long as γ does not occur freely in Φ.
The ⇐ implication follows by meta-specializing γ to Φ.
To get the converse implication, by the meta-generalization, it suffices to deduce
(Φ ⇒ γ) ⇒ γ from Φ. But Φ ⇒ ((Φ ⇒ γ) ⇒ γ) is easily deducible by a double
application of the exponential meta-law.
Proposition 4.54. In intuitionistic logic,
(a) ⊢ ϕ ⇐⇒ ⟮γ⟯ (ϕ→ γ)→ γ;
(b) ⊢ α ∧ β ⇐⇒ ⟮γ⟯ (α→ (β→ γ))→ γ;
(c) ⊢ α ∨ β ⇐⇒ ⟮γ⟯ (α→ γ)→ ((β→ γ)→ γ);
(d) ⊢ ∃xα(x) ⇐⇒ ⟮γ⟯ ∀x (α(x)→ γ)→ γ;
(e) ⊢ × ⇐⇒ ⟮γ⟯γ.
Parts (b), (c), (d),(e) yield meta-logical “definitions”, up to meta-equivalence, of ×;
of ∧ and ∨ in terms of →; and of ∃ in terms of → and ∀. Of course, these “definitions”
also apply in classical logic. Let us note that part (e) says that ⊢ ×⇔ ⨳˜.
Proof. (a). This is similar to Example 4.53. The⇐ follows by meta-specializing γ to ϕ.
To get the converse, by the meta-generalization, it suffices to derive (ϕ → γ) → γ
from ϕ. By the modus ponens rule, it suffices to derive ϕ→ ((ϕ→ γ)→ γ). But it is
easily derivable by a double application of the exponential law. 
(b),(c),(d),(e). These follow from (a) by appropriately meta-specializing ϕ. Namely, (b)
follows by the exponential law; (c) by (24) and the exponential law; (d) by (16); and (e)
is straightforward. 
Proposition 4.55. In intuitionistic logic,
(a) ⊢ Φ ∧Ψ⇔ Φ&Ψ for any formulas Φ, Ψ;
(b) ⊢ ∀xΦ⇔ ⟮x⟯Φ for any formula Φ;
(c) ⊢ ⨳⇒×;
(d) ⊢ Φ ‖ Ψ⇒ Φ ∨Ψ for any formulas Φ, Ψ;
(e) ⊢ 〈x〉Φ⇒ ∃xΦ for any formula Φ;
(f) ⊢ Φ→ Ψ⇒ (Φ⇒ Ψ) for any formulas Φ, Ψ.
This clearly transfers to any extension of intuitionistic logic, including classical logic.
The converses to parts (d), (e), (f) do not hold already in zero-order classical logic
(and hence also in zero-order intuitionistic logic), see Examples 4.78 and 4.76.
Proof. (a). From (VIII) with γ = X and the &-elimination meta-rule we get ⊢ Φ&Ψ⇒
Φ ∧ Ψ. Conversely, from (VI) and the modus ponens rule we have ⊢ Φ ∧ Ψ ⇒ Φ and
⊢ Φ ∧Ψ⇒ Ψ. Hence by the &-introduction, ⊢ Φ ∧Ψ⇒ Φ &Ψ. 
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(b). Here⇐ follows from the generalization rule, and⇒ from (X) and the modus ponens
rule, along with the generalization meta-rule. 
(c). This follows from the ⨳-elimination rule. 
(d). From (VII) and the modus ponens rule we have ⊢ Φ ⇒ Φ ∨ Ψ and ⊢ Ψ ⇒ Φ ∨ Ψ.
Hence by the ‖-elimination, ⊢ Φ ‖ Ψ⇒ Φ ∨Ψ. 
(e). This is similar to (d). 
(f). This follows from the modus ponens rule. 
Remark 4.56. If F is a meta-formula with no occurrences of ⨳, then ⨳˜ ⇒ F is deducible.
Indeed, from ⨳˜ we can deduce any formula (regarded as an atomic meta-formula) by
the meta-specialization. The assertion now follows by induction, using &- ⇒-, ‖-, 〈·〉-
introduction and the meta-generalization.
4.7. Models
4.7.1. Meta-models. Let us call a meta-rule absolute if it involves no conditions on the
assumptions of the deduction. In particular, the ⇒-elimination meta-rule is absolute;
and so is every meta-law. Thus the Enderton-style system of §4.4.4 consists entirely of
absolute meta-rules.
Let us fix a language ℒ. An absolute meta-rule is said to be satisfied in a meta-ℒ-
structure 풿 if for every its instance
F1, . . . ,Fn
G
and every individual assignment 퓊 and every predicate valuation 퓋, if ?(|Fi|퓊퓋풿 ) =
‚
for
each i, then ?(|G|퓊퓋풿 ) =
‚
.
In particular, a meta-law is satisfied in 풿 if and only ?(|G|퓊퓋풿 ) =
‚
for every its
instance G and every individual assignment 퓊 and every predicate valuation 퓋. Let us
note also that the α-conversion rule is trivially satisfied in every meta-ℒ-structure.
A meta-ℒ-structure 풿 will be called a model of the meta-logic if it satisfies all meta-
rules of the Enderton-style formulation of the meta-logic in §4.4.4.
It is easy to see that if an absolute meta-rule is derivable in the Enderton-style system,
then it is satisfied in any model of the meta-logic.
This applies, in particular, to the &-introduction and &-elimination meta-rules. Thus
we obtain
Proposition 4.57. Let 풿 be a model of the meta-logic, F and G meta-formulas, 퓊 a
variable assignment and 퓋 a predicate valuation.
Then |F & G|퓊퓋풿 =
‚
if and only if |F|퓊퓋풿 =
‚
and |G|퓊퓋풿 =
‚
.
The same goes for the specialization meta-rules. However, the generalization meta-
rules are not absolute.
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Let us call a meta-ℒ-structure 풿 a semi-standard model of the meta-logic if it satisfies
all absolute meta-rules of the Hilbert-style formulation of the meta-logic in §4.4.4 and
also the following two conditions (corresponding to the generalization meta-rules):
(A) If ?(|F|퓊′퓋풿 ) =
‚
for every variable assignment 퓊′ that agrees with 퓊 on all
individual variables other than x, then ?(|⟮x⟯F|퓊퓋풿 ) =
‚
;
(B) if ?(|F|퓊퓋′풿 ) =
‚
for every predicate valuation 퓋′ that agrees with 퓋 on all
predicate variables other than γ, then ?(|⟮γ⟯F|퓊퓋풿 ) =
‚
.
It is easy to see, following the straightforward derivation of the Enderton-style system
from the Hilbert-style system, that every semi-standard model of the meta-logic is a
model of the meta-logic.
Proposition 4.58. Let 풿 be a semi-standard model of the meta-logic, F and G meta-
formulas, 퓊 a variable assignment and 퓋 a predicate valuation.
(a) ?(|⟮x⟯F|퓊퓋풿 ) =
‚
if and only if ?(|F|퓊′퓋풿 ) =
‚
for every variable assignment 퓊′
that agrees with 퓊 on all individual variables other than x.
(b) ?(|⟮γ⟯F|퓊퓋풿 ) =
‚
if and only if ?(|F|퓊퓋′풿 ) =
‚
for every predicate valuation 퓋′ that
agrees with 퓋 on all predicate variables other than γ.
Proof. Let us prove (a). The “if” assertion is precisely the condition corresponding to the
generalization meta-rule. So it remains to prove the “only if” assertion. The condition
corresponding to the specialization meta-rule is: for any F , 퓊 and 퓋, if ?(|⟮x⟯F|퓊퓋풿 ) =
‚
,
then ?(|F [x/T ]|퓊퓋풿 ) =
‚
, as long as T is free for x in F .
Let y be a variable that does not occur freely in F . Given an assignment 퓊′ as above,
let 퓊′′ be the assignment with 퓊′′(y) = 퓊′(x) and 퓊′′(z) = 퓊(z) for every variable z
other than y. Since y does not occur freely in F , we have |⟮x⟯F|퓊퓋풿 = |⟮x⟯F|퓊′′퓋풿 . By
the condition corresponding to the meta-specialization rule, if ?(|⟮x⟯F|퓊′′퓋풿 ) =
‚
, then
?(|F [x/y]|퓊′′퓋풿 ) =
‚
. Since y does not occur freely in F , we also have |F [x/y]|퓊′′퓋풿 =
|F|퓊′퓋풿 . Thus if ?(|⟮x⟯F|퓊퓋풿 ) =
‚
, then ?(|F|퓊′퓋풿 ) =
‚
.
The proof of (b) is similar. 
Let us note that while the ⇒-elimination meta-rule is absolute, the ⇒-introduction
meta-rule is not.
Let us call a meta-ℒ-structure 풿 a standard model of the meta-logic if it satisfies
all absolute meta-rules of the original natural deduction formulation of the meta-logic
in §4.4.1, the conditions (A) and (B) above (corresponding to the generalization meta-
rules), and also the following condition (corresponding to the⇒-introduction meta-rule):
(C) If either ?(|F|퓊퓋풿 ) = ‚ or ?(|G|퓊퓋풿 ) =
‚
, then ?(|F ⇒ G|퓊퓋풿 ) =
‚
.
It is easy to see that any standard model of the meta-logic is a semi-standard model
of the meta-logic.
Condition (C) is converse to the condition of satisfying the ⇒-elimination meta-rule.
Thus we obtain
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Proposition 4.59. Let 풿 be a standard model of the meta-logic, F and G meta-formulas,
퓊 a variable assignment and 퓋 a predicate valuation.
?(|F ⇒ G|퓊퓋풿 ) =
‚
if and only if ?(|F|퓊퓋풿 ) =
‚
implies ?(|G|퓊퓋풿 ) =
‚
.
It is easy to see that a two-valued meta-interpretation 풿 = 풾+ is always a standard
model of the meta-logic.
In fact, the converse also holds: any standard model of the meta-logic reduces to a
two-valued one.
Theorem 4.60. Let 풿 be a standard model of the meta-logic. Then there exists a two-
valued model 풾+ of the meta-logic such that any given meta-formula F is valid in 풿 if
and only if it is valid in 풾+.
Proof. The given model 풿 includes an ℒ-structure 풾, which in turn determines a two-
valued model 풾+ of the meta-logic, with !풾+ : 풪 → {
‚
,‚} defined as the composition
풪
!풿−→ 풬 ?풿−→ {‚,‚}. For any atomic meta-formula F and any variable assignment 퓊
and any predicate valuation 퓋 we have ?풿(|F|퓊퓋풿 ) =
‚
if and only if |F|퓊퓋풾+ =
‚
. Now
from 4.57, 4.58 and 4.59 we get that the same holds for an arbitrary meta-formula F .
In particular, a meta-formula F is valid in 풿 if and only if it is valid in 풾+. 
4.7.2. Two-valued meta-models. Let us now record the conditions corresponding to all
meta-rules (also for the additional meta-connectives) in two-valued models of the meta-
logic.
• |F & G|퓊퓋풾+ =
‚
if and only if |F|퓊퓋풾+ =
‚
and |G|퓊퓋풾+ =
‚
.
• |F ‖ G|퓊퓋풾+ =
‚
if and only if |F|퓊퓋풾+ =
‚
or |G|퓊퓋풾+ =
‚
.
• |F ⇒ G|퓊퓋풾+ =
‚
if and only if |F|퓊퓋풾+ =
‚
implies |G|퓊퓋풾+ =
‚
.
• |⟮x⟯F|퓊퓋풾+ =
‚
if and only if |F|퓊′퓋풾+ =
‚
for every variable assignment 퓊′ that
agrees with 퓊 on all individual variables other than x.
• |⟮γ⟯F|퓊퓋풾+ =
‚
if and only if |F|퓊퓋′풾+ =
‚
for every predicate valuation 퓋′ that
agrees with 퓋 on all predicate variables other than γ.
• | 〈x〉F|퓊퓋풾+ =
‚
if and only if |F|퓊′퓋풾+ =
‚
for some variable assignment 퓊′ that
agrees with 퓊 on all individual variables other than x.
• |⨳|풾+ =
‚
if and only if !(풪) = {‚}.
Here are some special cases:
Proposition 4.61. Let 풾 be an ℒ-structure and F a meta-formula.
(a) Let 퓋 be a predicate valuation. Then |⟮⟯F|퓋풾+ =
‚
if and only if |F|퓊퓋풾+ =
‚
for
every variable assignment 퓊.
(b) Suppose that F is closed. Then |⟮⟯F|풾+ =
‚
if and only if |F|퓋풾+ =
‚
for every
predicate valuation 퓋;
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(c) Let 퓋 be a predicate valuation. Then | 〈〉F|퓋풾+ =
‚
if and only if |F|퓊퓋풾+ =
‚
for
some variable assignment 퓊.
Let us note that the proposition can be rephrased as follows:
(a) a meta-formula F is valid in (풾,퓋) if and only if ⟮⟯F is valid in (풾,퓋);
(b) a closed meta-formula F is valid in 풾 if and only if ⟮⟯F is valid in 풾;
(c) a meta-formula F is satisfiable in (풾,퓋) if and only if 〈〉F is valid in (풾,퓋).
Corollary 4.62. Let 풾 be an ℒ-structure.
(a) A principle ·Φ is valid in 풾 if and only if the formula Φ is valid in 풾 (that is,
!(|Φ|퓊퓋풾 ) =
‚
for every variable assignment 퓊 and every predicate valuation 퓋).
(b) A rule Φ1, . . . ,Φn /Ψ is valid in 풾 if and only if for every predicate valuation 퓋,
if the formulas Φ1, . . . ,Φn are valid in (풾,퓋), then Ψ is also valid in (풾,퓋) (in other
words, if !(|Φj |퓊퓋풾 ) =
‚
for each j and every variable assignment 퓊, then !(|Ψ|퓊퓋풾 ) =
‚
for every variable assignment 퓊).
4.7.3. Models. Let us fix a logic L based on a language ℒ and given by a derivation
system D.
Anℒ-structure M is called a model of L if the meta-formula D is valid inM (in other
words, if all the laws and inference rules of D are valid in M+).70 If an ℒ-structure
M is a model of L, then clearly all derivable principles of L are valid in M , and more
generally, it is easy to see that
F1, . . . ,Fk ⊢L G implies F1, . . . ,Fk M G
for arbitrary meta-formulas Fi and G. In particular,
if a rule Φ1, . . . ,Φk /Ψ is derivable in L, then it is valid in every model of L.
For many logics one also has the converse implication (see e.g. [172; 1.4.11] for the zero-
order case). In fact, a logic L is said to be complete with respect to a family of its models
Mt (possibly consisting of just one model), if every purely logical principle that is valid
in each Mt is derivable in L, and strongly complete if every purely logical rule that is
valid in each Mt is derivable in L. Thus the family Mt is not strongly complete if and
only if there exists a proper extension L+ of L such that each Mt is a model of L
+.
A model of a theory T over L is an ℒ(T )-structure M that is a model of L such that
the meta-formula T is valid in M (in other words, such that all axioms of T are valid
in M). Clearly, every theorem of T is valid in all models of T . The theory T is called
complete with respect to a family Mt of its models if every formula that is valid in each
Mt is a theorem of T . Thus T is complete with respect to the family Mt if and only if
every principle (possibly not purely logical) that is valid in each Mt is derivable from T
in L. We may also call T strongly complete with respect to the family Mt if every rule
(possibly not purely logical) that is valid in each Mt is derivable from T in L.
Given a first-order languageℒ, let ℒ+ denote the language obtained by extending ℒ
by countably many predicate constants of each arity. Thus ifℒ is the language of a logic
70Let us note that models as defined here include neither a predicate valuation nor a variable assignment.
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L, we have an arity-preserving bijection ϕL between the predicate variables of ℒ and
the predicate constants of ℒ+. It extends to a bijection ϕL between the formulas of ℒ
and those formulas of ℒ+ that involve no predicate variables. If M is an ℒ
+-structure,
let M− denote the ℒ-structure obtained from M by discarding the interpretation of the
predicate constants that are not in ℒ.
Proposition 4.63. If every consistent theory T over a logic L such thatℒ(T ) =ℒ(L)+
and T involves no predicate variables is complete with respect to some family MT ,t of its
models, then L is strongly complete with respect to the two-parameter family M−T ,t of its
models.
The proof also works if L is replaced by an empty theory over L.
Proof. If a rule Φ1, . . . ,Φk /Ψ of the language ℒ(L) is not derivable in L, let T =
⟮⟯ϕL(Φ1) & · · · & ⟮⟯ϕL(Φk). Then ϕL(Ψ) is not a theorem of T . In particular, T is
consistent, and hence ϕL(Ψ) is not valid in MT ,t for some t. But each ⟮⟯ϕL(Φi) is valid
in MT ,t. Thus ⟮⟯ϕL(Φ1) & · · ·& ⟮⟯ϕL(Φk) ⇒ ⟮⟯ϕL(Ψ) is not valid in MT ,t, and hence
the rule Φ1, . . . ,Φk /Ψ is not valid in MT ,t or, equivalently, in M
−
T ,t. 
Remark 4.64. Strong completeness is closely related to Dragalin’s composite theories
[46]. We call a pair T = (T+, T−) a composite theory if T+ is a theory, i.e., a finite meta-
conjunction of principles, called the axioms of T , and T− is a finite meta-disjunction (see
4.6.3) of principles, which might be called the taboos of T . The empty meta-disjunction
will be identified with ⨳˜ = ⟮γ⟯γ. A composite theory T is called inconsistent if T+ ⊢ T−.
A model of a composite theory T over a logic L is a modelM of L such that T+ is valid
in M and T− is not valid in M . Since meta-disjunction, like all other meta-connectives,
is treated classically in the two-valued meta-interpretation, to say that T− is not valid
in M is equivalent to saying that none of the taboos of T is valid in M — as long as
there is at least one taboo. Else we have T− = ⟮γ⟯γ, and to say T− is not valid in M is
equivalent to saying that not all formulas are valid in M . This is equivalent to the usual
requirement that 풟 be nonempty (which is thus “explained” by composite theories).
If every consistent composite theory T over L such that ℒ(T ) = ℒ(L)+ and T
involves no predicate variables has a model MT , then L is strongly complete with re-
spect to the family M−T . Indeed, if a rule Φ1, . . . ,Φn /Ψ is not derivable, then the
composite theory T with axioms ⟮⟯ϕL(Φ1), . . . , ⟮⟯ϕL(Φn) and the only taboo ⟮⟯ϕL(Ψ)
is consistent. Then ⟮⟯ϕL(Φ1), . . . , ⟮⟯ϕL(Φn) are valid in MT , whereas ⟮⟯ϕL(Ψ) is not.
Hence ⟮⟯ϕL(Φ1) & · · · & ⟮⟯ϕL(Φn) ⇒ ⟮⟯ϕL(Ψ) is not valid in MT . Therefore the rule
Φ1, . . . ,Φn /Ψ is not valid in MT or, equivalently, in M
−
T .
4.7.4. Valuation fields. Given an ℒ-structure 풾 given by 풟, 풪 and interpretations of
function symbols, predicate constants, connectives and quantifiers, we call a family H
of subsets Hn ⊂ Hom(풟n,풪), n = 0, 1, 2, . . . , a valuation field with respect to 풾 if it
is closed with respect to the interpretations of function symbols, predicate constants,
connectives and quantifiers provided by 풾. In other words, H = (Hn) is a valuation
field if and only if each valuation 퓋 such that 퓋(ϕ) ∈ Hn for every n-ary predicate
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variable ϕ, n = 0, 1, 2, . . . , also satisfies |F |퓋풾 ∈ Hn for each n-formula F of the language,
n = 0, 1, 2, . . . .
A valuation field H contains a valuation 퓋 if 퓋(ϕ) ∈ Hn for every n-ary predicate
variable ϕ, n = 0, 1, 2, . . . . The valuation field generated by a valuation 퓋, denoted
〈퓋〉, is the smallest valuation field that contains 퓋. Clearly, 〈퓋〉 = (Hn) where each Hn
consists of |F |퓋풾 where F runs over all n-formulas of the language.
Given a valuation fieldH = (Hn) with respect to anℒ-structure 풾, ameta-L-structure
풿 restricted over H is defined like a usual meta-ℒ-structure, except that the second-
order meta-quantifiers are now interpreted by functions |qn|풿 : Hom(Hn,풬
) → 풬. In
particular, the two-valued meta-L-structure restricted over H is the modification 풾+(H)
of the usual two-valued meta-ℒ-structure 풾+ obtained by re-interpreting the second-
order meta-quantifiers by functions |qn|풾+(H) : Hom(Hn,풬
) → 풬 defined in the same
way as before, i.e. by |qn|풾+(H)(f) =
‚
if and only f(ϕ) =
‚
for all ϕ ∈ Hn.
It is not hard to see that for any valuation field H, 풾+(H) is a standard model of the
meta-logic in the sense of §4.7.1, except that all valuations mentioned there are now
required to be contained in H. (It is here that we use that H is a valuation field and
not just an arbitrary family of subsets of the function sets Hom(풟n,풪).)
Given a valuation field H, with respect to an ℒ-structure M , the latter is called a
model of ℒ with respect to H if the meta-formula D is valid in M+(H).
Remark 4.65. Valuation fields are parallel to (and, in a sense, generalize) algebras of
admissible sets, which distinguish the so-called “general frames” from usual frames.
4.8. Classical logic (semantics)
4.8.1. Two-valued models. In a two-valued model of classical logic, the set 풪 is taken to
be {‚,‚}, with ! = id, and the connectives and the quantifiers are interpreted according
to the usual truth tables (see §3.1). (Thus two-valued models of classical logic differ
only in the choice of the domain 풟.) It is not hard to check that, indeed, the laws and
the inference rules of classical logic (see §4.6) hold under this interpretation.
A model of a theory over classical logic is two-valued if it extends a two-valued model
of classical logic (by additionally interpreting the predicate constants and the function
symbols in the language of the theory). By a strong form of Go¨del’s completeness
theorem [168; VIII.5.2], every consistent theory T over classical logic is complete with
respect to the family of its two-valued models with domain N.71 In fact, the proof of this
assertion in [168] actually shows that T is complete with respect to a family MT ,t of its
two-valued models with domain N that differ only in the interpretation of the predicate
constants, as they all have the same interpretation of the function symbols. (Namely,
if f is an n-ary function symbol, |f| : Nn → N is defined by |f|(t1, . . . , tn) = f(t1, . . . , tn),
71Let us recall that our theories correspond to the traditional notion of a theory given by finitely many
axioms and finitely many axiom schemata (which due to our finiteness restrictions on the language
consist of countably many axioms). This is included in the countably axiomatized traditional theory of
[168; VIII.5.2] (in fact, the finitely axiomatized case would already suffice for our present purposes).
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where · : 풯(ℒ) → N is some bijection between all terms of the language and natural
numbers.) Thus from 4.63 we get
Theorem 4.66. Classical logic is strongly complete with respect to its unique two-valued
model with domain N.
Every empty theory over classical logic is strongly complete with respect to a family of
its two-valued models with domain N. This family consists of just one model if there are
no predicate constants in the language.
The condition that there be no predicate constants in the language cannot be dropped
by considering a propositional (=nullary predicate) constant c. In any two-valued model
M , either |c|M = ‚ or |c|M = ‚; hence one of the non-derivable principles · c, ·¬c is
valid in M .
We will next use two-valued models to differentiate derivable, admissible and stably
admissible rules, as well as principles.
Example 4.67. Although the generalization rule p(x) / ∀xp(x) is derivable in classical
logic (see (XIIX)), the corresponding formula p(t)→ ∀xp(x) is not.
Indeed, let us consider a two-valued modelM of classical logic with풟M = {0, 1} and a
predicate valuation 퓋 such that |p|퓋M(0) = ‚ and |p|퓋M(1) =
‚
. Then |p(x)→ ∀xp(x)|퓊퓋M
is
‚
if 퓊(x) = 0 and ‚ if 퓊(x) = 1. Hence p(x) → ∀xp(x) is not valid in (M,퓋), and
therefore also in M . Thus it is not derivable in classical logic.
Let us note that the meta-formula ⟮x⟯p(x)⇒ ∀xp(x) must be valid in (M,퓋), since it
is an immediate consequence of the generalization rule. This is easy to check directly:
it is interpreted by the implication “if p(x) is valid in (M,퓋), then ∀xp(x) is valid in
(M,퓋)”, in which both the hypothesis and the conclusion are false.
Example 4.68. In zero-order classical logic with a propositional constant c added to
the language, the rule c /⊥ is admissible but not derivable (and not stably admissible).
Indeed, a two-valued model M such that |c|M = ‚ shows that the rule c /⊥ is not
derivable. Moreover it shows that the principle · c does not imply the principle ·⊥, and
hence that the rule c /⊥ is not stably admissible. On the other hand, a two-valued
model M such that |c|M = ‚ shows that the formula c is not derivable. Hence the rule
c /⊥, which has no special cases apart from itself, is admissible.
Example 4.69. In classical logic, the rule
∃xp(x), ∃x¬p(x)
⊥
is admissible but not derivable.
To see the latter, we can use the same M and 퓋 as in the previous example (4.67).
Then ∃xp(x) and ∃x¬p(x) are both valid in (M,퓋), yet ⊥ is not. Hence the rule in
question is not valid in M , and therefore it is not derivable in classical logic.
On the other hand, suppose that for some 1-formula P we have both ⊢ ∃xP (x) and
⊢ ∃x¬P (x). Let N be a two-valued model of classical logic with domain consisting of a
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single element, 풟N = {∗}. Then ∃xP (x) and ∃x¬P (x) must both be valid in N , that is,
|∃xP (x)|퓊퓋N = |∃x¬P (x)|퓊퓋N =
‚
for every individual assignment 퓊 and every predicate
valuation 퓋. Since ∗ is the only element in 풟N , this means that |P |퓊퓋N (∗) = |¬P |퓊퓋N (∗) =
‚
, which is a contradiction. Hence for any special case of the rule in question, the
derivability of the premisses is impossible, and in particular implies the derivability of
the conclusion. Thus the rule is admissible.
Remark 4.70. In fact, these examples are characteristic of non-derivable admissible rules
in classical logic. They are all such that any specialization of the conjunction of their
premisses is non-derivable, and even not satisfiable in any two-valued model with one-
element domain [47].
Example 4.71. The rule of the previous example is, in fact, stably admissible, not only
for classical but, more generally, for intuitionistic logic (and also for empty theories over
them, with no predicate constants of arity > 0 in the language). Let us note that this
rule is not derivable in intuitionistic logic, since it is not derivable in classical logic.
To prove the stable admissibility, we need to show that for any 1-formula Σ, the
principles ·∃xΣ(x) and ·∃x¬Σ(x) imply ·×. Indeed, let ~γ be the tuple of all predicate
variables that occur in Σ, and let ~r = (r1, . . . , rk) be the tuple of their arities. Next
let ×~r = (×r1, . . . ,×rn), where ×r denotes the r-formula x1, . . . , xr 7→ ×. (Alterna-
tively, we could have used X in place of ×, or both of them.) Then the two principles
in question meta-specialize to the formulas ∃xΣ(x)[~γ/×~r] and ∃x¬Σ(x)[~γ/×~r] respec-
tively. Since the language contains no predicate constants of arity > 0, the formula
Σ(x)[~γ/×~r] contains no occurrences of individual variables, including x. But then our
formulas ∃xΣ(x)[~γ/×~r] and ∃x¬Σ(x)[~γ/×~r] are equivalent (over intuitionistic logic) to
Σ(x)[~γ/×~r] and ¬Σ(x)[~γ/×~r] respectively. Thus they indeed have × as a joint conse-
quence.
Example 4.72. In classical logic with language extended by one binary predicate con-
stant (denoted =), the rule ∃xp(x), ∃x¬p(x) /⊥ is not stably admissible.
Indeed, let us show that the principles ·∃x x = y and ·∃x ¬x = y do not imply ·⊥; or
in other words that if they are added as laws to classical logic with equality, the resulting
logic is still consistent. Indeed, ⟮y⟯∃x x = y or, equivalently, ∀y ∃x x = y is derivable from
∀y y = y, and therefore is valid in any model of classical logic with equality; whereas
⟮y⟯ ∃x ¬x = y or, equivalently, ∀y ∃x ¬x = y is valid in any model of classical logic
with equality with non-singleton domain. (See e.g. [141] concerning classical logic with
equality.) Thus classical logic with = added to the language (and no additional laws or
inference rules) has two-valued models where both ∃x x = y and ∃x ¬x = y are valid;
whereas ⊥ is not valid in any model.
Proposition 4.73. In zero-order classical logic (with no propositional constants added
to the language) admissible rules are derivable.
Proof. If a rule P1, . . . , Pk /Q is not derivable, then by the strong completeness theo-
rem 4.66, this rule is not satisfied in the two-valued model M of zero-order classical
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logic. Then there is a special case P ′1, . . . , P
′
k /Q
′ of the rule in question and a valua-
tion 퓋 such that each |P ′i |퓋M =
‚
and |Q′|퓋M = ‚ (see e.g. Proposition 4.62(b)). Let
~p = (p1, . . . , pn) be the tuple of all propositional variables that occur freely in any of
the formulas P ′1, . . . , P
′
k, Q
′, and let ~c = (c1, . . . , cn), where ci = ⊤ if 퓋(pi) = ‚ and
ci = ⊥ if 퓋(pi) = ‚. Then (P ′1, . . . , P ′k /Q′)[~p/~c] is a new rule, which can be written
P ′′1 , . . . , P
′′
k /Q
′′, and which is another special case of the original rule P1, . . . , Pk /Q.
By design, each |P ′′i |퓋M =
‚
and |Q′′|퓋M = ‚. But since P ′′1 , . . . , P ′′k and Q′′ contain no
propositional variables, their interpretations do not depend on 퓋, and we may also write
|P ′′i |M =
‚
and |Q′′|M = ‚, and consider P ′′i and Q′′ as principles. But zero-order clas-
sical logic is complete with respect to M (see 4.66 again), so each P ′′i is derivable, and
Q′′ is not derivable (in fact, ¬Q′′ is derivable due to |¬Q′′|M = ‚.) Thus P1, . . . , Pk /Q
is not admissible. 
Two-valued models can also to be used to compare implication between principles or
rules with that between the judgements of their derivability.
Proposition 4.74. In zero-order classical logic (with no propositional constants added to
the language) rules R1, . . . ,Rk imply a rule S if and only if the judgements ⊢ R1, . . . ,⊢
Rk imply ⊢ S.
If propositional constants are added to the language, the assertion is no longer true
(see Example 4.82 below).
Proof. The “only if” assertion holds in any logic. Conversely, let us assume the implica-
tion between the judgements of derivability, and let us consider two cases. If R1, . . . ,Rk
all happen to be derivable, then so must be S, and so it is trivially a consequence of
R1, . . . ,Rk. If some Ri is not derivable, then by the proof of 4.73 it has a special case
P1, . . . , Pn /Q (involving only ⊤, ⊥ and other connectives, but no propositional vari-
ables) such that each Pj is derivable, and Q → ⊥ is also derivable. Thus by adjoining
Ri to the logic, we will be able to derive ⊥. Then everything becomes derivable, includ-
ing S. Thus S is a consequence of Ri alone; in particular, it is a joint consequence of
R1, . . . ,Rk. 
Proposition 4.74 does not generalize to first-order classical logic:
Example 4.75. In classical logic, the principle ·∃xp(x)→ ∀xp(x) does not imply ·⊥,
even though the judgement ⊢ ∃xp(x)→ ∀xp(x) implies ⊢ ⊥.
Indeed, ∃xp(x) → ∀xp(x) is valid in all models with a singleton domain, whereas
⊥ is not valid in any model; thus there is no implication between the principles. On
the other hand, ∃xp(x) → ∀xp(x) is not valid in some models; thus the judgement
⊢ ∃xp(x)→ ∀xp(x) is false, and so implies any other judgement.
4.8.2. Leibniz–Euler models. It was known already to Leibniz and became well-known
from the work of Euler that classical propositional logic can be interpreted by set-
theoretic operations (of course, at a level of knowledge that is informal by modern
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standards; see [16]). The predicate case (but of course not the modern formulations)
essentially appeared in the work of Pierce and Schro¨der in the 19th century.
To describe a Leibniz–Euler model V = V (X,풟) of classical logic,72 one starts with
arbitrary sets X and 풟. The set 풪 will be the set of arbitrary subsets of X, and the
function ! : 풪 → {‚,‚} sends the entire X to ‚ and every proper subset S ( X to ‚.
Thus, to specify a valuation, each predicate variable of arity n must be interpreted by
a 풟n-indexed family of subsets of X. Upon a choice of a valuation 퓋, a closed formula
will be interpreted by a subset of X, and more generally a closed n-formula F will be
interpreted by a 풟n-indexed family |F |퓋V : 풟n → 풪 of subsets of X. Upon a further
choice of a variable assignment 퓊, an arbitrary formula will be interpreted by a subset
of X, and more generally an arbitrary n-formula F will be interpreted by a 풟n-indexed
family |F |퓊퓋V : 풟n → 풪 of subsets of X. Validity of an n-formula F in the model,  F ,
means that |F |퓊퓋V (t1, . . . , tn) = X for each tuple (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ 풟n and for an arbitrary
valuation 퓋 and assignment 퓊.
Finally, disjunction of formulas is interpreted by union of sets, negation by complement
(within X), and universal quantification by 풟-indexed union. In symbols, if F and G
are formulas and H is a 1-formula,
• |F ∨G|퓊퓋V = |F |퓊퓋V ∪ |G|퓊퓋V ;
• |¬F |퓊퓋V = X \ |F |퓊퓋V ;
• |∃xH(x)|퓊퓋V =
⋃
d∈D |H|퓊퓋V (d).
Consequently, conjunction is interpreted by intersection, and existential quantification
by 풟-indexed intersection. The interpretation of implication is also determined by those
disjunction and negation. The interpretation of ⊥, which is classically equivalent to
p ∧ ¬p, is determined by those of conjunction and negation; and the interpretation of
⊤ is determined by those of ⊥ and negation. Thus ⊥ is interpreted by the empty union
(that is, ∅) and ⊤ by the empty intersection (that is, X).
We call this interpretation a Leibniz–Euler model of classical logic; indeed, it is not
hard to check that the laws and the inference rules of classical logic (see §4.6) hold
under this interpretation (cf. [168]). For example, let us consider the generalization rule,
q(x) / ∀xq(x). To check that it is valid in a Leibniz–Euler model V = V (X,풟), we pick
some predicate valuation 퓋 (cf. 4.62). Then |q|퓋V is some function from 풟 to the set of
all subsets of X; |∀xq(x)|퓋V is the intersection of all its values; and |q(x)|퓊퓋V is its value
at 퓊(x), where the individual assignment 퓊 associates to every individual variable,
including x, an arbitrary element of 풟. Thus if |q(x)|퓊퓋V = X for every individual
assignment 퓊, then |∀xq(x)|퓋V = X, as desired.
In the case where X is a singleton, {∗}, Leibniz–Euler models reduce to the two-
valued models discussed previously. As long as no predicate constants are added to
the language, two-valued models suffice to discern classical truth (see Theorem 4.66).
72In the literature, these seem to be best known as a special case of Boolean-valued models. However,
for the purposes of the present treatise there is no benefit in dealing with general Boolean algebras (and
consequently, also general Heyting algebras) so there is no point in using that terminology here, as it
would only obscure matters.
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Moreover, with an arbitrary language, a formula F that is not valid in some Leibniz–
Euler model V = V (X,풟) is also not valid in some two-valued model M with the same
domain 풟. Namely, we can get M from V by keeping the same interpretations of the
function symbols, picking an x ∈ X such that x /∈ |F |퓊퓋V for some individual assignment
퓊 and predicate valuation 퓋, and setting the interpretation |p|M of a predicate constant
p to be the function sending a tuple ~d ∈ 풟n to {∗} if x ∈ |p|V (~d) and to ∅ otherwise.
On the other hand, classical logic (or the empty theory over it, with any language)
is complete with respect to some Leibniz–Euler model with domain N and with a fixed
predicate valuation [168; VIII.3.3, II.8.1], but of course not with respect to any particular
two-valued model with a fixed valuation — not even in the propositional case. Also, a
λ-closed formula F is not valid in a two-valued model M if and only if ¬F is valid in
M ; of course, this strange property does not hold in Euler models.
Nevertheless, an Euler model such that X = 풟k for some k can be derived from a two-
valued model, by introducing k implicit parameters and changing the arities of predicate
constants. Thus we fix a domain 풟, and to interpret an n-ary predicate constant p in
an Euler model V with X = 풟k we look at the interpretation of an (n+k)-ary predicate
constant p′ in a two-valued model M with the same domain 풟, and set
|p|V (x1, . . . , xn) = {(xn+1, . . . , xn+k) ∈ 풟k | |p′|M(x1, . . . , xn+k) = ‚}.
Example 4.76. In classical logic, F ‖ G ⊢ F ∨ G for any formulas F , G by 4.55; but
the converse, F ∨G ⊢ F ‖ G, does not hold already in the zero-order case.
Indeed, let V be a Leibniz–Euler model of classical logic with X = {0, 1}, and let
퓋 be a valuation such that 퓋(p) = {0} and 퓋(q) = {1}. Then |p ∨ q|퓋V = {0, 1},
so |p ∨ q|퓋V+ =
‚
; whereas |p|퓋V = {0} and |q|퓋V = {1}, so |p|퓋V+ = |q|퓋V+ = ‚, and
consequently |p ‖ q|퓋V+ = ‚. Thus p ∨ q⇒ p ‖ q is not valid in V , and consequently is
not derivable in classical logic.
Let us note that F ∨ G ⇒ F ‖ G is clearly valid for any formulas F , G in every
two-valued model of classical logic.
Example 4.77. The previous example (4.76) can be improved: ⟮⟯F ∨G ⊢ ⟮⟯ (F ‖ G)
does not hold already in zero-order classical logic.
Indeed, let V be a Leibniz–Euler model of classical logic with X = {0, 1}, and let 퓋
be a valuation such that 퓋(p) = {0}. Then |¬p|퓋V = {1}, so |p|퓋V+ = |¬p|퓋V+ = ‚, and
consequently |p ‖ ¬p|퓋V+ = ‚. Thus ⟮⟯ (p ‖ ¬p) is not valid in V , and consequently is
not derivable in classical logic. On the other hand, ⟮⟯p∨¬p is the principle of excluded
middle, which is certainly derivable in classical logic.
Example 4.78. In classical logic, F → G ⊢ F ⇒ G for any formulas F , G by the modus
ponens rule; but the converse, F ⇒ G ⊢ F → G, does not hold already in the zero-order
case.
Indeed, let V be a Leibniz–Euler model of classical logic with X = {0, 1}, and let 퓋 be
a valuation such that 퓋(p) = {0}. Then |p → ⊥|퓋V = {1}, so |p → ⊥|퓋V+ = ‚; whereas
|p|퓋V = {0} and |⊥|퓋V = {∅}, so |p|퓋V+ = |⊥|퓋V+ = ‚, and consequently |p ⇒ ⊥|퓋V+ =
‚
.
MATHEMATICAL SEMANTICS OF INTUITIONISTIC LOGIC 98
Thus (p⇒ ⊥)⇒ p→ ⊥ is not valid in V , and consequently is not derivable in classical
logic.
Let us note that (F ⇒ G) ⇒ F → G is clearly valid for any formulas F , G in every
two-valued model of classical logic.
Example 4.79. A rule F /G need not imply the principle ·F → G in zero-order classical
logic with language extended by a propositional constant c.
Indeed, similarly to the previous example (4.78), V c⇒ ⊥ does not imply V c→ ⊥
for a Leibniz–Euler model V with XV = {0, 1} and |c|V = {0}.
Remark 4.80. A rule F /G implies the principle ·F → G in zero-order classical logic
(with no propositional constants added to the language). Indeed, ⊢ F /G implies ⊢
·F → G by the deduction theorem, and therefore (F /G) implies ·F → G by 4.74.
Example 4.81. ⊢ ⟮⟯ (F ⇒ G) ⇒ ⟮⟯F → G need not imply ⊢ ⟮⟯ ((F ⇒ G) ⇒ F →
G) already in zero-order classical logic (with no propositional constants added to the
language).
Indeed, let F = p and G = ⊥. Then the former meta-formula is derivable by Remark
4.79; whereas the latter one is not derivable by Example 4.78.
Example 4.82. If R and S are rules, and the judgement ⊢ R implies ⊢ S, then
the rule R need not imply S in zero-order classical logic with language extended by a
propositional constant c.
Indeed, let R = c /⊥ and S = ·¬c (or, equivalently, S = ⊤ /¬c). Then R is not
derivable (see Example 4.68), and consequently ⊢ R implies everything, including ⊢ S.
On the other hand, R does not imply S (see Example 4.79).
Example 4.83. A rule F /G need not imply the principle ·F → G in classical logic,
even if the formulas F and G are closed.
Indeed, let F = ∃xp(x) ∧ ∃x¬p(x) and G = ⊥. We will construct an Euler model by
combining the two-valued models of Examples 4.67 and 4.69.
Thus let M and N be the two-valued models of classical logic with 풟M = {0, 1}
and 풟N = {∗}. Let V be an Euler model with X = {µ, ν} and 풟 = {0, 1}. Given a
predicate valuation 퓋M for M and a predicate valuation 퓋N for N , let 퓋 = 퓋(퓋M ,퓋N)
be the predicate valuation for V defined on each r-ary predicate variable q by µ ∈
퓋(q)(x1, . . . , xr) if and only if 퓋M(q)(x1, . . . , xr) =
‚
and by ν ∈ 퓋(q)(x1, . . . , xr) if and
only if 퓋N(q)(∗, . . . , ∗) = ‚. It follows that for every closed formula P , µ ∈ |P |퓋V if and
only if P is valid in (M,퓋M), and ν ∈ |P |퓋V if and only if P is valid in (N,퓋N).
It is easy to see that valuations of the form 퓋(퓋M ,퓋N) form a valuation field K. Let
us note that these are precisely those valuations 퓋 for V that satisfy for each r = 1, 2, . . .
and each r-ary predicate variable q the following alternative: either ν ∈ 퓋(q)(x1, . . . , xr)
for all x1, . . . , xr ∈ {0, 1} or ν /∈ 퓋(q)(x1, . . . , xr) for all x1, . . . , xr ∈ {0, 1}.
Let 퓋M be a predicate valuation for M such that 퓋M(p)(0) = ‚ and 퓋M(p)(1) =
‚
,
and let 퓋N be some predicate valuation for N . Let 퓋 = 퓋(퓋M ,퓋N).
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Clearly, F is valid in (M,퓋M), and consequently |F |퓋V contains µ. Hence |F → ⊥|퓋V
does not contain µ, and therefore |F → ⊥|퓋V+ = ‚. Thus ·F → ⊥ is not valid in V with
respect to the valuation field K.
On the other hand, F is clearly not valid in (N,퓋N) (regardless of the choice of
퓋N), and consequently |F |퓋V does not contain ν. Hence |F ⇒ ⊥|퓋V+ =
‚
. This works
regardless of the choice of 퓋M , so we get that F /⊥ is valid in V with respect to the
valuation field K.
4.8.3. Platonist interpretation I (naive). We now turn to contentual interpretations of
the meta-logical notions introduced above, in the case of classical object logic.
As discussed in §3.10, a natural understanding of classical logic, closely related to the
Platonist philosophy, is that closed formulas signify propositions — which are either true
or false. This view is compatible with the usual Tarski-style model theory, as presented
in §4.3.4 and §4.7.1, and extends to give an interpretation of the meta-logic of classical
logic.
Namely, a domain 풟 is fixed, and 풪 is taken to be a class of propositions, consisting
of a prescribed class of contentful (e.g. mathematical) primitive propositions and of
composite propositions, which are obtained inductively from primitive ones by using
contentual classical connectives and quantifiers over arbitrary 풟-indexed families of
propositions. For instance, primitive propositions could be of the form “n = m”, where
n and m are numerals, e.g. “0 = 1” and “1 = 1”. In this case composite propositions
would include “0 = 1 or not 0 = 1” and, if 풟 is the set N of numerals, also “there
exists an n such that not n = 0”. Formal classical connectives and quantifiers (∨ : 12 →
1, ∃ : (0 → 1) → 1, etc.) are interpreted straightforwardly by the contentual ones
(“or” : 풪2 → 풪, “exists” : Hom(풟,풪)→ 풪, etc.).
The truth function ! : 풪 → 풬 = {‚,‚} is defined explicitly on primitive propositions,
and is extended inductively to composite ones by the usual truth tables (see §3.1). This
determines a contentual interpretation of classical logic and its meta-logic, which we will
call the Platonist interpretation.
Since we are assuming that each proposition is either true or false, the Platonist
interpretation is incompatible with the specific interpretation of §3.10.3, although it is
compatible with the preceding sketch there (if “provability” in that sketch is taken to be
in a complete theory, such as Tarski’s elementary geometry).
Example 4.84. Let us record the Platonist interpretations of the judgements of ad-
missibility, stable admissibility and derivability of a purely logical rule F /G. Let
~ϕ = (ϕ1, . . . , ϕm) be the tuple of all predicate variables that occur freely in F or in
G, and let ~r = (r1, . . . , rm) be the tuple of their arities. Below ~Φ is understood to run
over the set ℱ~r := ℱr1 × . . . ×ℱrm of all tuples (Φ1, . . . ,Φm) such that each Φi is an
ri-formula.
• Derivability: ∀풟,풪 ∀퓋 (∀퓊 |F |퓋퓊 → ∀퓊 |G|퓋퓊);
• Stable admissibility: ∀~Φ∀풟,풪 (∀퓋,퓊 |F [~ϕ/~Φ]|퓋퓊 −→ ∀퓋,퓊 |F [~ϕ/~Φ]|퓋퓊);
• Admissibility: ∀~Φ (∀풟,풪 ∀퓋,퓊 |F [~ϕ/~Φ]|퓋퓊 −→ ∀풟,풪 ∀퓋,퓊 |F [~ϕ/~Φ]|퓋퓊).
MATHEMATICAL SEMANTICS OF INTUITIONISTIC LOGIC 100
If we identify with each other all true propositions and, separately, all false proposi-
tions, we will get a two-valued model of classical logic (see §4.8.1), which clearly deter-
mines the validity of formulas and meta-formulas in the Platonist interpretation. Thus
the Platonist interpretation can be seen as a mere rewording of two-valued models. In
particular, it may be argued to be an adequate understanding of classical logic on the
grounds that classical logic is strongly complete with respect to a two-valued model with
countable domain (see Theorem 4.66).
However, every two-valued model M of classical logic obviously has the property that
if some rule F /G is valid in M , where F and G are closed formulas, then also the
principle ·F → G is valid in M . This property is not satisfied by Leibniz–Euler models
of classical logic (see Examples 4.79 and 4.83). Thus F /G generally does not imply
·F → G in classical logic, but this is not detected by the Platonist interpretation!
4.8.4. Modified Platonist interpretation. It is not hard to amend the Platonist interpre-
tation so as to overcome the said deficiency.
In addition to a domain of discourse 풟, we fix a “hidden parameter” domain ℰ.
Now 풪 is taken to be a class of predicates on ℰ, consisting of a prescribed class of
contentful (e.g. mathematical) primitive predicates and composite predicates, which are
obtained inductively from the primitive ones by using contentual classical connectives
and quantifiers over arbitrary 풟-indexed families of predicates. For instance, if ℰ is
the rational plane Q × Q, primitive predicates could be of the form “nq = mr”, where
n and m are numerals, e.g. “3q = 2r”. In this case composite predicates would include
“q = 2r or 2q = r” and, if 풟 is the set N of numerals, also “there exists an n such that
nq = r”. Formal classical connectives and quantifiers are interpreted straightforwardly
by the contentual ones.
The value of ! : 풪 → 풬 = {‚,‚} on a predicate P ∈ 풪 will be ‚ if and only if P (e)
is true for all e ∈ ℰ, where “true” is defined explicitly for primitive P ∈ 풪 and all e ∈ ℰ
and is extended inductively to composite P ∈ 풪 and all e ∈ E by the usual truth tables,
separately for each e ∈ ℰ. This determines a contentual interpretation of classical logic
and its meta-logic, which we will call the modified Platonist interpretation.
If we again identify with each other all true propositions and, separately, all false
propositions, we will get a Leibniz–Euler model of classical logic, which determines the
validity of formulas and meta-formulas in the modified Platonist interpretation. Thus
the modified Platonist interpretation can be seen as a mere rewording of the Leibniz–
Euler models. In particular, it does detect that F /G generally does not imply ·F → G
in classical logic.
Example 4.85. In the notation of Example 4.84, the modified Platonist interpretations
of the same judgements are as follows, where e is understood to run over ℰ:
• Derivability: ∀풟,ℰ,풪 ∀퓋 (∀퓊 ∀e |F |퓋퓊(e)→ ∀퓊 ∀e |G|퓋퓊(e));
• Stable admissibility:
∀~Φ ∀풟,ℰ,풪 (∀퓋,퓊 ∀e |F [~ϕ/~Φ]|퓋퓊(e) −→ ∀퓋,퓊 ∀e |F [~ϕ/~Φ]|퓋퓊(e));
• Admissibility:
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∀~Φ (∀풟,ℰ,풪 ∀퓋,퓊 ∀e |F [~ϕ/~Φ]|퓋퓊(e) −→ ∀풟,ℰ,풪 ∀퓋,퓊 ∀e |F [~ϕ/~Φ]|퓋퓊(e)).
5. Topology, translations and principles
Our next goal is to naturally arrive at Tarski’s topological models of intuitionistic
logic by means of a symbolic analysis of the BHK interpretation.
5.1. Deriving a model from BHK
Given a problem Γ, let ?Γ denote, as in §3.8, the proposition A solution of Γ exists. In
the notation of §3.9, ?Γ can be also expressed as |Γ| 6= ∅, where |Γ| denotes the set of
solutions of Γ. Validity of propositions of the form ?Γ is understood to be determined, at
least to some extent, by the BHK interpretation (in particular, it should be known from
context for primitive Γ). Then the BHK entails, in particular, the following judgements,
which involve both intuitionistic and classical connectives:
(1) ?(Γ ∧∆) if and only if ?Γ ∧ ?∆;
(2) ?(Γ ∨∆) if and only if ?Γ ∨ ?∆;
(3) ?(Γ→ ∆) implies ?Γ→ ?∆;
(4) ¬?×;
(5) ?∃xΓ(x) if and only if ∃x ?Γ(x);
(6) ?∀xΓ(x) implies ∀x?Γ(x).
(7) ?X.
Judgements (1)–(6) are perhaps best understood as immediate consequences of the six
assertions in §3.9, which were in turn obtained directly from the BHK interpretation.
For instance, from |Γ ∨ ∆| = |Γ| ⊔ |∆| we immediately obtain (2), since S ⊔ T 6= ∅ if
and only if S 6= ∅ or T 6= ∅. On the other hand, since X = × → × by definition,
judgement (7) can be considered as a special case of either ?(Γ→ Γ) or ?(×→ Γ). Both
are clearly true on the BHK interpretation: (i) given a solution of Γ, by doing nothing
to it we get a solution of Γ, which is a general method — hence a solution of Γ→ Γ; (ii)
×→ Γ was already discussed in §3.14, (5).
Let us formulate a theory TBHK over classical logic attempting to capture the meaning
of the above informal judgements. This will be only a countable theory in the traditional
sense, i.e. a countable (and recursively enumerable) set of axioms, not a finite meta-
conjunction of formulas and principles.
For each n and each n-formula Φ in the language of intuitionistic logic, let us introduce
an n-ary predicate constant, denoted ?Φ. The following are the axioms of TBHK :
(1) ?(Φ ∧Ψ) ←→ ?Φ ∧ ?Ψ;
(2) ?(Φ ∨Ψ) ←→ ?Φ ∨ ?Ψ;
(3) ?(Φ→ Ψ) −→ (?Φ→ ?Ψ);
(4) ¬?×;
(5) ?∃xΦ(x) ←→ ∃x ?Φ(x);
(6) ?∀xΦ(x) −→ ∀x?Φ(x);
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(7) ?X.
Suppose that we have a Leibniz–Euler model of TBHK in subsets of a set X with
some domain 풟. Let us call a subset of X intuitionistic if it of the form |?Φ|퓊 for some
formula Φ in the language of intuitionistic logic, and some assignment 퓊 in풟. Thus ∅ is
intuitionistic by (4), and X is intuitionistic by (7). The intersection of two intuitionistic
sets is a set of the form |?Φ|퓊 ∩ |?Ψ|퓊′. Here there is no loss of generality in considering
only such pairs of formulas Φ, Ψ that the free variables of Φ have no overlap with the free
variables of Ψ; consequently, we may additionally assume that 퓊′ = 퓊; we are also free
to keep the latter assumption but drop the former one. Now |?Φ|퓊∩|?Ψ|퓊 = |?Φ∧?Ψ|퓊,
which by (1) is the same as |?(Φ ∧ Ψ)|퓊, an intuitionistic set. Similarly by (2), the
union of two intuitionistic sets in intuitionistic. Also (5) implies that unions of some
풟-indexed families of intuitionistic sets are intuitionistic.
Thus intuitionistic subsets of X are very similar to open subsets in some topology on
X, except that they are known to be closed only under some infinite unions.
Then let us try again. Suppose that we have a Leibniz–Euler model of TBHK in subsets
of a set X with some domain 풟. Let us call a subset of X open if it a union of subsets
of the form |?Φ|퓊, where Φ is a formula of intuitionistic logic, and 퓊 is an assignment in
풟. Thus the union of any family of open sets is open. Also, similarly to the above, the
intersection of two open sets is open, and ∅ and X are open. Thus we get a topology
on X.
Another apparent deficiency here is that the axiom lists (3) and (6), which provide a
minimal formal extract from the intrinsically vague BHK clauses for→ and ∀, seem to be
too weak to yield any interesting conclusions as they provide only one-sided constraints
on the intuitinistic → and ∀.
One way to strengthen (3) and (6) to something bidirectional is as follows:
(3′)
(
?Ξ→ ?(Φ→ Ψ)) ⇐⇒ (?Ξ→ (?Φ→ ?Ψ));
(6′)
(
?Ξ→ ?∀xΦ(x)) ⇐⇒ (?Ξ→ ∀x ?Φ(x)).
Indeed, (3′) implies (3) by considering Ξ = Φ → Ψ, and (6′) implies (6) by considering
Ξ = ∀xΦ(x). Conversely, (3) implies the ⇒ meta-implication in (3′), and (6) implies
the ⇒ meta-implication in (6′), by using the modus ponens rule of classical logic. As
for the ⇐ meta-implications, they specialize by considering Ξ = X and using (7) to the
following partial converses to (3) and (6):
(3′′) ?Φ→ ?Ψ =⇒ ?(Φ→ Ψ);
(6′′) ∀x ?Φ(x) =⇒ ?∀xΦ(x).
Remark 5.1. Let us emphasize that there is nothing in the BHK interpretation that would
suggest strengthening (3) and (6) in this particular way — although some strengthening
of (3) and (6) is certainly present in the BHK interpretation. In the QHC calculus of
[1], which pretends to capture some formal aspects of the BHK interpretation along the
lines of the present section, the ⇐ meta-implications in (3) and (6) correspond to the
rules ?γ→ (?α→ ?β) / ?γ→ ?(α→ β) and ?γ→ ∀x ?α(x) / ?γ→ ?∀xα(x), which are
shown to be non-derivable, and even non-admissible in QHC [2].
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Let us denote the extension of TBHK by the meta-axiom lists (3
′) and (6′) by T ′BHK .
(Here (3) and (6) could of course be dropped from T ′BHK .) Then (3
′′) and (6′′) yield:
(3′′′) T ′BHK ⊢ ?Φ→ ?Ψ implies T ′BHK ⊢ ?(Φ→ Ψ);
(6′′′) T ′BHK ⊢ ∀x ?Φ(x) implies T ′BHK ⊢ ?∀xΦ(x).
Now let us assume that our Leibniz–Euler model of TBHK happens to satisfy also the
meta-axioms of T ′BHK . (One way to achieve this is to consider the theory T
′′
BHK consisting
of all formulas that are consequences of T ′BHK , and consider a Leibniz–Euler model of
T ′′BHK along with a valuation with respect to which T
′′
BHK is complete, cf. [168; VIII.3.3,
II.8.1]. This model with valuation will necessarily satisfy all admissible, and not only
derivable, rules of T ′BHK .) Then (3
′) guarantees that |?(Φ → Ψ)|퓊 is the largest open
set contained in |?Φ → ?Ψ|퓊, and (6′) guarantees that |?∀xΦ(x)|퓊 is the largest open
set contained in |∀x ?Φ(x)|퓊. Symbolically, |?(Φ→ Ψ)|퓊 = Int
(
(X \ |?Φ|퓊)∪ |?Ψ|퓊
)
and
|?∀xΦ(x)|퓊 = Int
⋂
d∈D |?Φ(d)|퓊, where Int denotes topological interior.
Thus we can also go the other way round: given any topological space X and a domain
풟, we can interpret every predicate constant ?α, where α is a problem variable, by an
arbitrary open subset of X (for any given assignment). Then we can interpret all our
predicate constants ?Φ using inductively the above interpretations of ?(Φ∧Ψ), ?(Φ∨Ψ),
?(Φ→ Ψ), ?×, ?∃xΞ(x), ?∀xΞ(x), ?X in terms of given interpretations of ?Φ, ?Ψ, ?Ξ(x).
(In particular, each |?Φ|퓊 will be an open subset of X.) This yields a model of T ′BHK .
Now, how does T ′BHK fit with the official laws and inference rules of intuitionistic
logic? (3) implies T ′BHK ⊢ ?Φ & ?(Φ→ Ψ)⇒ ?Ψ, and from (3′′′) we immediately obtain
T ′BHK ⊢ ?(Φ→ Φ) and T ′BHK ⊢ ?(×→ Φ). If, in addition to (3′′′), we take into account
(1) and (2), we also get T ′BHK ⊢ ?(Φ1 ∧ Φ2 → Φi) and T ′BHK ⊢ ?(Φi → Φ1 ∨ Φ2) for
each i = 1, 2. Using (5) and (6), we similarly obtain T ′BHK ⊢ ?
(
Φ(t) → ∃xΦ(x)) and
T ′BHK ⊢ ?
(∀xΦ(x)→ Φ(t)).
To verify that T ′BHK ⊢ ?
(
Ξ → Φ(x)) ⇒ ?(Ξ → ∀xΦ(x)), by (3′′) and (6′) it suffices
to check that T ′BHK ⊢ ?
(
Ξ→ Φ(x))→ (?Ξ→ ∀x ?Φ(x)), which indeed follows from (3).
This takes care of (XII′), and similarly one can deal with (XIII′), (VIII) and (IX). The
same approach also works for (III) and (IV).
Thus if we regard each open set |?Φ|퓊 as an interpretation of the intuitionistic formula
Φ, and not just of the predicate constant ?Φ, we get a model of intuitionistic logic.
5.2. Tarski models
Let us summarize in closed terms the models of intuitionistic logic that we have just ob-
tained. In the zero-order case, they were discovered independently by Stone [189], Tang
[192] (see also §5.7.3) and Tarski [194] in the 1930s, with Tarski having also established
completeness of zero-order intuitionistic logic with respect to this class of models. The
models were extended to the first-order case by Mostowski, with completeness estab-
lished by Rasiowa and Sikorski (see §5.3).
We will consider only models of intuitionistic logic, and not of empty theories over it.
Thus there will be no problem constants and function symbols in the language.
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We fix an arbitrary topological space X and a domain (i.e., an arbitrary set) 풟. Then
the set 풪 consists of all open subsets of X, and the function ! : 풪 → {‚,‚} sends the
entire space X to
‚
, and each proper open subset of X to ‚.
Thus, to specify a valuation, each problem variable α of arity n must be interpreted
by a 풟n-indexed family of open subsets of X (i.e., by a function |α| : 풟n → 풪). Upon
a choice of a valuation 퓋, a closed formula will be interpreted by an open subset of X,
and more generally a closed n-formula Φ will be interpreted by a 풟n-indexed family of
open subsets of X, to be denoted |Φ| or in more detail |Φ|퓋, or in still more detail |Φ|퓋X .
(The valuation will be suppressed in the notation when it is clear from context.) Upon
a further choice of a variable assignment 퓊, an arbitrary formula will be interpreted by
an open subset of X, and more generally an arbitrary n-formula Φ will be interpreted
by a 풟n-indexed family of open subsets of X, to be denoted |Φ| or in more detail |Φ|퓊
or in still more detail |Φ|퓋퓊. (The assignment will be suppressed in the notation when
it is clear from context.) Validity of an n-formula Φ in the model,  Φ, means that
|Φ|퓋퓊(t1, . . . , tn) = X for each tuple (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ 풟n and for an arbitrary valuation 퓋
and assignment 퓊.
Finally, intuitionistic connectives and quantifiers are interpreted as follows:
• |Φ ∨Ψ| = |Φ| ∪ |Ψ|;
• |Φ ∧Ψ| = |Φ| ∩ |Ψ|;
• |Φ→ Ψ| = Int ((X \ |Φ|) ∪ |Ψ|);
• |×| = ∅;
• |∃xΞ(x)| = ⋃d∈D |Ξ|(d);
• |∀xΞ(x)| = Int⋂d∈D |Ξ|(d),
where Φ and Ψ are formulas and Ξ is a 1-formula, and 퓊 and 퓋 are fixed. Let us note
that |Φ→ Ψ| is the union of all open sets U such that U ∩ |Φ| ⊂ U ∩ |Ψ|.
In particular, we have |¬Φ| = Int(X \ |Φ|) = X \Cl |Φ| and |¬¬Φ| = Int(Cl |Φ|). Thus
decidable formulas (i.e. Φ such that ⊢ Φ ∨ ¬Φ) are represented by clopen (=closed and
open) sets; and stable formulas (i.e. Φ such that ⊢ ¬¬Φ→ Φ) are represented by regular
open sets (i.e. sets equal to the interior of their closure). Stable formulas coincide (by
(3) and (1) in §3.14) with those that are equivalent to a negated formula. Decidable
formulas are stable by (8). On the other hand, if Φ ∨ ¬Φ is stable, then Φ is decidable
by (32).
Tarski models yield simple and intuitive proofs that many classically valid principles
are not derivable in intuitionistic logic. Here are a few examples.
5.2.1. Constant Domain Principle. The converse to (15), known as the Constant Do-
main Principle (for reasons related to Kripke models):
·∀x (α ∨ π(x)) −→ α ∨ ∀xπ(x)
is not derivable in intuitionistic logic, as witnessed by the Tarski model with X = R and
풟 = N and a valuation with |π|(n) = (− 1
n
, 1
n
) and |α| = R\{0}. A simple modification of
this model and valuation, which we purposely leave to the reader, shows non-derivability
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of the following Negative Constant Domain Principle:
·∀x (¬α ∨ π(x)) −→ ¬α ∨ ∀xπ(x).
In fact, the contrapositive of the Constant Domain Principle is derivable in intuition-
istic logic:
⊢ ¬∀x (α ∨ π(x)) ←→ ¬(α ∨ ∀xπ(x)).
Indeed, the right hand side is equivalent, by (40) and (13), to ¬∀x (¬α→ π(x)), and the
“←” implication follows from (7). (The “→” implication is the contrapositive of (15).)
However, the following two-variable generalization of the Constant Domain Principle:
·∀y ∀x (ρ(y) ∨ π(x, y)) −→ ∀y (ρ(y) ∨ ∀xπ(x, y))
does not turn into an intuitionistically derivable principle upon taking the contrapositive:
·¬∀y (ρ(y) ∨ ∀xπ(x, y)) −→ ¬∀y ∀x (ρ(y) ∨ π(x, y)).
Indeed, the latter principle is not valid in the Tarski model with X = 풟 = R, by
considering a valuation with |π|(x, y) = (y − ex, y + ex) and |ρ|(y) = R \ {y}. We will
call the latter principle (i.e., the contrapositive) the Parametric Distributivity Principle.
It may be regarded as “dual” to the Constant Domain Principle in that they have a
common generalization but no common special cases.
Let us note that the Parametric Distributivity Principle can be equivalently reformu-
lated as
·¬¬
(
∀y ∀x (ρ(y) ∨ π(x, y)) −→ ∀y (ρ(y) ∨ ∀xπ(x, y)))
using the intuitionistically derivable principles (34) and (44). Hence it is a special case
of a variant of Kleene’s Principle:
·¬¬∀y
(
∀x (ρ(y) ∨ π(x, y)) −→ (ρ(y) ∨ ∀xπ(x, y)))
Kleene’s principle [103; §80, Theorem 58(b)(iii)] has π(x) instead of π(x, y).
5.2.2. Independence of Premise. The converse to (12) is known as the principle of In-
dependence of Premise:
·
(
δ→ ∃xπ(x)) −→ ∃x (δ→ π(x)).
Its contrapositive
·¬(δ→ ∃xπ(x)) ←→ ¬∃x (δ→ π(x))
is derivable in intuitionistic logic, which follows from (38) and (18). By contrast, even
if δ is specialized to ¬α, and ∃ is “specialized” to ∨ in the principle of Independence of
Premise, the resulting formula, known as the Kreisel–Putnam Principle:
· (¬α→ β ∨ γ) −→ (¬α→ β) ∨ (¬α→ γ)
is not derivable in intuitionistic logic. Indeed, let X = R2,
|β| = {(x, y) | x > 0},
|γ| = {(x, y) | y > 0}
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and |α| = |¬(β ∨ γ)|, so that |¬α| = {(x, y) | x > 0 ∨ y > 0}. Then |¬α→ β ∨ γ| = R2,
whereas
|¬α→ β| = {(x, y) | x > 0 ∨ y < 0};
|¬α→ γ| = {(x, y) | x < 0 ∨ y > 0}.
Hence |¬α→ β| ∪ |¬α→ γ| = R2 \ {(0, 0)}.
This Tarski model shows also that Harrop’s Rule:
¬α→ β ∨ γ
(¬α→ β) ∨ (¬α→ γ)
is not derivable in intuitionistic logic. (Alternatively, if it were derivable, then the
Kreisel–Putnam principle would also be derivable by the deduction theorem.) However,
it is admissible, see Theorem 5.4 below (hence, in particular, this rule does not imply
the Kreisel–Putnam principle). The stronger rule:
δ→ β ∨ γ
(δ→ β) ∨ (δ→ γ)
is not even admissible, by considering its special case with δ substituted by β ∨ γ. In
this case the meta-quantified premiss is derivable in intuitionistic logic, but the meta-
quantified conclusion, · (β ∨ γ→ β) ∨ (β ∨ γ→ γ), is clearly equivalent to the following
Go¨del–Dummett principle:
· (β→ γ) ∨ (γ→ β),
which is certainly not derivable in intuitionistic logic (for instance, the previous model
in R2 works to show this). Let us note that, in fact, our specialization of δ to β ∨ γ
led to no loss of generality, since · (β ∨ γ→ β) ∨ (β ∨ γ→ γ) clearly implies (using the
exponential law) the quantifier-free independence of premise,
· (δ→ β ∨ γ)→ (δ→ β) ∨ (δ→ γ).
Thus the latter principle as well as its rule version considered above are each equivalent
to the Go¨del–Dummett principle. These equivalent principles are strictly stronger than
the Kreisel–Putnam principle (see Example 5.6 below).
A similar argument shows that the following stable Harrop’s rule:
¬¬(β ∨ γ)→ (β ∨ γ), ¬α→ β ∨ γ
(¬α→ β) ∨ (¬α→ γ)
is equivalent to the following stable Go¨del–Dummett principle:
¬¬(β ∨ γ)→ (β ∨ γ)
(β→ γ) ∨ (γ→ β)
and to the following stable Kreisel–Putnam principle:
¬¬(β ∨ γ)→ (β ∨ γ)
(¬α→ β ∨ γ) −→ (¬α→ β) ∨ (¬α→ γ) ;
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and, moreover, that ¬α can be replaced by δ in these stable versions. In fact, these all are
equivalent forms of the original Harrop rule. Indeed, assuming ¬α→ β ∨ γ and writing
Φ = ¬α ∧ β and Ψ = ¬α ∧ γ, we have ¬α↔ Φ ∨ Ψ. Then also ¬¬(Φ ∨ Ψ)→ (β ∨ γ),
and hence the stable Harrop rule implies (¬α→ Φ) ∨ (¬α→ Ψ), which in turn implies
(¬α→ β) ∨ (¬α→ γ).
By another argument of the same type, the rule
β ∧ γ→ δ
(β→ δ) ∨ (γ→ δ)
implies the Go¨del–Dummett principle · (β→ γ) ∨ (γ→ β), which in turn implies Skolem’s
principle (see [210]), the converse of (25):
· (β ∧ γ→ δ)→ (β→ δ) ∨ (γ→ δ);
thus the three are equivalent. Let us also note that by “generalizing” ∧ and ∨ to ∀ and
∃, Skolem’s form of the Go¨del–Dummett principle transforms into the converse of (17):
· (∀xγ(x)→ δ) −→ ∃x (γ(x)→ δ),
which is therefore also an independent principle (by considering a two-element domain).
Remark 5.2. We will see in §5.4 that the principle
· (β ∧ γ→ ¬α)→ (β→ ¬α) ∨ (γ→ ¬α)
is strictly stronger than the Kreisel–Putnam principle. This might seem surprising, since
the two principles are clearly equivalent to the rules
¬¬δ→ δ
(β ∧ γ→ δ)→ (β→ δ) ∨ (γ→ δ) and
¬¬δ→ δ
(δ→ β ∨ γ)→ (δ→ β) ∨ (δ→ γ)
respectively — even though these rules have the same premiss and equivalent meta-
closures of the conclusions. As we have seen, it is enough to meta-quantify over δ:
⊢ ⟮δ⟯ (β ∧ γ→ δ)→ (β→ δ) ∨ (γ→ δ) ⇐⇒ ⟮δ⟯ (δ→ β ∨ γ)→ (δ→ β) ∨ (δ→ γ).
5.3. Topological completeness
Rasiowa and Sikorski proved that every consistent first-order theory T over intuitionistic
logic is complete with respect to the Tarski model in a certain subspace X = XT of the
Baire space73 with 풟 = N [168; X.3.2].74 In particular, intuitionistic logic is complete
with respect to one such Tarski model (in fact, even with respect to a fixed valuation),
and strongly complete with respect to the class of all such Tarski models (see 4.63). The
latter result was improved by Dragalin, who showed that intuitionisitic logic is strongly
complete with respect to the Tarski model with풟 = N and with X the Baire space itself
73That is, NN with the product topology. This space is well-known to be homeomorphic to the set of
irrational reals.
74Thus if Ψ is not a theorem of T , then Ψ is not valid in XT . It is additionally shown in [168; X.3.4
and remark after X.3.5] that if ¬Φ is not a theorem of T , then Φ is satisfiable in the Tarski model in a
certain subspace X = X ′T of the Baire space with 풟 = N.
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[46]75 (and, in fact, complete even with respect to a fixed valuation in such a model). It
is easy to see that intuitionistic logic is not strongly complete with respect to any Tarski
model with connected X, including Euclidean spaces (see §5.5.1).
Originally, Tarski [194] (see also [135]; for a sketch, see [188; 2.4.1], and for sim-
plified proofs see [184], [113], [114] and references there) proved that if X is a sepa-
rable metrizable space with no isolated points (for instance, Rn for any n > 0), then
zero-order intuitionistic logic is complete with respect to the Tarski model in X. For
instance, the Kreisel–Putnam Principle (and, in fact, even Harrop’s Rule) is also dis-
proved by the Tarski model with X = R, by considering a valuation with |¬α| = (0, 1),
|β| = ⋃∞i=1( 12i+2 , 12i) and |γ| = ⋃∞i=1( 12i+1 , 12i−1). In general, it should be noted that open
subsets of R can be quite complicated (see [149; §III.6.9]).
Tarski’s result was only recently extended to first-order intuitionistic logic by Kremer
[116], who showed it to be complete with respect to the Tarski model with 풟 = N in
any zero-dimensional separable metrizable space X with no isolated points; and strongly
complete with respect to Tarski models with 풟 = N in open subspaces of X.76 These
include the Cantor set, the Baire space, and the set of rational numbers. On the other
hand, intuitionistic logic is not complete with respect to the Tarski model with any 풟
in any locally connected space, including open subsets of Euclidean spaces [116].
5.3.1. Disjunction property. Interestingly, if Φ is a closed formula such that |Φ∨¬Φ|퓋 =
X for some valuation 퓋 for the Tarski model in a connected spaceX, then either |Φ|퓋 = X
or |¬Φ|퓋 = X (since the only clopen subsets of X are ∅ and X). In other words, for
closed formulas Φ the judgement Φ ∨ ¬Φ  Φ ‖ ¬Φ is valid in Tarski models with
connected X (for instance, for X = R). It is clearly not valid for any disconnected X;
in particular, the judgement Φ∨¬Φ ⊢ Φ ‖ ¬Φ does not hold in zero-order intuitionistic
logic.
However, the corresponding external judgement holds: in zero-order intuitionistic
logic, if ⊢ Φ ∨ ¬Φ, then either ⊢ Φ or ⊢ ¬Φ. This is a special case of the following
remarkable fact, originally announced by Go¨del and proved by Gentzen (see also [103;
§80, Theorem 57(a)], [168; X.8.1], [135; Theorem 4.4]):
Theorem 5.3 (Disjunction Property). In intuitionistic logic, if ⊢ Φ∨Ψ then either ⊢ Φ
or ⊢ Ψ, for any closed formulas Φ and Ψ.
75Dragalin’s theorem [46; 3.5.2] says that every composite theory (see Remark 4.64) has a Tarski model
with 풟 = N and with X the Baire space; this trivially implies the assertion (see Remark 4.64).
76Kremer’s theorem says, in particular, that if Γ and ∆ are closed formulas such that Γ → ∆ is not a
theorem of intuitionistic logic, then |Γ|퓋 \ |∆|퓋 6= ∅ for some valuation 퓋 in the Tarski model in X with
풟 = N. If Ψ is not a theorem of intuitionistic logic, then its universal closure ∆ is also not a theorem,
and hence |X|퓋 \ |∆|퓋 6= ∅ for some 퓋, i.e., |∆|퓋 6= X , and so Ψ is not valid in X . If a rule Φ1, . . . ,Φn /Ψ
is not derivable in intuitionistic logic, then Γ → ∆ is not a theorem of intuitionistic logic, where Γ is
the universal closure of Φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ Φn and ∆ is the universal closure of Ψ. Hence |Γ|퓋 \ |∆|퓋 6= ∅ for
some valuation 퓋 in the Tarski model in X with 풟 = N. If we let Y = |Γ|퓋 and |Ξ|퓋Y퓊 = |Ξ|퓋퓊 ∩ Y for
every formula Ξ and every assignment 퓊 in 풟 = N, then it is easily checked by induction that 퓋Y is a
valuation in the Tarski model in Y with 풟 = N; clearly, |Γ|퓋Y = Y and |∆|퓋Y 6= Y . Hence Φ1, . . . ,Φn
are valid in (Y,퓋Y ), and Ψ is not valid in (Y,퓋Y ). Thus Φ1, . . . ,Φn /Ψ is not valid in Y .
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It is easy to deduce this from the completeness of Tarski models.
The proof employs the following construction, which will also be used in sequel: the
Alexandroff dual cone C∗W over the space W is the union W ∪ {0ˆ} (as a set) endowed
with the topology whose open sets are as follows: (i) open subsets of W ; (ii) W ∪ {0ˆ}.
Proof. Suppose that ⊢ Φ ∨ Ψ, but 6⊢ Φ and 6⊢ Ψ. Then there are valuations 퓋X, 퓋Y
for the Tarski models in topological spaces X, Y with domains 풟X and 풟Y such that
|Φ|퓋X 6= X and |Ψ|퓋Y 6= Y . Let 풟 be a set that admits surjections dX onto 풟X and
dY onto 풟Y . Let us define valuations 퓋
′
X , 퓋
′
Y for the Tarski models in X and Y with
domain 풟 by |α|퓋′X퓊 = |α|퓋XdX◦퓊 and |α|
퓋′Y
퓊 = |α|퓋YdY ◦퓊 for every problem variable α and
every assignment 퓊 in 풟. Then it is easy to see that |Ξ|퓋′X = |Ξ|퓋X and |Ξ|퓋′Y = |Ξ|퓋Y
for every closed formula Ξ. In particular, |Φ|퓋′X 6= X and |Ψ|퓋′Y 6= Y .
Let Z := C∗(X⊔Y ) be the Alexandroff dual cone over the disjoint union X⊔Y . Let us
define a valuation 퓋Z for the Tarski model in Z with domain 풟 by |α|퓋Z퓊 = |α|퓋
′
X
퓊 ∪ |α|퓋
′
Y
퓊
for every problem variable α and every assignment 퓊 in 풟. Then it is easy to check
by induction (using that X and Y are open in Z) that |Ξ|퓋X퓊 = |Ξ|퓋Z퓊 ∩X and |Ξ|퓋Y퓊 =
|Ξ|퓋Z퓊 ∩ Y for any formula Ξ and any assignment 퓊 in 풟. In particular, |Φ|퓋Z 6⊃ X and
|Ψ|퓋Z 6⊃ Y .
By our hypothesis, |Φ ∨ Ψ|퓋Z = Z. In particular, either 0ˆ ∈ |Φ|퓋Z or 0ˆ ∈ |Ψ|퓋Z .
However, the minimal open set containing 0ˆ is the entire space Z. Hence either |Φ|퓋Z = Z
or |Ψ|퓋Z = Z, which is a contradiction. 
5.3.2. Harrop’s rule. The Disjunction Property can be regarded as a multiple-conclusion
admissible rule in zero-order intuitionistic logic. A rather similar argument establishes
the admissibility of one genuine (single-conclusion) rule in first-order intuitionisitc logic:
Theorem 5.4. Harrop’s rule
¬γ→ ϕ ∨ψ
(¬γ→ ϕ) ∨ (¬γ→ ψ)
is an admissible rule for intuitionistic logic.
See [98] for a direct syntactic proof not appealing to the completeness theorem.
It should be mentioned that Harrop’s rule is, in fact, stably admissible [166].
The admissibility of Harrop’s rule implies the following generalization of the Disjunc-
tion Property:
Corollary 5.5. In intuitionistic logic, if ¬Γ ⊢ Φ ∨ Ψ then either ¬Γ ⊢ Φ or ¬Γ ⊢ Ψ,
for any closed formulas Γ, Φ and Ψ.
Proof. The hypothesis along with the Deduction Theorem imply ⊢ ¬Γ→ Φ ∨Ψ. Since
Harrop’s rule is admissible, we have ⊢ (¬Γ → Φ) ∨ (¬Γ → Ψ). By the Disjunction
Property, it follows that either ⊢ ¬Γ → Φ or ⊢ ¬Γ → Ψ. This along with the modus
ponens implies the assertion. 
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Proof of Theorem 5.4. We will prove the admissibility of the following rule, which as
shown in §5.2.2 is equivalent to Harrop’s rule:
¬¬(γ ∨ δ)→ (γ ∨ δ)
(γ→ δ) ∨ (δ→ γ) .
Suppose that ⊢ ¬¬(Γ ∨∆) → (Γ ∨∆) and 6⊢ (Γ → ∆) ∨ (∆ → Γ) for some formulas Γ
and ∆. Then by Tarski’s completeness theorem, there exist a space X and a domain 풟
such that |(Γ→ ∆)∨(∆→ Γ)|퓋X퓊0 6= X for some assignment 퓊0 in 풟 and some valuation
퓋X in the Tarski model in X with domain 풟. Then, in particular, |Γ|퓋X퓊0 6⊂ |∆|퓋X퓊0 and
|∆|퓋X퓊0 6⊂ |Γ|퓋X퓊0 .
Let us define a valuation 퓋Y in the Tarski model in Y := |Γ ∨∆|퓋X퓊0 with domain 풟
by |α|퓋Y퓊 = |α|퓋X퓊 ∩ Y for every problem variable α and every assignment 퓊 in 풟. Then
|Ξ|퓋Y퓊 = |Ξ|퓋X퓊 ∩ Y for every formula Ξ and every assignment 퓊 (using that Y is open in
X). In particular, |Γ ∨∆|퓋Y퓊0 = Y , and neither of |Γ|퓋Y퓊0 , |∆|퓋Y퓊0 lies in the other one.
Let Z be the Alexandroff dual cone C∗Y = Y ∪ {0ˆ}. Let us define a valuation 퓋Z in
the Tarski model in Z with domain 풟 by |α|퓋Z퓊 = |α|퓋Y퓊 for every problem variable α
and every assignment 퓊 in 풟. Then |Ξ|퓋Y퓊 = |Ξ|퓋Z퓊 ∩ Z for every formula Ξ and every
assignment 퓊 (using that Y is open in Z). In particular, neither of |Γ|퓋Z퓊0 , |∆|퓋Z퓊0 lies in
the other one. Also, |Γ ∨∆|퓋Z퓊0 contains Y , and consequently |¬¬(Γ ∨∆)|퓋Z퓊0 = Z (since
Cl Y = Z). But then our hypothesis ⊢ ¬¬(Γ∨∆)→ (Γ∨∆) implies that |Γ∨∆|퓋Z퓊0 = Z.
In particular, either 0ˆ ∈ |Γ|퓋Z퓊0 or 0ˆ ∈ |∆|퓋Z퓊0 . However, the minimal open set containing
0ˆ is the entire space Z. Thus either |Γ|퓋Z퓊0 = Z or |∆|퓋Z퓊0 = Z, which is a contradiction. 
5.3.3. Alexandroff spaces. McKinsey and Tarski also proved that zero-order intuition-
istic logic is complete with respect to the class of Tarski models with finite X. Finite
topological spaces are included in the class of Alexandroff spaces, where the intersection
of any (possibly infinite) family of open subsets of X is open. The relation x ∈ Cl {y}
on the points x, y of an Alexandroff space is a preorder, i.e. it is reflexive and transitive.
Conversely, any preordered set P can be endowed with its Alexandroff topology, where
a subset of P is defined to be closed if it is an order ideal. This gives a one-to-one cor-
respondence between Alexandroff spaces and preordered sets, under which T0 spaces
77
correspond precisely to posets.
In the zero-order case, Tarski models in Alexandroff spaces with fixed valuations
are also known (in somewhat different terms) as Kripke models. In general, Tarski
models in Alexandroff spaces with fixed valuations are the same as “Kripke models
with constant domain”. (See ?? concerning the case of “non-constant domain”). First-
order intuitionistic logic is not complete with respect to the class of Tarski models in
Alexandroff spaces: clearly, the Constant Domain Principle holds in all such models. In
fact, this is the only obstacle to completeness: by a result of S. Go¨rneman, the extension
of intuitionistic logic by the Constant Domain Principle is complete with respect to
Tarski models in Alexandroff spaces (see [59; §3.3, Corollary 8]).
77That is, spaces where at least one out of any two distinct points is contained in an open set not
containing the other point.
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Let us note that if the Alexandroff topology on a poset is T1,
78 then it is discrete.
Let us note also that every Alexandroff space X admits a continuous open surjection
onto the T0 Alexandroff space obtained as the quotient of X by the equivalence relation
whose equivalence classes are the minimal nonempty open sets of X.
If K is a simplicial complex (or more generally a cell complex or a cone complex,
see [140]), viewed as a topological space (with the metric topology, see [139]), let X(K)
be the face poset of K, viewed as a T0 Alexandroff space. By sending a point of K
to the minimal simplex (or cell or cone) that contains it, we obtain a continuous open
surjection K → X(K). Conversely, given a T0 Alexandroff space X, viewed as a poset,
we have its order complex, whose simplices can be arranged into cones of a cone complex
K(X) such that X(K(X)) = X (see [140]). Thus we have a continuous open surjection
K(X)→ X. Thus a Tarski model in an Alexandroff space X gives rise to a Tarski model
in the polyhedron K(X), and all completeness results can be transferred accordingly.
Example 5.6. The Go¨del–Dummett principle · (β→ γ) ∨ (γ→ β) is obviously valid
in all Alexandroff spaces associated to totally ordered posets. It is not valid in every
Alexandroff space X corresponding to a poset that contains a pair of non-comparable
elements q, r with a lower bound p. Indeed, the smallest open set Up containing p also
contains q and r, and consequently p lies neither in Int
(
Uq ∪ (X \ Ur)
)
(which does not
contain r) nor in Int
(
Ur ∪ (X \ Uq)
)
(which does not contain q).
Meanwhile, the Kreisel–Putnam principle · (¬α→ β ∨ γ)→ (¬α→ β) ∨ (¬α→ γ)
is valid, for instance, in the three-element poset P consisting of a pair of incomparable
elements q, r and their lower bound p. Indeed, ¬α can only be interpreted by a regular
open set, and the only regular open sets in P are ∅, P , {q} and {r}. It is easy to see
that the Kreisel–Putnam principle is satisfied under any valuation such that |¬α| = |×|
or |¬α| = |X| or |γ| ⊂ |β| or |β| ⊂ |γ|. This leaves only the following options: |β| = {q}
and |γ| = {r} (or vice versa), with ¬α interpreted by either {q} or {r}. In each of
these cases either |¬α| = |β| or |¬α| = |γ|, and the Kreisel–Putnam principle is again
satisfied.
Thus the Kreisel–Putnam principle does not imply the Go¨del–Dummett principle.
Remark 5.7. In fact, the Kreisel–Putnam principle holds in every poset P satisfying the
following van Benthem condition (cf. [94; p. 886]):
∀x ∈ P ∀y , z ≥ x ∃u ≥ x (u ≤ y, z and ∀v ≥ u ∃w ≥ v (w ≥ y or w ≥ z)).
Indeed, suppose that P satisfies this condition, but the Tarski model in P does not
satisfy the Kreisel–Putnam principle. Then
Int(Cl(A) ∪B ∪ C) 6⊂ Int(Cl(A) ∪ B) ∪ Int(Cl(A) ∪ C)
for some open subsets A, B, C of P . So there exists an x ∈ Int(Cl(A)∪B∪C) such that
x /∈ Int(Cl(A) ∪ B) and x /∈ Int(Cl(A) ∪ C). Then the smallest open set Ux containing
78A topological space is called T1 if for every pair of distinct points, each is contained in an open set
not containing the other one; or equivalently if all singleton subsets are closed.
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x contains some y /∈ Cl(A)∪B and some z /∈ Cl(A)∪C. Thus y, z ≥ x and y, z /∈ ClA;
also, y /∈ B and z /∈ C. Let u be given by the van Benthem condition. Then u /∈ B,
u /∈ C, so u /∈ B ∪C. Also, u ∈ Cl(A)∪B ∪C since u ≥ x. Hence u ∈ ClA. Then there
exists a v ≥ u such that v ∈ A. If w is given by the van Benthem condition, then w ∈ A
and either w ≥ y or w ≥ z. Then either y ∈ ClA or z ∈ ClA, which is a contradiction.
Remark 5.8. Iemhoff [95; 3.14] characterized admissible rules of zero-order intuitionistic
logic as those rules that are valid in the Tarski model in every T0 Alexandroff space
whose corresponding poset has a smallest element and a “tight” lower bound for every
finite subset Y , that is, a lower bound z such that every x > z satisfies x ≥ y for some
y ∈ Y . (It should be noted here that the admissibility of a rule Φ/Ψ means not just
that ⊢ Φ implies ⊢ Ψ, but that ⊢ Φ′ implies ⊢ Ψ′ for every special case Φ′/Ψ′ of Ψ/Ψ;
whereas the validity of Φ/Ψ in a class of models means just that 퓋 Φ implies 퓋 Ψ
for all valuations 퓋 in all those models. But, of course, the validity of Φ/Ψ in a class
of models implies the validity of every special case Φ′/Ψ′ of Ψ/Ψ in the same class of
models, due to the quantification over all valuations. It is essential here that valuations
are not included in our definition of a “model”.)
Iemhoff also gave another characterization of admissible rules of zero-order intuition-
istic logic. Let us define several operations on Tarski models-with-valuations (X,퓋):
(O1) “restrict” a given (X,퓋) by reducing X to the smallest open neighborhood of some
point; (O2) extend a given (X,퓋) in any way over the Alexandroff dual cone C
∗X; (O3)
combine a given collection of (Xi,퓋i) by taking the disjoint union of Xi. (All these oper-
ations are used in the proofs of 5.3, 5.4 above.) Then a rule is admissible for zero-order
intuitionistic logic if and only if it is valid in every Tarski model-with-valuation obtained
by applying O3 to any family F of Tarski models-with-valuation in finite T0 spaces such
that F is in the image of O2, and F is closed under O1 and O2 ◦O3 [95; 3.15].
5.4. Jankov’s principle
A striking omission in our list of intuitionistic validities in §3.14 is the converse to one
the de Morgan laws (29):
·¬(γ ∧ δ) −→ ¬γ ∨ ¬δ. (JP)
To see that this Jankov’s principle is not derivable in intuitionistic logic, it suffices
to substitute a stable but not decidable formula Φ (e.g. Φ = ¬α) for γ and ¬Φ for
δ. Jankov’s principle (also known as “de Morgan’s principle” or the “weak principle of
excluded middle”) may have various appearances:
Proposition 5.9. The following are equivalent to (JP):
(1) ·¬¬(α ∨ β) ←→ ¬¬α ∨ ¬¬β;
(2) ·¬α ∨ ¬¬α;
(3)
¬¬β→ β
β ∨ ¬β .
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Let us note that the admissibility of the rule (3) amounts to the assertion that stable
formulas are decidable (which of course does not hold in intuitionisitc logic).
Proof. To obtain (1) from (JP), we substitute ¬α for γ and ¬β for δ, and use the
contrapositive of the other de Morgan tautology (28), ⊢ ¬(α ∨ β)↔ ¬α ∧ ¬β.
To obtain (2) from (1), we apply the latter with ¬α susbstituted for β, and use (3)
and (32).
Next, from (30) and (35) we get ⊢ ¬(γ ∧ δ) −→ (¬¬γ → ¬δ), and it follows that
⊢ ¬(γ∧ δ) −→ (¬γ∨¬¬γ→ ¬γ∨¬δ). Upon a double application of the exponential
law (26), we get ⊢ ¬γ ∨ ¬¬γ→ (¬(γ ∧ δ)→ ¬γ ∨ ¬δ)), so that (2) implies (JP).
Finally, applying the rule (3) with ¬α substituted for β, we get (2). Conversely, we
trivially have ⊢ (¬α↔ β) −→ (¬α∨¬¬α→ β∨¬β). The exponential law transforms
this validity into ⊢ ¬α ∨ ¬¬α −→ ((¬α ↔ β) → β ∨ ¬β). Applying the latter with
¬β substituted for α, we get that (2) implies (3). 
Jankov’s principle is satisfied in all extremally disconnected spaces, that is, spaces
where the closure of every open set is open (or equivalently, every regular open set
is clopen). All extremally disconnected metrizable spaces are discrete (see [49; Exer.
6.2.G(a)]), and in a certain model of ZF, all extremally disconnected compact Hausdorff
spaces are finite [144]. However, in ZFC, a well-known example of an extremally dis-
connected compact Hausdorff space is the Stone–Cˇech compactification of any infinite
discrete space [49].
On the other hand, the Alexandroff space corresponding to a poset with a greatest
element is always extremally disconnected. In general, the Alexandroff space corre-
sponding to a poset P is extremally disconnected if and only if “principal filters of P are
directed sets”, that is, every pair of elements of P that has a lower bound also has an
upper bound. Indeed, if U is an open subset of P whose closure is not open, then some
z ∈ ClU is bounded above by some y /∈ ClU (since ClU is not open). Also z /∈ U (since
U is open), but it is bounded above also by some x ∈ U (since z ∈ ClU). However, if u
is an upper bound of x and y, then u ∈ U (since x ∈ U) and therefore y ∈ ClU , which
is a contradiction. Conversely, if x, y ∈ P have a lower bound z but no upper bound,
then the minimal open set Ux containing x has a non-open closure (since ClUx contains
z but not y).
The Go¨del–Dummett principle implies Jankov’s principle; more precisely, the latter
is a special case of the principle
· (γ ∧ δ→ ¬α) −→ (γ→ ¬α) ∨ (δ→ ¬α), (JP′)
which is in turn a special case of Skolem’s form of the Go¨del–Dummett principle (see
§5.2.2). Jankov’s principle does not imply the Go¨del–Dummett principle by considering,
for instance, the four-element poset consisting of a pair of incomparable elements along
with their upper and lower bounds.
On the other hand, Jankov’s principle implies the Kreisel–Putnam principle,
· (¬α→ γ ∨ δ) −→ (¬α→ γ) ∨ (¬α→ δ).
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Indeed, we clearly have ⊢ (¬α → γ ∨ δ) −→ (¬α ∨ ¬¬α → γ ∨ δ ∨ ¬¬α). Hence
by the exponential law, ·¬α ∨ ¬¬α implies · (¬α → γ ∨ δ) −→ γ ∨ δ ∨ ¬¬α, and
it remains to observe that ⊢ γ ∨ δ ∨ ¬¬α −→ (γ ∨ ¬¬α) ∨ (δ ∨ ¬¬α) and by (6),
⊢ (γ ∨ ¬¬α) ∨ (δ ∨ ¬¬α) −→ (¬α → γ) ∨ (¬α → δ). The Kreisel–Putnam principle
does not imply Jankov’s principle by considering, for instance, the three-element poset
of Example 5.6.
By contrast, (JP′) is in fact equivalent to Jankov’s principle. Indeed, by the exponen-
tial law (JP′) is equivalent to
·
(
α→ ¬(γ ∧ δ)) −→ (α→ ¬γ) ∨ (α→ ¬δ),
where substituting ¬β for α leads to no loss of generality due to (35). Now Jankov’s
principle implies ·
(¬β→ ¬(γ∧δ)) −→ (¬β→ ¬γ∨¬δ), whereas the Kreisel–Putnam
principle implies · (¬β→ ¬γ ∨ ¬δ) −→ (¬β→ ¬γ) ∨ (¬β→ ¬δ).
To summarize, the following strict entailments of principles have been discussed:
Go¨del–Dummett pr. ⊢ Jankov’s principle ⊢ Kreisel–Putnam pr. ⊢ Harrop’s rule
5.4.1. Mints-Citkin rule and Rose’s formula. Harrop’s rule is a consequence of the fol-
lowing Mints–Citkin rule [33]
(λ→ µ)→ ϕ ∨ψ(
(λ→ µ)→ ϕ) ∨ ((λ→ µ)→ ψ) ∨ ((λ→ µ)→ λ) .
Indeed, the Mints–Citkin rule with µ = × implies Harrop’s rule, since ⊢ (¬λ → λ) →
(¬λ→ ϕ) (due to ⊢ ¬λ ∧ (¬λ→ λ) ∧ ¬λ→× and ⊢ ×→ ϕ).
Since Harrop’s rule is not derivable (see §5.2.2), the Mints–Citkin rule is also not
derivable. But it is known to be admissible (see [95; proof of Theorem 3.13]). In fact,
a slight generalization of this rule is the first in an infinite list of admissible rules (the
so-called Visser rules) that imply every admissible rule of zero-order intuitionistic logic,
by a celebrated result of P. Rozie`re [170] and R. Iemhoff [95].
But in contrast to Harrop’s rule, the Mints–Citkin rule is not stably admissible [96;
Theorem 24]. Indeed, if it were stably admissible, then the Kreisel–Putnam principle
· (¬α→ β ∨ γ) −→ (¬α→ β) ∨ (¬α→ γ),
whose formula happens to be a special case of the premise of the Mints–Citkin rule,
would imply the principle
·
(
(¬α→ β∨γ)→ (¬α→ β))∨((¬α→ β∨γ)→ (¬α→ γ))∨((¬α→ β∨γ)→ ¬α).
By a well-known theorem of Kreisel and Putnam, the extension of zero-order intuition-
istic logic by the Kreisel–Putnam principle has the Disjunction Property (see [37; p.
3] for a short proof). Thus the Kreisel–Putnam principle would have to imply either
· (¬α→ β ∨ γ)→ (¬α→ β) or · (¬α→ β ∨ γ)→ (¬α→ γ) or · (¬α→ β ∨ γ)→ ¬α.
However, none of these three principles are derivable even in classical logic, in which the
Kreisel–Putnam principle is certainly derivable.
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It follows from Proposition 5.9, (3)⇒(2), that the principle · (¬¬α → α) → α ∨ ¬α
implies ·¬α ∨ ¬¬α. In contrast, the Lemmon–Scott rule
(¬¬α→ α)→ α ∨ ¬α
¬α ∨ ¬¬α
is not derivable. Indeed, let us consider the Tarski model with X = R × (R+ ∪ R−) ∪
{(0, 0)}, where R+ = {x ∈ R | x > 0} and R− = {x ∈ R | x < 0} and a valuation
with |α| = (R+ ∪ R−) × R+. Then |¬α| = R × R− and |¬¬α| = R × R+, so that
|¬α ∨ ¬¬α| = R× (R+ ∪ R−) = X \ {(0, 0)}. On the other hand, |α ∨ ¬α| = R× R− ∪
(R+ × R−)× R+ = |¬¬α→ α|, so that |(¬¬α→ α)→ α ∨ ¬α| = X. (See [172; 3.5.21]
for a model in an Alexandroff space.)
Remark 5.10. Our example above works to show non-derivability of the special case of
the Lemmon–Scott rule with α substituted by ¬β ∨ ¬γ, by considering a valuation
with |β| = R+ × R+ ∪ R × R− and |γ| = R− × R+ ∪ R × R−. On the other hand, the
Lemmon–Scott rule is clearly equivalent to the rule
(¬¬α→ α)→ ¬α ∨ ¬¬α
¬α ∨ ¬¬α .
Thus our model shows non-derivability of Rose’s formula
(
(¬¬Φ→ Φ)→ ¬Φ∨¬¬Φ) →
¬Φ ∨ ¬¬Φ, where Φ = ¬β ∨ ¬γ. (See [149; §III.6.9] for a model in the real line.)
Remark 5.11. It is not essential in the previous examples that X is non-locally compact.
The same effect can be achieved in a Tarski model in Y = {(x, y) ∈ R2 | |y| ≥ |x|}, by
considering a valuation with |α|, |β|, |γ| as above but intersected with Y .
However, the Lemmon-Scott rule is admissible; in fact, as observed in [99], it follows
easily from a special case of the Mints–Citkin rule:
(¬¬α→ α)→ α ∨ ¬α(
(¬¬α→ α)→ α) ∨ ((¬¬α→ α)→ ¬α) ∨ ((¬¬α→ α)→ ¬¬α) .
Indeed, it is not hard to check that the second disjunct of the conclusion implies ¬α,
whereas the first and the third disjuncts each imply ¬¬α.
Let us now sketch an alternative argument that the Mints–Citkin rule is not stably
admissible (a variation of [97; proof of Proposition 23]). If the Mints–Citkin rule were
stably admissible, the Scott principle
·
(
(¬¬α→ α)→ α ∨ ¬α) −→ ¬α ∨ ¬¬α,
whose formula happens to be a special case of the premise of the Mints–Citkin rule,
would imply the principle
·
(
αˆ→ ¬α) ∨ (αˆ→ ¬¬α) ∨ (αˆ→ (¬¬α→ α)),
where αˆ = (¬¬α→ α)→ α ∨ ¬α. By a well-known theorem of Scott, the extension of
zero-order intuitionistic logic by the Scott principle has the Disjunction Property (see
[37; pp. 4–5]). Thus the Scott principle would have to imply either ·
(
(¬¬α → α) →
α ∨ ¬α) → ¬α or ·((¬¬α → α) → α ∨ ¬α) → ¬¬α or ·((¬¬α → α) → α ∨ ¬α) →
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(¬¬α→ α). However, the first two of the latter tree principles are not derivable even in
classical logic, in which the Scott principle is certainly derivable; and the third implies
·β ∨ ¬β by substituting β ∨ ¬β for α. However, the Scott principle does not imply
·β ∨ ¬β, since Jankov’s principle ·¬α ∨ ¬¬α implies the Scott principle but does not
imply ·β ∨ ¬β (see §5.4).
Remark 5.12. The rule
(¬¬α→ α)→ α ∨ ¬α
α ∨ ¬α
and its corresponding principle ·
(
(¬¬α → α) → α ∨ ¬α) → α ∨ ¬α are equivalent to
·α ∨ ¬α. Indeed, the latter principle clearly implies the former principle, whereas the
rule is clearly equivalent to
(¬¬α→ α)→ α ∨ ¬α
¬¬α→ α ,
which implies ·α ∨ ¬α by substituting β ∨ ¬β for α.
Moreover, the formula
(
(¬¬α→ α)→ α∨¬α)→ α∨¬α is equivalent to ¬¬α→ α.
Indeed, it is clearly equivalent to
(
(¬¬α→ α)→ α∨¬α)→ (¬¬α→ α), and it suffices
to show that
⊢
((
(¬¬α→ α)→ α ∨ ¬α)→ (¬¬α→ α)) −→ (¬¬α→ α).
Indeed, we can rewrite this judgement, by the exponential law, as
⊢ ¬¬α ∧
((
(¬¬α→ α)→ α ∨ ¬α)→ (¬¬α→ α)) −→ α. (∗)
The left hand side of (∗) implies, using (27),(
¬¬α→ ((¬¬α→ α)→ α ∨ ¬α))→ (¬¬α→ α),
which by the exponential law rewrites as(
(¬¬α→ α)→ (¬¬α→ α ∨ ¬α))→ (¬¬α→ α),
which in turn is equivalent to ¬¬α → α. On the other hand, the left hand side of (∗)
also implies ¬¬α; thus it implies ¬¬α ∧ (¬¬α → α), which in turn implies the right
hand side of (∗).
Remark 5.13. See [19] concerning stable admissibility of rules in arithmetic.
5.5. Markov’s principle
Similarly missing among intuitionistic laws is the following converse to (19), which is
sometimes referred to as the Generalized Markov Principle:
·¬∀xπ(x) −→ ∃x¬π(x). (GMP)
This is of course the “generalization” of Jankov’s principle above with ∃ and ∀ in place of
∨ and ∧. On the other hand, (GMP) can also be “specialized” by replacing ∃ and ∀ with
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∧ and →, and the resulting principle · ⊢ ¬(χ→ π) −→ (χ∧¬π) is also non-derivable.
Indeed, it specializes to ·¬¬χ→ χ by substituting π with ×.
The stable case of (GMP),
¬¬π(x)→ π(x)
¬∀xπ(x) −→ ∃x¬π(x) ,
is clearly equivalent to the principle ·¬∀x¬ρ(x) −→ ∃x¬¬ρ(x), which is in turn
equivalent, via (18), to the following Strong Markov Principle
·¬¬∃x ρ(x) −→ ∃x¬¬ρ(x) (SMP)
whose converse is the intuitionistic law (47). Using (18) and (3), (SMP) can be equiva-
lently rewritten as
·¬¬∃x¬¬ρ(x) −→ ∃x¬¬ρ(x),
which is in turn clearly equivalent to the rule
¬¬ρ(x)→ ρ(x)
¬¬∃x ρ(x)→ ∃x ρ(x) ,
whose admissibility amounts to the assertion that if ρ(x) is stable, then so is ∃x ρ(x).
Let us note that ∀x ρ(x) is always stable if ρ(x) is, due to the intuitionistic law (46).
It is easy to see that (SMP) holds in all Alexandroff spaces whose corresponding
preorder is a directed set (i.e., every pair of elements has an upper bound). Nevertheless,
Jankov’s principle does not imply (SMP) by considering the Stone–Cˇech compactification
of N (where the union of the regular open sets {n}, n ∈ N, is not regular open). It is not
hard to construct a simpler model of this kind that does not depend on the uncountable
axiom of choice (see Proposition 5.24 below).
If ∃ is “specialized” to ∧ in (SMP), the resulting principle ·¬¬(χ∧ ρ) −→ (χ∧¬¬ρ)
is still non-derivable (indeed, it specializes to ·¬¬χ→ χ by substituting ρ with X), but
its stable case ·¬¬(¬ψ ∧ ¬π) −→ (¬ψ ∧ ¬π) is derivable by (41) and (28). If ∃ is
“specialized” to ∨ in (SMP), the resulting principle ·¬¬(ρ1 ∨ ρ2) −→ ¬¬ρ1 ∨ ¬¬ρ2
is still non-derivable, and so is its stable case (since the union of two regular open sets
may well fail to be regular open). However, the decidable case
ρ1 ∨ ¬ρ1, ρ2 ∨ ¬ρ2
¬¬(ρ1 ∨ ρ2) −→ ¬¬ρ1 ∨ ¬¬ρ2
is derivable, since the premise implies (ρ1 ∨ ρ2) ∨ ¬(ρ1 ∨ ρ2) using (28), which in turn
implies ¬¬(ρ1 ∨ ρ2) −→ ρ1 ∨ ρ2 by (8).
The following Strong Markov Rule asserts that (SMP) holds for all decidable ρ(x):
ρ(x) ∨ ¬ρ(x)
¬¬∃x ρ(x) −→ ∃x ρ(x) ; (SMR)
or equivalently that (GMP) holds for all decidable π(x):
π(x) ∨ ¬π(x)
¬∀xπ(x) −→ ∃x¬π(x) . (SMR
′)
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To see that (SMR) is not derivable, let us consider the Tarski model with 풟 = N
and X = N+, the one-point compactification of the countable discrete space N, and a
valuation with |ρ|(n) = {n}. Then each |ρ|(n) is clopen, but their union is not regular
open. Another useful Tarski model where (SMR) fails has 풟 = N and X = 2N, the
Cantor set of all functions N→ {0, 1}; each subset |ρ|(n) of 2N consisting of all functions
f such that f(n) = 1 is clopen, but the union of these subsets, 2N \ {(0, 0, . . . )}, is not
regular open.
These examples actually show that even the following Markov Rule is not derivable:
ρ(x) ∨ ¬ρ(x), ¬¬∃x ρ(x)
∃x ρ(x) .
But the latter is strictly weaker than the Strong Markov Rule. Indeed, let us consider
a Tarski model with 풟 = N and X = N+ × [0, 1] ∪ {∞}× (−1, 0], and a valuation with
|ρ|(n) = {n} × [0, 1]. Again each |ρ|(n) is clopen, and their union is not regular open.
On the other hand, if Cl(
⋃∞
i=1Ui) = X, where each Ui is clopen, then at least one Ui
contains a neighborhood of {∞} × [−1, 1], and it follows that in fact ⋃Ui = X.
Theorem 5.14. The Markov rule is admissible in intuitionistic logic.
Proof. Suppose that for some 1-formula Φ we have ⊢ Φ(x)∨¬Φ(x) and ⊢ ¬¬∃xΦ(x), but
6⊢ ∃xΦ(x). Then by the completeness theorem, there exists a Tarski model in some space
X with some domain 풟 such that some point pX ∈ X is not contained in |∃xΦ(x)|퓋X퓊0
for some valuation 퓋X and some assignment 퓊0. (Of course, the latter is needed only if
∃xΦ(x) is not a closed formula.)
Let Y be the Alexandroff space corresponding to the three element poset consisting
of a pair of incomparable elements pY , q and of their lower bound r. Let Z be the gluing
X ∪pX=pY Y , that is, the quotient space of the disjoint union X ⊔ Y by the equivalence
relation whose only non-singleton class, to be denoted by p, consists of pX and pY . We
will identify X and Y with their images in Z, and in particular from now on we will write
p in place of both pX and pY . Let 퓋Z be the valuation for the Tarski model in Z with
domain 풟 defined by |α|퓋Z퓊 = |α|퓋X퓊 for every problem variable α and every assignment
퓊. Since X is open in Z, it is easy to check by induction that |Ξ|퓋X퓊 = |Ξ|퓋Z퓊 ∩ X for
every formula Ξ and every assignment 퓊. In particular, |Φ|퓋X퓊0 (d) = |Φ|퓋Z퓊0 (d) ∩ X for
each d ∈ 풟.
Then p /∈ |Φ|퓋Z퓊0 (d) for each d ∈ 풟. Since Y is connected and each |Φ|퓋Z퓊0 (d) is clopen
(due to our hypothesis that Φ(x) is decidable), we also have q /∈ |Φ|퓋Z퓊0 (d) for each d ∈ 풟.
Hence q /∈ |∃xΦ(x)|퓋Z퓊0 . Since Z \{q} is closed, q also does not belong to |¬¬∃xΦ(x)|퓋Z퓊0 =
IntCl |∃xΦ(x)|퓋Z퓊0 . But this contradicts our hypothesis that ⊢ ¬¬∃xΦ(x). 
The following is sometimes called the Markov Principle:
·∀x (ρ(x) ∨ ¬ρ(x)) −→ (¬¬∃x ρ(x)→ ∃x ρ(x)).
It is strictly stronger than the Markov Rule due to the admissibility of the latter; more-
over, it is strictly stronger than the Strong Markov Rule. Indeed, let us consider a
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Tarski model with 풟 = N and X = N+ × [0, 1] ∪ [0,∞] × {0} and a valuation with
|ρ|(n) = Un := {n}× (0, 1]. Then
⋃∞
i=1 Ui = N× (0, 1] and Int Cl(
⋃∞
i=1 Ui) = N+× (0, 1],
and consequently |¬¬∃x ρ(x) → ∃x ρ(x)| = X \ ({∞} × [0, 1]). On the other hand,
Ui ∪ Int(X \ Ui) = X \ {(n, 0)}, and therefore |∀x
(
ρ(x) ∨ ¬ρ(x))| = X \ (N+ × {0}),
which is not a subset of X \ ({∞}× [0, 1]). Nevertheless, the model satisfies the Strong
Markov Rule, since the only clopen subsets of X are ∅ and X.
Remark 5.15. Markov’s original formulation of his principle was concerned with the case
where x ranges over N.79 A decidable problem ρ(n) is equivalent to the problem of
verifying that ρn = 1, where each ρn ∈ {0, 1} is defined by ρn = 1 if ρ(n) is soluble, and
ρn = 0 if ¬ρ(n) is soluble. Under the BHK interpretation (assuming that ρ is decidable),
the problem ∃n ρ(n) asks essentially to find a one in the sequence (ρi), and the problem
¬¬∃n ρ(n), or equivalently ¬∀n¬ρ(n), asks essentially to prove that there exists no proof
that each entry in the sequence is zero. Markov’s Principle is then asserting that there
exists a general method that, given a sequence of zeroes and ones, and a proof that this
sequence cannot be proved to be all 0’s, produces a 1 somewhere in this sequence. Of
course, we are not really told how to find this 1 by constructive means, so this principle
is not justified by the clarified BHK interpretation.
However, on a very computational reading of the BHK interpretation, Markov’s prin-
ciple is validated. Indeed, suppose we have a Turing machine that reads a sequence
of zeroes and ones until it finds a one. If this machine continues forever on some se-
quence, this can (perhaps) be equated with a proof that the sequence is all zeroes. Now,
given a proof that the machine does not continue forever on some sequence, by actually
running it on this sequence we get a general method of finding a one in the sequence.
In this connection Markov’s constructivist school considered Markov’s Principle to be
constructively acceptable (cf. [202]).
5.5.1. Principle of Omniscience. The following Rule of Omniscience:80
π(x) ∨ ¬π(x)
∃x¬π(x) ∨ ∀xπ(x) (RO)
implies (SMR′) by (7). Using (8) and (18), one can equivalently reformulate (RO) as
ρ(x) ∨ ¬ρ(x)
∃x ρ(x) ∨ ¬∃x ρ(x) .
(To obtain this from (RO), substitute ¬ρ(x) for π(x); and for the converse, substitute
¬π(x) for ρ(x).)
From the latter form of (RO) it is clear that its admissibility amounts to the assertion
that if ρ(x) is decidable, then so is ∃x ρ(x). Also, (RO) is valid in those spaces where
arbitrary union of clopen sets is clopen. These include all Alexandroff spaces and all
79In some form, Markov’s Principle was discussed long before A. A. Markov, Jr. (who himself called it
the “Leningrad Principle”), in particular by P. S. Novikov [150] and, according to Hilbert [88; p. 268],
already by Kronecker.
80This is a form of Bishop’s “Principle of Omniscience” [22].
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connected spaces. In particular, Tarski models in Euclidean spaces satisfy (RO), and so
intuitionistic logic is not strongly complete with respect to this class of models. On the
other hand, (RO) is not valid in a Tarski model in the subset [−1, 0]∪{ 1
n
| n ∈ N} of the
real line, where (SMR) is valid; indeed, in this space, a union of clopen sets is regular
open, but generally not clopen.
The symmetric assertion, that ∀x ρ(x) is decidable whenever ρ(x) is, amounts to the
admissibility of what can be called the Weak Rule of Omniscience:
π(x) ∨ ¬π(x)
∀xπ(x) ∨ ¬∀xπ(x) , (WRO)
because it follows from (RO) by (19). The converse implication fails by considering the
Tarski model in N+, where (RO) is not valid (indeed, already (SMR) is not valid), but
(WRO) is valid, since the only open set of N+ that is not clopen is N, but it is neither
the interior of any larger set nor the intersection of any family of clopen sets. On the
other hand, (WRO) together with (SMR) obviously entail (RO). Thus in fact (RO) is
equivalent to the meta-conjunction of (WRO) and (SMR):
⊢ (RO) ⇐⇒ (WRO) & (SMR).
Remark 5.16. When x ranges over N, the three principles can be recast under the BHK
interpretation in terms of the Cantor set 2N of all functions N→ {0, 1}. If∞ denotes the
constant function n 7→ 1, and p is understood to range over 2N, then the three principles
assert the existence of general methods for solving the following problems:
• Weak Rule of Omniscience: p =∞∨¬(p =∞);
• Strong Markov Rule: ¬(p =∞)→ p 6=∞;
• Rule of Omniscience: p =∞∨ p 6=∞,
where p = q denotes the problem, Prove that p(n) = q(n) for all n ∈ N, and p 6= q
denotes the problem, Find an n ∈ N such that p(n) 6= q(n). As observed by Escardo
[52], there is no loss of generality in permitting p to range just over the subset N+ ⊂ 2N
consisting of all non-increasing functions. (Note that N+ = N ∪ {∞}, where N is a
copy of N.) This follows from the existence of a constructive retraction r of 2N onto N+,
defined by r(p)(n) = min{p(k) | k ≤ n}.
5.6. ¬¬-Translation
A translation of classical predicate logic QC into intuitionistic predicate logic QH was
discovered essentially by Kolmogorov (even though he only had his formalization of a
fragment of QH available at the moment) [107] (see also [34], [204], [159]).
Theorem 5.17. Given a formula F in the language of classical logic, insert the double
negation ¬¬ in front of every subformula, and replace ⊤ and ⊥ by X and×, respectively.
Then the resulting formula F¬¬ is derivable in intuitionistic logic if and only if F is
derivable in classical logic.
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Moreover, a rule F1, . . . , Fk /G is derivable in classical logic if and only if the rule
(F1)¬¬, . . . , (Fk)¬¬ /G¬¬ is derivable in intuitionistic logic.
Kolmogorov’s translation was later rediscovered by Go¨del and Gentzen, who gave
proofs in the setup of QH and also observed that prefixing ∧, ∀ and (in the case of
Gentzen) → by ¬¬ is superfluous:
Proposition 5.18. The following holds in intuitionistic logic:
(a) ⊢ ¬¬α ∧ ¬¬β ←→ ¬¬(¬¬α ∧ ¬¬β);
(b) ⊢ (¬¬α→ ¬¬β) ←→ ¬¬(¬¬α→ ¬¬β);
(c) ⊢ ∀x¬¬α(x) ←→ ¬¬∀x¬¬α(x).
Proof. By (28) and (30), if γ and δ are stable, then so are γ ∧ δ and γ → δ. Also, by
(18), if γ(x) is stable, then so is ∀xγ(x). But by (3), ⊢ ¬¬ǫ↔ ǫ holds for stable ǫ. 
Proof of Theorem 5.17. The “only if” assertion is trivial: any derivation of F¬¬ in in-
tuitionistic logic is also valid classically, but clearly F¬¬ is classically equivalent to F .
Similarly for rules.
For the converse, we may consider instead of Kolmogorov’s interpretation F 7→ F¬¬ its
(Gentzen’s) simplified version described above, to be denoted F 7→ F ′. Then it suffices
to check that if ·F is a law of classical logic, then ·F ′ is derivable in intuitionistic logic;
and if F1, . . . , Fk /G is an inference rule of classical logic, then F
′
1, . . . , F
′
k /G
′ is derivable
in intuitionistic logic.
For principles and rules that do not involve ∨ or ∃, this is trivial, by 5.18. From
the law ·α(x) → ∃xα(x) we get that ·¬¬α(x) → ¬¬∃x¬¬α(x) is derivable, using that
⊢ β → ¬¬β. From the inference rule α(x) → γ/ ∃xα(x) → γ we get that ¬¬α(x) →
¬¬γ /¬¬∃x¬¬α(x)→ ¬¬γ is derivable, using that ⊢ ¬¬(¬¬γ)→ ¬¬γ. The analogous
law and inference rule involving ∨ are treated similarly. Finally, ·¬¬(¬¬α ∨ ¬(¬¬α))
is derivable, using ⊢ ¬¬(γ ∨ ¬γ). 
As for ∨ and ∃, let us note that one can eliminate them altogether using the intu-
itionistic de Morgan laws (28), (18):
⊢ ¬¬(α ∨ β) ←→ ¬(¬α ∧ ¬β),
⊢ ¬¬∃xα(x) ←→ ¬∀x¬α(x).
To summarize, the ¬¬-translation of classical logic into intuitionistic can be presented
as follows:
• predicate variables are interpreted as problem variables prefixed by ¬¬;
• ⊤ and ⊥ are replaced by X and ×, respectively;
• classical ∧, ∀ and → (and hence ¬) are interpreted as the intuitionistic ones;
• classical ∨ and ∃ are interpreted as the ¬-conjugates of intuitionistic ∧ and ∀.
Topologically, we have interpreted classical logic as the logic of regular open sets,
where ∧, ∀ and → (and hence ¬) are interpreted as in Tarski models, whereas ∨ and ∃
are interpreted via the Tarski interpretations of ∧ and ∀.
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In embedding classical logic into intuitionistic in a type theoretic context it may be
essential to avoid the prefixing of atomic subformulas (see [29]). This is achieved by
the Kuroda embedding, which places ¬¬ before the entire formula and also after each
universal quantifier. It is still equivalent to Kolmogorov’s embedding:81
Proposition 5.19. The following holds in intuitionistic logic:
(a) ⊢ ¬¬(α ∧ β) ←→ ¬¬(¬¬α ∧ ¬¬β);
(b) ⊢ ¬¬(α ∨ β) ←→ ¬¬(¬¬α ∨ ¬¬β);
(c) ⊢ ¬¬(α→ β) ←→ ¬¬(¬¬α→ ¬¬β);
(d) ⊢ ¬¬∃xα(x) ←→ ¬¬∃x¬¬α(x).
Proof. Using respectively (41), (28), (38) and (18), the left hand sides can be equivalently
rewritten in a form where each atomic subformula is prefixed by a ¬. In this form, each
atomic subformula can be replaced by its double negation, due to (3). 
Of course, instead of placing ¬¬ in front of the entire formula it suffices (in view of
5.18) to put it before every ∃ and ∨. This yields an “essentially local” version of the
translation (similar to Dowek’s version [45]):
• prefix every classical ∃ and ∨ by a ¬¬;
• postfix every classical ∀ and ∧ by a ¬¬;
• if the entire formula is a single atom, prefix it by a ¬¬;
• replace ⊤, ⊥ by X, ×.
(Here a classical ∧ really needs to be postfixed by a ¬¬ only when there are no other
types of connectives “around”.)
5.6.1. ¬¬-Shift principle. Prefixing only the entire formula with ¬¬ (and replacing ⊤, ⊥
by X, ×), which is known as Glivenko’s transformation, does not work in the presence
of universal quantifiers. Indeed, let F denote the formula ∀xπ(x) ∨ ∃x¬π(x), which
we encountered in the Rule of Omniscience and which is derivable in classical logic. If
Glivenko’s transformation were taking classically derivable formulas to intuitionistically
derivable formulas, then ·¬¬F , that is,
·¬¬ (∀xπ(x) ∨ ∃x¬π(x)),
would be an intuitionistically derivable principle. The latter principle is equivalent, via
(28) and (30), to
·¬∃x¬π(x) −→ ¬¬∀xπ(x),
which is nothing but the contrapositive of (GMP), Generalized Markov’s Principle. By
(18), the latter principle is in turn equivalent to the following ¬¬-Shift Principle:
·∀x¬¬π(x) −→ ¬¬∀xπ(x). (DNS)
Note that the converse to the ¬¬-Shift Principle is nothing but the intuitionistically
derivable principle (46). If ∀ is “specialized” to ∧, the ¬¬-Shift Principle itself becomes
81Other variants of the ¬¬-translation achieve still more economy in the use of ¬ (see [55]).
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intuitionistically derivable (43); and if ∀ is “specialized” to →, the resulting principle
· (χ→ ¬¬π) −→ ¬¬(χ→ π) is again intuitionistically derivable (by (44) and (35)).
To see that the ¬¬-Shift Principle is not derivable, let us consider the Tarski model
with X = R and 풟 = Q, and a valuation with |π|(q) = R \ {q}. Then |∀x¬¬π(x)| = R,
whereas |¬¬∀xπ(x)| = ∅ (indeed, |∀xπ(x)| = ∅ since R \ Q has empty interior in R).
Another Tarski model where the ¬¬-Shift Principle is not valid can be obtained by
observing that the poset of integers (ordered in the usual way) with its Alexandroff
topology contains only countably many open sets, whose intersection is empty, and no
regular open sets other than ∅ and the whole space.
By 5.18, the ¬¬-Shift Principle can be equivalently rewritten as
·¬¬∀x¬¬π(x) −→ ¬¬∀xπ(x). (DNS′)
It follows that the ¬¬-Shift Principle holds for stable π(x). In other words, the contra-
positive of (SMP), the Strong Markov Principle, is derivable in intuitionistic logic.
Yet another equivalent formulation of the ¬¬-Shift Principle was discussed in §3.12:
·¬¬∀x (π(x) ∨ ¬π(x)). (DNS′′)
To see that (DNS) implies (DNS′′) it suffices to note that by (32), ⊢ ∀x¬¬(π(x)∨¬π(x)).
Conversely, (DNS′′) implies (DNS′) using that ⊢ ¬¬α ∧ (α ∨ ¬α) −→ α.
Let us note that the ¬¬-Shift Principle is valid, for instance, in the Tarski model in
the one-point compactification N+ of the countable discrete space N with any풟. Indeed,
|α∨¬α| must be dense in N+ due to ⊢ ¬¬(α∨¬α) (see (32)). Hence |α∨¬α| contains
N. Therefore |∀x (π(x) ∨ ¬π(x))| also contains N, and thus |¬¬∀x (π(x) ∨ ¬π(x))| = N+.
5.7. Provability translation
5.7.1. Modal logic QS4. Suppose that classical connectives and quantifiers are inter-
preted by set-theoretic operations on subsets of a set X (as in §4.8.2), and that X also
happens to be a topological space. As long as the Leibniz–Euler model is closed under
the topological interior operator Int, this operator can be regarded as interpreting some
additional unary connective . In a Leibniz–Euler model, equivalent formulas are al-
ways interpreted by the same subset; thus such a  must certainly be well-defined on
equivalence classes of formulas, in the sense that if F ↔ G is derivable in classical logic,
then F ↔ G is to be postulated. This condition along with the usual axioms of a
topological space X in terms of interior,
• IntP ⊂ P ;
• IntP ⊂ Int(IntP );
• X ⊂ IntX;
• IntP ∩ IntQ = Int(P ∩Q),
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correspond to the following properties of , which suggest the intended reading of F
as “there exists a proof of F ”.82
• (reflection) ·p→ p;
• (proof checking) ·p→ p;
• (modus ponens) ·p ∧(p→ q) −→ q.
• (necessitation) p
p
;
Indeed, the modus ponens principle follows from:
(i) ·p ∧q ←→ (p ∧ q);
(ii)
p↔ q
p↔ q .
using that in classical logic, ⊢ p ∧ (p→ q) ←→ p ∧ q. Conversely, the modus ponens
principle implies
(iii) ·(p→ q) −→ (p→ q)
by the exponential law (regarded as a law of classical logic). Now (iii) and necessitation
imply (ii) and (i). In more detail, the← implication in (i) is proved using that in classical
logic, ⊢ p ∧ q→ p and ⊢ p ∧ q→ q; and the → implication in (i), transformed by the
exponential law, is proved using that in classical logic, ⊢ p→ (q→ (p ∧ q)).
The four properties of  (reflection, proof checking, necessitation and modus ponens),
regarded as three laws and one inference rule, are supplemented by the usual laws and
inference rules of classical logic (see §4.6), with understanding that they now apply to
all formulas, possibly containing the new connective . The resulting logic is known
as QS4, and its zero-order version as S4. The connective  is called a modality and is
assigned the same level of precedence as ¬.
By design, a Leibniz–Euler model of classical logic in subsets of a topological space
extends to a topological model of QS4 by interpreting  by the interior operator. It
is well-known that QS4 is complete with respect to its topological models [168] with
countable domain (see also [115]).
Let us note that the laws of QS4 can be equivalently restated in terms of ♦ := ¬¬:
(1) ·p→ ♦p;
(2) ·♦♦p→ ♦p;
(3) · (♦p→ ♦q)→ ♦(p→ q).
However, the rule ♦p / p, which is the “contrapositive” of the necessitation rule p /p, is
not even an admissible rule of QS4. Indeed, q→ q is not derivable in QS4, but ♦(q→
q) is (see §5.7.2 below). Alternatively, since α ∨ ¬α is not derivable in intuitionistic
82It is remarkable that Orlov, who first introduced these axioms in 1928, did so in order to give a prov-
ability explanation of propositional intuitionistic logic [154; §§6,7] (see [1; §6.2.1]). His work remained
virtually unknown, while the same axioms were rediscovered in a few years by Lewis, Becker and Go¨del
(see [69], [135; Theorem 2.1]).
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logic, whereas ·¬¬(α ∨ ¬α) is, it follows (see §5.7.3 below) that q ∨ ¬q is not
derivable in QS4, whereas ¬¬(q ∨¬q) is.
Example 5.20. An example of an admissible non-derivable rule of QS4 is
¬p ∧ ¬¬p
⊥ .
Indeed, in a topological model, |¬p ∧ ¬¬p| = Cl |p| \ Int |p|, that is, the topological
frontier Fr |p|. Since Fr |p| may well be the entire space (for instance, the frontier of Q
as a subset of R is R), the rule is not derivable.
On the other hand, if F is a formula, we claim that 6⊢ ¬F ∧ ¬¬F . Indeed, in a
topological model with a valuation and an assignment such that all predicate variables
are interpreted by the entire space, |F | will be either empty or the entire space; in either
case, |¬F ∧ ¬¬F | = Fr(|F |) = ∅.
5.7.2. QS4 and formal provability. In what sense does the modality  of S4 and QS4
correpond to provability? Clearly, provability in the sense of the “classical BHK” (see
§3.9) satisfies the laws and inference rules of QS4 — albeit in a trivial way, with F ↔ F
being valid.
However,  fails to directly represent formal provability in any theory containing
Peano Arithmetic. Indeed, reflection and necessitation imply ⊢ (⊥ → ⊥); if  is to
be interpreted as formal provability, then this would be saying that the consistency of
the theory can be proved within the theory, contradicting Go¨del’s second incompleteness
theorem (see [185]). Thus Go¨del spoke of derivability “understood not in a particular
system, but in the absolute sense (that is, one can make it evident)” and suggested an
intended reading of  as “is provable in the absolute sense” [68]. This, of course, raises
the question of what, if anything,  ever has to do with actual proof theory.
In fact, it is more natural to compare not with Go¨del’s predicate of formal provability
Bew(#F ) := ∃mProv(m,#F ), where Prov(m,n) is a formula expressing the predicate
that the mth proof is a proof of the nth formula in the Go¨del numbering, but rather
with its strengthened variants such as Mostowski’s
M(#F ) := ∃m(Prov(m,#F ) ∧ ¬Prov(m,# 0=1)),
which is equivalent to Bew(#F ) but the equivalence is not a theorem of Peano Arith-
metic. Indeed, the consistency formula for Mostowski’s predicate, ¬M(# 0 = 1), is
trivially a theorem of Peano Arithmetic — just like ¬⊥ is trivially a theorem of QS4.
However, neither M(#F ) nor any other arithmetic provability predicate B(#F ) ex-
pressible in Peano Arithmetic can interpret the modality  of QS4. Indeed, by Lo¨b’s
theorem (see [185; 4.1.1], [101]), any arithmetic provability predicate of the form ⊡F =
B(#F ) satisfying the (schematic) principles ⊡(F → G)→ (⊡F → ⊡G) and ⊡F → ⊡⊡
F and the (schematic) rule F / ⊡F also satisfies Lo¨b’s principle: ⊡(⊡F → ⊡F )→ ⊡F .
On the other hand, the contrapositive of Lo¨b’s principle for F = ⊥: ¬⊡⊥ → ¬⊡(¬⊡⊥)
is a modal version of Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem, which is inconsistent with
the theorem ¬⊥ of QS4. (It should be noted that Lo¨b’s theorem implies also the
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original second incompleteness theorem, since ⊡F = Bew(#F ) does satisfy the three
principles in the hypothesis of Lo¨b’s theorem.)
The next natural step in the quest for a proof-theoretic interpretation of the modality
 of QS4 would be to get rid of the constraint imposed by working within a fixed
first-order theory (such as the Peano Arithmetic). If we extend a theory T that admits
a Go¨del numbering by the reflection principle RT := BewT (#F ) → F , where BewT
denotes Go¨del’s provability predicate for T , then the formula expressing the consistency
of T , Consis(T ) := BewT (# 0=1)→ 0=1 follows, and so does Consis
(
T+Consis(T )
)
=
BewT
(
#BewT (# 0=1)
) → 0=1; and so on. If we now write ⊡F = BewT (#F ), then
the principles ⊡F → F , ⊡F → ⊡ ⊡ F and ⊡(F → G) → (⊡F → ⊡G) are derivable
in T + RT . However, the rule F / ⊡ F is not even admissible for T + RT : while ¬⊡⊥
is provable (due to RT ), ⊡(¬ ⊡ ⊥) is not (since ¬ ⊡ (¬ ⊡ ⊥) is provable, due to Lo¨b’s
theorem for T ).
An analysis of the latter failure suggests that maybe instead of finding a single proof-
theoretic interpretation of , different occurrences of  could be interpreted differently,
according to their “depth” in a formula. This effectively means that we are lifting a
formula of QS4 to a formula of a polymodal logic, which has infinitely many modalities:
[0], [1], [2], . . . , by labelling every occurrence of  with some number; and then seeking
an arithmetical interpretation of this polymodal logic, with each [n] interpreted by formal
provability in a theory Tn, where each Ti+1 contains at least Ti and its reflection principle
RTi . Because of Lo¨b’s theorem, we do not want to label an occurrence of  as [n] if its
scope contains an occurrence of  already labelled as [k] for some k ≥ n.
But it turns out that such a lift is impossible. Indeed, let us consider the formula
♦(p → p), which can be equivalently presented as ¬(p ∧ ¬p). To see that it is
derivable in QS4, observe that (p ∧ ¬p) implies, firstly, p and, secondly, ¬p,
which in turns implies ¬p. Thus (p ∧ ¬p) implies ⊥, as desired. As observed in
[118], this argument has “a flavor of self-referentiality”; indeed, if we try to repeat it with
labels, we get that [1](p ∧ ¬[0]p) implies, firstly, [1]p and, secondly, [1]¬[0]p, which in
turn implies ¬[0]p. Yet there is nothing contradictory about this, as [0]p implies [1]p
but not conversely.
A different approach was suggested informally by Go¨del, but remained unpublished
until 1995; a closely related, but somewhat different approach was suggested and formal-
ized independently by Arte¨mov (see [101; §10]). Their idea is to lift a formula of S4 to
a polymodal logic whose modalities are indexed by “proof terms”, which are to be inter-
preted by actual proofs in the arithmetical model. Arte¨mov’s approach takes advantage
of the fact that Peano Arithmetic proves Prov(n,#F ) for some numeral n if and only if
it proves F (see [185; 3.2.4]). Thus it can be said that on Arte¨mov’s interpretation, the
modality  of S4 represents “existence of proofs” in Peano Arithmetic (and not just in
its extensions by reflection principles), where “proofs” have the usual meaning of formal
proofs (except that Arte¨mov needs one “proof” to be able to prove several formulas),
but “existence” is understood in an explicit sense, not expressible internally in Peano
Arithmetic.
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Another well-known approach is thatF can be represented in the form F∧⊡F , where
it is ⊡ that should be interpreted as an arithmetic provability predicate. (Topologically,
¬ ⊡ ¬ corresponds to Cantor’s derivative operation; see [50] for further details.) In
particular, by well-known results of (i) Solovay and (ii) Kuznetsov–Muravitsky, Goldblatt
and Boolos (see [198], [50], [101]), F := F ∧Bew(#F ) satisfies the laws and inference
rules of QS4, and besides those only one additional quantifier-free principle, namely the
following principle Grz: ((F → F ) → F ) → F . This does not contradict Lo¨b’s
theorem because Bew(#F ) ∧ F is not expressible in the form B(#F ).
5.7.3. Provability translation. Tarski models motivate the following embedding of intu-
itionistic logic into QS4: interpret every problem variable as a predicate variable prefixed
by a box (because each problem variable corresponds to an open set in a Tarski model
with chosen valuation and assignment), replace × and X by ⊥ and ⊤ respectively,
and insert a box in front of every implication and in front of every universal quanti-
fier (because of their special treatment in Tarski models). This is a version of Go¨del’s
translation (see below) due to McKinsey–Tarski, as extended to the first-order case by
Rasiowa–Sikorski, Maehara and Prawitz–Malmna¨s (see [198], [149], [56]).
Thus every formula Φ in the language of intuitionistic logic corresponds to a formula
Φ′ in the language of QS4 (namely, the formula obtained from Φ by the modification
just described) so that the interpretation of Φ in a Tarski model of intuitionistic logic is
the same as the interpretation of Φ′ in the corresponding topological model of QS4.
It is straightforward to check directly that if ·Φ is a law of intuitionistic logic, then
·Φ′ is derivable in QS4; and if Φ1, . . . ,Φk /Ψ is an inference rule of intuitionistic logic,
then Φ′1, . . . ,Φ
′
k /Ψ
′ is derivable in QS4. Alternatively, this follows from the strong
completeness of QS4 with respect to topological models.
The converse implications follow from the strong completeness of intuitionistic logic
with respect to Tarski models. (A syntactic verification is also possible, but it relies on
Gentzen’s cut elimination theorem; see e.g. [143; p. 489].)
Of course, one could as well insert a box in front of every subformula of Φ (in addition
to replacing × and X by ⊥ and ⊤); the resulting formula Φ will be equivalent to Φ′
in QS4:
Proposition 5.21. The following holds in QS4:
(a) ⊢ (p ∧q) ←→ (p ∧q);
(b) ⊢ (p ∨q) ←→ (p ∨q);
(c) ⊢ ∃xp(x) ←→ ∃xp(x).
The topological counterpart of this proposition is saying essentially that finite inter-
sections and arbitrary unions of open sets are open. Any proof of this fact from the
axioms of a topological space in terms of Int should translate into a proof of 5.21.
By combining the above, we obtain
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Theorem 5.22. Given a formula Φ in the language of intuitionistic logic, insert a box
in front of every subformula, and replace ×, X by ⊥, ⊤ respectively. Then the resulting
formula Φ is derivable in QS4 if and only if Φ is derivable in intuitionistic logic.
Moreover, a rule Φ1, . . . ,Φk /Ψ is derivable in intuitionistic logic if and only if the
rule (F1), . . . , (Fk) /G is derivable in QS4.
Go¨del’s original translation, as extended to the first-order case (cf. [198]) is as follows:
given a formula Φ, insert a box after each instance of ∨, → and ∃. Then the resulting
formula Φ′′ is derivable in QS4 if and only if Φ is derivable in intuitionistic logic. Indeed,
Φ′′ is derivable in QS4 if and only if Φ′′ is. On the other hand, Φ ↔ Φ′′ is derivable
in QS4:
Proposition 5.23. The following holds in QS4:
(a) ⊢ (p ∧ q) ←→ (p ∧q);
(b) ⊢ ∀xp(x) ←→ ∀xp(x).
Here each of the two judgements is proved similarly to their topological counterpart,
Int
⋂
i Si = Int
⋂
i IntSi. Indeed, here ⊃ follows from Si ⊃ IntSi. Conversely, we have⋂
i Si ⊂ Sn for each n, whence Int
⋂
i Si ⊂ IntSn. Since this holds for each n, we get
Int
⋂
i Si ⊂
⋂
i IntSi. Applying Int to both sides completes the proof.
Here is a sample application of the -translation:
Proposition 5.24. Jankov’s principle does not imply the Strong Markov Principle.
Proof. Let us consider the Tarski model in the one-point compactification N+ of the
countable discrete space N with 풟 = N. Let us consider the valuation 퓋 such that
|q|퓋(n) = {n} and |r|퓋 = {∞}, where q is unary and r is nullary, and any other problem
variable is also interpreted by {∞} on every input. Since the union of the clopen sets
{n} is not regular open, (SMR) and in particular (SMP) are not valid with respect to
the valuation field 〈퓋〉 (since their formulas are not valid with respect to 퓋). To show
that, nevertheless, Jankov’s principle is valid with respect to 〈퓋〉, it is convenient to use
the -translation. Let us note that every formula of QS4 is 퓋-equivalent to (i.e., has the
same interpretation under 퓋 as) a formula whose only problem variables are q, r.
If F is a quantifier-free closed m-formula of QS4 containing no ’es, then either ∞ is
contained in |F |퓋(~n) for all ~n, or∞ is contained in |¬F |퓋(~n) for all ~n; also, either |F |퓋(~n)
contains a punctured neighborhood of ∞ for all ~n, or |¬F |퓋(~n) contains a punctured
neighborhood of ∞ for all ~n. Indeed, both assertions are true if F is either one of
q, ¬q, r, ¬r, and remain true under conjunction and disjunction; thus they follow by
considering the disjunctive normal form of F .
If |F |퓋(~n) contains ∞ and |¬F |퓋(~n) contains a punctured neighborhood of ∞ for all
~n, then F is 퓋-equivalent to F ∧¬r; and in the remaining cases either |F |퓋(~n) contains
a punctured neighborhood of∞ for all ~n, or |¬F |퓋(~n) contains a neighborhood of∞ for
all ~n, whence F is 퓋-equivalent to F . It follows by induction that every quantifier-free
closed m-formula is 퓋-equivalent to a quantifier-free closed m-formula without ’es. In
MATHEMATICAL SEMANTICS OF INTUITIONISTIC LOGIC 129
other words, every quantifier-free formula is 퓋-equivalent to a quantifier-free formula
without ’es.
If F is a quantifier-free 1-formula without ’es, by considering its conjunctive normal
form we get that F (x) is 퓋-equivalent to a formula of the form
(
q(x)∨G)∧(¬q(x1)∨H),
where G and H contain no occurrences of x. Consequently ∀xF (x) is 퓋-equivalent to(∀xq(x) ∨ G) ∧ (∀x1 ¬q(x) ∨ H), which is 퓋-equivalent to G ∧ (r ∨ H). By similarly
using the disjunctive normal form, we get that ∃xF (x) is 퓋-equivalent to a formula
that contains no quantification over x. It follows by induction that every formula is
퓋-equivalent to a quantifier-free formula without ’es.
Finally, by combining the above results, we get that for each m-formula F , every set
|F |퓋(n1, . . . , nm) is either clopen or differs from a clopen set only in the point∞. (So, for
example, it cannot be the set of all even integers.) Then for each 퓋′ ∈ 〈퓋〉 and for each
m-ary predicate variable p, every set |p|퓋′(n1, . . . , nm) is either clopen or differs from a
clopen set only in the point∞. In either case, it is easy to see that |¬p|퓋′(n1, . . . , nm)
is clopen. Thus the -translation of ¬α, where α is nullary, is interpreted by a clopen
set under 퓋′. Hence the -translation of ·¬α ∨ ¬¬α, a form of Jankov’s principle (see
5.9), is valid with respect to 〈퓋〉. 
5.8. Independence of connectives and quantifiers
Theorem 5.25. Neither of the intuitionistic connectives and quantifiers ×, ∧, ∨, →,
∃, ∀ can be expressed in terms of the other ones.
Our argument attempts to focus on properties that distinguish the connectives, but
occasionally resorts to specific models. For a proof-theoretic approach see [164; p. 59].
Proof. It is easy to see that × is not expressible in terms of the other connectives and
quantifiers by considering a Tarski model in a nonempty space X with the valuation
that associates X to every problem variable and every tuple of elements of the domain.
Then every formula not involving × is interpreted by X, but in every Tarski model, ×
is interpreted by ∅.
In intuitionistic logic, decidability is preserved under ∨ (using (28)), ∧ (using (29))
and → (using (6) and (31)). In the model showing that the Weak Rule of Omniscience
does not imply the Rule of Omniscience (see §5.5.1), decidability is also preserved under
∀, but not under ∃. Thus ∃ is not expressible in terms of the other connectives and
quantifiers.
Due to the intuitionistically derivable principles (43), (44), (45), (46) and (47), and
to the independence of the ¬¬-Shift Principle (see §5.6.1), ∀ is the only connective or
quantifier through which ¬¬ cannot be “pushed inside”. Thus ∀ is not expressible in
terms of the other connectives and quantifiers.
Due to the same intuitionistically derivable principles and to the independence of
Jankov’s principle (see §5.5), ∨ and ∃ are the only connectives or quantifiers through
which ¬¬ cannot be “pushed outside”. In models with singleton domain, however, ¬¬
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can be pushed outside through ∃ (but generally not through ∨). Thus ∨ cannot be
expressed in terms of other connectives or quantifiers.
(Alternatively, one can combine the use of the singleton domain with the observation
that ∨ is the only connective that does not preserve stability; or with the observation
that ∨ is the only connective that is not preserved under the ¬¬-translation, but if it
were expressible in terms of other connectives and quantifiers in intuitionistic logic, then
the same expression would also work in classical logic.)
If → is expressible in terms of ∧, ∨, ∀, ∃ and ×, then so is ¬, and if so, such an
expression would also work in classical logic (with × replaced by ⊥), and consequently
also in QS4. Now ∧, ∨ and ∃ are preserved under the -translation (in the McKinsey–
Tarski form, see 5.21), × turns into ⊥, and ∀ is preserved from the viewpoint of models
with singleton domain (Tarksi models of intuitionisitc logic and topological models of
QS4). But ¬ is not preserved: ¬p→ ¬p is not derivable in QS4, since in topological
models, the complement of an open set does not have to be open.
Finally, given a collection Γ1, . . . ,Γn of closed formulas such that ⊢ ¬¬Γi for each
i, any closed formula Ξ obtained from Γ1, . . . ,Γn using ∨, → and × satisfies either
⊢ Γi → Ξ for some i or ⊢ Ξ → ×. Indeed, arguing by induction, we may assume that
Ξ is either Φ ∨ Ψ or Φ → Ψ or ×, where either ⊢ Γi → Φ or ⊢ Φ → ×, and either
⊢ Γj → Ψ or ⊢ Ψ→×. If Ξ =×, then ⊢ Ξ→×. In the case Ξ = Φ ∨Ψ, if ⊢ Γi → Φ,
then ⊢ Γi → Ξ; if ⊢ Γj → Ψ, then ⊢ Γj → Ξ; and if ⊢ Φ → × and ⊢ Ψ → ×, then
⊢ (Φ ∨ Ψ) → ×. It remains to consider the case Ξ = Φ → Ψ. If either ⊢ Γj → Ψ or
⊢ Φ → ×, then ⊢ Γj → Ξ. So we may assume that ⊢ Γi → Φ and ⊢ Ψ → ×. Then
⊢ Ξ→ ¬Φ and ⊢ ¬¬Γi → ¬¬Φ. By the hypothesis ⊢ ¬¬Γi, so ⊢ ¬¬Φ. Hence ⊢ Ξ→×.
Now as far as models with singleton domain are concerned, the use of ∃ and ∀ does not
yield anything new — but the use of ∧ does, by considering the Tarski model in R (with
singleton domain) and a valuation with |α| = R \ {0} and |β| = R \ {1}, which suffices
to detect that Ξ = α ∧ β satisfies neither ⊢ α→ Ξ nor ⊢ β→ Ξ nor ⊢ Ξ→×. 
6. Sheaf-valued models
The first two sections below contain, in particular, a review of some basic sheaf theory.
This goes only slightly beyond an exposition of a standard material (for sheaves of sets),
which can be found in Bredon’s [25] and/or Godement’s [66] books (mostly for sheaves
of modules).
6.1. Sheaves
6.1.1. Sheaves and presheaves. A sheaf (of sets) on a (topological) space B is a map
F : E → B that is a local homeomorphism (i.e. each e ∈ E has a neighborhood O in E
such that F(O) is a neighborhood of f(e) and F|O : O → F(O) is a homeomorphism).
Clearly, such an F is an open map; in particular, SuppF := F(E) is always open in B.
If F : E → B is a sheaf and b ∈ B, the point-inverse Fb := F−1(b) is called the stalk of
F at b.
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A section of a sheaf or more generally of a continuous map f : E → B over an open
subset U ⊂ B is a continuous map s : U → E such that fs = idU . Clearly, every section
is a homeomorphism onto its image. A section s : U → E is said to extend a section
t : V → E if V ⊂ U and t = s|V . If F : E → B is a sheaf, it is easy to see that a base of
topology on E is given by the images of all sections of F (over all open subsets of B).
A morphism F → F ′ between sheaves F : E → B and F ′ : E ′ → B is a continuous
map f : E → E ′ such that F ′f = F . Clearly, such a map is itself a local homeomorphism.
A constant sheaf is the projection B × Ξ → B, where Ξ is a discrete space. A sheaf is
locally constant if it is a covering map, that is, its restriction over a sufficiently small
neighborhood of every point of B is isomorphic to a constant sheaf.
There are two basic reasons why a sheaf can fail to be locally constant:
• Even locally, sections need not extend, as is the case for the characteristic sheaf
χU : U → B, where U is an open subset of B and χU is the inclusion map.
• Even locally, sections may extend non-uniquely, as is the case for the amalgamated
union χU ∪χW χV : U ∪W V → B, where U and V are open subsets of B and W is
an open subset of U ∩V . Here U ∪W V is the quotient space of the disjoint union
U ⊔V = U×{0}∪V ×{1} ⊂ B×{0, 1} by the equivalence relation (b, 0) ∼ (b, 1)
if b ∈ W , and χU ∪χW χV sends the class of (b, i) to b.
Note that U ∪W V is non-Hausdorff, as long as some b ∈ (U ∩V )\W lies in the closure of
W — in this case (b, 0) and (b, 1) have no disjoint neighborhoods in U ∪W V . In general,
if s : U → E and t : V → E are sections of a sheaf F : E → B over open sets, then
{b ∈ U ∩ V | s(b) = t(b)} is open. If E happens to be Hausdorff, then this set must also
be closed in U ∩ V .
A presheaf (of sets) on a (topological) space B is a contravariant functor from the
category of open subsets of B and their inclusions into the category of sets. A morphism
ϕ : F → G of presheaves on B is a natural transformation of functors, that is, a collection
of maps ϕU : F (U)→ G(U) for all open U ⊂ B that commute with the restriction maps
F (j) : F (U) → F (V ) and G(j) : G(U) → G(V ) for all inclusions j : V →֒ U between
open subsets of B.
Given a sheaf, or more generally a continuous map f : X → B, its presheaf of sections
σf assigns to an open subset U ⊂ B the set (σf)(U) of all continuous sections of f over
U , and to an inclusion j : V →֒ U of open subsets of B the map (σf)(U) → (σf)(V )
given by restriction of sections. In general, for an arbitrary presheaf F , elements of
each F (U) are called sections over U , and the image of a section s ∈ F (U) under
F (j) : F (U) → F (V ) is called the restriction of s and is denoted s|V . If U is an open
subset of B, the presheaf CharU := σχU can be described by (CharU)(V ) = {idV } if
V ⊂ U and (CharU)(V ) = ∅ otherwise.
If F is a presheaf on a space B and b ∈ B, a germ of F at b is an element of the
direct limit (=colimit, inductive limit) Fb := lim−→
F (U) over all open neighborhoods U
of b ordered by inclusion. In other words, a germ of F at b is an equivalence class of
sections sU ∈ F (U) over open neighborhoods U of b, where sU ∼ tV if U ∩ V contains
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an open neighborhood W of b such that sU |W = tV |W . In particular, Fb = ∅ if and only
if F (U) = ∅ for all open neighborhoods U of b.
A presheaf F on a space B gives rise to the sheaf of germs (or sheafafication) of
F , denoted γF , whose stalk (γF )b at b is the set of germs Fb; a base of topology on
E =
⋃
b∈B Fb consists of sets of the form Os,U = {ϕU,b(s) | b ∈ U}, where U ⊂ B is
open and ϕU,b : F (U) → Fb is the natural map. The open set SuppF := Supp γF can
be described as the union of all open subsets U of B such that F (U) 6= ∅.
6.1.2. Sheaf conditions. Given a sheaf F , it is easy to see that γσF is isomorphic to
F . Given a presheaf F , we have an obvious morphism F → σγF , whose component
F (U)→ σγF (U) is a bijection if and only if the following two sheaf conditions hold:
• If {Uα} is an open cover of U , and s, t ∈ F (U) are such that s|Uα = t|Uα for all
α, then s = t.
• If {Uα} is an open cover of U , and sα ∈ F (Uα) are such that sα|Uα∩Uβ = sβ|Uα∩Uβ
for all α, β, then there exists an s ∈ F (U) such that each sα = s|Uα.
Thus sheaves on B are in one-to-one correspondence with presheaves on B satisfying the
sheaf conditions for every open U ⊂ B. For example, a presheaf of the form σf always
satisfies the sheaf conditions, so it is isomorphic to σF , where F = γσf is called the sheaf
of germs of sections of f . Moreover, every sheaf morphism F → G clearly determines a
presheaf morphism σF → σG; and every presheaf morphism F → G clearly determines a
sheaf morphism γF → γG. It follows that the category of sheaves on B can be identified
with a full subcategory of the category of presheaves on B.
Example 6.1. If π : B × X → B is the projection, then γσπ is the sheaf of germs of
continuous functions B → X. Note that the total space E of this sheaf is non-Hausdorff
already for B = X = R, since the germs at 0 of the constant function f(b) = 0 and the
function g(b) = max(b, 0) are distinct, but have no disjoint neighborhoods.
If C is a category, a C-valued presheaf on a space B is a contravariant functor from the
category of open subsets of B and their inclusions to C. When C is a concrete category
(for example, the category Ab of abelian groups), each C-valued presheaf on B is also a
presheaf of sets on B.
Conversely, if F is a presheaf of sets on a space B, it determines an Ab-valued presheaf
ZF on B by setting ZF (U) to be the free abelian group Z[F (U)] with generator set F (U)
for every open U ⊂ B, and ZF (j) : Z[F (U)] → Z[F (V )] to be the linear extension of
F (j) : F (U) → F (V ) for every inclusion j : V →֒ U between open subsets of B. It is
clear that F satisfies the sheaf conditions if and only if ZF does.
On the other hand, the sheaf conditions for an Ab-valued presheaf F are easily seen
to be equivalent to exactness of the sequence
0→ F (U) ϕ−→
∏
α
F (Uα)
ψ−→
∏
(α,β)
F (Uα ∩ Uβ) (∗)
for any open subset U ⊂ B and any open cover {Uα} of U , where ϕ(s) = (α 7→ s|Uα)
and ψ(α 7→ sα) =
(
(α, β) 7→ sα|Uα∩Uβ − sβ|Uα∩Uβ
)
.
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Example 6.2. Let f : E → B be a monotone map between posets. If we endow E
and B with the Alexandroff topology, then f is continuous. Every poset endowed with
the Alexandroff topology is weakly homotopy equivalent to its order complex [132], so
singular (co)homology of a poset, absolute or relative, may be thought of as (co)homology
of its order complex. For each i = 0, 1, . . . let us define presheaves Li and Li on B
by Li(U) = H i(f−1(U); Z) and Li(U) = Hi(E, E \ f−1(U); Z); the restriction maps
Li(U) → Li(V ) and Li(U) → Li(V ) are the usual forgetful homomorphisms. By the
Mayer–Vietoris spectral sequence, the sequence (∗) is exact for F = L0 and, if the order
complex of E is of dimension n <∞, then also for F = Ln. Thus L0 and Ln satisfy the
sheaf conditions.
In general, the sheaf of germs Hi(f) = γLi is known as the ith Leray sheaf of f , and
when f = idX : X → X, the sheaf of germs Hi(X) = γLi is known as the ith local
homology sheaf of X. If X is the face poset of a graph, then H1(X) has stalk Z at every
edge and stalk Zd−1 at every vertex of degree d. If X is the face poset of a triangulation
of a closed n-manifold, then Hn(X) is locally constant, with stalks Z; it will be constant
precisely when the manifold is orientable. If B and E are the face posets of simplicial
complexes, and f comes from a simplicial map that triangulates a bundle with fiber a
closed orientable k-manifold, then Hk(f) is locally constant, with stalks Z; it will be
constant precisely when the bundle is orientable.
6.1.3. Sheaves and problems. Let f : X → B be a continuous map (for instance, this
could be a real polynomial f : R → R or a complex polynomial f : C → C, f(x) =
anx
n + · · ·+ a0), and consider the following parametric problem Γf(b), b ∈ B:
Find a solution of the equation f(x) = b.
Thus each point-inverse f−1(b) is nothing but the set of solutions of Γf (b).
If the parameter b represents experimental data (which inevitably contains noise), then
any talk about the exact value of b (e.g. whether b is a rational or irrational number
when B = R) is pointless. It would be not so unreasonable, however, to assume that the
value of b can in principle be determined up to arbitrary precision. Indeed, the point
of continuous maps is that if a point in the domain is known only up to a sufficient
accuracy, it still makes sense to speak of its image — it will be known up to a desired
accuracy. This leads us to consider only stable solutions of the equation f(x) = b, that
is, such x0 ∈ X that f(x0) = b and there exists a neighborhood U of b in the space
B over which f has a section. Indeed, if the parameter b is only known to us up to a
certain degree of precision, we should only stick with a solution x0 of f(x) = b as long
as we can be certain that it would not disappear when our knowledge of b improves.83
Thus we will consider the following parametric problem ∆b, b ∈ B:
Find a stable solution of the equation f(x) = b.
83This may remind the reader of Brouwer’s idea that “all functions are continuous”, as well as some
of Poincare´’s writings; a more rigorous exposition of these ideas can be found in M. Escardo’s notes
[51] and in P. S. Novikov’s physical interpretation of intuitionisic logic in terms of weighting of masses
[149; §III.4].
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If is easy to see that the set Fb ⊂ f−1(b) of all stable solutions of f(x) = b is nothing
but the stalk of the sheaf F = γσf of germs of sections of the map f .
For example, if f : R→ R is a polynomial with real coefficients, then stable solutions
of f(x) = b are all the non-repeated real roots of the polynomial f(x) − b, along with
its other roots of odd multiplicity. Indeed, f is a local homeomorphism at each of
those roots, but has a local extremum at every root x0 of even multiplicity. Hence the
perturbed equation f(x) = b ± ε (with + chosen in the case of a local maximum, and
− in the case of a local minimum) has no real solutions near x0 as long as ε > 0 is
sufficiently small.
If f : C → C is a polynomial with complex coefficients, then stable solutions of the
equation f(z) = b, where b ∈ C, are precisely all the non-repeated complex roots of
the polynomial f(z) − b. Indeed, at a root z0 of multiplicity d > 1 we can write
f(z) = b + k(z − z0)d + o
(
(z − z0)d
)
. So f is locally a d-fold branched covering, and
therefore admits no section over any neighborhood of b = f(z0). In other words, even
though the perturbed equation f(z) = b + ε does have solutions near z0 whenever |ε|
is sufficiently small, we cannot choose such a solution continuously depending on ε; but
with discontinuous choice, we can never be sure that our chosen explicit solution will
persist when our knowledge of b improves.
Similar behaviour occurs if we consider the problem of finding a root of a complex
polynomial fb = anz
n + · · ·+ a0 as a function of all its coefficients b = (a0, . . . , an). Set
Σn = {(a0, . . . , an, x) ∈ Cn+2 | anxn + · · · + a0 = 0}, and let ϕ : Σn → Cn+1 be the
projection along the last coordinate. Then ϕ−1(b) is the set of roots of fb, and the stalk
(σϕ)b is the set of its stable roots. By varying just a0 like above we see that no multiple
root is stable; clearly, all non-repeated roots are stable.
6.2. Operations on sheaves
6.2.1. Product and coproduct. Given a collection of presheaves F i, i ∈ I, their product∏
F i and coproduct
⊔
F i are defined respectively by U 7→ ∏i F i(U) and by U 7→⊔
i F
i(U), with the obvious restriction maps.
If the presheaves F i satisfy the sheaf conditions, then clearly so does
∏
F i. On
the other hand,
⊔
F i generally does not satisfy the second sheaf condition, since for
a disconnected open set U ⊔ V the sheaf conditions for each F i imply F i(U ⊔ V ) ≃
F i(U)×F i(V ), so that (⊔i F i)(U ⊔V ) ≃ ⊔i F i(U)×F i(V ), which is generally not the
same as
(⊔
i F
i
)
(U)× (⊔i F i)(V ) = (⊔i F i(U)) × (⊔i F i(V )).
Given a collection of sheaves F i, i ∈ I, their product ∏F i := γ∏ σF i satisfies
σ
∏F i ≃∏ σF i by the above. Their coproduct is defined by ⊔F i = γ⊔σF i.
It is not hard to see that the operations just introduced are precisely the product and
the coproduct in the categories of sheaves and presheaves.
The coproduct of sheaves F i : Ei → B can be alternatively described as the sheaf⊔F i : ⊔Ei → B, where ⊔Ei is the disjoint union of spaces, and ⊔F i is defined by F i
on the ith summand. Thus
(⊔F i)
b
≃ ⊔(F i)b (isomorphism in the category of sets) for
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each b ∈ B. More generally, (⊔F i)
b
≃ ⊔(F i)b for any presheaves F i since direct limit
commutes with coproducts.
The product of two sheaves F : E → B and F ′ : E ′ → B can be alternatively described
as the fiberwise product F × F ′ : E ×B E ′ → B, where E ×B E ′ is the subspace of the
Cartesian product E × E ′ consisting of all pairs (e, e′) such that F(e) = F ′(e′). Thus
(F ×F ′)b ≃ Fb ×F ′b. More generally, (F × F ′)b ≃ Fb × F ′b for any presheaves F and F ′
since direct limit commutes with finite products.
The fiberwise product
(∏
B Ei
)→ B of the sheaves F i : Ei → B need not be a sheaf
when I is infinite. For, although every xi ∈ (F i)b has a neighborhood in Ei that maps
homeomorphically onto a neighborhood Ui of b in B, the fiberwise product may fail to
be a local homemorphism at the point (i 7→ xi) if
⋂
i Ui is not a neighborhood of b.
Given presheaves F i, i ∈ I, for each n ∈ I, the projection ∏i F i → F n induces a map(∏
i F
i
)
b
→ (F n)b for each b ∈ B. These in turn yield a map
풢b :
(∏
F i
)
b
→
∏(
F i
)
b
.
An element of the right hand side is a collection of germs of local sections si : Ui → Ei,
whereas an element of the left hand side is a germ of a collection of local sections U → Ei.
The germs of si’s may fail to define such a single germ if
⋂
Ui is not a neighborhood
of b; thus 풢b is not surjective in general. On the other hand, given two collections of
local sections, σi : U → Ei and τi : V → Ei such that each σi equals τi on some open set
Wi ⊂ U ∩ V , there might be no single open set W ⊂ U ∩ V such that each σi|W = τi|W ;
thus 풢b is not injective in general.
84
It is clear, however, that 풢b is a bijection when B is an Alexandroff space.
Let us note that the existence of 풢b implies that if
(∏
F i
)
b
6= ∅, then each (F i)b 6= ∅.
The converse fails:
Proposition 6.3. There exist sheaves F1,F2, . . . on R such that each (F i)b 6= ∅ for
each b ∈ R but ∏F i = χ∅.
Proof. It suffices to consider, for each i, the cover Ci = {(r − 1i , r + 1i ) | r ∈ R} of R by
all open intervals of length 2/i, and the sheaf F i = ⊔r χ(r−1/i, r+1/i). 
6.2.2. The support of a product. A topological space X is of covering dimension zero if
every open cover of X has a refinement consisting of disjoint open sets; and of inductive
dimension zero if it has a base of topology consisting of clopen sets. For T4 spaces
(i.e. T1 spaces where disjoint closed subsets are separated by neighborhoods), covering
dimension zero implies inductive dimension zero (see [49; 6.2.5, 6.2.6]). The converse
holds for spaces whose topology has a countable base (see [49; 6.2.7]). In particular,
the two notions are equivalent for separable metrizable spaces, so we may speak of zero-
dimensional separable metrizable spaces. Examples of such spaces include the Cantor
set and the Baire space, as well as their arbitrary subspaces. Indeed, it is easy to see
that if a space is of inductive dimension zero, then so is every its subspace.
84Of course, it is easy to provide a specific example, thus refuting an assertion in [66; §II.1.10].
MATHEMATICAL SEMANTICS OF INTUITIONISTIC LOGIC 136
Lemma 6.4. If F is a sheaf on a zero-dimensional separable metrizable space B, and
U is an open subset of B, then F has a section over U if and only if U ⊂ SuppF .
Proof. The “only if” implication follows from the definitions. Given an open U ⊂ SuppF ,
each x ∈ U is contained in an open set Vx over which F has a section. Without loss
of generality Vx ⊂ U . Since U is zero-dimensional, the cover {Vx | x ∈ U} of U has a
refinement {Uα} consisting of disjoint open sets. Since F has a section over each Uα and
is a sheaf (not just a presheaf), by combining these sections we get a section over U . 
Proposition 6.5. If F i are presheaves on a space B, then Supp
∏
F i ⊂ Int (⋂SuppF i).
The reverse inclusion holds in each of the following cases:
(a) B is an Alexandroff space;
(b) B is a zero-dimensional separable metrizable space, and F i = σF i for some F i.
Proof. The inclusion follows from the existence of the map 풢b and from the fact that
the left hand side is an open set. The reverse inclusion for holds for Alexandroff spaces
since their 풢b is bijective. If B is a zero-dimensional separable metrizable space and x
lies in an open set U contained in SuppF i for each i, then by 6.4 each F i has a section
over U . Hence so does their product, whose support therefore contains x. 
6.2.3. Hom-sheaf. If F is a presheaf on a space B, and A ⊂ B is open, then open subsets
of A are open in B, so F determines the restriction presheaf F |A on A. In the case of a
sheaf F : E → B, the corresponding construction generalizes to the case of an arbitrary
continuous map f : A → B, which induces the inverse image f ∗F : f ∗E → A, where
f ∗E = {(a, e) ∈ A× E | f(a) = F(e)} and (f ∗F)(a, e) = a.
If F and G are presheaves on B, let us consider the set Hom(F,G)(U) of morphisms
F |U → G|U . If V is an open subset of U , every such morphism ϕ restricts to a morphism
ϕ|V : F |V → G|V , and thus we get the exponential presheaf Hom(F,G). If G satisfies
the sheaf conditions, then clearly so does Hom(F,G). This enables one to define the
sheaf Hom(F ,G) := γ Hom(σF , σG), called the sheaf of germs of morphisms between
the sheaves F and G. In general, for any presheaves F and G, the stalk Hom(F,G)b
consists of germs of morphisms F → G, that is, of equivalence classes of local morphisms
ϕU : F |U → G|U over open neighborhoods U of b, where ϕU ∼ ϕV if U ∩ V contains an
open neighborhood W of b such that ϕU |W = ϕV |W . A germ of morphisms determines
a map between germs, so we get a map
ℱb : Hom(F,G)b → Hom(Fb, Gb),
where Hom(S, T ) denotes the set of all maps between the sets S and T . This map is
neither injective nor surjective in general:
Proposition 6.6. For any set S there exist sheaves F , G on R such that F0 = G0 = ∅
and Hom(F ,G)0 ≃ S.
Proof. Let U = R \ {0} and let F = χU . Let G be the disjoint union of copies of F
indexed by S. Then for every open neighborhood V of 0 the set of sheaf morphisms
F|V → G|V is in a bijection with S, and its elements persist under restriction. 
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Let us mention two more peculiar examples:
Example 6.7. There exist sheaves F , G on R2 such that SuppF = SuppG = R2 \ {0},
yet Hom(F ,G)0 = ∅. Indeed, let U = R2 \ {0} and let F = χU . Let G : U˜ → U ⊂ R2 be
the nontrivial double covering over U . Then for every open neighborhood V of 0 there
exist no sheaf morphisms F|V → G|V .
Example 6.8. There exist sheaves Fn and G on R, n ∈ N, such that each Hom(Fn,G) 6=
χ∅ but Hom(
⊔
nFn,G) = χ∅. Indeed, let Fn = χ(−∞,−1/n)∪(1/n,∞) and let G = χ∅. Then
Hom(Fn,G) ≃ χ(−1/n,1/n). It follows that Hom(
⊔
nFn,G) ≃
∏
n∈N χ(−1/n,1/n) ≃ χ∅.
6.2.4. The support of a Hom-sheaf.
Proposition 6.9. SuppHom(F,G) ⊂ Int ( SuppG∪ (B \SuppF )) for presheaves F , G
on a space B, and the reverse inclusion holds in each of the following cases:
(a) G is the characteristic presheaf of an open set, in which case so is Hom(F,G);
(b) B is a zero-dimensional separable metrizable space, and G = σG for some G.
Proof. The inclusion follows from the existence of the map ℱb and from the fact that
the left hand side is an open set. Suppose that x lies in an open set U contained in
SuppG ∪ (B \ SuppF ). Thus if y ∈ U and y ∈ SuppF , then y ∈ SuppG; that is,
U ∩ SuppF ⊂ U ∩ SuppG. Then for each open V ⊂ U such that V 6⊂ SuppG we have
V 6⊂ SuppF , hence F (V ) = ∅ and there is a unique map F (V ) → G(V ). Let us now
consider an open V ⊂ U such that V ⊂ SuppG.
If G = Char(SuppG), then G(V ) = {idV } and there is a unique map F (V )→ G(V ).
If B is a zero-dimensional separable metrizable space, and G = σG, then by 6.4 G has
a section s over U ∩ SuppG, and we have the constant map F (V )→ G(V ) onto {s|V }.
In either case, the constructed maps F (V ) → G(V ) commute with the restriction
maps G(V )→ G(W ) and F (V )→ F (W ) for each open W ⊂ V ⊂ U , and so determine
a morphism of presheaves F |U → G|U . The germ at x of this morphism is an element
of the stalk Hom(F,G)x, so x is contained in SuppHom(F,G).
Moreover, in the case (a) we have shown that for every open U contained in SuppG∪
(B \ SuppF ), we have a unique morphism F |U → G|U ; thus Hom(F,G)(U) contains
precisely one element. If U is not contained in SuppG ∪ (B ∪ SuppF ), then U contains
a point y such that y /∈ SuppG and y ∈ SuppF . The latter implies that y lies in an
open set V such that F (V ) 6= ∅. Without loss of generality V ⊂ U . On the other hand,
since y /∈ SuppG, we have G(V ) = ∅. Hence there exists no map F (V ) → G(V ), and
consequently no morphism F |U → G|U . Thus Hom(F,G)(U) = ∅. It then follows that
Hom(F,G) is isomorphic to Char
(
SuppG ∪ (B ∪ SuppF )). 
Corollary 6.10. Hom(F,Char∅) ≃ Char ( Int(B \ SuppF )).
The inclusion in 6.9 cannot be reversed for sheaves over an Alexandroff space:
Proposition 6.11. There exist sheaves F , G over a certain Alexandroff space B such
that SuppF = Supp G, yet SuppHom(F ,G) 6= B.
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For future purposes we fix some terminology regarding sheaves on Alexandroff spaces.
If B in an Alexandroff space and p ∈ B, let 〈p〉 = {q ∈ B | q ≥ p}, the minimal open
set containing p. Given a sheaf F : E → B, for each p, q ∈ B with p ≤ q let Fpq : Fp →
Fq denote the restriction map (σF)(j) : (σF)(〈p〉) → (σF)(〈q〉) corresponding to the
inclusion j : 〈q〉 →֒ 〈p〉. Let us note that the topology on E is an Alexandroff topology;
its corresponding preorder is given by x ≤ y if x ∈ Fp, y ∈ Fq, p ≤ q and y = Fpq(x).
Proof. Let B be the product of two copies of the poset 0 < 1. Let F(0,0) = ∅ and F(1,0) =
F(0,1) = F(1,1) = {z}. Let G(0,0) = ∅, G(1,0) = {x}, G(0,1) = {y} and G(1,1) = {x, y}, where
the maps Gpq are treated as inclusions. Clearly, Hom(F ,G)(0,0) = ∅. 
In the general case, the inclusion in 6.9 can be partially reversed:
Proposition 6.12. SuppG ∪ Int(B \ SuppF ) ⊂ SuppHom(F,G).
Proof. If b ∈ SuppG, then G(U) is nonempty for some open neighborhood U of b. Then
we can pick some sU ∈ G(U) and define a morphism F |U → G|U by sending every F (V ),
V ⊂ U , onto {sU |V } ⊂ G(V ). If B \SuppF contains an open neighborhood U of b, then
F (V ) = ∅ for all open V ⊂ U . Hence a morphism F |U → G|U is defined by observing
that all objects in the domain are empty. 
6.3. Sheaf-valued models
Let us summarize the behavior of stalks under operations on presheaves:
Proposition 6.13. If F , G and F i, i ∈ I, are presheaves on a space B, b ∈ B, then
• (F ×G)b ≃ Fb ×Gb;
• (F ⊔G)b ≃ Fb ⊔Gb;
• there is a map ℱb : Hom(F,G)b → Hom(Fb, Gb);
• (Char∅)b = ∅;
• (⊔F i)
b
≃ ⊔(F i)b;
• there is a map 풢b :
(∏
F i
)
b
→∏(F i)b.
This looks suspiciously similar to the BHK interpretation (see, in particular, §3.9),
which suggests that sheaves might have something to do with intuitionistic logic.
6.3.1. Sheaf-valued structures. Let B be a topological space and 풟 a set. The set 풪 will
consist of all sheaves over B, and the function ! : 풪 → {‚,‚} will send a sheaf F to ‚
if and only if it has a global section, i.e. (σF)(B) 6= ∅.
Thus, to specify a valuation, each problem variable α of arity n must be interpreted
by a 풟n-indexed family of sheaves on B (i.e., by a function |α| : 풟n → 풪). Upon a
choice of a valuation 퓋, a closed formula will be interpreted by a sheaf on B, and more
generally a closed n-formula Φ will be interpreted by a 풟n-indexed family of sheaves on
B, to be denoted |Φ| or in more detail |Φ|퓋, or in still more detail |Φ|퓋B. (The valuation
will be suppressed in the notation when it is clear from context.) Upon a further choice
of a variable assignment 퓊, an arbitrary formula will be interpreted by a sheaf on B, and
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more generally an arbitrary n-formula Φ will be interpreted by a 풟n-indexed family of
sheaves on B, to be denoted |Φ| or in more detail |Φ|퓊 or in still more detail |Φ|퓋퓊. (The
assignment will be suppressed in the notation when it is clear from context.) Validity
of an n-formula Φ in the model,  Φ, means that the sheaf |Φ|퓋퓊(t1, . . . , tn) has a global
section for each tuple (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ 풟n for an arbitrary valuation 퓋 and assignment 퓊.
Intuitionistic connectives and quantifiers are interpreted by the basic operations on
sheaves:
• |Φ ∨Ψ| = |Φ| ⊔ |Ψ|;
• |Φ ∧Ψ| = |Φ| × |Ψ|;
• |Φ→ Ψ| = Hom(|Φ|, |Ψ|);
• |×| = Char∅;
• |∃xΞ(x)| = ⊔d∈D |Ξ|(d);
• |∀xΞ(x)| =∏d∈D |Ξ|(d),
where Φ and Ψ are formulas and Ξ is a 1-formula, and 퓊 and 퓋 are fixed.
In exactly the same way we define presheaf-valued structures. The only essential
difference between sheaf- and presheaf-valued structures is in the interpretations of ∨
and ∃, due to the fact that σF ⊔ σG 6= σ(F ⊔ G) in general.
Theorem 6.14. Sheaf- and presheaf-valued structures are models of intuitionisitic logic.
Since (pre)sheaves form a topos, this is a special case of Palmgren’s models of intu-
itionistic logic in locally cartesian closed categories with finite sums [156].
Proof. We need to show that all laws and inference rules of the modified Spector’s
derivation system in §4.6 are valid in the two kinds of structures. It suffices to show
that these laws and inference rules are valid with respect to an arbitrary predicate
valuation 퓋. Thus we fix 퓋, and | · | will mean | · |퓋. For those laws and inference rules
that involve neither ∨ nor ∃, the case of sheaves reduces to the case of presheaves, and
so need not be considered separately.
(I) (modus ponens). We are given a global section s of |α| and a global section of
|α→ β|, that is, a presheaf morphism f : |α| → |β|. Then f(B) : |α|(B)→ |β|(B) sends
s to a global section of |β|.
(II), (III) The identity is a natural transformation, and composition of natural trans-
formations is a natural transformation.
(VI), (VII) The projections of the product of presheaves onto its factors as well as the
inclusions of summands into the coproduct of presheaves are presheaf morphisms. Also,
the inclusions of summands into the coproduct of sheaves are sheaf morphisms.
(VIII), (IX) (Co)product of presheaves is their (co)product in the category of presheaves.
Also, coproduct of sheaves is their coproduct in the category of sheaves.
(IV) (exponential law) Given a presheaf morphism f : |α|× |β| → |γ|, we need to con-
struct a presheaf morphism g : |α| → Hom(|β|, |γ|). Let g(U) send an s ∈ |α|(U) to the
following presheaf morphism h : |β||U → |γ||U . If V ⊂ U , define h(V ) : |β|(V )→ |γ|(V )
by t 7→ f(V )(s|V , t). If V ′ ⊂ V , then f(V ′)(s|V ′, t|V ′) = f(V )(s|V , t)|V ′ since s|V ′ =
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(s|V )|V ′ and f is a natural transformation. Hence h = g(U)(s) is a natural transforma-
tion. If U ′ ⊂ U , then g(U ′)(s|U ′) = g(U)(s)|U ′ as presheaf morphisms |β||U ′ → |γ||U ′
due to (s|U ′)|V = s|V for each V ⊂ U ′. Thus g is a natural transformation.
Conversely, given a g, we need to construct an f . Let f(U) : |α|(U)×|β|(U)→ |γ|(U)
send a pair (s, t) to h(U)(t), where h = g(U)(s). If U ′ ⊂ U , then f(U ′)(s|U ′, t|U ′) =
h′(U ′)(t|U ′), where h′ = g(U ′)(s|U ′). Since g is a natural transformation, h′ = h|U ′ as
presheaf morphisms |β||U ′ → |γ||U ′, where again h = g(U)(s). In particular, h′(U ′) =
h(U ′) as maps |β|(U ′) → |γ|(U ′). Since h is a natural transformation, h(U ′)(t|U ′) =
h(U)(t)|U ′ . Thus f(U ′)(s|U ′, t|U ′) = f(U)(s, t)|U ′, whence f is a natural transformation.
(V) (explosion principle) χ∅ is the initial object in the category of sheaves.
(X), (XI) For each t ∈ D, the projection onto the tth factor is a presheaf morphism∏
d∈D |α|(d)→ |α|(t), and the inclusion onto the tth summand is a (pre)sheaf morphism
|α|(t)→ ⊔d∈D |α|(t).
(XIIX) (generalization rule) We need to show that if α(x) is valid in a presheaf-valued
structure for every variable assignment, then ∀xα(x) is valid in the structure.
Indeed, the hypothesis says that for each d ∈ D we have a global section of |α|(d).
These yield a global section of the presheaf
∏
d∈D |α|(d).
(XII′), (XIII′) We need to prove that if ∀x (β→ α(x)) is valid in a (pre)sheaf structure,
then so is β→ ∀xα(x); and if ∀x (α(x)→ β) is valid, then so is ∃xα(x)→ β.
The hypothesis implies that for each d ∈ D we have a presheaf morphism |β| → |α|(d)
(resp. |α|(d)→ |β|). Since (co)product of presheaves is their (co)product in the category
of presheaves, we get a presheaf morphism |β| → ∏d∈D |α|(d) (resp. ⊔d∈D |α|(d)→ |β|).
This works similarly for coproduct of sheaves. 
6.3.2. Completeness. We note the following consequence of 6.13.
Proposition 6.15. If F , G and F i, i ∈ I, are presheaves on a space B, then
(1) Supp(F ×G) = SuppF ∩ SuppG;
(2) Supp(F ⊔G) = SuppF ∪ SuppG;
(3) SuppHom(F,G) ⊂ Int ( SuppG ∪ (B \ SuppF ));
(4) Supp(Char∅) = ∅;
(5) Supp
(⊔
F i
)
=
⋃
SuppF i;
(6) Supp
(∏
F i
) ⊂ Int (⋂SuppF i).
This is reminiscent of Tarski models, except that we have seen in the previous sections
that the inclusions in (3) and (6) are strict in general, with (3) being strict even for some
Alexandroff spaces.
However, by 6.5 and 6.9, the inclusions in (3) and (6) can be reversed if the presheaves
satisfy the sheaf conditions, and B is a zero-dimensional separable metrizable space.
Also, by 6.4 a sheaf over such a space B has a global section if and only if its support is
the entire B. Thus from Dragalin’s and Kramer’s completeness results for Tarski models
(see §5.3) we obtain
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Theorem 6.16. Intuitionistic logic is strongly complete with respect to its sheaf-valued
model with countable domain over the Baire space NN, and complete with respect to
its sheaf-valued model with countable domain over any given zero-dimensional separable
metrizable space with no isolated points.
Although over zero-dimensional separable metrizable spaces sheaf-valued models can
be seen as merely a proof-relevant conservative extension of Tarski models, in general
they tend to be very different from Tarski models.
In particular, from 6.3 it is easy to see that the Tarski model of intuitionistic logic in
R with 풟 = N is not obtainable by taking supports from the sheaf-valued model in R
with 풟 = N. This example can be improved:
Proposition 6.17. The Tarski model of zero-order intuitionistic logic in some Alexan-
droff space B is not obtainable by taking supports from the sheaf-valued model in B.
Proof. Let B = {x, y, xy, yx, 1ˆ} with partial order generated by x, y < xy; x, y < yx and
xy, yx < 1ˆ. Then 〈x〉 ∩ 〈y〉 = 〈xy〉 ∪ 〈yx〉, and therefore if α, β, γ, δ are interpreted
respectively by 〈x〉, 〈y〉, 〈xy〉, 〈yx〉, then (α ∧ β)→ (γ ∨ δ) is interpreted by B.
On the other hand, if F , F ′, G, G ′ are sheaves with supports 〈x〉, 〈y〉, 〈xy〉 and
〈yx〉 respectively, then we have sheaf sections Char 〈x〉 → F and Char 〈y〉 → F ′ and
sheaf morphisms G → Char 〈xy〉 and G ′ → Char 〈yx〉. Consequently we have a sheaf
morphism Hom(F × F ′,G ⊔ G ′) → Hom(Char 〈x〉 × Char 〈y〉 ,Char 〈xy〉 ⊔ Char 〈yx〉).
Therefore from 6.11, Hom(F ×F ′,G ⊔ G ′)x = ∅ = Hom(F ×F ′,G ⊔ G ′)y. Thus if α, β,
γ, δ are interpreted respectively by F , F ′, G, G ′, then (α ∧ β)→ (γ ∨ δ) is interpreted
by a sheaf with support {xy, yx, 1ˆ} and not B. 
Example 6.18. Let us discuss the Kreisel–Putnam principle and Harrop’s rule in the
light of sheaf-valued models. Let us fix a valuation in a sheaf-valued model of intu-
itionistic logic in a space B, and set |β| = χU1 , |γ| = χU2 and |¬α| = χU . Then by
6.9(a), each Hom(χU , χUi) ≃ χVi , where Vi = Int
(
Ui ∪ (X \ U)
)
. On the other hand,
|β ∨ γ| ≃ χU1 ⊔ χU2.
In our previous discussion of the Kreisel–Putnam principle and Harrop’s rule, which
was based on Tarski models (see §5.2.2), we had B = R2, U1 = {(x, y) | x > 0},
U2 = {(x, y) | y > 0} and U = U1 ∪ U2. It is not hard to see that in this case,
|¬α→ β∨γ| = Hom(χU , χU1⊔χU2) is isomorphic to the amalgamated union χV1∪χV χV2,
where V = {(x, y) | x < 0 ∧ y < 0}. The support of this amalgamated union is
R2 \ {(0, 0)}, so it does not have a global section (in fact, it does not even have a
section over its support). So this example no longer works to refute Harrop’s rule.
However, it still applies to refute the Kreisel–Putnam principle (even though in this case
Supp |¬α → β ∨ γ| coincides with Supp |(¬α → β) ∨ (¬α → β)|), since there are no
sheaf morphisms (χV1 ∪χV χV2)|O → (χV1 ⊔ χV2)|O for any neighborhood O of (0, 0).
To refute Harrop’s rule with a sheaf-valued model we can, however, take B = R2,
U1 = {(x, y) | x > 0 ∧ y > 0}, U2 = {(x, y) | x < 0 ∧ y < 0} and U = U1 ∪ U2. Then
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V1 = {(x, y) | x > 0 ∨ y > 0} and V2 = {(x, y) | x < 0 ∨ y < 0}, so that the support of
|(¬α→ β)∨(¬α→ γ)| is V1∪V2 = R2\{(0, 0)}. On the other hand, |¬α→ β∨γ| ≃ χR2.
Let us now analyze the difference between the two models just considered. If we write
U0 = Int((U1 ∪ U2) \ (U1 ∩ U2)), then the sheaf morphism χU0 → χU1 ⊔ χU2 induces a
sheaf morphism Hom(χU , χU0)→ Hom(χU , χU1 ⊔ χU2). By 6.9(a), Hom(χU , χU0) ≃ χV0,
where V0 = Int(U0 ∪ (X \ U)). Thus |¬α→ β ∨ γ| will have a global section as long as
V0 is the entire space, and in general, Supp |¬α→ β∨γ| contains V0. However, V0 need
not be contained in Supp |(¬α → β) ∨ (¬α → γ)| = V1 ∪ V2 as shown by the second
example. On the other hand, if V0 ⊂ V1 ∪ V2, then Hom(χU , χU1 ⊔ χU2) is isomorphic to
the amalgamated union χV1 ∪χV χV2 , where V = Int(X \ U). In general, one can show
that Hom(χU , χU1 ⊔ χU2) ≃ (χV1 ∪χV χV2) ∪χW χV0 , where W = V0 ∩ (V1 ∪ V2).
Example 6.19. Let us show that the Negative Constant Domain principle is not valid
in some sheaf-valued model. Let 풟 = N and let B = (−∞, 0] ∪ N ⊂ R, where N =
{ 1
n
| n ∈ N}. Then N is a regular open set in B, so F = χN could interpret a negated
formula. Let F i = χB\{1/i}. Then
∏
iF i ≃ χ(−∞,0), so F ⊔
∏
iF i ≃ χB\{0}, which has
no global section. On the other hand, each F ⊔ F i has a global section, hence so does
their product. Thus there exist no sheaf morphisms
∏
i(F ⊔ F i)→ F ⊔
∏
iF i.
Presheaf-valued models are not as good as sheaf-valued models:
Proposition 6.20. Presheaf-valued models satisfy the Negative Constant Domain Prin-
ciple.
Proof. We need to construct a morphism of presheaves
∏
i(F ⊔F i)→ F ⊔
∏
i F
i, where
F is of the form |¬Φ|. Given an open set U and a collection s = (si) of sections
si ∈ F (U) ⊔ F i(U), we consider two cases. If none of the si actually belongs to F (U),
then we send s via the inclusion
∏
i F
i(U) ⊂ F (U) ⊔∏i F i(U). If some si belongs to
F (U), we send s to the image of this si under the inclusion F (U) ⊂ F (U) ⊔
∏
i F
i(U).
Since F = |¬Φ| is the characteristic presheaf of some open set (in fact, of a regular
open set), F (U) contains at most one element, so the choice of i is irrelevant. This
construction is clearly natural in U . 
Proposition 6.21. Presheaf-valued models satisfy the Rule of Omniscience and the
Disjunction Property.
In sheaf-valued models, every formula interpreted by the characteristic sheaf of a
clopen set is decidable. Hence the Disjunction Property fails if B is disconnected; and
the Rule of Omniscience can be refuted similarly to §5.5.
Proof. To prove that the Disjunction Property is valid in presheaf-valued models it
suffices to note that F ⊔G has a global section if and only if at least one of the presheaves
F , G has a global section.
In particular, if Φ is a formula such that Φ∨¬Φ is valid with respect to some valuation
퓋 and some assignment 퓊 in a presheaf-valued model, then either |Φ| has a global section
or |¬Φ| has a global section; the latter amounts to saying that |Φ| = Char∅. If each
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|α|(n), n ∈ N, coincides with Char∅, then so does |∃xα(x)| = ⊔n |α|(n); and if some
|α|(n) has a global section, then so does ⊔n |α|(n). Thus ∃xα(x)∨¬∃xα(x) is valid with
respect to 퓋 and 퓊 as long as α(x) ∨ ¬α(x) is. 
It is clear from the proofs of 6.20 and 6.21 that when the space B is connected, sheaf-
valued models also satisfy the Negative Constant Domain Principle and the Disjunction
Property — in contrast to Tarski models.
6.3.3. Relation to Medvedev–Skvortsov models. Let B be the two-element poset 0 < 1
endowed with its Alexandroff topology. A presheaf (of sets) F over B such that F (∅)
is a singleton is always a sheaf. (In general, sheafafication of presheaves over B has the
effect of identifying the points of F (∅) with each other.)
A sheaf F over B consists of two stalks F0 = σF({0, 1}) and F1 = σF({0}) and a
map F01 : F0 → F1 corresponding to the inclusion {0} ⊂ {0, 1}. We have Hom(F ,G)1 =
Hom(F1,G1), whereas Hom(F ,G)0 consists of commutative diagrams
F0 F01−−−→ F1y y
G0 G01−−−→ G1.
If F01 and G01 are inclusions, such a diagram amounts to a map ϕ : F0 → G0 such that
ϕ(F1) ⊂ G1.
In the case where the restriction maps of the sheaves are inclusions, by 6.13 we further
have
(
(
⊔
iF i)1 , (
⊔
iF i)0
)
= (
⊔
i(F i)1,
⊔
i(F i)0) and, using that B is an Alexandroff
space, also
(
(
∏
iF i)1 , (
∏
iF i)0
)
= (
∏
i(F i)1,
∏
i(F i)0).
This is reminiscent of the interpretation of connectives and quantifiers in Medvedev–
Skvortsov models (see §3.13). To recover an actual version of Medvedev–Skvortsov
models, let us fix a domain 풟, and one set Xrk corresponding to each problem variable
x0
r
→1
k . Let X =
∏
r∈ω
∏
k∈NHom(풟
r, 2Xrk), where ω = {0, 1, . . . } and N = {1, 2, . . . }.
Here 2S denotes the set of all subsets of S and Hom(Y, Z) denotes the set of all maps
Y → Z. Let us consider the Alexandroff space X+ = X ∪ {1ˆ}, where X is regarded as
a discrete space, or alternatively as a poset with no comparable pair of elements, and 1ˆ
is an additional element that is greater than all elements of XΦ. Each ~Y = (Yrk) ∈ X
determines the two-element subspace {~Y , 1ˆ} of X+, which is homeomorphic to B.
Let us interpret the kth r-ary problem variable, x0
r
→1
k , by the following r-ary family
F rk(t1, . . . , tr) of sheaves over X+. Let F rk(~t)1ˆ = Xrk and F rk(~t)~Y = Yrk(~t), and let
F rk(~t)~Y 1ˆ : Yrk(~t)→ Xrk be the inclusion map.
Let connectives and quantifiers be interpreted as in a sheaf-valued model, except for
×, which is interpreted by the sheaf F with F~Y = ∅ for each ~Y ∈ X and F1ˆ = {∅}.
As long as all the sets Xrk are non-empty, it is easy to see that this yields a model of
intuitionistic logic with respect to the valuation field generated by the above valuation.
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Given a closed formula Φ, let x0
ri→1
ki
, i = 1, . . . , m, be all the problem variables that
occur in Φ. Let XΦ =
∏m
i=1Hom(풟
ri, 2Xriki ) and let πΦ : X → XΦ be the projection
onto the subproduct, ~Y 7→ (Yr1k1 , . . . , Yrmkm).
Then Φ is interpreted by the sheaf G, where, in the notation of §3.13, the stalk G1ˆ = S
and the stalk G~Y ′ = T (~Y ) for each ~Y ∈ XΦ and each ~Y ′ ∈ π−1Φ (~Y ). Thus the set of
global sections of G can be identified with ⋂~Y ∈XΦ T (~Y ) ⊂ S, and in particular G has a
global section if and only if this intersection is nonempty.
Remark 6.22. By adding the least element 0ˆ to the poset X+ and considering sheaves
over the resulting Alexandroff space X± = X ∪{0ˆ, 1ˆ} one can also model a modification
of Medvedev–Skvortsov models (a non-equivariant version of La¨uchli models [120]) where
all Xij are taken to be a fixed set U , and× is interpreted not by ({∅},∅), but by (U,Z)
for some fixed Z ⊂ U (possibly nonempty!), and only Yrk containing Z are considered.
6.3.4. Modified BHK interpretation. Kolmogorov’s interpretation of ·γ ∨ ¬γ as “the
problem of finding a general method of solving the problem Γ ∨ ¬Γ for every contentful
problem Γ” contains constructive quantification over all problems; it does not seem to be
compatible with usual, Tarski-style model theory, which only deals with classical quan-
tification over all valuations. (It is compatible with a certain alternative model theory
constructed below; see §7.3.6.) The following modification of Kolmogorov’s interpreta-
tion overcomes this difficulty by replacing the informal (i.e., contentual) constructive
quantifier with a combination of an informal classical quantifier (enabling compatibility
with standard model theory) and a potentially formal constructive quantifier (prevent-
ing intuitionistic logic from degeneration into classical). Related ideas are also found in
[122; Definition 4.2] (see also [167; Ch. 7]).
In addition to a domain of discourse 풟, we fix a “hidden parameter” domain ℰ (just
like in the modified Platonist interpretation of classical logic). Now 풪 is taken to be a
class of problems with parameter in ℰ, consisting of a prescribed class of contentful (e.g.
mathematical) primitive parametric problems and of composite parametric problems,
which are obtained inductively from the primitive ones by using contentual intuitionistic
connectives and quantifiers over arbitrary 풟-indexed families of parametric problems.
For instance, if ℰ = P × P , where P is the set of all finite presentations of groups,
primitive parametric problems could be of the form “Find an isomorphism between
the groups given by presentations p and q”. In this case composite parametric problems
would include “Find an isomorphism between the groups given by p and q or find a proof
that it is impossible”. Formal intuitionistic connectives and quantifiers are interpreted
straightforwardly by the contentual ones.
The value of ! : 풪 → 풬 = {‚,‚} on a parametric problem Θ will be ‚ if and only
if there exists a general method of solving the problem Θ(e) for all e ∈ ℰ. What is
meant by “solving” Θ(e) is defined explicitly for primitive Θ ∈ 풪 and all e ∈ ℰ and is
extended inductively to composite Θ ∈ 풪 and all e ∈ ℰ by the usual BHK interpretation
(see §3.7), separately for each e ∈ ℰ. This determines a contentual interpretation of
intuitionistic logic and its meta-logic, which we will call themodified BHK interpretation.
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Let us note that the arguments of §3.12 and §3.13 still work to show that ·γ∨¬γ is
not valid under the modified BHK interpretation.
Example 6.23. Let us record the modified BHK interpretations of the judgements of
admissibility, stable admissibility and derivability of a purely logical rule Γ /∆. The
tuples ~ϕ and ~Φ have the same meaning as in Example 4.84, and e is again understood to
run over ℰ as in Example 4.85. Like before, ?Θ denotes the proposition “The problem
Θ has a solution”.
• Derivability: ∀풟,ℰ,풪 ∀퓋 (∀퓊 ?∀e |Γ|퓋퓊(e)→ ∀퓊 ?∀e |∆|퓋퓊(e));
• Stable admissibility:
∀~Φ ∀풟,ℰ,풪 (∀퓋,퓊 ?∀e |Γ[~ϕ/~Φ]|퓋퓊(e) −→ ∀퓋,퓊 ?∀e |∆[~ϕ/~Φ]|퓋퓊(e));
• Admissibility:
∀~Φ (∀풟,ℰ,풪 ∀퓋,퓊 ?∀e |Γ[~ϕ/~Φ]|퓋퓊(e) −→ ∀풟,ℰ,풪 ∀퓋,퓊 ?∀e |∆[~ϕ/~Φ]|퓋퓊(e)).
Remark 6.24. Let us observe that sheaf-valued models provide a formalization of the
modified BHK semantics.
7. Semantics of the meta-logic
7.1. Generalized models
All the models considered so far are based on classical, moreover, two-valued interpreta-
tion of the meta-logic, in accordance with traditional model theory. But the meta-logic
is intuitionistic, and so is severely collapsed in such models.
Given a logic L based on a language ℒ and given by a derivation system D, a meta-
ℒ-structure M will be called a generalized model (resp. a semi-generalized model) of
L if it is a model (resp. a semi-standard model) of the meta-logic (see §4.7.1) and the
meta-formula D is valid in M . When M is an ℒ-structure (i.e., the interpretation of
the meta-logic is two-valued), this is the same as a model in the usual sense (see §4.7.3).
7.1.1. Generalized Tarski models. Let풟 be a set, letX and Y be topological spaces, and
let f : X → Y be a continuous map. Let 풪 be the collection of all open sets in X, 풬 the
collection of all open sets in Y , and ! : 풪 → 풬 be defined by !(U) = Int (Y \f(X \U)).85
Let us interpret the intuitionistic connectives and quantifiers in X in the usual way and
the meta-connectives and the first-order meta-quantifier in Y in the similar way (that
is, in the way the corresponding connectives and the universal quantifier are interpreted
in the Tarski model in Y with domain 풟). The second-order meta-quantifier qn is also
interpreted similarly; namely, its interpretation |qn| associates to a Hom(풟n,풪)-indexed
family of open sets in Y the interior of their intersection. Let ? : 풬 → {‚,‚} be defined
by sending Y to
‚
and any its proper subset to ‚.
This yields a meta-structure for the language of intuitionistic logic, which will be
called the generalized Tarski meta-structure in the map f : X → Y with domain 풟.
85Let us note that if X is compact, or more generally f is a closed map, then Y \ f(X \ U) is open.
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Theorem 7.1. Generalized Tarski meta-structures are semi-generalized models of intu-
itionistic logic.
Proof. It is clear that all the laws of the Hilbert-style derivation system of intuitionistic
logic (see §4.6.2) are valid in this meta-structure (because they are valid in the two-
valued structure given by the Tarski model in X with domain 풟), and that all the
meta-laws of the Hilbert-style formulation of the meta-logic (see §4.4.3) are also valid
in it (because they are similar to the said laws of intuitionistic logic). Also, the ⇒-
elimination meta-rule and the conditions (A) and (B) of §4.7.1 are satisfied for the same
reasons that the modus ponens and the generalization rule of intuitionistic logic are valid
in Tarski models. Thus it remains to check that the modus ponens and the generalization
rule of intuitionistic logic are valid in our meta-structure.
Let us check the validity of the modus ponens rule. Given two open sets U, V ⊂ X, let
W = Int
(
V ∪ (X \ U)). Since ·α ∧ (α→ β)→ β is derivable in intuitionistic logic (or
by direct reasoning), U∩W ⊂ V . Then (X \U)∪(X \W ) = X \(U∩W ) ⊃ X \V . Hence
f(X\U)∪f(X\W ) = f((X\U)∪(X\V )) ⊃ f(X\V ). Since IntA∩IntB = Int(A∩B),
we get !(U) ∩ !(W ) ⊂ !(V ).
Let us check the validity of the generalization rule. Given a family of open sets Ux,
x ∈ 풟, we need to show that Int⋂x∈풟 !(Ux) ⊂ !(Int⋂x∈풟 Ux). Since Int⋂x Int Sx =
Int
⋂
x Sx (see §5.7.3), and the left hand side is open, this is equivalent to
Int
⋂
x∈풟
(
Y \ f(X \ Ux)
) ⊂ Y \ f (X \ Int ⋂
x∈풟
Ux
)
.
Since the complement to the interior is the closure of the complement, and the comple-
ment to an intersection is the union of the complements, this is equivalent to
Y \ Cl
⋃
x∈풟
f(X \ Ux) ⊂ Y \ f
(
Cl
⋃
x∈풟
(X \ Ux)
)
.
But since the image of a union is the union of the images, the latter is the same as
Cl f
(⋃
x∈풟
(X \ Ux)
)
⊃ f
(
Cl
⋃
x∈풟
(X \ Ux)
)
,
which follows from the continuity of f . (In fact, f : X → Y is continuous if and only if
f(ClA) ⊂ Cl f(A) for each A ⊂ X.) 
Example 7.2. Let c be the constant map from a topological space X to a point. It is
easy to see that the generalized Tarski model of intuitionistic logic in c with domain 풟
is nothing but the usual Tarski model in X with domain 풟.
Example 7.3. If X and Y are topological spaces and X is discrete, any map f : X → Y
is continuous. Also, since usual Tarski models in X satisfy the principle ·α ∨ ¬α, this
principle is also valid in generalized Tarski models in f . So they are in fact semi-
generalized models of classical logic.
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Example 7.4. If Y is a topological space and Y d is the same underlying set re-endowed
with the discrete topology, the previous example (Example 7.3) applies to the identity
map f : Y d → Y . Let us note that ! is interpreted by S 7→ IntS in this case.
Example 7.5. As a special case of the previous example (Example 7.4), we have semi-
generalized models of classical logic in any set X, with 풪 = 풬 = 2Y and ! = id.
Example 7.6. There exists a semi-generalized model W of classical logic with respect
to a valuation field, and principles ·F and ·G such that neither ·F nor ·G nor ·F ⇒ ·G
is valid in W .
Indeed, let us consider X = {µ, ν} and let F = ¬(∃xp(x) ∧ ∃x¬p(x)) and G = ⊥.
The usual Leibniz–Euler model V in X with respect to a certain valuation field K,
constructed in Example 4.83, yields a semi-generalized Leibniz–Euler model W in X
with respect to K by re-interpreting ! and the meta-connectives and the meta-quantifiers
as in Example 7.5. Since |¬F |퓋V does not contain ν for each 퓋 in K, but contains µ for
some 퓋 in K, |F |퓋V contains ν for each 퓋 in K and does not contain µ for some 퓋 in K.
Hence |!F |퓋W also contains ν for each 퓋 in K and does not contain µ for some 퓋 in K.
Consequently |·F |KW = {ν}. Then |·F ⇒ ⊥|KW = {µ}. Thus neither ·F nor ·F ⇒ ⊥ is
valid in W with respect to K.
7.1.2. Tarski/sheaf-valued models. Let us note a slightly different type of generalized
models. Let 풟 be a set, let X and Y be topological spaces, and let f : X → Y be a
continuous map. Let 풪 be the collection of all open sets in X. Let 풬 the collection
of sheaves on Y . Let ! : 풪 → 풬 be defined by setting !(U) to be the characteristic
sheaf of the open set Int
(
Y \ f(X \ U)). Let us interpret the intuitionistic connectives
and quantifiers in X in the usual way (as in a Tarski model) and the meta-connectives
and the meta-quantifiers in Y in the similar way (as in a sheaf-valued model). Let us
interpret the intuitionistic connectives and quantifiers in X in the usual way (as in a
Tarski model) and the meta-connectives and the first-order meta-quantifier in Y in the
similar way (as in a sheaf-valued model). The second-order meta-quantifier qn is also
interpreted similarly; namely, its interpretation |qn| associates to a Hom(풟n,풪)-indexed
family of sheaves on Y their product (in the category of sheaves). Let ? : 풬 → {‚,‚}
be defined by sending Y to
‚
and any its proper subset to ‚.
This yields a meta-structure for the language of intuitionistic logic. The arguments
of the previous subsection (§7.1.1) apply without changes to show that this is a semi-
generalized model of intuitionistic logic. Indeed, the verification of the modus ponens and
generalization rules really involves only products of characteristic sheaves (a product of
two of them and a 풟-indexed product) which are the same as the characteristic sheaves
of the intersection. Let us call this semi-generalized model of intuitionistic logic the
Tarski/sheaf-valued model in the map f : X → Y with domain 풟.
Example 7.7. If X is a topological space and Xd is the same underlying set re-endowed
with the discrete topology, the identity map f : Xd → X is continuous. But since
usual Tarski models in Xd satisfy the principle ·α ∨ ¬α, this principle is also valid in
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Tarski/sheaf-valued models in f . So they are in fact semi-generalized models of classical
logic. Let us note that ! is interpreted by S 7→ χIntS in this case.
7.1.3. Verificationist interpretation. We fix a domain of discourse 풟. Like in the Pla-
tonist interpretation, 풪 is taken to be a class of propositions, consisting of a prescribed
class of contentful (e.g. mathematical) primitive propositions and composite proposi-
tions, which are obtained inductively from the primitive ones by using contentual classi-
cal connectives and quantifiers over arbitrary풟-indexed families of propositions. Formal
classical connectives and quantifiers are interpreted straightforwardly by the contentual
ones. We also have the notion of “truth”, defined explicitly for primitive P ∈ 풪, and
extended inductively to composite P ∈ 풪 by the usual truth tables.
Now 풬 is taken to be a class of problems, consisting of primitive problems of the
form !(P ) = “Prove P ”, which are the values of ! : 풪 → 풬, and of composite problems,
which are obtained inductively from the primitive ones by using contentual intuitionistic
connectives and quantifiers over arbitrary 풟-indexed and Hom(풟i,풪)-indexed (i =
0, 1, . . . ) families of problems.
The value of ? : 풬 → {‚,‚} on a problem Θ will be‚ if and only if Θ has a solution.
To “solve” a primitive Θ = !(P ) means to prove that P is true; this notion of “solving” is
extended inductively to composite Θ ∈ 풬 by the usual BHK interpretation (see §3.7).
This determines a contentual interpretation of classical logic and its meta-logic, which
we will call the modified Verificationist interpretation.
The Verificationist interpretation is very close to the sketch of an interpretation in
§3.10.3, which however suggests fully classical interpretation of the meta-logic.
Example 7.8. Let us record the modified Verificationist interpretations of the judge-
ments of admissibility, stable admissibility and derivability of a purely logical rule F /G.
The tuples ~ϕ and ~Φ have the same meaning as in Example 4.84, and e is again under-
stood to run over ℰ as in Example 4.85. Like before, ?Θ denotes the proposition “The
problem Θ has a solution”, and !P denotes the problem “Prove the proposition P ”.
• Derivability: ∀풟,ℰ,풪 ?∀퓋 (∀퓊 !|F |퓋퓊 → ∀퓊 !|G|퓋퓊);
• Stable admissibility:
∀~Φ ∀풟,ℰ,풪 ?(∀퓋,퓊 !|F [~ϕ/~Φ]|퓋퓊 −→ ∀퓋,퓊 !|F [~ϕ/~Φ]|퓋퓊);
• Admissibility:
∀~Φ (∀풟,ℰ,풪 ?∀퓋,퓊 !|F [~ϕ/~Φ]|퓋퓊 −→ ∀풟,ℰ,풪 ?∀퓋,퓊 !|F [~ϕ/~Φ]|퓋퓊).
Remark 7.9. The Verificationist interpretation can be straightforwardly generalized using
a “hidden parameter” domain ℰ, so that 풪 consists of predicates on ℰ (similarly to the
modified Platonist interpretation) and 풬 consists of parametric problems with parameter
in ℰ (similarly to the modified BHK interpretation).
Let us note that this modified Verificationist semantics is formalized by the generalized
models of Example 7.7.
7.1.4. Absolute realizability. In 1945, Kleene introduced the notion of realizability for
arithmetical formulas, which is weaker than provability in intuitionistic arithmetic (see
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[103; §82], [161]). A parallel notion of realizability for predicate formulas, called “ab-
stract realizability”, was introduced by Plisko in the 1970s (see [160], [161]). However,
traditionally, realizability for predicate formulas has been more extensively studied in an
indirect way, by substituting arithmetical formulas for predicate variables, which leads
to several inequivalent definitions of realizability for predicate formulas (see [161; §4,
§8] for a comparison of these definitions with each other and [209; §1, Assertion 1 and
subsequent remarks]86 concerning their relationship with abstract realizability).
All notions of realizability for predicate formulas are weaker than provability in intu-
itionistic logic. Thus one can consider them as models of intuitionistic logic. However,
these are not models in the sense of the traditional, Tarski-style model theory.
We will now see that abstract realizability can in fact be regarded as a generalized
model of intuitionistic logic.
Let 풟 = N and 풪 = 2N, the set of all subsets of N. The connectives and quantifiers
are interpreted as follows. For m,n ∈ N let #(x, y) = 2m · 3n. Let R denote the set of
all (partial) recursive functions N ⊃ Dom f f−→ N, and for any f ∈ R let #f ∈ N be the
Go¨del number of f .87 Then for any subsets X, Y ⊂ N and any P : N→ 2N we set:
• X |∨| Y = {#(0, x) | x ∈ X} ∪ {#(1, x) | y ∈ Y };
• X |∧| Y = {#(x, y) | x ∈ X, y ∈ Y };
• X |→| Y = {#f | f ∈ R, X ⊂ Dom f and f(X) ⊂ Y };
• |×| = ∅;
• |∃|(P ) = {#(x, y) | y ∈ P (x)};
• |∀|(P ) = {#f | Dom f = N and f(x) ∈ P (x) for each x ∈ N}.
Let us note that Dom f may be strictly larger than X in the definition of X |→| Y .88
Thus, in fact, |×→×| consists of all partial recursive functions.
It should be noted that this interpretation of the connectives is nothing but a rather
computational reading of the BHK interpretation: the set of solutions of every problem
is identified with a set of natural numbers, and “general method” is interpreted as “al-
gorithm”. This at once guarantees that, in the notation of §3.9, ℱ is neither injective
nor surjective, and 풢 is not surjective.
Then it is natural (cf. the meta-clarified BHK interpretation in §7.3.6 below) to set
풬 = 풪 = 2N, ! = id: 풪 → 풬, and interpret the meta-connectives and the first-order
meta-quantifier similarly to the corresponding connectives and the universal quantifier.
Thus for any subsets X, Y ⊂ N and any P : N→ 2N and Qn : Hom(Nn, 2N)→ 2N we set
• X |&| Y = X |∧| Y ;
• X |⇒| Y = X |→| Y ;
• |q|(P ) = |∀|(P );
• |qn|(Qn) =
⋂
P : Nn→2N Qn(P ).
86Not found in the 2002 conference proceedings paper by the same authors with the same title.
87It is essential here that f need not be total. The set of all total recursive functions is not recursively
enumerable.
88This freedom is essential. Domains of recursive functions coincide with recursively enumerable sets.
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Here the second-order meta-quantifier cannot be interpreted directly similarly to the
first-order one, since the set Hom(Nn, 2N) is uncountable, so we cannot speak of recursive
functions defined on this set (as long as “recursive” is understood in the original sense).
However, a constant function would arguably qualify as “recursive”; so one straightfor-
ward option is to be content with constant functions; this yields the above definition of
|qn|. Finally, it is natural to define ? : 풬 → {‚,‚} by ?(X) = ‚ if and only if X 6= ∅.
Thus for a closed formula Φ, if ~γ is the tuple of all problem variables that occur
in Φ, and r1, . . . , rm are their arities, then we have ?(|·Φ|) = ‚ if and only if there
exists a natural number e such that e ∈ |~γ 7→ Φ|(|~γ|) for all tuples |~γ| of functions
|γi| : Nri → 2N. This is the precisely one of the two equivalent definitions (“absolute
uniform realizability”) of Φ being abstractly realizable in the sense of Plisko [160], [161].
For this reason we will call the meta-structure just described the abstract realizability
meta-structure.
Theorem 7.10. The abstract realizability meta-structure is a generalized model of in-
tuitionistic logic.
Proof. It is well-known that intuitionistically valid formulas are abstractly realizable
(see [160], [161]), so all the laws of the Hilbert-style derivation system of intuitionistic
logic (see §4.6.2) must be valid in this meta-structure. It follows that the meta-laws
of the Enderton-style formulation of the meta-logic (see §4.4.4) that do not involve the
second-order quantifier are also valid in it.
There remain three meta-laws involving the second-order quantifier. Let us check the
validity of ⟮~z⟯ ⟮~β⟯
(
⟮γ⟯ (F ⇒ G) ⇒ (⟮γ⟯F ⇒ ⟮γ⟯G)). Given an individual assignment 퓊
and a predicate valuation 퓋, the set |F ⇒ G|퓊퓋 consists of the Go¨del numbers of all
total recursive functions f such that f(|F|퓊퓋) ⊂ |G|퓊퓋. By definition, |⟮γ⟯H|퓊퓋 is the
intersection of the sets |H|퓊퓋′ over all 퓋′ ∈ V , where V consists of all predicate valuations
that agree with 퓋 on all predicate variables except possibly γ. Thus |⟮γ⟯ (F ⇒ G)|퓊퓋
consists of the Go¨del numbers of all total recursive f such that f(|F|퓊퓋′) ⊂ |G|퓊퓋′ for
every 퓋′ ∈ V . This is clearly a subset of the set |⟮γ⟯F ⇒ ⟮γ⟯G|퓊퓋 of the Go¨del numbers
of all total recursive f such that f(
⋂
퓋′∈V |F|퓊퓋
′
) ⊂ ⋂퓋′∈V |G|퓊퓋′ . Thus |⟮γ⟯ (F ⇒ G) ⇒
(F ⇒ ⟮γ⟯G)|퓊퓋 contains the Go¨del number of the identity function. Consequently so
does |⟮~z⟯ ⟮~β⟯ (⟮γ⟯ (F ⇒ G)⇒ (⟮γ⟯F ⇒ ⟮γ⟯G))|퓊퓋.
The validity of the two remaining meta-laws involving the second-order quantifier,
⟮~z⟯ ⟮~β⟯
(
⟮γ⟯F ⇒ F [γ/Φ]), provided that Φ is free for γ in F ; and ⟮~z⟯ ⟮~β⟯ (F ⇒ ⟮γ⟯F),
provided that γ does not occur freely in F , is checked similarly, also using the Go¨del
number of the identity function.
The validity of the ⇒-elimination meta-rule is easy: if |F|퓊퓋 is nonempty and there
exists a total recursive function f such that f(|F|퓊퓋) ⊂ |G|퓊퓋, then |G|퓊퓋 must be
nonempty as well.
It remains to check the validity of the two object-level rules: the generalization rule
⟮α⟯
(
⟮x⟯ α(x)⇒ ∀xα(x)) and the modus ponens ⟮α⟯ ⟮β⟯ (α& α→ β⇒ β), or equivalently
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(using the exponential meta-law) ⟮α⟯ ⟮β⟯
(
α→ β⇒ (α⇒ β)). But these are trivial, since
|→| = |⇒| and |q| = |∀|. 
7.2. Alternative semantics
7.2.1. Kolmogorov’s semantic consequence. The interpretations considered above are
traditional, “Tarski-style” interpretations, which are based, in particular, on Tarski’s
concept of semantic consequence [193]; and the meta-interpretations considered above
can be called “generalized Tarski-style”.
We will next do something different, and consider alternative, “Kolmogorov-style”
interpretations, which are based, in particular, on Kolmogorov’s concept of semantic
consequence, found in his problem interpretation of intuitionistic logic [108].
Kolmogorov’s problem interpretation explains not only logical, but, in disguise, also
meta-logical connectives and quantifiers by the same means of solutions of problems,
and it is this coincidence of 풪 and 풬 that makes Kolmogorov’s concept of semantic
consequence particularly apposite to his context. One might argue that the meta-logical
constants should rather be interpreted by means of meta-solutions of meta-problems,
so that the issue of coincidence of 풪 with 풬 does not arise. But what are the meta-
problems, and where does one find them? In fact, Kolmogorov’s notion of semantic
consequence yields a nice description of meta-problems in terms of problems (see §7.3.6)
— and one can hardly dream of anything simpler. It also applies to yield a description
of meta-propositions in terms of propositions (see §7.2.5).
Namely, Kolmogorov offered the following interpretation of the rules used by Heyting
in his original axiomatization of intuitionistic logic: p ∧ q /p, the modus ponens rule
p,p→ q /q and the (non-structural) substitution rule — or rather of the assumption
that these are inference rules of the logic:89
“[W]e assume that we are always able (i.e. we possess a general method) to solve, for any
given elementary problem functions [=formulas of zero-order intuitionistic logic regarded
as functions of their problem variables] p, q, r, s, . . . , the following problems:
I. If · (p ∧ q) is solved, to solve ·p;
II. If ·p and · (p→ q) are solved, to solve ·q;
III. If ·p(a, b, c, . . . ) is solved, to solve ·p(q, r, s, . . . ).”
Remark 7.11. It should be noted that Kolmogorov’s “If ... is solved, to solve ...” is
apparently meant to be the same as his interpretation of object-level implication: “a→ b
is the problem ‘assuming that a solution to a is given, solve b’, or, which means the same,
‘reduce the solution of b to the solution of a’.”
But in our presentation of the BHK interpretation in §3.7, we follow Heyting’s more
nuanced reading of a→ b as the problem “find a general method to transform the given
89Kolmogorov’s formulas are given here in a modern notation (replacing ⊃ with → and Peano’s dots
with the usual parentheses); also, Kolmogorov’s symbol “⊢” is replaced with “· ” since his interpretation
of ⊢ is precisely the same as our interpretation of · (and different from our interpretation of ⊢).
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solution of a into a solution of b”. Hence it is natural to apply this more nuanced reading
here as well.
It is not hard to see that the same approach applies to an arbitrary rule just as well,
including those in first-order logic. So here is the natural Kolmogorov-style interpretation
of a rule
Γ1, . . . ,Γk
Γ0
over intuitionistic logic.
(1) Suppose that all variables that occur freely in the formulas Γi form a p-tuple ~t
of individual variables and an s-tuple ~ϕ of problem variables of arities q1, . . . , qs.
Then the rule Γ1, . . . ,Γk /Γ0 is interpreted as the problem of finding a general
method of solving a certain problem∣∣∣·Γ1[~t/~T , ~ϕ/~Φ] & · · ·& ·Γk[~t/~T , ~ϕ/~Φ] ⇒ ·Γ0[~t/~T , ~ϕ/~Φ]∣∣∣
for any given p-tuple ~T of terms and any given s-tuple ~Φ of qi-formulas.
(2) A solution of the problem |·∆1 & · · ·& ·∆k ⇒ ·∆0| is in turn a general method
of transforming any given solutions of |·∆1|, . . . , |·∆k| into a solution of |·∆0|.
(3) Suppose that all variables that occur freely in the formulas ∆i = Γi[~t/~T , ~ϕ/~Φ]
form an n-tuple ~x of individual variables and an m-tuple ~θ of problem variables
of arities r1, . . . , rm. Then a solution of each |·∆i| is a general method of solving
the contentful problem |~x, ~θ 7→ ∆i|( ~X, ~Θ) for any n-tuple ~X of elements of the
domain and any m-tuple ~Θ of contentful problems of arities r1, . . . , rm.
(4) What is a solution of each contentful problem |~x, ~θ 7→ ∆i|( ~X, ~Θ) is determined
by the usual BHK interpretation (see §3.7).
An obvious issue with this interpretation of rules is that step (1) applies what in
essence is constructive quantification (“to find a general method”) to syntactic entities
(“for any given formulas and terms”), thereby creating a dangerous mix of syntax and
semantics. (Perhaps this was not such an obvious issue back in 1932, when Kolmogorov
published his interpretation of rules [108] but, for instance, Tarski’s paper [193] on
semantic consequence had not appeared yet.)
But it turns out that this mix of syntax and semantics can be disentangled. What
is important in Kolmogorov’s interpretation of rules is that the formulas ~Φ and terms
~T being quantified over are treated as functions of the problem variables ~θ and the
individual variables ~x. But such a functional dependence can well be understood on the
semantic level.
7.2.2. Alternative semantics. Given a Tarski-style meta-interpretation 풿 of a language
ℒ as in §4.3.4, we want to define an alternative meta-interpretation of ℒ. We re-
call that 풿 consists of the following data: an ℒ-structure 풾, the set 풬, the maps
! : 풪 → 풬 and ? : 풬 → {‚,‚}, elements |& |, |⇒ | of Hom(풬 × 풬,풬), an element
|q| of Hom(Hom(풟,풬),풬) and an element |qn| of Hom(Hom(Hom(풟n,풪),풬),풬) for
each n ∈ N.
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The first step, which is also the crucial one, is to interpret ! : 1→ µ. Its Tarski-style
interpretation was simply by ! : 풪 → 풬, which made it possible to routinely omit !
altogether. The alternative interpretation of ! will be more sophisticated.
Given a λ-closed (n,~r)-meta-formula of the “atomic” form G = ~γ 7→ (~x 7→ !F ), where
~r = (r1, . . . , rm), it can be interpreted by a function ||G|| : ℱr1×. . .×ℱrm → Hom(풯n,풬),
where 풯 = 풯(ℒ) is the set of terms and ℱi = ℱi(ℒ) is the set of i-formulas of the
language ℒ. Namely, given an n-tuple ~T ∈ 풯n and an m-tuple ~Φ ∈ ℱr1 × . . . ×ℱrm,
we can find a formula F ′, α-equivalent to F and such that ~T is free for ~x in F and ~Φ
is free for ~γ in F . Let F~Φ, ~T = F
′[~γ/~Φ, ~x/~T ]. The principle ·F~Φ, ~T is Tarski-interpreted
by a specific element |·F~Φ, ~T | ∈ 풬, and we set ||G||(~F )(~T ) to be this element. Clearly,
the α-equivalence class of ·F~Φ, ~T does not depend on the choice of F
′, and hence ||G|| is
well-defined.
However, the set of terms 풯 and the sets of i-formulas ℱi are not really semantic
notions, so it is not desirable to use them in our “alternative semantics”. To this end we
will replace them with their semantic analogues.
(Incidentally, let us also note that the above definition of ||G|| does not seem to
generalize in a reasonable way to the case where G is not λ-closed, because same variables
could have free occurrences in the original formula and also new occurrences introduced
upon the substitution.)
Let ω denote, as usual, the totally ordered set {0, 1, . . . }. A semantic term of degree
k ∈ ω is a function T : 풟k → 풟, and a semantic n-formula of degree (k, l) ∈ ω × ω is a
function Φ: 풟k×풪[l] → Hom(풟n,풪), where 풪[l] denotes the product∏l−1i=0Hom(풟i,풪)l
of l× l factors. (We allow for the possibility that k 6= l only as a matter of convenience;
it is not strictly necessary.) A semantic term is an element [k, T ] of the disjoint union
|풯| := ⊔k∈ω Hom(풟k,풟), and a semantic n-formula is an element [k, l,Φ] of the disjoint
union |ℱn| :=
⊔
k,l∈ω Hom(풟
k × 풪[l],Hom(풟n,풪)). A semantic 0-formula is also called
a semantic formula.90
Given a λ-closed (n,~r)-meta-formula of the “atomic” form G = ~γ 7→ (~x 7→ !F ),
where ~r = (r1, . . . , rm), its alternative interpretation will be a map G : |ℱ~r| →
Hom(|풯|n,풬), defined as follows. Let us start from the usual Tarski-style interpre-
tation |G| : ∏mi=1Hom(풟ri ,풪) → Hom(풟n,풬). Given an n-tuple ~T of semantic terms
Ti : 풟
ki → 풟, we can combine them into a map T : 풟k → 풟n, where k = max(k1, . . . , kn).
Given anm-tuple ~Φ of semantic ri-formulas Φk : 풟
k′i×풪[li] → Hom(풟ri ,풪), we can com-
bine them into a map Φ: 풟k
′ × 풪[l] → ∏mi=1Hom(풟ri ,풪), where k′ = max(k′1, . . . , k′m)
and l = max(l1, . . . , lm). Finally, |G|, T and Φ combine into a map풟k′′×풪[l] → 풬, where
k′′ = max(k, k′), which we will denote, somewhat loosely, by |G| ◦ (~T × ~Φ). We can apply
to this map the Tarski-interpreted k′-fold first-order and l × l-fold second-order meta-
quantifier |q[l]k′′| : Hom
(
풟k
′′×풪[l],풬)→ 풬 and obtain an element |q[l]k′′|(|G|◦(~T×~Φ)) ∈ 풬.
90Although “semantic terms” and “semantic formulas” are technically oxymorons, this nevertheless seems
to be a reasonable terminology.
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Thus we have described a map G : |ℱ~r| → Hom(|풯|n,풬). Let us note that the Tarski-
interpreted meta-quantifiers |q| and |qn| are used here to interpret ! rather than any
meta-quantifiers.
Next, we keep the Tarski-style interpretations & := |&| and ⇒ := |⇒| for the meta-
connectives, whereas the first-order meta-quantifier q is re-interpreted by a function
q : Hom(|풯|,풬) → 풬; and the n-ary second-order meta-quantifier qn by a function
qn : Hom(|ℱn|,풬)→ 풬.
The above will be called the alternative meta-interpretation associated to the given
Tarski-style meta-interpretation 풿. In the case of a Tarski-style interpretation 풿 =
풾+, we can define an alternative interpretation by providing explicit definitions of the
functions q and qn . Namely, we set q (f) =
‚
if and only f(T ) =
‚
for all T ∈ |풯|
and qn (f) =
‚
if and only f(Φ) =
‚
for all Φ ∈ |ℱn|.
Given an alternative meta-interpretation, we can interpret any λ-closed (n,~r)-meta-
formula G by a function G : |ℱ~r| → Hom(|풯|n,풬) by a straightforward induction. In
particular, any λ-closed meta-formula F is interpreted by an element F ∈ 풬. We may
also write F 풿 to emphasize the given meta-interpetation 풿, or F 풾 in the case of an
interpretation 풿 = 풾+.
We will see below that the alternative interpretation turns out to be the same as
the original Tarski-style interpretation for principles (§7.2.3), but generally different for
rules (§7.2.4). In order to generalize this to many-valued meta-interpretations, we will
need to reformulate alternative interpretations in a different language (§7.3).
7.2.3. Principles and rules. A pre-assignment 풰 assigns a semantic term 풰(x) ∈ |풯|
to each individual variable x. Clearly, a pre-assignment 풰 along with an interpretation
풾 of function symbols yield an interpretation of each term T by a semantic term T 풾풰,
also denoted T 풰. Let us note that a usual variable assignment 퓊 is a special case of
a pre-assignment 풰 that assigns to each individual variable x a semantic term 풰(x) of
the form [0, T ], T : 풟0 → 풟, i.e. an element of 풟.
A pre-valuation 풱 assigns a semantic n-formula 풱(γ) ∈ |ℱn| to each n-ary predicate
variable γ, for each n = 0, 1, . . . . Let us note that a usual predicate valuation is a special
case of a pre-valuation 풱 that assigns to each n-ary predicate variable γ a semantic n-
formula 풱(γ) of the form [0, 0,Φ], Φ: 풟0 × 풪(0) → Hom(풟n,풪), i.e. an element of
Hom(풟n,풪).
Clearly, a pre-valuation 풱 along with an interpretation 풾 of function symbols, pred-
icate constants, connectives and quantifiers yield an interpretation of each closed n-
formula G by a semantic n-formula G 풱풾 , also denoted G
풱. Given additionally a pre-
assignment 풰, then also each formula F is interpreted by a semantic formula F 풱풰 .
Namely, if ~x = (x1, . . . , xn) is the tuple of all free individual variables of F , then
F 풱풰 = [max(k, k
′), l,Φ ◦ T ], Φ ◦ T : 풟max(k,k′) ×풪[l] → 풪, is obtained by pre-composing
the semantic n-formula |~x 7→ F |풱 = [k′, l,Φ], Φ: 풟k × 풪[l] → Hom(풟n,풪) with the
function T : 풟k → 풟n, k = max(k1, . . . , kn), obtained by combining the semantic terms
풰(xi) = [ki, Ti], Ti : 풟
ki → 풟.
MATHEMATICAL SEMANTICS OF INTUITIONISTIC LOGIC 155
Given an assignment 퓊 and a pre-assignment 풰, we can define a new assignment 풰[퓊]
by 풰[퓊](x) = f
(
퓊(x01), . . . ,퓊(x
0
k)
)
, where 풰(x) = [k, f ], f : 풟k → 풟. Then for each
term T we have |T |풰[퓊] = f(|x01|퓊, . . . , |x0k|퓊), where T 풰 = [k, f ], f : 풟k → 풟.
Given an assignment 퓊, a valuation 퓋 and a pre-valuation 풱, we define a new valu-
ation 풱[퓊,퓋] by 풱[퓊,퓋](γ) = f
(
퓊(x01), . . . ,퓊(x
0
k);
(
퓋(x0
i
→1
1 ), . . . ,퓋(x
0i→1
l )
)l−1
i=0
)
, where
풱(γ) = [k, l, f ], f : 풟k×풪[l] → Hom(풟n,풪). Then for each closed n-formula G we have
|G|풱[퓊,퓋] = f
(
퓊(x01), . . . ,퓊(x
0
k);
(
퓋(x0
i
→1
1 ), . . . ,퓋(x
0i→1
l )
)l−1
i=0
)
, where G 풱 = (k, l, f),
f : 풟k × 풪[l] → Hom(풟n,풪).
Consequently, given an assignment 퓊, a valuation 퓋, a pre-assignment 풰 and a pre-
valuation 풱, for each formula F we again have
|F |풱[퓊,퓋]
풰[퓊] = f
(
퓊(x01), . . . ,퓊(x
0
k);
(
퓋(x0
i
→1
1 ), . . . ,퓋(x
0i→1
l )
)l−1
i=0
)
,
where F 풱풰 = (k, l, f), f : 풟
k × 풪[l] → 풪.
Example 7.12. Let us discuss the alternative interpretation (i.e. the alternative two-
valued meta-interpretation) of a principle, ·F .
Since 풬 = {‚,‚} and ? : 풬 → {‚,‚} is the identity map, we may identify elements
of 풬 with judgements about pre-valuations and pre-assignments.
From the definition, we have
·F = ∀풱,풰 ∀퓋,퓊 ! |F |풱[퓊,퓋]
풰[퓊] .
This is clearly equivalent to the Tarski-style interpretation
|·F | = ∀퓋,퓊 ! |F |퓋퓊.
Example 7.13. Let us now discuss the alternative interpretation (i.e. the alternative
two-valued meta-interpretation) of a rule, F/G.
From the definition, we have
F /G = ∀풱 (∀풰 ∀퓋,퓊 ! |F |풱[퓊,퓋]
풰[퓊] −→ ∀풰 ∀퓋,퓊 ! |G|풱[퓊,퓋]풰[퓊] ).
This clearly simplifies as
F /G = ∀풱 (∀퓋,퓊 ! |F |풱[퓊,퓋]퓊 −→ ∀퓋,퓊 ! |G|풱[퓊,퓋]퓊 ).
The latter clearly follows from
|F /G| = ∀풱 ∀퓋 (∀퓊 ! |F |풱[퓊,퓋]퓊 −→ ∀퓊 ! |G|풱[퓊,퓋]퓊 ),
which is clearly equivalent to the Tarski-style interpretation
|F /G| = ∀퓋 (∀퓊 ! |F |퓋퓊 −→ ∀퓊 ! |G|퓋퓊).
However, we will see in Example 7.16 below that there is no reverse implication, at least,
in a minor modification of the setup.
7.2.4. Two-valued alternative models. Example 7.13 (see also Example 7.17 below) sug-
gests that at least with two-valued interpretation of the meta-logic, the alternative in-
terpretation of the derivability of a rule is very similar to the interpretation of its stable
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admissibility (either Tarski-style or alternative, these are the same by Example 7.12).
Let us show that despite this similarity, they do not coincide.
Example 7.14. The rule ∃xp(x) ∧ ∃x¬p(x) /⊥ is stably admissible for classical logic
(see Example 4.71). However, this rule is not alternatively-valid already in the two-
valued model of classical logic (two-valued both on the meta-level and the object-level,
i.e. 풪 = 풬 = {‚,‚}). This is established in essence similarly to Example 4.72.
In more detail, we need to interpret p by a semantic 1-formula 풱(p) = [l,Φ] ∈ |ℱ1|,
Φ: 풟k×풪[l] → Hom(풟,풪). Let us choose k = 1, l = 0 and Φ: 풟 → Hom(풟,풪) defined
by Φ(y, γ)(x) =
‚
if and only if x = y. Then the semantic formula ∃xp(x)∧∃x¬p(x) 풱
is [1, 0,Ψ] ∈ |ℱ0|, where Ψ: 풟 → 풪 is the Tarski-style interpretation of the λ-closed
1-formula y 7→ ∃x x = y ∧ ∃x ¬x = y of the language extended by the binary predicate
constant = with the obvious interpretation.
Therefore the alternative interpretation of the λ-closed (0, (1))-meta-formula p 7→
!
(∃xp(x) ∧ ∃x¬p(x)) ⇒ ⊥ is by a function f : |ℱ1| → 풬 whose value on 풱(p) is the
Tarski-style interpretation of the λ-closed meta-formula (⟮y⟯∃x x = y∧ ∃x ¬x = y)⇒ ⊥
of the extended language. As long as 풟 contains at least two elements, this value
f
(
풱(p)
) ∈ 풬 is ‚. (see Example 4.72). Hence the alternative interpretation of the rule
in question, i.e. the λ-closed meta-formula ⟮p⟯
(
!
(∃xp(x) ∧ ∃x¬p(x))⇒ ⊥), is also ‚.
Let us call a semantic n-formula (k, l,Φ) ∈ |ℱk|, Φ: 풟k ×풪[l] → Hom(풟n,풪), pure if
it uses the given n+k elements of 풟 only by feeding them into the given elements of the
factors Hom(풟i,풪) of 풪[l]; or more formally if there exists a semantic formula (0, l,Φ′) ∈
|ℱ0| such that Φ(~x,~γ)(~y) = Φ′(~γ′), where ~γ = (γ01, . . . , γ0l; . . . ; γl−1,1, . . . , γl−1,l), ~γ′ =
(γ01◦ϕ01, . . . , γ0l◦ϕ0l; . . . ; γl−1,1◦ϕl−1,1, . . . , γl−1,l◦ϕl−1,l) and each ϕij : 풟i → 풟i replaces
some of the given elements of 풟 with some entries of the tuples ~x and ~y.
Let |ℱk|p denote the subset of |ℱk| consisting of pure semantic k-formulas. If the
language contains no function symbols and predicate constants, then we define a pure
alternative interpretation and a pure pre-valuation by repeating the definitions of an
alternative interpretation and a pre-valuation with |ℱk|p in place of |ℱk|.
Remark 7.15. One can define “pre-valuation fields” similarly to valuation fields (either
of the two definitions in §4.7.4), and check that the family |ℱk|p forms a pre-valuation
field.
Example 7.16. The rule ∃xp(x)∧∃x¬p(x) /⊥ is not derivable in classical logic, and is
not valid in the Tarski-style two-valued model of classical logic with any non-singleton
domain. However, this rule is purely alternatively valid in the two-valued model of
classical logic with every domain. This is established in essence similarly to Example
4.71.
In more detail, suppose that p is interpreted by a pure semantic 1-formula 풱(p) =
(k, l,Φ) ∈ |ℱ1|p, Φ: 풟k × 풪[l] → Hom(풟,풪). Let fi : 풟i → 풪 send every input to ‚,
and let ~f = (f0, . . . , f0; . . . ; fl−1, . . . , fl−1) ∈ 풪[l]. Since 풱(p) is pure, Φ(~y, ~f)(x) does
not depend on ~y and x. Then the semantic formula ∃xp(x) ∧ ∃x¬p(x) 풱 is the same
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as p(x)∧¬p(x) 풱퓊 for any individual assignment 퓊. But the latter is ‚. It follows that
the rule in question is purely alternatively valid.
7.2.5. Platonist interpretation II (alternative). We now present a new contentual inter-
pretation of the meta-logic of classical logic based on the alternative semantics of §7.2.2
(two-valued, both on the meta-level and the object-level).
Like in the Platonist interpretation of §4.8.3, a domain풟 is fixed, and 풪 is taken to be
a class of propositions, consisting of a prescribed class of contentful (e.g. mathematical)
primitive propositions and of composite propositions, which are obtained inductively
from the primitive ones by using contentual classical connectives and quantifiers over ar-
bitrary 풟-indexed families of propositions. Formal classical connectives and quantifiers
are interpreted straightforwardly by the contentual ones.
풬 is taken to be a larger class of propositions, consisting of those in 풪, called “meta-
primitive” (thus the function ! : 풪 → 풬 is the inclusion) and of “meta-composite” propo-
sitions, obtained inductively from the meta-primitive ones by using contentual clas-
sical connectives and quantifiers over arbitrary 풟-indexed, Hom(풟i,풪)-indexed (i =
0, 1, . . . ), |풯|-indexed and |ℱi|-indexed (i = 0, 1, 2, . . . ) families of propositions. (We
recall that |풯| and |ℱi| are defined in terms of 풟 and 풪, see §7.2.2.) Meta-connectives
and meta-quantifiers are Tarski-interpreted by contentual classical connectives and 풟-
indexed and Hom(풟i,풪)-indexed quantifiers in the straightforward way; and meta-
quantifiers are also alternatively-interpreted by contentual classical |풯|-indexed and
|ℱi|-indexed quantifiers.
The function ? : 풬 → {‚,‚} sends a proposition P to ‚ if and only if P is true,
where “true” is defined explicitly for primitive P ∈ 풪 and is extended inductively to
composite P ∈ 풪 and then further to all meta-composite P ∈ 풬 by the usual truth
tables. This determines a contentual interpretation of classical logic and its meta-logic,
which we will call the alternative Platonist interpretation.
Example 7.17. Let us record the alternative Platonist interpretations of the judgements
of admissibility, stable admissibility and derivability of a purely logical rule F /G. Let
~ϕ be the tuple of all predicate variables that occur freely in F or in G, and let ~r be the
tuple of their arities. Below ~Φ is understood to run over ℱ~r.
• Derivability: ∀풟,풪 ∀풱 (∀퓋,퓊 |F |풱[퓊,퓋]퓊 −→ ∀퓋,퓊 |G|풱[퓊,퓋]퓊 );
• Stable admissibility: ∀~Φ∀풟,풪 (∀퓋,퓊 |F [~ϕ/~Φ]|퓋퓊 −→ ∀퓋,퓊 |F [~ϕ/~Φ]|퓋퓊);
• Admissibility: ∀~Φ (∀풟,풪 ∀퓋,퓊 |F [~ϕ/~Φ]|퓋퓊 −→ ∀풟,풪 ∀퓋,퓊 |F [~ϕ/~Φ]|퓋퓊).
7.3. Generalized alternative semantics
Our next goal is to better understand alternative meta-interpretations, so as to be able
to define alternative meta-models. In particular, we have seen above that principles are
interpreted in the same way in Tarski-style and in alternative two-valued semantics. But
so far we have no way to see that this is also so in the many-valued case.
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To this end we will first look at an extension of the meta-logic, which besides the
original copy of the meta-logic will contain another, “unintended” embedding. The point
is that the straightforward, generalized-Tarski-style interpretation of the extended meta-
logic will restrict to the Kolmogorov-style interpretation on the re-embedded meta-logic
(and, unsurprisingly, to the Tarski-style interpretation on the original copy).
This extension of the meta-logic goes somewhat beyond being another special case
of Paulson’s formalism in Isabelle’s metalogic: it employs λ-calculus with N-indexed
sums (i.e., countably infinite disjoint unions), and also assumes a generalized form of
⇒-elimination.
7.3.1. Extended λ-calculus. We define an extension of the λ-calculus described in §4.2
which involves infinite sums and certain variable lists.
Let ω = {0, 1, . . . } and for any n ∈ ω let [n] = {1, . . . , n}; thus [0] = ∅. The extended
λ-calculus has the following type forming rules:
(1) base types are types;
(2) if Γ and ∆ are types, then so is Γ → ∆;
(3) if n ∈ ω and Γi is a type for each i ∈ [n], then so is
∏
i∈[n] Γi;
(4) if Γi is a type for each i ∈ ω, then so is
∑
i∈ω Γi.
We write Γn =
∏
i∈[n] Γ. We often shorten
∏
i∈[n] Γi to
∏n
i=1 Γi and
∑
i∈NΓi to
∑∞
i=1 Γi.
While n-ary products as such could be defined in terms of binary products (see §4.2.4),
we will need them already to properly describe the expression forming rules (cf. Remark
7.18 below.)
Constants and variables are denoted as before (see §4.2.1). Expression forming rules
are as follows, where n ∈ ω:
(1) a constant of type Γ is an expression of type Γ;
(2) a variable of type Γ is an expression of type Γ;
(3) (abstraction) if T : ∆ on the assumption that x is a variable of type Γ, then
x 7→ T : Γ → ∆;
(4) (application) if F : ∆ → Γ, and T : ∆, then F (T ) : Γ;
(5) (projections) if k ∈ [n], then pk :
∏
i∈[n] Γi → Γk;
(6) (function tuples) if Fi : ∆ → Γi on the assumption that i ∈ [n], then (Fi)i∈[n] :
∆ →
∏
i∈[n] Γi;
91
(7) (inclusions) if k ∈ ω, then ik : Γk →
∑
i∈ω Γi;
(8) (definition by cases) if Fi : Γi → ∆ on the assumption that i ∈ ω, then (Fi)i∈ω :∑
i∈ω Γi → ∆;
92
(9) (pre-tuple) there is a constant ~∅ :
∏
∅
.
Using the pre-tuple and function tuples, we can define usual tuples (at least, up to
α-equivalence): given a Ti : Γi for each i ∈ [n], let (Ti)i∈[n] :
∏
i∈[n] Γi denote (x 7→
Ti)i∈[n](~∅), where x is a variable of type
∏
∅
that does not occur freely in any of the Ti.
91We use these “function tuples” instead of the traditional n-tuples in order to emphasize symmetry
between product and sum.
92This is yet another divergence from traditional notation of λ-calculus.
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Thus the empty tuple () :
∏
∅
is the image of the pre-tuple ~∅ :
∏
∅
under the empty
function tuple () :
∏
∅
→
∏
∅
. (The latter has the meaning of a constant map, but
secretly is also the identity map.)
Remark 7.18. We treat the index i of the variable xΓi as a variable, rather than a meta-
variable. This means that we may say, for example, that “xΓi : Γ on the assumption that
i ∈ ω”. It follows that (xΓi )i∈[n], which can also be written as (xΓ1 , . . . , xΓn), is a valid ex-
pression of type Γn on the assumption that n ∈ ω. Consequently,(fi 7→ fi(xΓ1 , . . . , xΓn))i∈ω
is a valid expression of type
∑
i∈ω(Γ
i
→ Γ)→ Γ. Also,
(
(xΓ11 , . . . , x
Γ1
n ), . . . , (x
Γn
1 , . . . , x
Γn
n )
)
is a valid expression of type
∏n
i=1 Γ
n
i on the assumption that n ∈ ω.
Example 7.19.
(
f 7→ (pi ◦ f)
)
i∈[n] :
(
∆ →
∏
i∈[n] Γi
)
→
∏
i∈[n](∆ → Γi) is a λ-closed
expression.
Example 7.20. t 7→ (pi(t))i∈[n] :
∏
i∈[n](∆ → Γi) →
(
∆ →
∏
i∈[n] Γi
)
is a λ-closed
expression.
The previous two examples show that function tuples amount to a special case of usual
tuples (even though usual tuples were defined via a special case of function tuples).
Although we do not really need n-ary sums, they can be defined just like the infinite
sums above, and have the following relations with n-ary products:
Example 7.21. t 7→ (pi(t))i∈[n] : ∏i∈[n](Γi → ∆) → (∑i∈[n] Γi → ∆) is a λ-closed
expression.
Example 7.22. f 7→ (f ◦ ii)i∈[n] :
(∑
i∈[n] Γi → ∆
)
→
∏
i∈[n](Γi → ∆) is a λ-closed
expression.
The previous two examples show that (·)i∈[n] is in essence a special case of (·)i∈[n].
(But technically they live in different types. Also, their comparison uses both rules, so
none of the two rules has been deduced from the other one.)
Example 7.23.
(
fi 7→
(
t 7→ fi ◦ pi(t)
))i∈[n]
:
∑
i∈[n](Γi → ∆) →
(∏
i∈[n] Γi → ∆
)
is a
λ-closed expression.
Example 7.24. fi 7→ (ii ◦ fi)i∈[n] :
∑
i∈[n](∆ → Γi) →
(
∆ →
∑
i∈[n] Γi
)
is a λ-closed
expression. The same goes for the infinite sums.
The definition of free occurrence is extended as follows:
(1) x occurs freely in (Fi)i∈[n] if it occurs freely in Fi for some i ∈ [n];
(2) x occurs freely in (Fi)
i∈ω if it occurs freely in Fi for some i ∈ ω.
The definition of substitution is extended as follows:
(1) (Fi)i∈[n]|x:=T = (Fi|x:=T )i∈[n];
(2) (Fi)
i∈ω|x:=T = (Fi|x:=T )i∈ω.
We also define terminal types and their units following [36]:
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(1) If each Θi is a terminal type with unit Ui, then
∏
i∈[n]Θi is a terminal type with
unit (Ui)i∈[n]. In particular,
∏
∅
is a terminal type with unit ().
(2) If Γ is a type and Θ is a terminal type with unit U , then Γ → Θ is a terminal
type with unit x 7→ U .
The definition of β-reduction is extended as follows:
(1) if n ∈ [m], every expression of the form pn
(
(Fi)i∈[m](T )
)
β-reduces to Fn(T );
(2) if n ∈ ω, every expression of the form (Fi)i∈ω
(
in(T )
)
β-reduces to Fn(T ).
(3) if Θ is a terminal type with unit U , every T : Θ β-reduces to U .
Example 7.25. Let us see how to recover the β-reduction for usual tuples: pn
(
(Ti)i∈[m]
)
β-reduces to Tn. Indeed, pn
(
(x 7→ Ti)i∈[m](~∅)
)
, where x does not occur freely in any of
the Ti, β-reduces to (x 7→ Tn)(~∅), which in turn β-reduces to Tn.
Example 7.26. If Θ is a terminal type with unit U , we have ϕ : Γ → (Θ → Γ),
ϕ = t 7→ (x 7→ t), and ψ : (Θ → Γ) → Γ, ψ = f 7→ f(U). Now ψ(ϕ(t)) β-reduces to
(x 7→ t)(U), which in turn β-reduces to t. Conversely, ϕ(ψ(f)) β-reduces to x 7→ f(U).
This does not β-reduce to f , but we will now see that it βη-reduces to f .
The definition of η-reduction is extended as follows for n > 0:
(1) every expression of the form
(
x 7→ pi
(
F (x)
))
i∈[n]
η-reduces to F ;
(2) every expression of the form
(
xi 7→ F
(
ii(xi)
))i∈ω
η-reduces to F ;
(3) ifΘ is a terminal type with unit U , for every F : Θ→ Γ, the expression x 7→ F (U)
η-reduces to F ;
(4) if Θ is a terminal type with unit U , for every F : Γ → Θ × ∆, the expression(
x 7→ U, x 7→ p1
(
F (x)
))
η-reduces to F ;
(5) if Θ is a terminal type with unit U , for every F : Θ ⊔ Γ → ∆, the expression(
x1 7→ F
(
i1(U)
)
, x2 7→ F
(
i1(x2)
))
η-reduces to F .
Example 7.27. Let us see how to recover the η-reduction for usual tuples:
(
pi(T )
)
i∈[n]
is βη-equivalent to T . Indeed,
(
x 7→ pi(T )
)
i∈[n](~∅), where x does not occur freely in
T , β-expands to
(
x 7→ pi
(
(x 7→ T )(x)))
i∈[n]
(~∅) which η-reduces to (x 7→ T )(~∅), which
β-reduces to T .
Remark 7.28. Let us note some immediate consequences of the β- and η-rules:
• pn ◦ (Fi)i∈[m] βη-reduces to Fn, as long as n ∈ [m];
• (pi ◦ F )i∈[m] η-reduces to F ;
• (Fi)i∈ω ◦ in βη-reduces to Fn, as long as n ∈ ω;
• (F ◦ ii)i∈ω η-reduces to F .
Here are some further consequences:
Lemma 7.29. (a) (Fi)i∈[n] ◦G is βη-equivalent to (Fi ◦G)i∈[n];
(b) G ◦ (Fi)i∈ω is βη-equivalent to (G ◦ Fi)i∈ω.
MATHEMATICAL SEMANTICS OF INTUITIONISTIC LOGIC 161
Proof. By the previous remark, (Fi ◦G)i∈[n] βη-expands to
(
pi ◦ (Fj)j∈[n] ◦G
)
i∈[n], which
in turn η-reduces to (Fj)j∈[n] ◦G.
Similarly, (G ◦ Fi)i∈ω βη-expands to
(
G ◦ (Fj)j∈ω ◦ ii
)i∈ω
, which in turn η-reduces to
G ◦ (Fj)j∈ω. 
Remark 7.30. Let Γ =
∑
i∈ω Γi and ∆ =
∑
i∈ω∆i. Suppose that Fij : Γi ×∆j → Θ for
each i, j ∈ I. We will define (Fij)(i,j)∈ω×ω : Γ×∆ → Θ.
We will use F and G defined in Example 4.11. We have F(Fij) : Γi → (∆j → Θ). Then(
F(Fij)
)i∈ω
: Γ→ (∆j → Θ). Let H = F ◦T ◦G, where T : (Γ×∆ → Θ)→ (∆×Γ → Θ)
is defined by f 7→ (q 7→ f(p2q,p1q)). Then H(F(Fij))i∈ω : ∆j → (Γ → Θ). Hence(
H
(
F(Fij)
)i∈ω)j∈ω
: ∆ → (Γ → Θ). Finally, let
(Fij)
(i,j)∈ω×ω = G
(
H
(
F(Fij)
)i∈ω)j∈ω
: Γ×∆ → Θ.
More generally, given Fk1,...,kn : Γ1,k1 × . . .× Γn,kn → Θ for each k1, . . . , kn ∈ I, one can
similarly define
(Fk1,...,kn)
(k1,...,kn)∈ωn :
∑
i∈ω
Γ1,i × . . .×
∑
i∈ω
Γn,i → Θ.
7.3.2. Extended meta-logic. We use the notation introduced in §7.2.2. Given a k ∈ ω
(i.e., a nonnegative integer), we denote by 1[k] the product
∏k−1
i=0 (0
i
→ 1)k of k × k
factors. We will also write xτ[k] = (x
τ
1, . . . , x
τ
k) : τ
k and x1[[k]] = (x
00→1
[k] , . . . , x
0k−1→1
[k] )) : 1
[k]
(see Remark 7.18).
It is easy to see that every term T of the language can be obtained as a β-reduction of
Tk(x
0
[k]) for some λ-closed expression Tk : 0
k
→ 0, where k is the maximal number such
that x0k occurs in T . Similarly, every n-formula F of the language can be obtained as a
β-reduction of Fk(x
0
[k], x
1
[[k]]) for some λ-closed Fk : 0
k × 1[k] → (0n → 1), where k is the
maximal number such that either x0k or x
0l−1→1
k or x
0k−1→1
l occurs in F for some l.
Let 0∗ =
∑
k∈ω(0
k
→ 0) and 1∗n =
∑
k∈ω
(
0k × 1[k] → (0n → 1)). Let us define
term evaluation E : 0∗ → 0 by E = (Ek)k∈ω, where Ek : (0k → 0) → 0 is defined
by tk 7→ tk(x0[k]). (See Remark 7.18.) Then every term T of the language can also be
obtained as a β-reduction of E(T ∗) for some λ-closed T ∗ : 0∗. Indeed, let T ∗ = ik(Tk),
where Tk is as above; then E
(
ik(Tk)
)
β-reduces to Ek(Tk), which in turn β-reduces to
Tk(x
0
[k]).
Similarly, we have n-formula evaluation En : 1∗n → (0
n
→ 1), En = (Enk)
k∈ω, where
Enk :
(
0k × 1[k] → (0n → 1)) → (0n → 1) is defined by ϕk 7→ ϕk(x0[k], x1[[k]]). Every
n-formula F of the language can also be obtained as a β-reduction of En(F ∗) for some
λ-closed F ∗ : 1∗n. Namely, F
∗ = ik(Fk), where Fk is as above. Then En
(
ik(Fk)
)
β-reduces
to Enk(Fk), which in turn β-reduces to Fk(x
0
[k], x
1
[[k]).
The variables of type 0∗ will be called term variables, and the variables of type 1∗n
will be called n-formula variables (or formula variables when n = 0). Corresponding to
these two sorts of variables, there are two new types of meta-quantifiers:
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• the term meta-quantifier q∗ : (0∗ → µ)→ µ;
• the k-formula meta-quantifier q∗n : (1∗n → µ) → µ.
In line with previous notation, we write ⟮t⟯F to mean q∗(t 7→ F) where t is a term
variable of an n-formula variable and F is a λ-expression of type µ. We also write ⟮~t⟯F
to mean ⟮t1⟯ . . . ⟮tn⟯F , where ~t = (t1, . . . , tn) is a tuple of term variables and ⟮~ϕ⟯F to
mean ⟮ϕ1⟯ . . . ⟮ϕm⟯F , where ~ϕ = (ϕ1, . . . , ϕm) is a tuple of ri-formula variables.
We define a term scheme (resp. a term pre-scheme) as an expression of type 0 (resp.
0∗) defined using function application, projections, inclusions, tuples and definition by
cases; function symbols of the language; individual and term variables and abstraction
over them. We define a k-formula scheme (resp. a k-formula pre-scheme) as an expres-
sion of type 0k → 1 (resp. 1∗k) defined using all of the above, plus: predicate constants,
connectives and quantifiers of the language; predicate and n-formula variables and ab-
straction over them. Finally, we define a meta-formula scheme as an expression of type
µ defined using all of the above, plus !, the two meta-connectives and the four sorts of
meta-quantifiers. In particular, terms schemes may involve E, and k-formula schemes
and meta-formula schemes may involve E and each En.
The inference meta-rules of §4.4.1 are now applied to term schemes, k-formula schemes
and meta-formula schemes in place of terms, k-formulas and meta-formulas, and are
augmented by the following new meta-rules, where F , Fk, Gk are meta-formula schemes,
t is a term variable, T is a term pre-scheme, ϕ is an n-formula variable and Φ is an
n-formula pre-scheme.
(1) (meta-generalization)
...
F
⟮t⟯F , provided that t does not occur freely in any of the assumptions;
...
F
⟮ϕ⟯F , provided that ϕ does not occur freely in any of the assumptions.
(2) (meta-specialization)
...
⟮t⟯F
F [t/T ] , provided that T is free for t in F ;
...
⟮ϕ⟯F
F [ϕ/Φ] , provided that Φ is free for ϕ in F .
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(3) (generalized ⇒-elimination)
...
(tk 7→ Fk)k∈ω(t)
...
Fk ⇒ Gk for each k ∈ ω
(tk 7→ Gk)k∈ω(t)
...
(ϕk 7→ Fk)k∈ω(ϕ)
...
Fk ⇒ Gk for each k ∈ ω
(ϕk 7→ Gk)k∈ω(ϕ)
Let us note that each of the latter two meta-rules has infinitely many premisses.
Remark 7.31. Here is a brief sketch of an equivalent formalism. Instead of meta-quantifiers
over term variables and k-formula variables, one could use their pre-limit versions (i.e.
meta-quantifiers over variables of types 0k → 0 and 0l × 1[k] → (0k → 1)) along with a
meta-quantifier over variables running over ω. All three sorts of meta-quantifiers come
with natural specialization and generalization rules. Moreover, the first two types of
meta-quantifiers subsume the original meta-quantifiers over individual and predicate
variables (and similarly for the corresponding rules). Thus only three types of meta-
quantifiers are needed, in contrast to the four types in the approach used above; and
additionally the generalized ⇒-elimination meta-rule is not needed.
So in some sense the alternative formalism is simpler; also it is closer to dependent type
theory. On the other hand, the above formalism has precisely those four meta-quantifiers
that we actually care about as primitive notions, and also avoids some excessive layers
of indices by focusing on limit, rather than pre-limit types.
7.3.3. Enderton-style formulation. The extended meta-logic also admits a straightfor-
ward Enderton-style formulation.
Suppose that F , Fk, G, Gk and H are meta-formula schemes, x is an individual
variable, T is a term scheme, γ is an n-ary predicate variable, Φ is an n-formula scheme,
t is a term variable, W is a term pre-scheme, ϕ is an n-formula variable and Ξ is an
n-formula pre-scheme. Further suppose that ~z is a tuple of individual variables, ~β is
tuple of predicate variables, ~s is a tuple of term variables and ~ψ is a tuple of i-formula
variables.
(1) ⟮~z⟯ ⟮~β⟯ ⟮~s⟯ ⟮~ψ⟯
(F ⇒ G), if F is α-equivalent to G;
(2) ⟮~z⟯ ⟮~β⟯ ⟮~s⟯ ⟮~ψ⟯
(F ⇒ F);
(3) ⟮~z⟯ ⟮~β⟯ ⟮~s⟯ ⟮~ψ⟯
(
(F ⇒ G) & (G ⇒ H) =⇒ (F ⇒ H));
(4) ⟮~z⟯ ⟮~β⟯ ⟮~s⟯ ⟮~ψ⟯
((
(F & G)⇒H) ⇐⇒ (F ⇒ (G ⇒ H)));
(5) ⟮~z⟯ ⟮~β⟯ ⟮~s⟯ ⟮~ψ⟯
(F & G ⇒ F) and ⟮~z⟯ ⟮~β⟯ ⟮~s⟯ ⟮~ψ⟯ (F & G ⇒ G);
(6) ⟮~z⟯ ⟮~β⟯ ⟮~s⟯ ⟮~ψ⟯
(
(H ⇒ F) & (H ⇒ G) =⇒ (H ⇒ F & G));
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(7) ⟮~z⟯ ⟮~β⟯ ⟮~s⟯ ⟮~ψ⟯
(
⟮x⟯F ⇒ F [x/T ]), provided that T is free for x in F ;
(8) ⟮~z⟯ ⟮~β⟯ ⟮~s⟯ ⟮~ψ⟯
(
⟮γ⟯F ⇒ F [γ/Φ]), provided that Φ is free for γ in F ;
(9) ⟮~z⟯ ⟮~β⟯ ⟮~s⟯ ⟮~ψ⟯
(
⟮t⟯F ⇒ F [t/W ]), provided that W is free for t in F ;
(10) ⟮~z⟯ ⟮~β⟯ ⟮~s⟯ ⟮~ψ⟯
(
⟮ϕ⟯F ⇒ F [ϕ/Ξ]), provided that Ξ is free for ϕ in F ;
(11) ⟮~z⟯ ⟮~β⟯ ⟮~s⟯ ⟮~ψ⟯
(
⟮x⟯ (F ⇒ G) =⇒ (⟮x⟯F ⇒ ⟮x⟯G));
(12) ⟮~z⟯ ⟮~β⟯ ⟮~s⟯ ⟮~ψ⟯
(
⟮γ⟯ (F ⇒ G) =⇒ (⟮γ⟯F ⇒ ⟮γ⟯G));
(13) ⟮~z⟯ ⟮~β⟯ ⟮~s⟯ ⟮~ψ⟯
(
⟮t⟯ (F ⇒ G) =⇒ (⟮t⟯F ⇒ ⟮t⟯G));
(14) ⟮~z⟯ ⟮~β⟯ ⟮~s⟯ ⟮~ψ⟯
(
⟮ϕ⟯ (F ⇒ G) =⇒ (⟮ϕ⟯F ⇒ ⟮ϕ⟯G));
(15) ⟮~z⟯ ⟮~β⟯ ⟮~s⟯ ⟮~ψ⟯
(F ⇒ ⟮x⟯F), provided that x does not occur freely in F ;
(16) ⟮~z⟯ ⟮~β⟯ ⟮~s⟯ ⟮~ψ⟯
(F ⇒ ⟮γ⟯F), provided that γ does not occur freely in F ;
(17) ⟮~z⟯ ⟮~β⟯ ⟮~s⟯ ⟮~ψ⟯
(F ⇒ ⟮t⟯F), provided that t does not occur freely in F ;
(18) ⟮~z⟯ ⟮~β⟯ ⟮~s⟯ ⟮~ψ⟯
(F ⇒ ⟮ϕ⟯F), provided that ϕ does not occur freely in F ;
(19)
F , F ⇒ G
G ;
(20)
(tk 7→ Fk)k∈ω(t), Fk ⇒ Gk for each k ∈ ω
(tk 7→ Gk)k∈ω(t)
;
(21)
(ϕk 7→ Fk)k∈ω(ϕ), Fk ⇒ Gk for each k ∈ ω
(ϕk 7→ Gk)k∈ω(ϕ)
.
7.3.4. Principles and rules.
Proposition 7.32. Let F(x) be a meta-formula scheme, where x is an individual vari-
able and no individual variable occurs freely in F , and let t be a term variable that does
not occur freely in F . Then the meta-formula scheme
⟮x⟯F(x) ⇐⇒ ⟮t⟯
(
tk 7→ ⟮x0[k]⟯F
(
Ek(tk)
))k∈ω
(t)
is deducible.
Let us note that the β-reduction of F(Ek(tk)) may require renaming of bound vari-
ables; in fact, it must require renaming of bound variables if bound variables ever occur
in F , since each individual variable occurs freely in some Ek.
Proof. By the ⇒-introduction meta-rule, it suffices to deduce the left hand side from
the right hand side, and conversely.
Suppose that x = x0m. By the meta-specialization for term variables, from the right
hand side we obtain (
tk 7→ ⟮x0[k]⟯F
(
Ek(tk)
))k∈ω(
im(pm)
)
, (∗)
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where im : (0
m
→ 0) → 0∗ is the inclusion of the mth summand of 0∗ =
∑
k∈ω(0
k
→ 0)
and pm : 0
m
→ 0 is the projection onto the mth factor. The expression (∗) β-reduces
to
(
tm 7→ ⟮x0[m]⟯F
(
Em(tm)
))
(pm), which in turn β-reduces to ⟮x
0
[m]⟯F
(
Em(pm)
)
. Here
Em(pm) β-reduces to pm(x
0
[m]), and hence to x
0
m = x. Thus we have deduced ⟮x⟯F(x).
Conversely, by the meta-specialization for individual variables, from ⟮x⟯F(x) we obtain
F(E(t)), which β-expands to (F ◦ E)(t). Here F ◦ E is βη-equivalent to (F ◦ Ek)k∈ω
by Lemma 7.29. Now F ◦ Ek is the same as tk 7→ F
(
Ek(tk)
)
, thus we have deduced(
tk 7→ F
(
Ek(tk)
))k∈ω
(t). On the other hand, by the meta-generalization for individual
variables and ⇒-introduction F(Ek(tk))⇒ ⟮x0[k]⟯F(Ek(tk)) is deducible for each k ∈ ω.
Hence by the generalized ⇒-elimination we get
(
tk 7→ ⟮x0[k]⟯F
(
Ek(tk)
))k∈ω
(t). Finally,
by the meta-generalization for term variables, from the latter meta-formula scheme we
get ⟮t⟯
(
tk 7→ ⟮x0[k]⟯F
(
Ek(tk)
))k∈ω
(t). 
Similarly one can handle second-order quantification:
Proposition 7.33. Let F(γ) be a meta-formula scheme, where γ is an r-ary predicate
variable and no individual or predicate variables occur freely in F , and let ~ϕ be an
r-formula variable that does not occur freely in F . Then the meta-formula scheme
⟮γ⟯F(γ) ⇐⇒ ⟮ϕ⟯
(
ϕk 7→ ⟮x0[k]⟯ ⟮x1[[k]]⟯F
(
Erk(ϕk)
))k∈ω
(ϕ)
is deducible.
Let us also formulate the multivariable case, using the notation of Remark 7.30:
Proposition 7.34. Let F(~x,~γ) be a meta-formula scheme, where ~x is an n-tuple of
individual variables, ~γ is an m-tuple of predicate variables of arities (r1, . . . , rm) = ~r and
no individual or predicate variables occur freely in F , and let ~t be an n-tuple of term
variables that do not occur freely in F and ~ϕ be an m-tuple of ri-formula variables that
do not occur freely in F . Then the meta-formula scheme
⟮~x⟯ ⟮~γ⟯F(~x,~γ) ⇐⇒ ⟮~t⟯ ⟮~ϕ⟯
(
t~k, ϕ~l 7→ ⟮x0[~k,~l]⟯ ⟮x1[[~l]]⟯F
(
E~k(t~k),E
~r
~l
(ϕ~l)
))(~k,~l)∈ωn×ωm
(~t, ~ϕ)
is deducible.
Here for ~k = (k1, . . . , kn) we write [~k] = [max(k1, . . . , kn)], [[~k]] = [[max(k1, . . . , kn)]],
t~k = (tk1, . . . , tkn) and ϕ~k = (ϕk1, . . . , ϕkn). The evaluations E~k :
∏n
i=1(0
ki
→ 0) → 0n
and E~r~l :
∏m
i=1
(
0li × 1[li] → (0ri → 1)) → ∏mi=1(0ri → 1), where ~l = (l1, . . . , lm), are
defined respectively by t~k 7→
(
Ek1(tk1), . . . ,Ekn(tkn)
)
and ϕ~l 7→
(
Er1l1 (ϕl1), . . . ,E
rm
lm
(ϕlm)
)
.
7.3.5. Semantics of the extended meta-logic. A co-assignment풰 assigns a semantic term
풰(x) ∈ |풯| to each term variable x. A co-valuation 풱 assigns a semantic k-formula
풱(γ) ∈ |ℱk| to each k-formula variable γ, for each k = 0, 1, . . . .
Given a co-assignment 풰 and an assignment 퓊 along with an interpretation 풾 of
function symbols, we clearly get an interpretation of each term scheme T by an element
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|T |풾퓊풰 ∈ 풪, which does not depend on 퓊 (resp. on 풰) if T contains no free occurrences
of individual (resp. term) variables.
Given additionally a co-valuation 풱 and a valuation 퓋 along with an interpretation
풾 of predicate constants, connectives and quantifiers, we clearly get an interpretation
of each formula scheme F by an element |F |퓋풱퓊풰풾 ∈ 풪, which does not depend on 퓊
(resp. on 풰) if F contains no free occurrences of individual (resp. term) variables and
does not depend on 퓋 (resp. on 풱) if F contains no free occurrences of predicate (resp.
k-formula) variables.
Given additionally also an interpretation 풿 of meta-connectives and meta-quantifiers,
we clearly also get an interpretation of each meta-formula scheme F by an element
|F|퓋풱퓊풰풿 ∈ 풬, with the same dependence properties. In particular, a λ-closed meta-
formula scheme F is interpreted by an element |F|풿 ∈ 풬.
We can now generalize the definitions of §4.7.1 to the case of the extended meta-logic.
An absolute meta-rule is said to be satisfied in a meta-structure 풿 if for every its instance
F1, . . . ,Fn
G
and every individual assignment 퓊, co-assignment 풰, predicate valuation 퓋, and co-
valuation 풱, if ?(|Fi|퓊풰퓋풱풿 ) =
‚
for each i, then ?(|G|퓊풰퓋풱풿 ) =
‚
. In particular, a
meta-law is satisfied in 풿 if and only ?(|G|퓊풰퓋풱풿 ) =
‚
for every its instance G and
arbitrary 퓊, 풰, 퓋 and 풱.
A meta-interpretation 풿 of the extended meta-logic is called a model of the extended
meta-logic if it satisfies all meta-rules of the Enderton-style formulation of the extended
meta-logic (see §7.3.3).
Now we define the Kolmogorov translation ℱ of λ-closed meta-formulas into λ-closed
meta-formula schemes:
• ℱ sends each individual variable x0i to the corresponding term variable x0∗i , and
each k-ary predicate variable x0
k→1
i to the corresponding k-formula variable x
1∗
k
i .
• ℱ sends both meta-connectives to themselves, the first-order meta-quantifier
to the term meta-quantifier, and the k-ary second-order meta-quantifier to the
k-formula meta-quantifier.
• If G is a λ-closed atomic (n,~r)-meta-formula ~x,~γ 7→ !F , where F is a formula
and ~r = (r1, . . . , rm), then its Kolmogorov-image ℱ(G) is the following λ-closed
expression of type (0∗)n × 1∗r1 × . . .× 1∗rm → µ:(
t~k, ϕ~l 7→ ⟮x0[~k,~l]⟯ ⟮x1[[~l]]⟯ !F
(
E~k(t~k),E
~r
~l
(ϕ~l)
))(~k,~l)∈ωn×ωm
.
If F is a λ-closed meta-formula, it is easy to see that |ℱ(F)|풿 is precisely the alter-
native meta-interpretation F 풿 as defined in §7.2.2.
Proposition 7.34 now implies that Examples 7.12 and 7.13 extend to the case of many-
valued interpretations of the meta-logic:
Theorem 7.35. If F , G be formulas and 풿 a model of the extended meta-logic. Then
MATHEMATICAL SEMANTICS OF INTUITIONISTIC LOGIC 167
(a) ·F 풿 = |·F |풿.
(b) ?(|F /G|풿) = ‚ implies ?( F /G 풿) = ‚.
An alternative model of the meta-logic is defined by applying a model of the extended
meta-logic to the Kolmogorov translation from meta-logic to extended meta-logic. Given
a logic L based on a languageℒ and given by a derivation system D, a meta-ℒ-structure
M is called a generalized alternative model of L if it is an alternative model of the meta-
logic and the meta-formula D is valid in M .
By Theorem 7.35, a principle is valid in a generalized alternative model if and only
if it is valid in the corresponding generalized model; this clearly remains so if valuation
fields or pre-valuation fields are used. But by Example 7.16, this is not the case for rules,
at least if pre-valuation fields are used.
7.3.6. Meta-clarified BHK interpretation. This will be based on the alternative seman-
tics of §7.2.2 and §7.3.5 with many-valued meta-interpretation of the meta-logic.
A domain풟 is fixed, and 풪 is taken to be a class of problems, consisting of a prescribed
class of contentful (e.g. mathematical) primitive problems and of composite problems,
which are obtained inductively from the primitive ones by using contentual intuitionistic
connectives and quantifiers over arbitrary 풟-indexed families of parametric problems.
Formal intuitionistic connectives and quantifiers are interpreted straightforwardly by the
contentual ones.
풬 is taken to be a larger class of problems, consisting of those in 풪, called “meta-
primitive” (thus the function ! : 풪 → 풬 is the inclusion) and of “meta-composite”
problems obtained inductively from the meta-primitive ones by using contentual in-
tuitionistic connectives and quantifiers over arbitrary 풟-indexed, Hom(풟i,풪)-indexed
(i = 0, 1, . . . ), |풯|-indexed and |ℱi|-indexed (i = 0, 1, 2, . . . ) families of problems. (We
recall that |풯| and |ℱi| are defined in terms of 풟 and 풪, see §7.2.2.) Meta-connectives
and meta-quantifiers are Tarski-interpreted by contentual intuitionistic connectives and
풟-indexed and Hom(풟i,풪)-indexed quantifiers in the straightforward way; and meta-
quantifiers are also alternatively-interpreted by contentual intuitionistic |풯|-indexed and
|ℱi|-indexed quantifiers.
The function ? : 풬 → {‚,‚} sends a problem Θ to ‚ if and only if there exists a
solution of Θ. What is meant by solving a problem Θ is defined explicitly for primi-
tive Θ ∈ 풪 and is extended inductively to composite Θ ∈ 풪 and then further to all
meta-composite Θ ∈ 풬 by the usual BHK-interpretation (see §3.7). This determines a
contentual interpretation of intuitionistic logic and its meta-logic, which we will call the
meta-clarified BHK interpretation.
Example 7.36. Let us record the meta-clarified BHK interpretations of the judgements
of admissibility, stable admissibility and derivability of a purely logical rule Γ /∆. The
tuples ~ϕ and ~Φ have the same meaning as in Example (4.84). Like before, ?Θ denotes
the proposition “The problem Θ has a solution”.
• Derivability: ∀풟,풪 ?∀풱 (∀퓋,퓊 |Γ|풱[퓊,퓋]퓊 −→ ∀퓋,퓊 |∆|풱[퓊,퓋]퓊 );
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• Stable admissibility: ∀~Φ∀풟,풪 ?(∀퓋,퓊 |Γ[~ϕ/~Φ]|퓋퓊 −→ ∀퓋,퓊 |∆[~ϕ/~Φ]|퓋퓊);
• Admissibility: ∀~Φ (∀풟,풪 ?∀퓋,퓊 |Γ[~ϕ/~Φ]|퓋퓊 −→ ∀풟,풪 ?∀퓋,퓊 |∆[~ϕ/~Φ]|퓋퓊).
Remark 7.37. Let us note that there is an obvious variation of the Verificationist in-
terpretation with alternative interpretation of the meta-level, similar to the one in the
meta-clarified BHK interpretation.
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